Types   of  Naval   Officers 


Works  by  Captain  A.  T.  Mahan. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER  UPON  HISTORY. 
1660-1783. 

THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER  UPON  THE  FRENCH 
REVOLUTION  AND  EMPIRE.  Two  vols. 

THE  LIFE  OF  NELSON,  THE  EMBODIMENT  OF  THE 
SEA  POWER  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN.  Two  vols 

THE  LIFE  OF  NELSON.     Popular  edition.    One  vol. 

THE  INTEREST  OF  AMERICA  IN  SEA  POWER, 
PRESENT  AND  FUTURE. 

LESSONS  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN,  AND  OTHER 
ARTICLES. 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  ASIA  AND  ITS  EFFECT  UPON 
INTERNATIONAL  POLICIES. 

TYPES  OF  NAVAL  OFFICERS,  WITH  SOME  REMARKS 
ON  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE 
DURING  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY. 


Types  of  Naval-  Officers 

Drawn  from  the 

History  of  the  British  Navy 

With  Some  Account  of  the  Conditions  of  Naval 
Warfare  at  the  beginning  of  the  Eighteenth 
Century,  and  of  its  subsequent  develop- 
ment during  the  Sail  Period 


By 

A.  T.  Mahan,  D.C.L.,  LL.D. 

Captain,  United  States  Navy 

Author  of  the   "Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History, 

1660-1783,"   and   "Upon  the  French  Revolution 

and  Empire;"   of  "The  Life  of  Nelson," 

and  a   "  Life  of  Farragut " 


Boston 

Little,  Brown,  and  Company 
1901 


Copyright,  1893, 

BY    HOUGHTON,    MlFFLIN    AND    COMPANY. 

Copyright,  1901, 
BY  A.   T.   MAHAN. 


All  rights  rticrvtd 


November,    1901 


UNIVERSITY  PRESS    •    JOHN    WILSON 
AND  SON      •       CAMBRIDGr,   U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 

ALTHOUGH  the  distinguished  seamen,  whose  lives 
and  professional  characteristics  it  is  the  object 
of  this  work  to  present  in  brief  summary,  belonged 
to  a  service  now  foreign  to  that  of  the  United  States, 
they  have  numerous  and  varied  points  of  contact  with 
America;  most  of  them  very  close,  and  in  some  in- 
stances of  marked  historical  interest.  The  older  men, 
indeed,  were  during  much  of  their  careers  our  fellow 
countrymen  in  the  colonial  period,  and  fought,  some 
side  by  side  with  our  own  people  in  this  new  world, 
others  in  distant  scenes  of  the  widespread  strife  that 
characterized  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the 
beginnings  of  "  world  politics ;  "  when,  in  a  quarrel 
purely  European  in  its  origin,  "  black  men,"  to  use 
Macaulay's  words,  "  fought  on  the  coast  of  Coromandel, 
and  red  men  scalped  each  other  by  the  great  lakes  of 
North  America."  All,  without  exception,  were  actors 
in  the  prolonged  conflict  that  began  in  1739  concerning 
the  right  of  the  ships  of  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies 
to  frequent  the  seas  bordering  the  American  dominions 
of  Spain ;  a  conflict  which,  by  gradual  expansion,  drew 
in  the  continent  of  Europe,  from  Russia  to  France, 
spread  thence  to  the  French  possessions  in  India  and 
North  America,  involved  Spanish  Havana  in  the  western 
hemisphere  and  Manila  in  the  eastern,  and  finally 


2040381 


VI 


Preface 


entailed  the  expulsion  of  France  from  our  continent. 
Thence,  by  inevitable  sequence,  issued  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  United  States.  The  contest,  thus  com- 
pleted, covered  forty-three  years. 

The  four  seniors  of  our  series,  Hawke,  Rodney,  Howe, 
and  Jervis,  witnessed  the  whole  of  this  momentous 
period,  and  served  conspicuously,  some  more,  some  less, 
according  to  their  age  and  rank,  during  its  various 
stages.  Hawke,  indeed,  was  at  the  time  of  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution  too  old  to  go  to  sea,  but  he  did  not  die 
until  October  16,  1781,  three  days  before  the  surrender 
of  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown,  which  is  commonly  accepted 
as  the  closing  incident  of  our  struggle  for  independence. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  two  younger  men,  Saumarez  and 
Pellew,  though  they  had  entered  the  navy  before  the 
American  Revolution,  saw  in  it  the  beginnings  of  an 
active  service  which  lasted  to  the  end  of  the  Napoleonic 
wars,  the  most  continuous  and  gigantic  strife  of  modern 
times.  It  was  as  the  enemies  of  our  cause  that  they 
first  saw  gunpowder  burned  in  anger. 

Nor  was  it  only  amid  the  commonplaces  of  naval 
warfare  that  they  then  gained  their  early  experiences  in 
America.  Pellew  in  1776,  on  Lake  Champlain,  bore  a 
brilliant  part  in  one  of  the  most  decisive  —  though 
among  the  least  noted  —  campaigns  of  the  Revolutionary 
contest ;  and  a  year  later,  as  leader  of  a  small  contingent 
of  seamen,  he  shared  the  fate  of  Burgoyne's  army  at 
Saratoga.  In  1776  also,  Saumarez  had  his  part  in  an 
engagement  which  ranks  among  the  bloodiest  recorded 
between  ships  and  forts,  being  on  board  the  British 
flagship  Bristol  at  the  attack  upon  Fort  Moultrie,  the 


Preface 


vn 


naval  analogue  of  Bunker  Hill ;  for,  in  the  one  of  these 
actions  as  in  the  other,  the  great  military  lesson  was  the 
resistant  power  against  frontal  attack  of  resolute  marks- 
men, though  untrained  to  war,  when  fighting  behind 
entrenchments,  —  a  teaching  renewed  at  New  Orleans, 
and  emphasized  in  the  recent  South  African  War.  The 
well-earned  honors  of  the  comparatively  raw  colonials 
received  generous  recognition  at  the  time  from  their  op- 
ponents, even  in  the  midst  of  the  bitterness  proverbially 
attendant  upon  family  quarrels;  but  it  is  only  just  to 
allow  that  their  endurance  found  its  counterpart  in  the 
resolute  and  persistent  valor  of  the  assailants.  In  these 
two  battles,  with  which  the  War  of  Independence  may 
be  said  fairly  to  have  begun,  by  land  and  by  water,  in 
the  far  North  and  in  the  far  South,  the  men  of  the  same 
stock,  whose  ancestors  there  met  face  to  face  as  foes, 
have  now  in  peace  a  common  heritage  of  glory.  If 
little  of  bitterness  remains  in  the  recollections  which 
those  who  are  now  fellow-citizens  retain  of  the  struggle 
between  the  North  and  the  South,  within  the  American 
Republic,  we  of  two  different  nations,  who  yet  share  a 
common  tongue  and  a  common  tradition  of  liberty  and 
law,  may  well  forget  the  wrongs  of  the  earlier  strife,  and 
look  only  to  the  common  steadfast  courage  with  which 
each  side  then  bore  its  share  in  a  civil  conflict. 

The  professional  lives  of  these  men,  therefore,  touch 
history  in  many  points;  not  merely  history  generally, 
but  American  history  specifically.  Nor  is  this  contact 
professional  only,  devoid  of  personal  tinge.  Hawke  was 
closely  connected  by  blood  with  the  Maryland  family 
of  Bladen ;  that  having  been  his  mother's  maiden  name, 


viii  Preface 

and  Governor  Bladen  of  the  then  colony  being  his  first 
cousin.  Very  much  of  his  early  life  was  spent  upon  the 
American  Station,  largely  in  Boston.  But  those  were 
the  days  of  Walpole's  peace  policy ;  and  when  the  mari- 
time war,  which  the  national  outcry  at  last  compelled, 
attained  large  dimensions,  Hawke's  already  demonstrated 
eminence  as  a  naval  leader  naturally  led  to  his  employ- 
ment in  European  waters,  where  the  more  immediate 
dangers,  if  not  the  greatest  interests,  of  Great  Britain 
were  then  felt  to  be.  The  universal  character,  as  well  as 
the  decisive  issues  of  the  opening  struggle  were  as  yet 
but  dimly  foreseen.  Rodney  also  had  family  ties  with 
America,  though  somewhat  more  remote.  Caesar  Rod- 
ney, a  signer  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  from 
Delaware,  was  of  the  same  stock;  their  great-grand- 
fathers were  brothers.  It  was  from  the  marriage  of  his 
ancestor  with  the  daughter  of  a  Sir  Thomas  Caesar  that 
the  American  Rodney  derived  his  otherwise  singular 
name. 

Howe,  as  far  as  known,  had  no  relations  on  this  side 
of  the  water ;  but  his  elder  brother,  whom  he  succeeded 
in  the  title,  was  of  all  British  officers  the  one  who  most 
won  from  the  colonial  troops  with  whom  he  was  asso- 
ciated a  personal  affection,  the  memory  of  which  has 
been  transmitted  to  us ;  while  the  admiral's  own  kindly 
attitude  towards  the  colonists,  and  his  intimacy  with 
Franklin,  no  less  than  his  professional  ability,  led  to  his 
being  selected  for  the  North  American  command  at  the 
time  when  the  home  country  had  not  yet  lost  all  hope 
of  a  peaceable  solution  of  difficulties.  To  this  the  Howe 
tradition  was  doubtless  expected  to  contribute.  Jervis, 


Preface  ix 

a  man  considerably  younger  than  the  other  three,  by  the 
accidents  of  his  career  came  little  into  touch  with  either 
the  colonies  or  the  colonists,  whether  before  or  during 
the  Revolutionary  epoch ;  yet  even  he,  by  his  intimate 
friendship  with  Wolfe,  and  intercourse  with  his  last  days, 
is  brought  into  close  relation  with  an  event  and  a  name 
indelibly  associated  with  one  of  the  great  landmarks  — 
crises  —  in  the  history  of  the  American  Continent.  Al- 
though the  issue  of  the  strife  depended,  doubtless,  upon 
deeper  and  more  far-reaching  considerations,  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  in  the  heights  of  Quebec,  and  in 
the  name  of  Wolfe,  is  signalized  the  downfall  of  the 
French  power  in  America.  There  was  prefigured  the 
ultimate  predominance  of  the  traditions  of  the  English- 
speaking  races  throughout  this  continent,  which  in  our 
own  momentous  period  stands  mediator  between  the 
two  ancient  and  contrasted  civilizations  of  Europe  and 
Asia,  that  so  long  moved  apart,  but  are  now  brought 
into  close,  if  not  threatening,  contact. 

Interesting,  however,  as  are  the  historical  and  social 
environments  in  which  their  personalities  played  their 
part,  it  is  as  individual  men,  and  as  conspicuous  ex- 
emplars —  types —  of  the  varied  characteristics  which  go 
to  the  completeness  of  an  adequate  naval  organization, 
that  they  are  here  brought  forward.  Like  other  profes- 
sions, —  and  especially  like  its  sister  service,  the  Army, 
—  the  Navy  tends  to,  and  for  efficiency  requires,  speciali- 
zation. Specialization,  in  turn,  results  most  satisfactorily 
from  the  free  play  of  natural  aptitudes ;  for  aptitudes, 
when  strongly  developed,  find  expression  in  inclination, 
and  readily  seek  their  proper  function  in  the  body 


x  Preface 

organic  to  which  they  belong.  Each  of  these  distin- 
guished officers,  from  this  point  of  view,  does  not  stand 
for  himself  alone,  but  is  an  eminent  exponent  of  a  class ; 
while  the  class  itself  forms  a  member  of  a  body  which 
has  many  organs,  no  one  of  which  is  independent  of  the 
other,  but  all  contributive  to  the  body's  welfare.  Hence, 
while  the  effort  has  been  made  to  present  each  in  his 
full  individuality,  with  copious  recourse  to  anecdote  and 
illustrative  incident  as  far  as  available,  both  as  a  matter 
of  general  interest  and  for  accurate  portrayal,  special 
care  has  been  added  to  bring  out  occurrences  and  actions 
which  convey  the  impression  of  that  natural  character 
which  led  the  man  to  take  the  place  he  did  in  the  naval 
body,  to  develop  the  professional  function  with  which 
he  is  more  particularly  identified ;  for  personality  under- 
lies official  character. 

In  this  sense  of  the  word,  types  are  permanent ;  for 
such  are  not  the  exclusive  possession  of  any  age  or  of 
any  service,  but  are  found  and  are  essential  in  every 
period  and  to  every  nation.  Their  functions  are  part  of 
the  bed-rock  of  naval  organization  and  of  naval  strategy, 
throughout  all  time ;  and  the  particular  instances  here 
selected  owe  their  special  cogency  mainly  to  the  fact 
that  they  are  drawn  from  a  naval  era,  1739-1815,  of 
exceptional  activity  and  brilliancy. 

There  is,  however,  another  sense  in  which  an  officer, 
or  a  man,  may  be  accurately  called  a  type ;  a  sense  no 
less  significant,  but  of  more  limited  and  transient  appli- 
cation. The  tendency  of  a  period,  —  especially  when 
one  of  marked  transition,  —  its  activities  and  its  results, 
not  infrequently  find  expression  in  one  or  more  histori- 


Preface 


XI 


cal  characters.  Such  types  may  perhaps  more  ac- 
curately be  called  personifications;  the  man  or  men 
embodying,  and  in  action  realizing,  ideas  and  processes 
of  thought,  the  progress  of  which  is  at  the  time  un- 
noted, but  is  afterwards  recognized  as  a  general  char- 
acteristic of  the  period.  Between  the  beginning  and 
the  end  a  great  change  is  found  to  have  been  effected, 
which  naturally  and  conveniently  is  associated  with  the 
names  of  the  most  conspicuous  actors;  although  they 
are  not  the  sole  agents,  but  simply  the  most  eminent. 

It  is  in  this  sense  more  particularly  that  Hawke  and 
Rodney  are  presented  as  types.  It  might  even  be  said 
that  they  complement  each  other  and  constitute  together 
a  single  type ;  for,  while  both  were  men  of  unusually 
strong  personality,  private  as  well  as  professional,  and 
with  very  marked  traits  of  character,  their  great  rela- 
tion to  naval  advance  is  that  of  men  who  by  natural 
faculty  detect  and  seize  upon  incipient  ideas,  for  which 
the  time  is  ripe,  and  upon  the  practical  realization  of 
which  the  healthful  development  of  the  profession  de- 
pends. With  these  two,  and  with  them  not  so  much 
contemporaneously  as  in  close  historical  sequence,  is 
associated  the  distinctive  evolution  of  naval  warfare  in 
the  eighteenth  century;  in  their  combined  names  is 
summed  up  the  improvement  of  system  to  which  Nelson 
and  his  contemporaries  fell  heirs,  and  to  which  Nelson, 
under  the  peculiar  and  exceptional  circumstances  which 
made  his  opportunity,  gave  an  extension  that  im- 
mortalized him.  Of  Hawke  and  Rodney,  therefore,  it 
may  be  said  that  they  are  in  their  profession  types  of 
that  element  of  change,  in  virtue  of  which  the  profession 


xii  Preface 

grows;  whereas  the  other  four,  eminent  as  they  were, 
exemplify  rather  the  conservative  forces,  the  permanent 
features,  in  the  strength  of  which  it  exists,  and  in  the 
absence  of  any  one  of  which  it  droops  or  succumbs.  It 
does  not,  however,  follow  that  the  one  of  these  great 
men  is  the  simple  continuator  of  the  other's  work; 
rather  it  is  true  that  each  contributed,  in  due  succession 
of  orderly  development,  the  factor  of  progress  which  his 
day  demanded,  and  his  personality  embodied. 

It  was  not  in  the  forecast  of  the  writer,  but  in  the 
process  of  treatment  he  came  to  recognize  that,  like 
Hawke  and  Rodney,  the  four  others  also  by  natural  char- 
acteristics range  themselves  in  pairs,  —  presenting  points 
of  contrast,  in  deficiencies  and  in  excellencies,  which 
group  them  together,  not  by  similarity  chiefly,  but  as  com- 
plementary. Howe  and  Jervis  were  both  admirable  gene- 
ral officers ;  but  the  strength  of  the  one  lay  in  his  tactical 
acquirements,  that  of  the  other  in  strategic  insight  and 
breadth  of  outlook.  The  one  was  easy-going  and  in- 
dulgent as  a  superior ;  the  other  conspicuous  for  sever- 
ity, and  for  the  searchingness  with  which  he  carried  the 
exactions  of  discipline  into  the  minute  details  of  daily 
naval  life.  Saumarez  and  Pellew,  less  fortunate,  did  not 
reach  high  command  until  the  great  days  of  naval  war- 
fare in  their  period  had  yielded  to  the  comparatively 
uneventful  occupation  of  girdling  the  enemy's  coast  with 
a  system  of  blockades,  aimed  primarily  at  the  restriction 
of  his  commerce,  and  incidentally  at  the  repression  of 
his  navy,  which  made  no  effort  to  take  the  sea  on  a 
large  scale.  Under  these  circumstances  the  functions 
of  an  admiral  were  mainly  administrative ;  and  if  Sau- 


Preface  xiii 

marez  and  Pellew  possessed  eminent  capacity  as  general 
officers  on  the  battle-field,  they  had  not  opportunity  to 
prove  it.  The  distinction  of  their  careers  coincides  with 
their  tenure  of  subordinate  positions  in  the  organisms  of 
great  fleets.  With  this  in  common,  and  differentiating 
them  from  Howe  and  Jervis,  the  points  of  contrast  are 
marked.  Saumarez  preferred  the  ship-of-the-line,  Pellew 
the  frigate.  The  choice  of  the  one  led  to  the  duties  of 
a  division  commander,  that  of  the  other  to  the  compara- 
tive independence  of  detached  service,  of  the  partisan 
officer.  In  the  one,  love  of  the  military  side  of  his  call- 
ing predominated ;  the  other  was,  before  all,  the  seaman. 
The  union  of  the  two  perfects  professional  character. 

The  question  may  naturally  be  asked,  —  Why,  among 
types  of  naval  officers,  is  there  no  mention,  other  than 
casual,  of  the  name  of  Nelson?  The  answer  is  simple. 
Among  general  officers,  land  and  sea,  the  group  to 
which  Nelson  belongs  defies  exposition  by  a  type,  both 
because  it  is  small  in  aggregate  numbers,  and  because 
the  peculiar  eminence  of  the  several  members,  —  the 
eminence  of  genius,  —  so  differentiates  each  from  his 
fellows  that  no  one  among  them  can  be  said  to  represent 
the  others.  Each,  in  the  supremacy  of  his  achievement, 
stands  alone,  —  alone,  not  only  regarded  as  towering 
above  a  brilliant  surrounding  of  distinguished  followers, 
but  alone  even  as  contrasted  with  the  other  great  ones 
who  in  their  own  day  had  a  like  supremacy.  Such  do 
not  in  fact  form  a  class,  because,  though  a  certain  com- 
munity of  ideas  and  principles  may  be  traced  in  their 
actions,  their  personalities  and  methods  bear  each  the 
stamp  of  originality  in  performance ;  and  where  origi- 


XIV 


Preface 


nality  is  found,  classification  ceases  to  apply.     There  is  a 
company,  it  may  be,  but  not  a  class. 

The  last  four  biographies  first  appeared  as  contribu- 
tions to  the  "Atlantic  Monthly,"  in  1893  and  1894.  I 
desire  to  return  to  the  proprietors  my  thanks  for  their 
permission  to  republish.  The  original  treatment  has 
been  here  considerably  modified,  as  well  as  enlarged.  I 
am  also  under  special  obligation  to  Mr.  Fleetwood  Hugo 
Pellew,  who  gave  me  the  photograph  of  Lord  Exmouth, 
with  permission  also  to  reproduce  it.  It  represents  that 
great  officer  at  the  age  most  characteristic  of  his  particu- 
lar professional  distinction,  as  by  me  understood. 

A.  T.  MAHAN. 
OCTOBER,  1901. 


CONTENTS 


Page 

INTRODUCTORY.  —  CONDITIONS   OF  NAVAL  WARFARE  AT 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  .     .        3 

II 

PROGRESS  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE  DURING  THE  EIGHTEENTH 

CENTURY 
HAWKE  :  THE  SPIRIT 77 

III 

PROGRESS  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE  DURING  THE  EIGHTEENTH 

CENTURY  (Continued} 
RODNEY  :  THE  FORM 148 

IV 
HOWE  :  THE  GENERAL  OFFICER,  AS  TACTICIAN     .     .     .     254 

V 

JERVIS:  THE  GENERAL  OFFICER,  AS  DISCIPLINARIAN  AND 

STRATEGIST 320 

VI 

SAUMAREZ  :    THE  FLEET   OFFICER  AND   DIVISION  COM- 
MANDER      382 

VII 
PELLEW  :  THE  FRIGATE  CAPTAIN  AND  PARTISAN  OFFICER    428 

INDEX 479 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


EDWARD,  LORD  HAWKE Frontispiece 

From  an  engraving  by  W.  Roll,  after  the  painting  by  Francis  Cotes 
in  the  Naval  Gallery  at  Greenwich  Hospital. 

PAGE 
PLAN  OF  BYNG'S  ACTION  OFF  MINORCA,  MAY  20,  1756        48 

GEORGE  BRYDGES,  LORD  RODNEY 148 

From  an  engraving  by  Edward  Finden,  after  the  painting  by  W. 
Grimaldi. 

RICHARD,  EARL  HOWE 254 

From  a  mezzotint  engraving  by  R.  Dunkarton,  after  the  painting 
by  John  Singleton  Copley. 

JOHN  JERVIS,  EARL  ST.  VINCENT 320 

From  an  engraving  by  J.  Cook,  after  the  painting  by  Sir  William 
Beechey. 

JAMES,  LORD  DE  SAUMAREZ 382 

From  an  engraving  by  W.  Greatbatch,  after  a  miniature  in  posses- 
sion of  the  family. 

EDWARD  PELLEW,  LORD  EXMOUTH 428 

From  the  original  painting  in  the  possession  of  Orr  Ewing,  Esq. 


TYPES    OF    NAVAL    OFFICERS 


TYPES    OF    NAVAL    OFFICERS 


INTRODUCTORY 

NAVAL  WARFARE  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  EIGHTEENTH 

CENTURY 

THE  recent  close  of  the  nineteenth  century 
has  familiarized  us  with  the  thought  that 
such  an  epoch  tends  naturally  to  provoke  an 
estimate  of  the  advance  made  in  the  various 
spheres  of  human  activity  during  the  period 
which  it  terminates.  Such  a  reckoning,  however, 
is  not  a  mere  matter  of  more  and  less,  of  com- 
parison between  the  beginning  and  the  end, 
regardless  of  intermediate  circumstances.  The 
question  involved  is  one  of  an  historical  process, 
of  cause  and  effect ;  of  an  evolution,  probably 
marked,  as  such  series  of  events  commonly  are, 
by  certain  salient  incidents,  the  way-marks  of 
progress  which  show  the  road  traversed  and  the 
succession  of  stages  through  which  the  past  has 
become  the  present.  Frequently,  also,  such  de- 
velopment associates  itself  not  only  with  conspic- 
uous events,  but  with  the  names  of  great  men, 
to  whom,  either  by  originality  of  genius  or  by 
favoring  opportunity,  it  has  fallen  to  illustrate  in 


4  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

action  the  changes  which  have  a  more  silent 
antecedent  history  in  the  experience  and  reflec- 
tion of  mankind. 

The  development  of  naval  warfare  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  its  advance  in  spirit  and 
methods,  is  thus  exemplified  in  certain  striking 
events,  and  yet  more  impressively  is  identified 
with  the  great  names  of  Hawke  and  Rodney. 
The  period  of  nearly  half  a  generation  intervened 
between  their  births,  but  they  were  contempora- 
ries and  actors,  though  to  no  large  extent  asso- 
ciates, during  the  extensive  wars  that  occupied 
the  middle  of  the  century  —  the  War  of  the  Aus- 
trian Succession,  1739-1748,  and  the  Seven 
Years  War,  1756-1763.  These  two  conflicts 
are  practically  one ;  the  same  characteristic  jeal- 
ousies and  motives  being  common  to  both,  as 
they  were  also  to  the  period  of  nominal  peace, 
but  scarcely  veiled  contention,  by  which  they  were 
separated.  The  difference  of  age  between  the 
•two  admirals  contributed  not  only  to  obviate  riv- 
alry, by  throwing  their  distinctive  activities  into 
different  generations,  but  had,  as  it  were,  the 
effect  of  prolonging  their  influence  beyond  that 
possible  to  a  single  lifetime,  thus  constituting  it 
into  a  continuous  and  fruitful  development. 

They  were  both  successful  men,  in  the  ordi- 
nary acceptation  of  the  word  success.  They  were 
great,  not  only  in  professional  character,  but  in 
the  results  which  do  not  always  attend  profes- 
sional desert ;  they  were  great  in  achievement. 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century 


Each  name  is  indissolubly  linked  with  a  brilliant 
victory,  as  well  as  with  other  less  known  but 
equally  meritorious  actions;  in  all  of  which  the 
personal  factor  of  the  principal  agent,  the  dis- 
tinctive qualities  of  the  commander-in-chief, 
powerfully  contributed  and  were  conspicuously 
illustrated.  These  were,  so  to  say,  the  examples, 
that  enforced  upon  the  men  of  their  day  the  pro- 
fessional ideas  by  which  the  two  admirals  were 
themselves  dominated,  and  upon  which  was  form- 
ing a  school,  with  professional  standards  of  ac- 
tion and  achievement  destined  to  produce  great 
effects. 

Yet,  while  this  is  so,  and  while  such  emphatic 
demonstrations  by  deeds  undoubtedly  does  more 
than  any  other  teaching  to  influence  contempo- 
raries, and  so  to  promote  professional  development, 
it  is  probably  true  that,  as  a  matter  of  historical 
illustration,  the  advance  of  the  eighteenth  century 
in  naval  warfare  is  more  clearly  shown  by  two  great 
failures,  for  neither  of  which  were  these  officers 
responsible,  and  in  one  only  of  which  in  fact  did 
either  appear,  even  in  a  subordinate  capacity. 
The  now  nearly  forgotten  miscarriage  of  Ad- 
miral Mathews  off  Toulon,  in  1744,  and  the 
miserable  incompetency  of  Byng,  at  Minorca,  in 
1756,  remembered  chiefly  because  of  the  conse- 
quent execution  of  the  admiral,  serve  at  least, 
historically,  to  mark  the  low  extreme  to  which 
had  then  sunk  professional  theory  and  practice  — 
for  both  were  there  involved.  It  is,  however,  not 


6  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

only  as  a  point  of  departure  from  which  to  esti- 
mate progress  that  these  battles  —  if  they  deserve 
the  name  —  are  historically  useful.  Considered 
as  the  plane  to  which  exertion,  once  well  directed 
and  virile,  had  gradually  declined  through  the 
prevalence  of  false  ideals,  they  link  the  seven- 
teenth century  to  the  eighteenth,  even  as  the 
thought  and  action  —  the  theory  and  practice  — 
of  Hawke  and  Rodney  uplifted  the  navy  from 
the  inefficiency  of  Mathews  and  Byng  to  the 
crowning  glories  of  the  Nile  and  Trafalgar,  with 
which  the  nineteenth  century  opened.  It  is  thus, 
as  the  very  bottom  of  the  wave,  that  those  singu- 
lar and  signal  failures  have  their  own  distinctive 
significance  in  the  undulations  of  the  onward 
movement.  On  the  one  hand  they  are  not  unac- 
countable, as  though  they,  any  more  than  the 
Nile  and  Trafalgar,  were  without  antecedent  of 
cause ;  and  on  the  other  they  serve,  as  a  back- 
ground at  least,  to  bring  out  the  figures  of  the 
two  admirals  now  before  us,  and  to  define  their 
true  historical  import,  as  agents  and  as  exponents, 
in  the  changes  of  their  day. 

It  is,  therefore,  important  to  the  comprehen- 
sion of  the  changes  effected  in  that  period  of 
transition,  for  which  Hawke  and  Rodney  stand, 
to  recognize  the  distinctive  lesson  of  each  of 
these  two  abortive  actions,  which  together  may 
be  said  to  fix  the  zero  of  the  scale  by  which 
the  progress  of  the  eighteenth  century  is  de- 
noted. They  have  a  relation  to  the  past  as  well 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century 


as  to  the  future,  standing  far  below  the  level 
of  the  one  and  of  the  other,  through  causes  that 
can  be  assigned.  Naval  warfare  in  the  past,  in 
its  origin  and  through  long  ages,  had  been  waged 
with  vessels  moved  by  oars,  which  consequently, 
when  conditions  permitted  engaging  at  all,  could 
be  handled  with  a  scope  and  freedom  not  secur- 
able  with  the  uncertain  factor  of  the  wind.  The 
motive  power  of  the  sea,  therefore,  then  resem- 
bled essentially  that  of  the  land,  —  being  human 
muscle  and  staying  power,  in  the  legs  on  shore 
and  in  the  arms  at  sea.  Hence,  movements  by 
masses,  by  squadrons,  and  in  any  desired  direc- 
tion corresponding  to  a  fixed  plan,  in  order  to 
concentrate,  or  to  outflank,  —  all  these  could  be 
attempted  with  a  probability  of  success  not  pred- 
icable  of  the  sailing  ship.  Nelson's  remarkable 
order  at  Trafalgar,  which  may  almost  be  said 
to  have  closed  and  sealed  the  record  of  the  sail 
era,  began  by  assuming  the  extreme  improba- 
bility of  being  able  at  any  given  moment  to 
move  forty  ships  of  his  day  in  a  fixed  order 
upon  an  assigned  plan.  The  galley  admiral 
therefore  wielded  a  weapon  far  more  flexible  and 
reliable,  within  the  much  narrower  range  of  its 
activities,  than  his  successor  in  the  days  of  sail ; 
and  engagements  between  fleets  of  galleys  accord- 
ingly reflected  this  condition,  being  marked  not 
only  by  greater  carnage,  but  by  tactical  combina- 
tions and  audacity  of  execution,  to  which  the 
sailing  ship  did  not  so  readily  lend  itself. 


8  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

When  the  field  of  naval  warfare  became  ex- 
tended beyond  the  Mediterranean,  —  for  long 
centuries  its  principal  scene,  —  the  galley  no 
longer  met  the  more  exacting  nautical  condi- 
tions; and  the  introduction  of  cannon,  involv- 
ing new  problems  of  tactics  and  ship-building, 
accelerated  its  disappearance.  The  traditions  of 
galley-fighting,  however,  remained,  and  were  rein- 
forced by  the  habits  of  land  fighting,  —  the  same 
men  in  fact  commanding  armies  on  shore  and 
fleets  at  sea.  In  short,  a  period  of  transition 
ensued,  marked,  as  such  in  their  beginnings 
are  apt  to  be,  by  an  evident  lack  of  clearness 
in  men's  appreciation  of  conditions,  and  of  the 
path  of  development,  with  a  consequent  confu- 
sion of  outline  in  their  practice.  It  is  not  always 
easy  to  understand  either  what  was  done,  or  what 
was  meant  to  be  done,  during  that  early  sail  era  ; 
but  two  things  appear  quite  certainly.  There 
is  still  shown  the  vehemence  and  determination 
of  action  which  characterized  galley  fighting, 
visible  constantly  in  the  fierce  effort  to  grapple 
the  enemy,  to  break  his  ranks,  to  confuse  and 
crush  him ;  and  further  there  is  clear  indication 
of  tactical  plan  on  the  grand  scale,  broad  in  out- 
line and  combination,  involving  different  —  but 
not  independent  —  action  by  the  various  great 
divisions  of  the  fleet,  each  of  which,  in  plan  at 
least,  has  its  own  part,  subordinate  but  contrib* 
utory  to  the  general  whole. 

The  results,  though  not  unimportant,  were  not 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century 


satisfactory,  for  men  were  compelled  to  see  that 
from  various  causes  the  huge  numbers  brought 
upon  the  field  lapsed  into  confusion,  and  that 
battle,  however  well  planned  in  large  outline, 
resolved  itself  into  a  mere  mass  of  warring  units 
incoherently  struggling  one  with  another.  There 
was  lack  of  proportion  between  effort  exerted 
and  effect  achieved.  A  period  of  systematization 
and  organization  set  in.  Unwieldy  numbers 
were  reduced  to  more  manageable  dimensions  by 
excluding  ships  whose  size  and  strength  did  not 
add  to  the  efficiency  of  the  order  of  battle ;  the 
powers  and  limitations  of  those  which  remained 
were  studied,  and  certain  simple  tactical  disposi- 
tions, fitted  to  particular  emergencies,  were  recog- 
nized and  adopted,  —  all  tending  to  impart  unity 
of  movement  and  action,  and  to  keep  the  whole 
in  regulated  order  under  the  hand  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief,  free  from  confusion. 

To  this  point  there  was  improvement ;  but  re- 
action, as  often,  went  too  far.  The  change  in 
accepted  ideas  is  emphatically  shown  by  a  com- 
parison of  the  Fighting  Instructions  of  1740  and 
1756,  when  the  crystallization  of  the  system  was 
complete  but  disintegration  had  not  yet  begun, 
with  those  issued  in  1665  by  the  Duke  of  York, 
afterwards  James  1 1.,  at  the  beginning  of  the  second 
of  the  three  Anglo-Dutch  Wars.  His  in  turn 
are  directly  deducible  from  others  framed  shortly 
after  the  first  war,  in  1652-1654,  when  sail  tactics 
had  not  passed  the  stage  of  infancy,  and  were 


io  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

still  strongly  affected  by  the  galley  tradition. 
There  is  here  found,  on  the  one  hand,  the  pre- 
scription of  the  line  of  battle,  —  a  single  column 
of  ships  formed  in  each  other's  wake,  —  with  the 
provision  that  if  the  enemy  is  to  leeward,  and 
awaits  attack,  the  headmost  squadron  of  the  Brit- 
ish shall  steer  for  the  headmost  of  the  enemy's 
ships.  This  accords  with  the  general  tenor  of 
the  later  Instructions ;  but  there  occurs  else- 
where, and  previously,  the  direction  that,  when 
the  enemy  is  to  windward,  if  the  leading  British 
Squadron  finds  it  can  weather  any  considerable 
part  of  them,  it  is  to  "  tack  and  stand  in,  and 
strive  to  divide  the  enemy's  body,"  and  that,  "  be- 
ing got  to  windward,  is  to  bear  down  on  those 
ships  to  leeward  of  them,"  which  have  thus  been 
cut  off. 

The  thing  to  be  observed  here  is  the  separate, 
but  positive,  initiative  prescribed  for  a  portion  of 
the  fleet,  with  a  view  to  divide  the  enemy,  and 
then  concentrate  the  whole  fleet  upon  the  frac- 
tion thus  isolated.  The  British  van  takes  a  par- 
ticular, but  not  an  independent,  action ;  for  the 
other  divisions  contribute  their  part  to  the  com- 
mon purpose.  "  The  middle  squadron  is  to  keep 
her  wind,  and  to  observe  the  motion  of  the 
enemy's  van,  which"  [that  is,  "which"  action  of 
the  middle  squadron]  "the  last  squadron  —  the 
rear  —  is  to  second ;  and  both  of  these  squadrons 
are  to  do  their  utmost  to  assist  or  relieve  the  first 
squadron,  that  divided  the  enemy's  fleet."  Evi- 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  1 1 

dently  here  we  have  tactical  combination  in 
order  to  decisive  action;  clearly  contemplated 
also  beforehand,  not  merely  by  a  capable  individ- 
ual general,  but  by  the  consensus  of  professional 
opinion  which  such  a  paper  as  the  Fighting 
Instructions  necessarily  reflects.  The  stamp  of 
the  galley  period  is  upon  this:  strenuous  and 
close  battle,  the  piercing  of  the  enemy's  order,  the 
movement  of  the  squadrons  differentiated,  in 
order  that  they  may  in  a  real  and  effective  sense 
combine,  instead  of  being  merely  distributed,  as 
they  afterwards  were  by  both  the  letter  of  the 
later  Instructions  and  the  tradition  by  which 
these  became  encrusted.  Nor  should  there  be 
overlooked,  in  this  connection,  the  discretion  al- 
lowed the  centre  and  rear.  They  are  to  "  keep 
their  wind;  "  an  expression  which  leaves  optional 
whether  to  tack,  or  stand  as  they  are,  whether  to 
engage  the  separated  enemies  to  windward  or  to 
leeward,  as  occasion  may  offer,  in  support  of  the 
van.  The  provisions  of  1665  afterwards  dis- 
appear. In  1740,  and  even  as  late  as  1781,  they 
are  traceable  only  in  certain  colorless  articles, 
suggestive  of  the  atrophied  organs  of  a  body 
concerning  whose  past  use  physiologists  may 
speculate. 

As  in  the  restoration  of  sounder  methods,  with 
which  we  shall  be  concerned,  this  degeneration  of 
ideals  was  a  work  of  time.  In  June,  1666,  the 
British  met  with  a  severe  check  in  the  Four  Days 
Battle,  in  which  Monk,  a  soldier,  commanded  in 


12  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

chief.  This  reverse  is  chiefly  to  be  attributed  to 
antecedent  strategic  errors,  which  made  a  portion 
only  of  the  available  British  force  bear  the  brunt 
of  the  first  three  days ;  but,  among  the  inevitable 
criticisms,  we  find  stress  laid  upon  fighting  in 
line  as  essential  to  success.  This  insistence 
upon  the  line  as  an  effective  instrument  pro- 
ceeded, among  others,  from  Sir  William  Penn,  a 
seaman,  and  was  at  that  time  in  the  direction  of 
professional  advance.  The  line  had  not  yet  ob- 
tained the  general  professional  acceptance  needed 
to  establish  and  utilize  its  indisputable  value. 
This  process  was  gradual,  but  when  effected  it 
followed  the  usual  laws  of  human  development ; 
from  a  valuable  means,  it  became  in  men's  estima- 
tion an  exaggerated  necessity.  It  came  to  pass 
in  time  that  the  line  no  longer  existed  for  tactics, 
but  tactics  for  the  line,  in  which  they  found  their 
consummation  and  end. 

There  intervened,  however,  a  happier  period,  — 
one  of  transition,  —  and  in  the  third  Anglo-Dutch 
war,  1672-1674,  we  seem  to  find  a  close  approach 
to  just  proportion  between  regularity  of  formation 
and  decisive  tactical  purpose ;  in  which  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  line  is  recognized  and  observed,  but 
is  utilized  by  professional  audacity  for  definite 
and  efficient  tactical  action,  aiming  at  conclusive 
results.  The  finest  exponent  of  this,  the  culmi- 
nating epoch  of  naval  warfare  in  the  seventeenth 
century,  is  the  Dutchman  Ruyter,  who,  taken 
altogether,  was  the  greatest  naval  seaman  of  that 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  13 

era,  which  may  be  roughly  identified  with  the 
reign  of  Charles  II.  After  that,  naval  warfare 
was  virtually  suspended  for  fifteen  years,  and 
when  resumed  in  the  last  decade  of  the  century, 
the  traces  of  incipient  degeneracy  can  already  be 
noted  amid  much  brilliant  performance.  From 
that  time  completeness  of  military  achievement 
became  in  men's  minds  less  of  an  object  than 
accurate  observance  of  rule,  and  in  practice  the 
defensive  consideration  of  avoiding  disaster  began 
to  preponderate  over  offensive  effort  for  the  de- 
struction of  the  enemy. 

In  the  development  of  tactical  science,  the 
French  had  played  a  leading  part,  as  they  usually 
have  where  reflective  mental  processes  and  formal 
evolution  of  ideas  are  concerned.  Among  admi- 
rals, the  greatest  name  of  this  later  period  is  the 
French  Tourville,  a  master  of  the  science  of  his 
profession,  and  gifted  with  a  personal  courage  of 
the  heroic  type ;  while  the  leading  exponent  of 
Tourville's  ideas,  as  well  as  historian  of  his 
achievements,  was  the  French  priest  Paul  Hoste, 
—  chaplain  to  his  fleet,  and  the  father  of  the  sys- 
tematic treatment  of  naval  evolutions.  But  with 
Tourville's  name  is  associated  not  only  a  high 
level  of  professional  management,  but  a  caution 
in  professional  action  not  far  removed  from 
timidity,  so  that  an  impatient  Minister  of  Marine 
of  his  day  and  nation  styled  him  "poltroon  in 
head,  though  not  in  heart."  His  powers  were 
displayed  in  the  preservation  and  orderly  move- 


14  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

ment  of  his  fleet ;  in  baffling,  by  sheer  skill,  and 
during  long  periods,  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  to 
bring  him  to  action ;  in  skilful  disposition,  when 
he  purposely  accepted  battle  under  disadvantage; 
but  under  most  favorable  opportunities  he  failed 
in  measures  of  energy,  and,  after  achieving  par- 
tial success,  superfluous  care  of  his  own  com- 
mand prevented  his  blows  from  being  driven 
home. 

Tourville,  though  a  brilliant  seaman,  thus  not 
only  typified  an  era  of  transition,  with  which 
he  was  contemporary,  but  fore-shadowed  the 
period  of  merely  formal  naval  warfare,  precise, 
methodical,  and  unenterprising,  emasculated  of 
military  virility,  although  not  of  mere  animal 
courage.  He  left  to  his  successors  the  legacy 
of  a  great  name,  but  also  unfortunately  that  of 
a  defective  professional  tradition.  The  splendid 
days  of  the  French  Navy  under  Ifbuis  XIV. 
passed  away  with  him,  —  he  died  in  1701  ;  but 
during  the  long  period  of  naval  lethargy  on  the 
part  of  the  state,  which  followed,  the  French 
naval  officers,  as  a  class,  never  wholly  lost  sight 
of  professional  ideals.  They  proved  themselves, 
on  the  rare  occasions  that  offered,  before  1715 
and  during  the  wars  of  Hawke  and  Rodney,  not 
only  gallant  seamen  after  the  pattern  of  Tour- 
ville, but  also  exceedingly  capable  tacticians, 
upon  a  system  good  as  far  as  it  went,  but  de- 
fective on  Tourville's  express  lines,  in  aiming 
rather  at  exact  dispositions  and  defensive  security 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century 


than  at  the  thorough-going  initiative  and  persist- 
ence which  confounds  and  destroys  the  enemy. 
"  War,"  to  use  Napoleon's  phrase,  "  was  to  be 
waged  without  running  risks."  The  sword  was 
drawn,  but  the  scabbard  was  kept  ever  open 
for  its  retreat. 

The  English,  in  the  period  of  reaction  which 
succeeded  the  Dutch  wars,  produced  their  own 
caricature  of  systematized  tactics.  Even  under 
its  influence,  up  to  1715,  it  is  only  just  to  say 
they  did  not  construe  naval  skill  to  mean  anxious 
care  to  keep  one's  own  ships  intact.  Rooke,  off 
Malaga,  in  1704,  illustrated  professional  fearless- 
ness of  consequences  as  conspicuously  as  he  had 
shown  personal  daring  in  the  boat  attack  at 
La  Hougue ;  but  his  plans  of  battle  exemplified 
the  particularly  British  form  of  inefficient  naval 
action.  There  was  no  great  difference  in  aggre- 
gate force  between  the  French  fleet  and  that 
of  the  combined  Anglo-Dutch  under  his  orders. 
The  former,  drawing  up  in  the  accustomed  line 
of  battle,  ship  following  ship  in  a  single  column, 
awaited  attack.  Rooke,  having  the  advantage 
of  the  wind,  and  therefore  the  power  of  engaging 
at  will,  formed  his  command  in  a  similar  and 
parallel  line  a  few  miles  off,  and  thus  all  stood 
down  together,  the  ships  maintaining  their  line 
parallel  to  that  of  the  enemy,  and  coming  into 
action  at  practically  the  same  moment,  van  to 
van,  centre  to  centre,  rear  to  rear.  This  ignored 
wholly  the  essential  maxim  of  all  intelligent 


1 6  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

warfare,  which  is  so  to  engage  as  markedly  to 
outnumber  the  enemy  at  a  point  of  main  col- 
lision. If  he  be  broken  there,  before  the  remain- 
der of  his  force  come  up,  the  chances  all  are  that 
a  decisive  superiority  will  be  established  by  this 
alone,  not  to  mention  the  moral  effect  of  partial 
defeat  and  disorder.  Instead  of  this,  the  impact 
at  Malaga  was  so  distributed  as  to  produce  a 
substantial  equality  from  one  end  to  the  other 
of  the  opposing  fronts.  The  French,  indeed,  by 
strengthening  their  centre  relatively  to  the  van 
and  rear,  to  some  extent  modified  this  condition 
in  the  particular  instance;  but  the  fact  does 
not  seem  to  have  induced  any  alteration  in 
Rooke's  dispositions.  Barring  mere  accident, 
nothing  conclusive  can  issue  from  such  arrange- 
ments. The  result  accordingly  was  a  drawn 
battle,  although  Rooke  says  that  the  fight,  which 
was  maintained  on  both  sides  "  with  great  fury 
for  three  hours,  .  .  .  was  the  sharpest  day's  ser- 
vice that  I  ever  saw ;  "  and  he  had  seen  much, 
—  Beachy  Head,  La  Hougue,  Vigo  Bay,  not  to 
mention  his  own  great  achievement  in  the  capture 
of  Gibraltar. 

This  method  of  attack  remained  the  ideal  —  if 
such  a  word  is  not  a  misnomer  in  such  a  case  — 
of  the  British  Navy,  not  merely  as  a  matter  of 
irreflective  professional  acceptance,  but  laid  down 
in  the  official  "  Fighting  Instructions."  It  cannot 
be  said  that  these  err  on  the  side  of  lucidity  ;  but 
their  meaning  to  contemporaries  in  this  partic- 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  17 

ular  respect  is  ascertained,  not  only  by  fair  infer- 
ence from  their  contents,  but  by  the  practical 
commentary  of  numerous  actions  under  common- 
place commanders-in-chief.  It  further  received 
authoritative  formulation  in  the  specific  finding 
of  the  Court- Martial  upon  Admiral  Byng,  which 
was  signed  by  thirteen  experienced  officers. 
"  Admiral  Byng  should  have  caused  his  ships 
to  tack  together,  and  should  immediately  have 
borne  down  upon  the  enemy ;  his  van  steering 
for  the  enemy's  van,  his  rear  for  its  rear,  each 
ship  making  for  the  one  opposite  to  her  in  the 
enemy's  line,  under  such  sail  as  would  have 
enabled  the  worst  sailer  to  preserve  her  station  in 
the  line  of  battle."  Each  phrase  of  this  opinion 
is  a  reflection  of  an  article  in  the  Instructions. 
The  line  of  battle  was  the  naval  fetich  of  the  day; 
and,  be  it  remarked,  it  was  the  more  dangerous 
because  in  itself  an  admirable  and  necessary 
instrument,  constructed  on  principles  essentially 
accurate.  A  standard  wholly  false  may  have  its 
error  demonstrated  with  comparative  ease ;  but 
no  servitude  is  more  hopeless  than  that  of  unin- 
telligent submission  to  an  idea  formally  correct, 
yet  incomplete.  It  has  all  the  vicious  misleading 
of  a  half-truth  unqualified  by  appreciation  of 
modifying  conditions ;  and  so  seamen  who  dis- 
dained theories,  and  hugged  the  belief  in  them- 
selves as  "  practical,"  became  doctrinaires  in  the 
worst  sense. 

It    would    seem,   however,    that    a    necessary 


1 8  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

antecedent  to  deliverance  from  a  false  concep- 
tion,—  as  from  any  injurious  condition, — is  a 
practical  illustration  of  its  fallacy.  Working  con- 
sequences must  receive  demonstration,  concrete 
in  some  striking  disastrous  event,  before  improve- 
ment is  undertaken.  Such  experience  is  painful 
to  undergo ;  but  with  most  men,  even  in  their 
private  capacity,  and  in  nearly  all  governmental 
action  where  mere  public  interests  are  at  stake, 
remedy  is  rarely  sought  until  suffering  is  not 
only  felt,  but  signalized  in  a  conspicuous  incident. 
It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  military  professions 
in  peace  times  are  peculiarly  liable  to  this  apathy; 
like  some  sleepers,  they  can  be  awakened  only 
by  shaking.  For  them,  war  alone  can  subject 
accepted  ideas  to  the  extreme  test  of  practice.  It 
is  doubtless  perfectly  true  that  acquaintance  with 
military  and  naval  history,  mastery  of  their  teach- 
ings, will  go  far  to  anticipate  the  penalty  attach- 
ing to  truth's  last  argument  —  chastisement ;  but 
imagination  is  fondly  impatient  of  warning  by 
the  past,  and  easily  avails  itself  of  fancied  or 
superficial  differences  in  contemporary  condi- 
tions, to  justify  measures  which  ignore,  or  even 
directly  contravene,  ascertained  and  fundamental 
principles  of  universal  application. 

Even  immediate  practical  experience  is  misin- 
terpreted when  incidents  are  thus  viewed  through 
the  medium  of  a  precedent  bias.  The  Transvaal 
War,  for  instance,  has  afforded  some  striking 
lessons  of  needed  modifications,  consequent  upon 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  19 

particular  local  factors,  or  upon  developments  in 
the  material  of  war ;  but  does  any  thoughtful  mili- 
tary man  doubt  that  imagination  has  been  actively 
at  work,  exaggerating  or  distorting,  hastily  waiv- 
ing aside  permanent  truth  in  favor  of  temporary 
prepossessions  or  accidental  circumstance  ?  It  is 
at  least  equally  likely  that  the  naval  world  at 
the  present  time  is  hugging  some  fond  delusions 
in  the  excessive  size  and  speed  to  which  battle- 
ships are  tending,  and  in  the  disproportionate 
weight  assigned  to  the  defensive  as  compared  to 
the  offensive  factors  in  a  given  aggregate  ton- 
nage. Imagination,  theory,  a  priori  reasoning,  is 
here  at  variance  with  rational  historical  precedent, 
which  has  established  the  necessity  of  numbers 
as  well  as  of  individual  power  in  battle-ships,  and 
demonstrated  the  superiority  of  offensive  over 
defensive  strength  in  military  systems.  These 
—  and  other  —  counterbalancing  considerations 
have  in  past  wars  enforced  the  adoption  of  a 
medium  homogeneous  type,  as  conducive  both  to 
adequate  numbers, —  which  permit  the  division 
of  the  fleet  when  required  for  strategic  or  tactical 
purposes,  —  and  also  directly  to  offensive  fleet 
strength  by  the  greater  facility  of  manoeuvring 
possessed  by  such  vessels ;  for  the  strength  of  a 
fleet  lies  not  chiefly  in  the  single  units,  but  in  their 
mutual  support  in  elastic  and  rapid  movement. 
Well  tested  precedent  —  experience  —  has  here 
gone  to  the  wall  in  favor  of  an  untried  forecast 
of  supposed  fundamental  change  in  conditions. 


2O  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

But  experience  is  uncommonly  disagreeable  when 
she  revenges  herself  after  her  own  fashion. 

The  British  Navy  of  the  eighteenth  century  in 
this  way  received  an  unpleasant  proof  of  the 
faultiness  of  its  then  accepted  conclusions,  in  the 
miscarriages  of  Mathews  off  Toulon,  in  1744, 
and  of  Byng  off  Minorca,  in  1756.  So  fixed  were 
men's  habits  of  thought  that  the  lessons  were  not 
at  once  understood.  As  evidenced  by  the  dis- 
tribution of  censure,  the  results  were  attributed 
by  contemporary  judges  to  particular  incidents 
of  each  battle,  not  to  the  erroneous  underlying 
general  plans,  contravening  all  sound  military 
precedent,  which  from  the  first  made  success 
improbable,  indeed  impossible,  except  by  an 
inefficiency  of  the  enemy  which  was  not  to  be 
presumed.  These  battles  therefore  are  important, 
militarily,  in  a  sense  not  at  all  dependent  upon 
their  consequences,  which  were  ephemeral.  They 
are  significant  as  extreme  illustrations  of  incom- 
petent action,  deriving  from  faulty  traditions ; 
and  they  have  the  further  value  of  showing  the 
starting  point,  the  zero  of  the  scale,  from  which 
the  progress  of  the  century  is  to  be  measured. 
In  describing  them,  therefore,  attention  will  be 
given  chiefly  to  those  circumstances  which  ex- 
hibit the  shackles  under  which  fleet  movements 
then  labored,  not  only  from  the  difficulties  inher- 
ent to  the  sea  and  sailing  ships,  but  from  the 
ideas  and  methods  of  the  times.  Those  incidents 
also  will  be  selected  which  show  how  false  stan- 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  21 

dards  affected  particular  individuals,  according  to 
their  personal  characteristics. 

In  Admiral  Mathews'  action,  in  February, 
1744,  an  allied  fleet  composed  of  sixteen  French 
ships-of-the-line  and  twelve  Spanish  lay  in  Tou- 
lon, waiting  to  sail  for  a  Spanish  port.  The 
British,  in  force  numerically  equal,  were  at 
anchor  under  the  Hyeres  Islands,  a  few  miles  to 
the  eastward.  They  got  underway  when  the 
allied  movement  began  on  February  2Oth ;  but 
anchored  again  for  the  night,  because  the  enemy 
that  day  came  no  farther  than  the  outer  road  of 
Toulon.  The  next  morning  the  French  and 
Spaniards  put  to  sea  with  a  wind  at  first  westerly, 
and  stretched  to  the  southward  in  long,  single 
column,  the  sixteen  French  leading.  At  10  A.  M. 
the  British  followed,  Vice-Admiral  Lestock's 
division  taking  the  van  ;  but  the  wind,  shifting 
to  east,  threw  the  fleet  on  the  port  tack,  on  which 
the  rear  under  Rear-Admiral  Rowley  had  to  lead. 
It  became  necessary,  therefore,  for  this  division 
and  the  centre  to  pass  Lestock,  which  took  some 
time  with  the  light  airs  prevailing.  Two  or 
three  manoeuvres  succeeded,  with  the  object  of 
forming  the  fighting  order,  a  column  similar  and 
parallel  to  that  of  the  enemy,  and  to  get  closer  to 
him.  When  night  fell  a  signal  was  still  flying 
for  the  line  abreast,  by  which,  if  completed,  the 
ships  would  be  ranged  on  a  line  parallel  to  the 
allies,  and  heading  towards  them  ;  consequently 
abreast  of  each  other.  It  would  then  need  only 


22  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

a  change  of  course  to  place  them  in  column,  sides 
to  the  enemy;  which,  as  before  said,  was  the  fight- 
ing order  —  the  "  line  of  battle." 

The  line  abreast,  however,  was  not  fully  formed 
at  dark.  Therefore  the  admiral,  in  order  to  hasten 
its  completion,  soon  afterwards  made  a  night  sig- 
nal, with  lanterns,  for  the  fleet  to  bring-to,  —  that 
is,  bring  their  sides  to  the  wind,  and  stop.  He 
intended  thereby  that  the  ships  already  in  station 
should  stand  still,  while  the  others  were  gaining 
their  places,  all  which  is  a  case  of  simple  evolu- 
tion, by  land  as  by  sea.  It  was  contended  by  the 
admiral  that  Vice-Admiral  Lestock's  division  was 
then  too  far  to  the  right  and  rear,  and  hence  too 
distant  from  the  enemy,  and  that  it  was  his  duty 
first  to  get  into  his  station  and  then  to  bring-to. 
To  this  the  vice-admiral  on  his  trial  replied,  first, 
that  he  was  not  out  of  his  station ;  and,  second, 
that  if  he  were,  the  later  signal,  to  bring-to,  sus- 
pended the  earlier,  to  form  line  abreast,  and  that 
it  was  therefore  his  business,  without  any  discre- 
tion, to  stop  where  he  was.  Concerning  the  first 
plea,  a  number  of  witnesses,  very  respectable  in 
point  of  rank  and  opportunity  for  seeing,  testified 
that  the  vice-admiral  did  bring-to  three  or  four 
miles  to  the  right  and  rear  of  his  place  in  the 
line  abreast,  reckoning  his  station  from  the  admi- 
ral's ship;  yet,  as  the  Court  peremptorily  rejected 
their  evidence,  it  is  probably  proper  to  accept  the 
contemporary  decision  as  to  this  matter  of  fact. 

But  as  regards  the  second  plea,  being  a  matter 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  23 

of  military  correctness,  a  difference  of  opinion  is 
allowable.  The  Court  adopted  as  its  own  the 
argument  of  the  vice-admiral.  Without  entering 
here  into  a  technical  discussion,  the  Court's  ruling, 
briefly  stated,  was  that  the  second  signal  super- 
seded the  first,  so  that,  if  the  vice-admiral  was  in 
the  wrong  place,  it  was  not  his  duty  to  get  into 
the  right  before  stopping ;  and  that  this  was 
doubly  the  case  because  an  article  of  the  Night 
Signals  (7)  prescribed  that,  under  the  conditions 
of  the  alleged  offence,  "  a  fleet  sailing  before  the 
wind,  or  nearly  so,  if  the  admiral  made  the  signal 
for  the  fleet  to  bring-to,  the  windward  ships 
should  bring-to  first."  Therefore,  if  Lestock  was 
to  windward,  as  the  charge  read,  it  was  his  duty 
to  bring-to  first  and  at  once.  It  is  evident,  how- 
ever, that  even  the  Sailing  Instructions,  cast-iron 
as  they  were,  contemplated  a  fleet  in  order,  not 
one  in  process  of  forming  order;  and  that  to 
bring-to  helter-skelter,  regardless  of  order,  was  to 
obey  the  letter  rather  than  the  spirit.  Muddle- 
headed  as  Mathews  seems  to  have  been,  what  he 
was  trying  to  do  was  clear  enough  ;  and  the  duty 
of  a  subordinate  was  to  carry  out  his  evident  aim. 
An  order  does  not  necessarily  supersede  its  pred- 
ecessor, unless  the  two  are  incompatible.  The 
whole  incident,  from  Lestock's  act  to  the  Court's 
finding,  is  instructive  as  showing  the  slavish 
submission  to  the  letter  of  the  Instructions;  a 
submission  traceable  not  to  the  law  merely,  but 
to  the  added  tradition  that  had  then  fast  hold  of 


24  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

men's  minds.  It  is  most  interesting  to  note  that 
the  unfortunate  Byng  was  one  of  the  signers  of 
this  opinion,  as  he  was  also  one  of  the  judges 
that  sentenced  Mathews  to  be  dismissed  from  the 
navy,  as  responsible  for  the  general  failure. 

During  the  night  of  the  2ist  the  allies,  who 
had  stopped  after  dark,  appear  again  to  have 
made  sail.  Consequently,  when  day  broke,  the 
British  found  themselves  some  distance  astern  and 
to  windward  —  northeast;  the  wind  continuing 
easterly.  Their  line,  indifferently  well  formed  in 
van  and  centre,  stretched  over  a  length  of  nine 
miles  through  the  straggling  of  the  rear.  Les- 
tock's  ship  was  six  miles  from  that  of  Mathews, 
whereas  it  should  not  have  been  more  than  two 
and  a  half,  at  most,  in  ordinary  sailing ;  for  battle, 
the  Instructions  allowed  little  over  a  half-mile. 
Accepting  the  Court's  finding  that  he  was  in 
position  at  dark,  this  distance  can  only  be  at- 
tributed, as  Lestock  argued  and  the  Court 
admitted,  to  a  current  —  that  most  convenient 
of  scape-goats  in  navigation.  The  allies,  too, 
had  a  lagging  rear  body,  five  Spanish  ships 
being  quite  a  distance  astern ;  but  from  van  to 
rear  they  extended  but  six  miles,  against  the 
British  nine.  It  was  the  distance  of  the  British 
rear,  not  straggling  in  van  or  centre,  that  consti- 
tuted this  disadvantage. 

Mathews  wished  to  wait  till  Lestock  reached 
his  place,  but  the  allies  were  receding  all  the 
time ;  and,  though  their  pace  was  slackened  to 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  25 

enable  the  five  sternmost  Spaniards  to  come  up, 
the  space  between  the  fleets  was  increasing.  It 
was  the  duty  of  the  British  admiral  to  force  an 
action,  on  general  principles ;  but  in  addition  he 
believed  that  the  French  intended  to  push  for 
Gibraltar,  enter  the  Atlantic,  and  join  their  Brest 
fleet,  in  order  to  cover  ah  invasion  of  England  by 
an  army  reported  to  be  assembling  at  Dunkirk. 
Clearly,  therefore,  something  must  be  done ;  yet 
to  enter  into  a  general  engagement  with  near  a 
third  of  his  command  out  of  immediate  support- 
ing distance  was  contrary  to  the  accepted  prin- 
ciples of  the  day.  The  fleet  was  not  extended 
with  that  of  the  enemy,  by  which  is  meant  that 
the  respective  vans,  centres,  and  rears  were  not 
opposed ;  the  British  van  being  only  abreast  of 
the  allied  centre,  their  centre  of  the  allied  rear, 
Lestock  tailing  away  astern  and  to  windward, 
while  the  dozen  leading  French  were  some  dis- 
tance ahead  of  both  bodies.  Now  the  Fighting 
Instructions  required  that,  "  If  the  admiral  and 
his  fleet  have  the  wind  of  the  enemy,  and  they 
have  stretched  themselves  in  a  line  of  battle,  the 
van  of  the  admiral's  fleet  is  to  steer  with  the 
van  of  the  enemies,  and  there  to  engage  them." 
There  was  no  alternative  course  laid  down  ;  just 
as  there  was  no  punishment  alternative  to  death 
in  the  Article  of  War  under  which  Byng  was 
shot. 

Yet   the  indications  all  were  that  to  wait  for 
this  most  formal  and  pedantic  disposition,  which 


i6  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

ignored  every  principle  of  warfare,  would  be  to 
throw  away  the  chance  of  battle.  The  French, 
fresh  from  port  and  clean-bottomed,  out-sailed 
the  bulk  of  the  British,  as  did  the  Spaniards, 
though  to  a  less  degree ;  and  it  was  part  of 
Lestock's  defence,  admitted  by  the  Court,  that, 
doing  his  utmost,  his  division,  as  a  whole,  cer- 
tainly could  not  get  abreast  the  allied  rear.  Les- 
tock,  indeed,  directly  submitted  to  the  Court  that 
the  commander-in-chief  was  at  fault  in  not  waiting 
till  his  line  was  thus  extended  and  formed,  and 
then  all  bearing  down  together,  in  line  abreast ; 
although  by  his  own  contention  no  such  issue 
could  have  been  reached  that  day,  unless  the 
allies  were  obliging  enough  to  wait.  "  I  aver,  and 
I  shall  die  in  this  opinion,  that  no  man  that  is  an 
officer,  who  knows  his  duty,  will  make  the  signal 
for  line  abreast  to  steer  down  upon  an  enemy, 
until  the  fleet  has  been  stretched  and  extended 
in  a  line  of  battle,  according  to  the  igth  Article 
of  the  Fighting  Instructions.  Can  it  be  service," 
he  adds,  "  to  bear  down  so  much  unformed  and 
in  confusion,  that  the  van  cannot  possibly  join 
battle  with,  or  engage  the  van  of  the  enemy,  the 
centre  with  the  centre,  and  the  rear  with  the 
rear?" 

Mathews  not  being  then  on  trial,  the  Court  in 
its  finding  did  not  reply  directly  to  this  question ; 
but  indirectly  it  left  no  doubt  as  to  its  opinion. 
"  The  Admiral,  by  bearing  down  as  he  did 
upon  the  rear  division  of  the  combined  fleet, 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  27 

excluded  the  Vice- Admiral  from  any  part  of  the 
engagement,  if  he  could  have  come  up;  for  if 
both  lines  had  been  closed,  when  the  Admiral 
engaged  the  Real,  there  would  have  been  no 
more  than  one  ship  of  the  enemy's  fleet  for 
the  Vice-Admiral  and  his  whole  division  to  have 
engaged."  Again,  "  It  does  not  appear  that  the 
Vice-Admiral  was  in  any  part  the  cause  of  the 
miscarriage  of  his  Majesty's  fleet  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean ;  the  bringing  on  of  the  general  engage- 
ment according  to  the  \<^th  Article  of  the  Fight- 
ing Instructions  .  .  .  not  depending  upon  him." 
Sixteen  officers  of  the  rank  of  captain  and  above 
signed  these  opinions,  and  there  is  no  denying 
the  words  of  the  igth  Article;  yet  one  wonders 
to  see  no  recognition  of  the  necessity  of  using 
your  opportunity  as  you  find  it,  of  the  moral 
effect  of  an  approaching  reserve,  which  Lestock's 
division  would  have  constituted,  of  the  part  it 
may  take  in  improving  or  repairing  the  results  of 
an  action  —  taking  the  place  of  injured  friends, 
preventing  injured  foes  escaping,  turning  doubtful 
battle  into  victory.  But  no  ;  these  commonplaces 
of  to-day  and  of  all  time  were  swamped  by  the 
Fighting  Instructions.  It  will  be  seen  in  the 
sequel  what  a  disastrous  moral  influence  Lestock's 
aloofness  exercised  upon  a  few  timid  captains,  and 
not  improbably  upon  the  entire  subsequent  course 
and  worst  errors  of  his  unfortunate  superior. 

One  of  the   witnesses  in   the  ensuing  Courts- 
Martial    testified    that    the    commander-in-chief, 


28  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

under  these  perplexing  circumstances,  went  into 
the  stern  gallery  of  the  flag-ship  Namur,  and 
called  to  Captain  Cornwall  of  the  Marlborough, 
next  astern,  asking  what  he  thought.  Cornwall 
replied  he  "  believed  they  would  lose  the  glory  of 
the  day,  if  they  did  not  attack  the  Spaniards,"  — 
i.  e.,  the  allied  rear-centre  and  rear,  —  "  the  Vice- 
Admiral  —  Lestock  —  being  so  far  astern."  To 
which  the  admiral  said,  "  If  you  '11  bear  down 
and  attack  the  Real"  —  the  Real  Felipe,  Spanish 
flag-ship,  —  "I'll  be  your  second."  This  was 
about  one  o'clock,  and  the  signal  to  engage  had 
been  made  two  hours  earlier,  probably  with  the 
double  object  of  indicating  the  ultimate  intention 
of  the  movements  in  hand,  and  the  immediate 
urgency  of  forming  the  line.  The  admiral's 
words  betray  the  indecision  of  an  irresolute 
nature  and  of  professional  rustiness,  but  not  of 
timidity,  and  Cornwall's  words  turned  the  scale. 
The  course  of  the  flag-ship  Namur  had  hitherto 
been  but  a  little  off  the  wind,  "  lasking  "  down, 
to  use  the  contemporary  but  long  obsolete  ex- 
pression, in  such  manner  as  to  show  the  admiral's 
desire  to  engage  himself  with  the  enemy's  centre, 
according  to  the  Fighting  Instructions;  but  now, 
in  hopelessness  of  that  result,  she  kept  broad 
off,  directly  for  the  nearest  enemy,  accompanied 
closely  by  the  Norfolk,  her  next  ahead,  and  by 
the  Marlborough.  Rear-Admiral  Rowley,  com- 
manding the  van,  imitated  the  admiral's  example, 
bringing  the  French  ship  abreast  him  to  close 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  29 

action.  He  also  was  thoroughly  supported  by 
the  two  captains  next  astern  of  him,  the  second 
of  whom  was  Edward  Hawke,  —  afterwards  the 
brilliant  admiral,  —  in  the  Berwick.  Two  Brit- 
ish groups,  each  of  three  ships,  were  thus  hotly 
engaged  ;  but  with  an  interval  between  them  of 
over  half  a  mile,  corresponding  to  the  places 
open  for  six  or  seven  other  vessels.  The  con- 
duct of  the  ships  named,  under  the  immediate 
influence  of  the  example  set  by  the  two  admirals, 
suggests  how  much  the  average  man  is  sustained 
by  professional  tone ;  for  a  visible  good  example 
is  simply  a  good  standard,  a  high  ideal,  realized 
in  action. 

Unfortunately,  however,  just  as  Hawke's  later 
doings  showed  the  man  able  to  rise  above  the 
level  of  prescribed  routine  duty,  there  was  found 
in  the  second  astern  of  the  Namur  a  captain 
capable  of  exceptional  backwardness,  of  reason- 
ing himself  into  dereliction  of  clear  duty,  and 
thus  effecting  a  demonstration  that  the  example 
of  timidity  is  full  as  contagious  and  more  master- 
ful than  that  of  audacity.  The  flag-ships  and 
their  supporters  ranged  themselves  along  the 
hostile  line  to  windward,  within  point-blank 
range ;  according  to  the  2oth  Article  of  the 
Fighting  Instructions,  which  read,  "  Every  Com- 
mander is  to  take  care  that  his  guns  are  not  fired 
till  he  is  sure  he  can  reach  the  enemy  upon  a 
point-blank  ;  and  by  no  means  to  suffer  his  guns 
to  be  fired  over  any  of  our  own  ships."  The 


jo  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

point-blank  is  the  range  of  a  cannon  laid  level, 
and  the  requirement  was  necessary  to  efficient 
action  in  those  days  of  crude  devices  for  pointing, 
with  ordnance  material  of  inferior  power.  Even 
sixty  years  later  Nelson  expressed  his  indifference 
to  improvements  in  pointing,  on  the  ground  that 
the  true  way  of  fighting  was  to  get  so  close  that 
you  could  not  miss  your  aim.  Thus  Mathews' 
captain  placed  the  Namur,  of  ninety  guns,  within 
four  hundred  yards  —  less  than  quarter  of  a  mile 
—  of  the  Spanish  flag-ship,  the  Real  Felipe, 
of  one  hundred  and  ten  guns ;  and  Cornwall 
brought  the  Marlborough  immediately  in  the 
wake  of  the  Namur,  engaging  the  Spanish  Her- 
cules. But  the  Dorsetshire,  which  should  have 
followed  the  Marlborough,  was  stopped  by  her 
commander,  Captain  George  Burrish,  at  a  dis- 
tance which  was  estimated  by  several  witnesses 
to  be  from  half  a  mile  to  nearly  a  mile  from  the 
enemy,  or,  to  use  a  very  expressive  phrase  then 
current,  "  at  random  shot."  The  Court- Martial, 
however,  in  pronouncing  upon  this  point,  decided 
that  inasmuch  as  a  bar-shot  came  on  board  the 
Dorsetshire  in  this  early  part  of  the  engagement, 
she  must  be  construed  to  have  brought-to  within 
extreme  point-blank.  In  view  of  the  mass  of 
testimony  to  the  greater  distance,  this  seems  to 
have  been  simply  giving  the  benefit  of  a  doubt. 

Thus  situated,  the  action  between  the  Namur 
and  Marlborough  on  the  one  side,  and  the  Real 
Felipe  and  Hercules  on  the  other,  was  for  some 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  31 

time  very  hot ;  but  the  Marlborough,  moving 
faster  than  the  Namur,  closed  upon  her,  so  that 
she  had  to  get  out  of  the  way,  which  she  did  by 
moving  ahead  and  at  the  same  time  hauling  to 
windward,  till  she  reached  as  far  from  the  Span- 
ish line  as  the  Dorsetshire  had  remained.  The 
Court  in  this  matter  decided  that,  after  the 
admiral  had  thus  hauled  off,  the  Dorsetshire  was 
in  a  line,  or  as  far  to  leeward  —  towards  the 
enemy  —  as  the  admiral.  The  Marlborough  was 
thus  left  alone,  exposed  to  the  fire  of  a  ship 
heavier  than  herself,  and  also  to  that  of  the 
Hercules,  which  was  able  to  train  upon  her  a 
considerable  part  of  her  battery.  Under  these 
circumstances,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Dorsetshire, 
as  it  was  the  opportunity  of  her  commander,  by 
attacking  the  Hercules,  to  second,  and  support, 
the  engaged  ship  ;  but  she  continued  aloof. 
After  two  hours  —  by  3  P.  M.  —  the  main  and 
mizzen  masts  were  cut  out  of  the  Marlborough, 
and  she  lost  her  captain  with  forty-two  men 
killed,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty  wounded, 
out  of  a  crew  of  seven  hundred  and  fifty.  Thus 
disabled,  the  sails  on  the  foremast  turned  her 
head  towards  the  enemy,  and  she  lay  moving 
sluggishly,  between  the  fleets,  but  not  under  con- 
trol. The  admiral  now  sent  an  officer  to  Bur- 
rish  —  the  second  that  morning  —  to  order  him 
into  his  station  and  to  support  the  Marlborough  ; 
while  to  the  latter,  in  response  to  an  urgent  rep- 
resentation by  boat  of  her  condition,  and  that  she 


32  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

was  threatened  by  the  approach  of  the  hitherto 
separated  ships  of  the  Spanish  rear,  he  replied 
that  the  Namur  was  wearing  and  would  come  to 
her  assistance. 

When  Burrish  received  his  message,  he  sent  for 
his  lieutenants  on  the  quarter-deck,  and  spoke  to 
them  words  which  doubtless  reflect  the  reasoning 
upon  which  he  was  justifying  to  himself  his  most 
culpable  inaction.  "  Gentlemen,  I  sent  for  you 
to  show  you  the  position  of  our  ships  to  wind- 
ward," (i.  e.  the  ships  of  the  centre  division 
behind  him,  and  Lestock's  division),  "  likewise 
those  five  sail  [Spanish]  of  the  enemy  that  are 
astern  of  us.  I  have  my  orders  to  engage  the 
Real,  and  you  see  I  am  bearing  down  for  that 
purpose."  The  lieutenants  remarked  that  he 
could  do  so  with  safety.  To  this  he  rejoined, 
with  a  curtness  that  testifies  to  the  uneasiness  of 
his  mind,  "  I  did  not  send  for  you  to  ask  your 
opinions,  but  only  to  observe  that  not  one  of  our 
ships  is  coming  down  to  my  assistance,  in  order 
to  cut  those  five  sail  off,  and  in  case  those  five 
sail  should  oblige  me  to  haul  my  wind  again,  and 
leave  the  Mar  thorough,  that  you  may  be  able  to 
indemnify  my  conduct,  if  called  in  question." 
One  witness  also  testified  that  he  "  was  angry 
that  Admiral  Lestock's  division  did  not  bear 
down,"  —  which  was  just  enough,  —  and  that  "he 
thought  it  most  advisable  to  keep  his  station ; " 
meaning  by  this,  apparently,  to  remain  where  he 
was.  His  cross-examination  of  the  evidence  was 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  33 

directed  to  prove  the  danger  to  his  ship  from 
these  remaining  Spaniards.  This  anxiety  was 
wholly  misplaced,  and  professionally  unworthy. 
Quite  independent  of  orders  by  signal  and  mes- 
sage, he  was  bound,  in  view  of  the  condition  of 
the  Marlborough,  to  go  to  her  relief,  and  to  as- 
sume that  the  three  English  ships  of  the  centre 
division,  in  his  rear,  would  surely  sustain  him. 
To  base  contrary  action  upon  a  doubt  of  their 
faithfulness  was  to  condemn  himself.  Four  ships 
to  five  under  such  conditions  should  be  rather 
a  spur  than  a  deterrent  to  an  officer  of  spirit,  who 
understands  the  obligation  of  his  calling. 

Till  this,  the  Dorsetshire  had  been  under  her 
three  top-sails  only.  She  appears  then  to  have 
stood  down  under  more  sail,  but  very  slowly,  and 
here  occurred  another  disaster  which  was  largely 
chargeable  to  her  being  out  of  her  station.  See- 
ing the  desperate  state  of  the  Marlborough, 
Mathews,  who  throughout  managed  blunder- 
ingly, with  the  single  exception  of  the  original 
attack,  had  thought  to  aid  her  and  divert  the  fire 
of  the  Real  by  sending  against  the  latter  a  fire- 
ship.  It  was  elementary  that  vessels  of  this  class 
needed  energetic  support  and  cover  in  their  des- 
perate work.  Small  in  size,  of  no  battery-force 
except  against  boat  attacks,  loaded  with  combus- 
tibles and  powder,  success  in  the  use  of  them 
under  an  enemy's  guns  required  not  only  imper- 
turbable coolness  and  nerve,  but  the  utmost 
attainable  immunity  from  the  attention  of  the 

3 


34  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

enemy.  This  could  be  secured  only  by  a  heavy 
and  sustained  fire  from  their  own  fleet.  With 
the  Norfolk,  Namur,  Marlborough,  and  Dorset- 
shire in  close  line,  as  they  should  have  been,  and 
heavily  engaged,  a  fire-ship  might  have  passed 
between  them,  and,  though  at  imminent  hazard 
even  so,  have  crossed  the  four  hundred  yards  of 
intervening  water  to  grapple  the  hostile  flag-ship; 
but  with  the  Marlborough  lying  disabled  and 
alone,  the  admiral  himself  acting  with  indecision, 
and  the  Dorsetshire  hanging  aloof,  the  attempt 
was  little  short  of  hopeless.  Still  it  was  made, 
and  the  Anne  Galley  —  such  was  her  odd  name 
—  bore  down,  passing  close  by  the  Dorsetshire. 

It  became  doubly  the  duty  of  Burrish  to  act, 
to  push  home  whatever  demonstration  was  in 
his  power  to  make ;  the  fire-ship,  however,  went 
by  him  and  was  permitted  to  pursue  her  des- 
perate mission  without  his  support.  The  Real, 
seeing  the  Anne  approach,  bore  up  out  of 
her  line,  and  at  the  same  time  sent  a  strongly- 
manned  launch  to  grapple  and  tow  her  out  of 
the  way.  This  was  precisely  one  of  the  measures 
that  it  was  the  business  of  supporting  ships  to 
repel.  The  captain  of  the  fire-ship,  thrown  upon 
his  own  resources,  opened  fire,  a  most  hazardous 
measure,  as  much  of  his  priming  was  with  loose 
powder;  but  the  launch  readily  avoided  injury 
by  taking  position  directly  ahead,  where  the  guns 
would  not  bear.  The  crew  of  the  Anne  were 
now  ordered  into  the  boat,  except  the  captain 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  35 

and  five  others,  who  were  to  remain  to  the  last 
moment,  and  light  the  train ;  but  from  some 
cause  not  certainly  demonstrated  she  exploded 
prematurely,  being  then  within  a  hundred  yards 
of  the  Real.  It  is  necessary  to  say  that  the 
Court-Martial  acquitted  Burrish  of  blame,  because 
he  "  had  no  orders  to  cover  the  fire-ship,  either 
by  signal  or  otherwise."  Technically,  the  effect 
of  this  finding  was*  to  shift  an  obvious  and  gross 
blunder  from  the  captain  to  some  one  else ;  but 
it  is  evident  that  if  the  Dorsetshire  had  oc- 
cupied her  station  astern  of  the  Marlborough, 
the  fire-ship's  attempt  would  have  been  much 
facilitated. 

The  Court  decided  unanimously  that  Burrish 
"ought  to  have  borne  down  as  far  to  leeward 
as  where  the  admiral  first  began  to  engage, 
notwithstanding  that  the  admiral  might  be 
hauled  off  before  the  Dorsetshire  got  so  far  to 
leeward."  The  point  upon  which  the  line  should 
have  been  formed  was  thus  established  by  the 
Court's  finding.  The  subsequent  proceedings 
of  this  ship  need  not  be  related.  She  now  came 
slowly  into  close  action,  but  that  part  of  the 
enemy's  order  was  already  broken,  and  their  rear 
vessels,  the  fear  of  which  had  controlled  her 
captain,  passed  by  as  they  came  up  without 
serious  action. 

How  far  Burrish's  example  influenced  the 
captains  immediately  behind  him  cannot  certainly 
be  affirmed.  Such  shyness  as  he  displayed  is 


36  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

not  only  infectious,  but  saps  that  indispensable 
basis  upon  which  military  effectiveness  reposes, 
namely,  the  certainty  of  co-operation  and  support, 
derived  from  mutual  confidence,  inspired  by  mili- 
tary discipline,  obedience,  and  honor.  It  is  well 
to  note  here  that  the  remoteness  of  Lestock's 
division  thus  affected  Burrish,  who  evidently 
could  not  understand  either  its  distance  or  its 
failure  to  approach,  and  who,  being  what  he 
was,  saw  himself  threatened  with  want  of  that 
backing  which  he  himself  was  refusing  to  the 
Marlborough.  While  he  was  blaming  Lestock, 
hard  things  were  being  said  about  him  in  Les- 
tock's division ;  but  the  lesson  of  Lestock's  in- 
fluence upon  Burrish  is  not  less  noteworthy 
because  the  latter  forfeited  both  duty  and 
honor  by  his  hesitation.  It  is  to  be  feared  that 
the  captain  of  the  Essex,  following  the  Dorset- 
shire, was  a  coward ;  even  so  Burrish,  an  old 
captain,  certainly  did  not  cheer  his  heart  by 
good  example,  but  rather  gave  him  the  pretext 
for  keeping  still  farther  off.  The  rearmost  two 
ships  of  the  division  but  confirm  the  evidences 
of  demoralization,  and  the  more  so  that  their 
captains  seem  from  the  evidence  to  have  been 
well-disposed  average  men ;  but  the  five  Spanish 
vessels  approaching,  with  the  Dorsetshire  and 
the  Essex  holding  aloof,  was  too  much  for  their 
resolution  —  and  not  unnaturally.  The  broad 
result,  however,  was  lamentable;  for  four  British 
ships  feared  to  come  to  the  aid  of  an  heroic 


of  the  Eighteenth   Century  37 

and  desperately  injured  consort,  in  deadly  peril, 
because  five  enemies  were  drawing  nigh. 

Upon  these  four  therefore  fell,  and  not  un- 
justly, the  weight  of  national  anger.  Burrish 
was  cashiered,  and  declared  forever  incapable 
of  being  an  officer  in  the  Navy.  Norris,  of  the 
Essex,  absconded  to  avoid  trial.  The  two  others 
were  pronounced  unfit  to  command,  but,  although 
never  again  employed,  mitigating  circumstances 
in  their  behavior  caused  them  to  be  retained 
on  the  lists  of  the  Navy.  It  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  they  were  men  just  of  the  stamp 
to  have  escaped  this  shame  and  ruin  of  reputa- 
tion, under  more  favorable  conditions  of  pro- 
fessional tone. 

Concerning  the  vice-admiral's  action  at  this 
time,  which  had  its  share  in  the  ruin  of  these 
captains,  another  curious  instance  of  men's  bond- 
age to  the  order  of  battle  transpires.  The  three 
rear  ships  of  his  squadron  were  clean,  that  is, 
relatively  fast ;  and  they  were  rearmost  for  this 
very  reason  of  speed,  because,  when  the  division 
led  on  the  other  tack,  they,  as  headmost  ships  of 
the  fleet,  would  be  ready  to  chase.  Nevertheless, 
when  the  admiral  sent  to  Lestock  in  the  fore- 
noon to  hurry  him  into  line,  no  order  was  given 
to  these  ships  to  press  ahead.  Why  ?  Lestock 
answers  that  to  send  those  ships  ahead,  out  of 
the  place  in  the  line  prescribed  to  them  by  the 
commander-in-chief,  was  breaking  the  line,  which 
should  expose  him  to  condign  punishment ;  and 


38  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

this  opinion  the  Court  also  adopts :  "  The  [only] 
messages  sent  to  the  Vice-Admiral  by  the  Ad- 
miral's two  lieutenants  were  to  make  what  sail 
he  possibly  could,  and  to  close  the  line  with  his 
division ;  no  signal  was  made  for  him  to  chase 
with  his  division,  or  send  ships  of  his  division 
to  chase;  without  which,  while  the  signal  for  tJie 
line  of  battle  was  flying,  and  more  especially  after 
the  messages  brought  him,  he  could  not,  without 
breach  of  duty,  either  have  chased  or  sent  ships 
to  chase  out  of  the  line."  It  is  to  be  noted  that 
the  word  "  chase "  is  here  used  in  the  strictest 
technical  sense,  not  merely  to  exclude  Lestock 
from  diverting  a  ship  to  some  other  purpose  than 
that  of  the  engagement,  but  even  from  shifting 
her  place  in  the  general  order  in  the  view  of 
furthering  the  engagement;  for  the  Court  says 
again :  "  The  Vice-Admiral  could  not  send  any 
ships  of  his  division  to  the  relief  of  the  Namur 
and  Marlborough  without  breaking  the  order  of 
battle,  there  being  four  ships  of  the  Admiral's 
division  "  (to  wit,  the  Dorsetshire  and  that  crowd) 
"  stationed  between  the  Vice-Admiral's  division 
and  the  Marlborough,  which  four  ships  might 
have  gone  to  the  assistance  of  the  Marlborough'' 
The  second  in  command  thus  had  no  liberty 
to  repair  either  the  oversights  of  his  superior,  or 
the  results  of  obvious  bad  conduct  in  juniors  ;  for 
Burrish's  backwardness  was  observed  throughout 
the  rear.  There  was  a  long  road  yet  to  travel 
to  Nelson's  personal  action  at  St.  Vincent  and 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  39 

Copenhagen,  or  to  his  judicious  order  at  Trafal- 
gar, "  The  Second  in  command  will,  after  my 
intentions  are  made  known  to  him,  have  the 
entire  direction  of  his  line."  Even  that  great 
officer  Hood,  off*  the  Chesapeake  in  1781,  felt 
himself  tied  hand  and  foot  by  the  union  flag  at 
the  mizzen  peak,  —  the  signal  for  the  line.  Only 
the  commander-in-chief  could  loose  the  bonds ; 
either  by  his  personal  initiative  alone,  and  vigi- 
lant supervision,  as  did  Hawke  and  Rodney,  or 
by  adding  to  this  the  broad  view  of  discretion  in 
subordinates  which  Nelson  took.  Before  leaving 
this  subject,  note  may  be  taken  of  a  pettifogging 
argument  advanced  by  Lestock  and  adopted  by 
the  Court,  that  orders  to  these  three  ships  to  press 
ahead  would  have  resulted  in  nothing,  because  of 
the  lightness  of  the  wind  then  and  afterwards. 
True,  doubtless,  and  known  after  the  fact;  but 
who  before  the  event  could  predict  the  uncertain 
Mediterranean  breeze,  or  how  much  each  foot 
gained  might  contribute  to  the  five  minutes 
which  measure  the  interval  between  victory  and 
defeat.  It  is  not  by  such  lagging  hesitations 
that  battles  are  won. 

It  is  a  trivial  coincidence,  though  it  may  be 
noted  in  passing,  that  as  it  was  the  second  astern 
of  the  commander-in-chief  on  whom  fell  the 
weight  of  the  disgrace,  so  it  was  the  second 
astern  of  the  commander  of  the  van  who  alone 
scored  a  distinct  success,  and  achieved  substan- 
tial gain  of  professional  reputation.  Hawke,  at 


40  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

first  bearing  down,  had  come  to  close  action  with 
the  Spanish  Neptuno,  a  vessel  nominally  of  less 
force  than  his  own  ship,  the  Berwick.  The  Nep- 
tuno  was  at  length  driven  out  of  her  line,  with  a 
loss  of  some  two  hundred  killed  and  wounded. 
Thus  left  without  an  immediate  antagonist, 
Hawke's  attention  was  attracted  by  another 
Spanish  vessel,  the  Poder,  of  the  same  nominal 
force  as  the  Neptuno,  and  following  her  in  the 
order  ;  with  which  four  or  five  of  the  seven  British 
ships,  that  should  have  closed  the  interval  between 
Mathews  and  Rowley,  were  carrying  on  a  distant 
and  circumspect  engagement,  resembling  in  cau- 
tion that  of  the  Dorsetshire  and  her  followers. 
He  carried  the  Berwick  close  alongside  the  new 
enemy,  dismasted  her,  and  after  two  hours  com- 
pelled her  to  strike  her  flag ;  the  only  vessel  in 
either  fleet  that  day  to  surrender,  and  then  only 
after  a  resistance  as  honorable  to  Spain  as  that 
of  the  Marlborough  had  been  to  Great  Britain. 
Her  commander  refused  to  yield  his  sword  to 
any  but  Hawke,  who  also  took  possession  of  the 
prize  with  a  party  from  his  own  ship  ;  thus  estab- 
lishing beyond  dispute,  by  all  customary  formali- 
ties, his  claim  to  the  one  trophy  of  the  day.  The 
occurrences  through  which  she  was  afterwards 
lost  to  the  British,  so  that  only  the  honor  of  the 
capture  remained,  and  that  to  Hawke  alone, 
must  be  briefly  told ;  for  they,  too,  are  a  part  of 
the  mismanagement  that  has  given  to  this  battle 
its  particular  significance  in  naval  history. 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  41 

As  the  unlucky  fire-ship  bore  down,  Mathews 
began  wearing  the  Namur,  —  turning  her  round, 
that  is,  from  the  wind,  and  therefore  towards  the 
Marlborough  and  her  opponents.  In  this  he 
seems  to  have  had  first  in  view  supporting  the 
fire-ship  and  covering  the  Marlborough.  Boats 
were  ahead  of  the  latter  towing  her  from  the 
enemy.  As  she  was  thus  being  dragged  off,  but 
after  the  fire-ship  blew  up,  the  Namur  passed 
between  her  and  the  hostile  line ;  then,  hauling 
to  the  wind  on  the  starboard  tack,  she  stood  north 
towards  Lestock's  division.  This  movement  to 
the  rear  was  imitated  by  the  British  ships  of 
the  centre,  —  the  Dorsetshire  and  others,  —  and, 
beyond  a  brush  with  the  rear  five  Spanish  vessels 
as  they  came  up,  the  action  in  the  centre  here 
ceased. 

This  retrograde  movement  of  Mathews  and  his 
division  drew  the  centre  away  from  the  van.  At 
about  the  same  time  the  allied  van,  composed 
wholly  of  French  ships,  seeing  the  straits  of  the 
Poder  and  the  Real,  tacked  —  turned  round  —  to 
come  down  to  their  assistance.  This  imposed  a 
like  movement  upon  the  British  van,  lest  it  should 
be  engaged  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  fleet,  and 
perhaps  doubled  on,  by  a  number  of  perfectly 
fresh .  ships.  The  Poder,  having  lost  her  chief 
spars,  could  not  be  carried  off,  nor  was  Hawke 
able  even  to  remove  the  men  he  had  thrown 
on  board.  She  was  therefore  retaken  by  the 
French.  Lieutenant  Lloyd,  the  officer  in  charge, 


42  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

escaped  with  a  part  of  the  prize  crew,  taking  with 
him  also  a  number  of  Spanish  prisoners ;  but  a 
junior  lieutenant  and  some  seamen  were  left 
behind  and  captured.  The  Berwick  being  com- 
pelled to  follow  her  division,  Lloyd  could  not 
rejoin  her  till  the  following  day,  and  sought 
refuge  for  that  night  on  board  another  ship. 

The  next  day,  February  23d,  Mathews  had 
another  chance.  As  he  did  not  pursue  during 
the  night,  while  the  allies  continued  to  retire,  he 
was  a  long  way  off  at  daylight ;  but  his  fleet  was 
now  united,  and  the  enemy  retreating.  He  need 
therefore  have  no  anxiety  about  the  crippled 
Marlborough,  but  could  follow  freely;  whereas, 
the  enemy  being  pursued,  their  injured  ships  both 
retarded  the  movement  and  were  endangered.  In 
the  course  of  the  day,  the  Poder  had  lagged  so  far 
behind  that  Admiral  Rowley,  who  had  recognized 
Hawke's  enterprise  the  day  before,  directed  him 
to  move  down  upon  her.  As  he  approached,  the 
French  ship  in  company  abandoned  her,  but  in 
taking  possession  Hawke  was  anticipated  by  the 
Essex,  which  Mathews  himself  had  ordered  to  do 
so.  The  captain  of  the  Essex  got  hold  of  the 
Spanish  flag,  with  some  other  small  trophies, 
which  he  afterwards  refused  to  give  up  unless 
compelled ;  and,  as  Mathews  would  not  give  an 
order,  Hawke  never  got  them.  Thus  curiously 
it  came  to  pass  that  the  one  man  who  above 
several  misdemeanants  distinguished  himself  by 
bad  conduct,  amounting  to  cowardice,  and  who 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  43 

ran  away  to  escape  trial,  kept  the  tokens  of  the 
single  achievement  of  the  day  from  him  whose 
valor  had  won  them.  The  Poder  herself  was  set 
on  fire,  and  destroyed. 

The  British  fleet  continued  to  follow  during 
the  23d,  and  at  nightfall  was  within  three  or 
four  miles  of  the  enemy,  when  Mathews  again 
stopped.  The  allies,  continuing  to  withdraw, 
were  next  morning  nearly  out  of  sight,  and 
further  pursuit  was  abandoned. 

Thus  ended  this  almost  forgotten  affair,  which 
in  its  day  occasioned  to  an  unusual  degree  the 
popular  excitement  and  discussion  which  always 
follow  marked  disaster,  and  but  rarely  attend 
success.  Besides  the  particular  missteps  of  Les- 
tock  and  the  individual  captains,  which  have  been 
mentioned,  Mathews's  conduct  was  marked  by 
serious  failures  in  professional  competency.  The 
charge  preferred  against  him  which  seems  most 
to  have  attracted  attention,  and  to  have  been 
considered  most  damaging,  was  taking  his  fleet 
into  action  in  a  confused  and  disorderly  manner. 
It  is  significant  of  professional  standards  that 
this  should  have  assumed  such  prominence;  for, 
however  faulty  may  have  been  his  previous  man- 
agement, the  most  creditable  part  of  his  conduct 
was  the  manner  of  his  attack.  He  did  not  wait 
for  a  pedantically  accurate  line,  but  by  a  straight- 
forward onslaught,  at  a  favorable  moment,  upon 
a  part  of  the  enemy,  —  and  that  the  rear,  —  set 
an  example  which,  had  it  been  followed  by  all 


44  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

who  could  do  so,  would  probably  have  resulted 
in  a  distinct  and  brilliant  success.  He  was  justi- 
fied—  if  he  reasoned  at  all  —  in  expecting  that 
Lestock  could  get  into  action  as  soon  as  the 
French  van ;  or,  at  the  least,  before  it  could 
reverse  the  conditions  which  would  have  ensued 
from  a  vigorous  encounter  upon  the  lines  of 
Mathews's  attack.  It  is  most  doubtful,  indeed, 
whether  the  French  van  would  have  ventured  to 
engage,  in  the  case  supposed ;  for  the  French 
admiral,  writing  to  the  French  ambassador  in 
Spain,  used  these  words :  "  It  is  clear,  in  the 
situation  I  was  in,  it  could  not  be  expected  that 
a  French  admiral  should  go  to  the  assistance  of 
the  Spaniards ;  neither  could  the  vanguard  of  the 
fleet  do  it  without  running  the  hazard  of  being 
surrounded  by  the  vanguard  of  the  English, 
which  had  the  wind  of  them ;  but  as  soon  as  the 
English  left  me  I  drew  together  all  the  ships  of 
both  squadrons,  and  sailed  immediately  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Real  Felipe,  in  doing  which  I 
was  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  whole  English 
line ;  but  happily  the  English  did  not  punish  my 
rashness  as  it  deserved."  Evidently  De  Court 
shared  to  the  full  the  professional  caution  which 
marked  the  French  naval  officers,  with  all  their 
personal  courage ;  for  if  it  was  rash  to  pass  the 
hostile  line  after  it  wore,  it  would  be  reckless  to 
do  so  before. 

Considered  simply  as  a  tactical   situation,  or 
problem,  quite  independent  of  any  tactical  fore- 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  45 

thought  or  insight  on  the  part  of  the  comma^der- 
in-chief,  —  of  which  there  is  little  indication, — 
the  conditions  resulting  from  his  attack  were  well 
summed  up  in  a  contemporary  publication,  wholly 
adverse  to  Mat  hews  in  tone,  and  saturated  with 
the  professional  prepossessions  embodied  in  the 
Fighting  Instructions.  This  writer,  who  claims 
to  be  a  naval  officer,  says : 

"  The  whole  amount  of  this  fight  is  that  the  centre, 
consisting  of  eleven  ships-of-the-line,  together  with  two 
of-the-line  and  two  fifty-gun  ships  of  the  Rear- Admiral's 
division  [the  van],  were  able  to  destroy  the  whole  Span- 
ish squadron,  much  more  so  as  three  of  those  ships  went 
on  with  the  French  [the  allied  van],  and  four  of  the 
sternmost  did  not  get  up  with  their  admiral  before  it 
was  darkish,  long  after  the  fire-ship's  misfortune,  so  that 
the  whole  afternoon  there  were  only  five,  out  of  which 
the  Constante  was  beat  away  in  less  than  an  hour ;  what 
then  fifteen  ships  could  be  doing  from  half  an  hour 
past  one  till  past  five,  no  less  than  four  hours,  and  these 
ships  not  taken,  burnt,  and  destroyed,  is  the  question 
which  behooves  them  to  answer." 

In  brief,  then,  Mathews's  attack  was  so  delivered 
that  the  weight  of  thirteen  of-the-line  fell  upon 
five  Spanish  of  the  same  class,  the  discomfiture  of 
which,  actually  accomplished  even  under  the  mis- 
behavior of  several  British  ships,  separated  the 
extreme  rear,  five  other  Spanish  vessels,  from  the 
rest  of  the  allies.  Whatever  the  personal  merit 
or  lack  of  merit  on  the  part  of  the  commander- 
in-chief,  such  an  opportunity,  pushed  home  by  a 


46  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

"band  of  brothers,"  would  at  the  least  have  wiped 
out  these  rear  ten  ships  of  the  allies ;  nor  could 
the  remainder  in  the  van  have  redeemed  the  situ- 
ation. As  for  the  method  of  attack,  it  is  worthy 
of  note  that,  although  adopted  by  Mathews 
accidentally,  it  anticipated,  not  only  the  best  gen- 
eral practice  of  a  later  date,  but  specifically  the 
purpose  of  Rodney  in  the  action  which  he  him- 
self considered  the  most  meritorious  of  his  whole 
career,  —  that  of  April  1 7,  1 780.  The  decisive 
signal  given  by  him  on  that  occasion,  as  explained 
by  himself,  meant  that  each  ship  should  steer, 
not  for  the  ship  corresponding  numerically  to 
her  in  the  enemy's  order,  but  for  the  one  imme- 
diately opposite  at  the  time  the  signal  was  made. 
This  is  what  Mathews  and  his  seconds  did,  and 
others  should  have  imitated.  Singularly  enough, 
not  only  was  the  opportunity  thus  created  lost, 
but  there  is  no  trace  of  its  existence,  even,  being 
appreciated  in  such  wise  as  to  affect  professional 
opinion.  As  far  as  Mathews  himself  was  con- 
cerned, the  accounts  show  that  his  conduct, 
instead  of  indicating  tactical  sagacity,  was  a 
mere  counsel  of  desperation. 

But  after  engaging  he  committed  palpable  and 
even  discreditable  mistakes.  Hauling  to  wind- 
ward —  away  —  when  the  Marlborough  forced 
him  ahead,  abandoned  that  ship  to  overwhelming 
numbers,  and  countenanced  the  irresolution  of 
the  Dorsetshire  and  others.  Continuing  to  stand 
north,  after  wearing  on  the  evening  of  the  battle, 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  47 

was  virtually  a  retreat,  unjustified  by  the  condi- 
tions ;  and  it  would  seem  that  the  same  false  step 
gravely  imperilled  the  Berwick,  Hawke  holding 
on,  most  properly,  to  the  very  last  moment  of 
safety,  in  order  to  get  back  his  prize-crew. 
Bringing-to  on  the  night  of  the  23d  was  an  error 
of  the  same  character  as  standing  north  during 
that  of  the  22d.  It  was  the  act  of  a  doubtful, 
irresolute  man, —  irresolute,  not  because  a  coward, 
but  because  wanting  in  the  self-confidence  that 
springs  from  conscious  professional  competency. 
In  short,  the  commander-in-chief's  unfitness  was 
graphically  portrayed  in  the  conversation  with 
Cornwall  from  the  quarter  gallery  of  the  flag-ship. 
"  If  you  approve  and  will  go  down  with  me,  I  will 
go  down."  Like  so  many  men,  he  needed  a 
backer,  to  settle  his  doubts  and  to  stiffen  his  back- 
bone. The  instance  is  far  from  unique. 

In  the  case  of  Byng,  as  of  Mathews,  we  are  not 
concerned  with  the  general  considerations  of  the 
campaign  to  which  the  battle  was  incidental.  It 
is  sufficient  to  note  that  in  Minorca,  then  a  Brit- 
ish possession,  the  French  had  landed  an  army  of 
15,000  men,  with  siege  artillery  sufficient  to 
reduce  the  principal  port  and  fortress,  Port 
Mahon ;  upon  which  the  whole  island  must  fall. 
Their  communications  with  France  depended 
upon  the  French  fleet  cruising  in  the  neighbor- 
hood. Serious  injury  inflicted  upon  it  would 
therefore  go  far  to  relieve  the  invested  garrison. 

Under   these   circumstances   the   British   fleet 


48  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

sighted  Minorca  on  the  igth  of  May,  1756,  and 
was  attempting  to  exchange  information  with  the 
besieged,  when  the  French  fleet  was  seen  in  the 
southeast.  Byng  stood  towards  it,  abandoning 
for  the  time  the  effort  to  communicate.  That 
night  both  fleets  manoeuvred  for  advantage  of 
position  with  regard  to  the  wind.  The  next  day, 
between  9  and  10  A.  M.,  they  came  again  in  view 
of  each  other,  and  at  1 1  were  about  six  miles  apart, 
the  French  still  to  the  southeast,  with  a  breeze 
at  south-southwest  to  southwest.  The  British 
once  more  advanced  towards  them,  close  hauled 
on  the  starboard  tack,  heading  southeasterly,  the 
enemy  standing  on  the  opposite  tack,  heading 
westerly,  both  carrying  sail  to  secure  the  weather 
gage  (Bt,  FJ).  It  appeared  at  first  that  the  French 
would  pass  ahead  of  the  British,  retaining  the 
windward  position  ;  but  towards  noon  the  wind 
changed,  enabling  the  latter  to  lie  up  a  point  or 
two  higher  (B2).  This  also  forced  the  bows  of 
the  several  French  vessels  off  their  course,  and  put 
them  out  of  a  regular  line  of  battle  ;  that  is,  they 
could  no  longer  sail  in  each  other's  wake  (F2). 
Being  thus  disordered,  they  reformed  on  the 
same  tack,  heading  northwest,  with  the  wind  very 
little  forward  of  the  beam.  This  not  only  took 
time,  but  lost  ground  to  leeward,  because  the 
quickest  way  to  re-establish  the  order  was  for  the 
mass  of  the  fleet  to  take  their  new  positions  from 
the  leewardmost  vessel.  When  formed  (F3),  as 
they  could  not  now  prevent  the  British  line  from 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  49 

passing  ahead,  they  hove-to  with  their  main- 
topsails  aback,  —  stopped,  —  awaiting  the  attack, 
which  was  thenceforth  inevitable  and  close  at 
hand. 

In  consequence  of  what  has  been  stated,  the 
British  line  (B2 —  B3)  —  more  properly,  column  — 
was  passing  ahead  of  the  French  (F2  —  F3),  steer- 
ing towards  their  rear,  in  a  direction  in  a  general 
sense  opposite  to  theirs,  but  not  parallel ;  that  is, 
the  British  course  made  an  angle,  of  between 
thirty  and  forty-five  degrees,  with  the  line  on 
which  their  enemy  was  ranged.  Hence,  barring 
orders  to  the  contrary,  —  which  were  not  given, — 
each  British  ship  was  at  its  nearest  to  the  enemy 
as  she  passed  their  van,  and  became  more  and  more 
distant  as  she  drew  to  the  rear.  It  would  have 
been  impossible  to  realize  more  exactly  the  post- 
ulate of  the  i  yth  Article  of  the  Fighting 
Instructions,  which  in  itself  voiced  the  ideal  con- 
ditions of  an  advantageous  naval  position  for 
attack,  as  conceived  by  the  average  officer  of 
the  day;  and,  as  though  most  effectually  to 
demonstrate  once  for  all  how  that  sort  of 
thing  would  work,  the  adjunct  circumstances 
approached  perfection.  The  admiral  was  thor- 
oughly wedded  to  the  old  system,  without  an 
idea  of  departing  from  it,  and  there  was  a  fair 
working  breeze  with  which  to  give  it  effect, 
for  the  ships  under  topsails  and  foresail  would 
go  about  three  knots ;  with  top-gallant  sails,  per- 
haps over  four.  A  fifty-gun  ship,  about  the 

4 


50  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

middle  of  the  engagement,  had  to  close  her 
lower  deck  ports  when  she  set  her  top-gallant 
sails  on  the  wind,  which  had  then  freshened 
a  little. 

The  lyth  Article  read  thus  :  "  If  the  admiral 
see  the  enemy  standing  towards  him,  and  he 
has  the  wind  of  them,  the  van  of  the  fleet 
is  to  make  sail  till  they  come  the  length  of 
the  enemy's  rear,  and  our  rear  abreast  of  the 
enemy's  van ;  then  he  that  is  in  the  rear  of 
our  fleet  is  to  tack  first,  and  every  ship  one 
after  another  as  fast  as  they  can  throughout 
the  whole  line;  and  if  the  admiral  will  have 
the  whole  fleet  to  tack  together,  the  sooner  to 
put  them  in  a  posture  of  engaging  the  enemy, 
he  will  hoist "  a  prescribed  signal,  "  and  fire 
a  gun;  and  whilst  they  are  in  fight  with  the 
enemy  the  ships  will  keep  at  half  a  cable's 
length  —  one  hundred  yards  —  one  of  the  other." 
All  this  Byng  aimed  to  do.  The  conditions  ex- 
actly fitted,  and  he  exactly  followed  the  rules,  with 
one  or  two  slight  exceptions,  which  will  appear, 
and  for  which  the  Court  duly  censured  him. 

When  thus  much  had  been  done,  the  igth 
Article  in  turn  found  its  postulate  realized,  and 
laid  down  its  corresponding  instruction :  "  If  the 
admiral  and  his  fleet  have  the  wind  of  the 
enemy,  and  they  have  stretched  themselves  in 
a  line  of  battle,  the  van  of  the  admiral's  fleet 
is  to  steer  with  the  van  of  the  enemy's,  and 
there  to  engage  with  them."  The  precise  force 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  51 

of  "  steer  with  "  is  not  immediately  apparent  to 
us  to-day,  nor  does  it  seem  to  have  been  perfectly 
clear  then ;  for  the  question  was  put  to  the 
captain  of  the  flag-ship, — the  heroic  Gardiner, 

—  "  You  have  been  asked  if  the  admiral  did  not 
express  some  uneasiness  at    Captain  Andrews  " 

—  of  the  van  ship  in  the  action  —  "  not  seeming 
to  understand  the  igth  Article  of  the  Fighting 
Instructions ;  Do  not  you  understand  that  article 
to  relate  to  our  van    particularly  when  the  two 
fleets  are  [already]  in  a  parallel  line  of  battle  to 
each  other  ?  "    (As  TT,  F3).    Answer :  "  I  appre- 
hended it  in  the  situation  "  [not  parallel]  "  we  were 
in l  if  the  word  For  were  instead  of   the  word 
With,  he  would,  I  apprehend,  have  steered  directly 

for  the  van  ship  of  the  Enemy."  Question.  "  As 
the  i  Qth  Article  expresses  to  steer  with  the 
van  of  the  enemy,  if  the  leading  ship  had  done 
so,  in  the  oblique  line  we  were  in  with  the 
enemy,  and  every  ship  had  observed  it  the  same, 
would  it  not  have  prevented  our  rear  coming  to 
action  at  all,  at  least  within  a  proper  distance  ? " 
Answer:  "Rear,  and  van  too."  "Steer  with" 
therefore  meant,  to  the  Court  and  to  Gardiner, 
to  steer  parallel  to  the  enemy,  —  possibly  like- 
wise abreast,  —  and  if  the  fleets  were  already 
parallel  the  instruction  would  work  ;  but  neither 
the  articles  themselves,  nor  Byng  by  his  signals, 
did  anything  to  effect  parallelism  before  making 
the  signal  to  engage. 

1  This  wording  and  punctuation  is  exact  from  the  text. 


52.  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

The  captain  of  the  ship  sternmost  in  passing, 
which  became  the  van  when  the  fleet  tacked 
together  according  to  the  Instructions  and 
signals,  evidently  shared  Gardiner's  impression ; 
when  about,  he  steered  parallel  to — "with"  — 
the  French,  who  had  the  wind  nearly  abeam. 
The  mischief  was  that  the  ships  ahead  of  him 
in  passing  were  successively  more  and  more 
distant  from  the  enemy,  and  if  they  too,  after 
tacking,  steered  with  the  latter,  they  would  never 
get  any  nearer.  The  impasse  is  clear.  Other 
measures  doubtless  would  enable  an  admiral 
to  range  his  fleet  parallel  to  the  enemy  at  any 
chosen  distance,  by  taking  a  position  himself  and 
forming  the  fleet  on  his  ship ;  or,  in  this  particu- 
lar instance,  Byng  being  with  the  van  as  it,  on 
the  starboard  tack,  was  passing  the  enemy 
(B3  B3),  could  at  any  moment  have  brought  his 
fleet  parallel  to  the  French  by  signalling  the 
then  van  ship  to  keep  away  a  certain  amount, 
the  rest  following  in  her  wake.  Nothing  to 
that  effect  being  in  the  Instructions,  it  seems 
not  to  have  occurred  to  him.  His  one  idea  was 
to  conform  to  them,  and  he  apprehended  that 
after  tacking,  as  they  prescribed,  the  new  van 
ship  would  bear  down  and  engage  without 
further  orders,  keeping  parallel  to  the  French 
when  within  point-blank,  the  others  following 
her  as  they  could  ;  a  process  which,  from  the 
varying  distances,  would  expose  each  to  a  con- 
centrated fire  as  they  successively  approached. 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  53 

Byng's  action  is  only  explicable  to  the  writer 
by  supposing  that  he  thus  by  "  steer  with " 
understood  "  steer  for  ;  "  for  when,  after  the  fleet 
tacked  together,  the  new  van  ship  (formerly  the 
rear)  did  not  of  her  own  motion  head  for  the 
leading  enemy,  he  signalled  her  to  steer  one 
point,  and  then  two  points,  in  that  direction. 
This,  he  explained  in  his  defence,  was  "  to  put 
the  leading  captain  in  mind  of  his  Instructions, 
who  I  perceived  did  not  steer  away  with  the 
enemy's  leading  ship  agreeable  to  the  igth  Arti- 
cle of  the  Fighting  Instructions."  The  results 
of  these  orders  not  answering  his  expectations, 
he  then  made  the  signal  to  engage,  as  the  only 
remaining  way  perceptible  to  him  for  carrying 
out  the  Instructions. 

To  summarize  the  foregoing,  up  to  the  moment 
the  signal  for  battle  was  made :  While  the  fleets 
were  striving  for  the  weather  gage,  the  wind  had 
shifted  to  the  southwest.  The  French,  momenta- 
rily disordered  by  the  change,  had  formed  in  line 
ahead  about  noon,  heading  northwest,  westerly,  so 
as  just  to  keep  their  main  topsails  aback  and  the 
ships  with  bare  steerage  way,  but  under  command 
(F3).  The  British  standing  south-southeast,  by  the 
wind,  were  passing  (B2— B3)  across  the  head  of  the 
enemy's  fleet  at  a  distance  of  from  three  to  two 
miles  —  the  latter  being  the  estimate  by  their 
ships  then  in  the  rear.  The  French  having 
twelve  vessels  in  line  and  the  British  thirteen,  the 
gradual  progress  of  the  latter  should  bring  their 


54  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

then  van  "  the  length  of  the  enemy's  rear,"  about 
the  time  the  rear  came  abreast  of  his  van.  When 
this  happened,  the  Instructions  required  that  the 
fleet  tack  together,  and  then  stand  for  the  enemy, 
ship  to  ship,  number  one  to  number  one,  and  so 
along  the  line  till  the  number  twelves  met.1 

This  Byng  purposed  to  do,  but,  unluckily  for 
himself,  ventured  on  a  refinement.  Considering 
that,  if  his  vessels  bore  down  when  abreast  their 
respective  antagonists,  they  would  go  bows-on, 
perpendicularly,  subject  to  a  raking — enfilading 
—  fire,  he  deferred  the  signal  to  tack  till  his  van 
had  passed  some  distance  beyond  the  French  rear, 
because  thus  they  would  have  to  approach  in  a 
slanting  direction.  He  left  out  of  his  account  here 
the  fact  that  all  long  columns  tend  to  straggle  in 
the  rear ;  hence,  although  he  waited  till  his  three 
or  four  leading  ships  had  passed  the  enemy 
before  making  signal  to  tack,  the  rear  had  got  no 
farther  than  abreast  the  hostile  van.  Two  of  the 
clearest  witnesses,  Baird  of  the  Portland,  next  to 
the  then  rear  ship,  and  Cornwall  of  the  Revenge, 
seventh  from  it,  testified  that,  after  tacking 
together,  to  the  port  tack,  when  they  kept  away 
for  the  enemy  in  obedience  to  the  signal  for 
battle,  it  was  necessary,  in  order  to  reach  their 
particular  opponents,  to  bring  the  wind  not  only 
as  far  as  astern,  but  on  the  starboard  quarter, 

1  So  far  was  literalism  carried,  that,  before  the  signal  for  battle,  Byng 
evened  numbers  with  his  opponent  by  directing  his  weakest  ship  to 
leave  the  line,  with  no  other  orders  than  to  be  ready  to  take  the  place  of 
a  disabled  vessel. 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  55 

showing  that  they  had  been  in  rear  of  their  sta- 
tion before  tacking,  and  so  too  far  ahead  after  it ; 
while  Durell  of  the  Trident,  ninth  from  rear  and 
therefore  fifth  from  van,  asserted  that  at  the 
same  moment  the  British  van,  which  after  tacking 
became  the  rear,  had  overpassed  the  enemy  by 
five  or  six  ships.  This  may  be  an  exaggeration, 
but  that  three  or  four  vessels  had  gone  beyond 
is  proved  by  evidence  from  the  ships  at  that  end 
of  the  line. 

The  Court  therefore  distinctly  censured  the 
admiral  for  this  novelty :  "  Unanimously,  the 
Court  are  of  opinion  that  when  the  British  fleet 
on  the  starboard  tack  were  stretched  abreast,  or 
about  the  beam  of  the  enemy's  line,  the  admiral 
should  have  tacked  the  fleet  all  together,  and 
immediately  have  conducted  it  on  a  direct  course 
for  the  enemy,  the  van  steering  for  the  enemy's 
van,"  etc.  The  instructive  point,  however,  is  not 
Byng's  variation,  nor  the  Court's  censure,  but  the 
idea,  common  to  both,  that  the  one  and  only  way 
to  use  your  dozen  ships  under  the  conditions  was 
to  send  each  against  a  separate  antagonist.  The 
highest  and  authoritative  conception  of  a  fleet 
action  was  thus  a  dozen  naval  duels,  occurring 
simultaneously,  under  initial  conditions  unfavor- 
able to  the  assailant.  It  is  almost  needless  to 
remark  that  this  is  as  contrary  to  universal  mili- 
tary teaching  as  it  was  to  the  practice  of  Rodney, 
Howe,  Jervis,  and  Nelson,  a  generation  or  two 
later. 


56  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

This  is,  in  fact,  the  chief  significance  of  this 
action,  which  ratified  and  in  a  measure  closed  the 
effete  system  to  which  the  middle  eighteenth 
century  had  degraded  the  erroneous,  but  com- 
paratively hearty,  tradition  received  by  it  from 
the  seventeenth.  It  is  true,  the  same  blunder- 
ing method  was  illustrated  in  the  War  of  1778. 
Arbuthnot  and  Graves,  captains  when  Byng  was 
tried,  followed  his  plan  in  1781,  with  like  dem- 
onstration of  practical  disaster  attending  false 
theory ;  but,  while  the  tactical  inefficiency  was 
little  less,  the  evidence  of  faint-hearted  profes- 
sional incompetency,  of  utter  personal  inade- 
quacy, was  at  least  not  so  glaring.  It  is  the 
combination  of  the  two  in  the  person  of  the 
same  commander  that  has  given  to  this  action  its 
pitiful  pre-eminence  in  the  naval  annals  of  the 
century. 

It  is,  therefore,  not  so  much  to  point  out  the 
lesson,  as  to  reinforce  its  teaching  by  the  exem- 
plification of  the  practical  results,  that  there  is 
advantage  in  tracing  the  sequel  of  events  in  this 
battle.  The  signal  to  tack  was  made  when  the 
British  van  had  reached  beyond  the  enemy's 
rear,  at  a  very  little  after  i  P.M.  (B3).  This  re- 
versed the  line  of  battle,  the  rear  becoming  the 
van,  on  the  port  tack.  When  done,  the  new 
van  was  about  two  miles  from  that  of  the 
French  (F4) ;  the  new  rear,  in  which  Byng  was 
fourth  from  sternmost,  was  three  and  a  half  or 
four  from  their  rear.  Between  this  and  2  p.  M. 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  57 

came  the  signals  for  the  ship  then  leading  to  keep 
two  points,  twenty-five  degrees,  more  to  starboard, 
—  towards  the  enemy;  a  measure  which  could 
only  have  the  bad  effect  of  increasing  the  angle 
which  the  British  line  already  made  with  that 
of  the  French,  and  the  consequent  inequality  of 
distance  to  be  traversed  by  their  vessels  in  reach- 
ing their  opponents.  At  2.20  the  signal  for  battle 
was  made,  and  was  repeated  by  the  second  in 
command,  Rear-Admiral  Temple  West,  who  was 
in  the  fourth  ship  from  the  van.  His  division  of 
six  bore  up  at  once  and  ran  straight  down  before 
the  wind,  under  topsails  only,  for  their  several 
antagonists;  the  sole  exception  being  the  van- 
most  vessel,  which  took  the  slanting  direction 
desired  by  Byng,  with  the  consequence  that  she 
got  ahead  of  her  position,  had  to  back  and  to 
wear  to  regain  it,  and  was  worse  punished  than 
any  of  her  comrades.  The  others  engaged  in 
line,  within  point-blank,  the  rear-admiral  hoisting 
the  flag  for  close  action  (B4).  Fifteen  minutes 
later,  the  sixth  ship,  and  rearmost  of  the  van, 
the  Intrepid,  lost  her  foretopmast,  which  crippled 
her. 

The  seventh  ship,  which  was  the  leader  of  the 
rear,  Byng's  own  division,  got  out  of  his  hands 
before  he  could  hold  her.  Her  captain,  Frederick 
Cornwall,  was  nephew  to  the  gallant  fellow  who 
fell  backing  Mathews  so  nobly  off  Toulon,  and 
had  then  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  Marl- 
borough,  fighting  her  till  himself  disabled.  He 


58  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

had  to  bring  the  wind  on  the  starboard  quarter 
of  his  little  sixty-four,  in  order  to  reach  the  sev- 
enth in  the  enemy's  line,  which  was  an  eighty-gun 
ship,  carrying  the  flag  of  the  French  admiral. 
This  post,  by  professional  etiquette,  as  by  evident 
military  considerations,  Byng  owed  to  his  own 
flag-ship,  of  equal  force. 

The  rest  of  the  rear  division  the  commander- 
in-chief  attempted  to  carry  with  himself,  slanting 
down ;  or,  as  the  naval  term  then  had  it,  "  lask- 
ing "  towards  the  enemy.  The  flag-ship  kept 
away  four  points  —  forty-five  degrees ;  but  hardly 
had  she  started,  under  the  very  moderate  canvas 
of  topsails  and  foresail,  to  cover  the  much  greater 
distance  to  be  travelled,  in  order  to  support  the 
van  by  engaging  the  enemy's  rear,  when  Byng 
observed  that  the  two  ships  on  his  left  —  towards 
the  van  —  were  not  keeping  pace  with  him.  He 
ordered  the  main  and  mizzen  topsails  to  be  backed 
to  wait  for  them.  Gardiner,  the  captain,  "  took 
the  liberty  of  offering  the  opinion  "  that,  if  sail 
were  increased  instead  of  reduced,  the  ships  con- 
cerned would  take  the  hint,  that  they  would  all 
be  sooner  alongside  the  enemy,  and  probably 
receive  less  damage  in  going  down.  It  was  a 
question  of  example.  The  admiral  replied,  "  You 
see  that  the  signal  for  the  line  is  out,  and  I  am 
ahead  of  those  two  ships;  and  you  would  not 
have  me,  as  admiral  of  the  fleet,  run  down  as  if 
I  was  going  to  engage  a  single  ship.  It  was  Mr. 
Mathews's  misfortune  to  be  prejudiced  by  not 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  59 

carrying  his  force  down  together,  which  I  shall 
endeavor  to  avoid."  Gardiner  again  "  took  the  lib- 
erty "  of  saying  he  would  answer  for  one  of  the  two 
captains  doing  his  duty.  The  incident,  up  to  the 
ship  gathering  way  again,  occupied  less  than  ten 
minutes ;  but  with  the  van  going  down  headlong 
—  as  it  ous^ht  —  one  ceases  to  wonder  at  the 

O 

impression  on  the  public  produced  by  one  who 
preferred  lagging  for  laggards  to  hastening  to 
support  the  forward,  and  that  the  populace  sus- 
pected something  worse  than  pedantry  in  such 
reasoning  at  such  a  moment.  When  way  was 
resumed,  it  was  again  under  the  very  leisurely 
canvas  of  topsails  and  foresail. 

By  this  had  occurred  the  incident  of  the  In- 
trepid losing  her  foretopmast.  It  was  an  ordinary 
casualty  of  battle,  and  one  to  be  expected ;  but 
to  such  a  temper  as  Byng's,  and  under  the 
cast-iron  regulations  of  the  Instructions,  it 
entailed  consequences  fatal  to  success  in  the 
action,  —  if  success  were  ever  attainable  under 
such  a  method,  —  and  was  ultimately  fatal  to 
the  admiral  himself.  The  wreck  of  the  fallen 
mast  was  cleared,  and  the  foresail  set  to  maintain 
speed,  but,  despite  all,  the  Intrepid  dropped 
astern  in  the  line.  Cornwall  in  the  Revenge 
was  taking  his  place  at  the  moment,  and  fearing 
that  the  Intrepid  would  come  back  upon  him, 
if  in  her  wake,  he  brought  up  first  a  little 
to  windward,  on  her  quarter;  then,  thinking 
that  she  was  holding  her  way,  he  bore  up  again. 


60  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

At  this  particular  instant  he  looked  behind,  and 
saw  the  admiral  and  other  ships  a  considerable 
distance  astern  and  to  windward ;  much  Les- 
tock's  position  in  Mathews's  action.  This  was 
the  stoppage  already  mentioned,  to  wait  for  the 
two  other  ships.  Had  Cornwall  been  Burrish, 
he  might  in  this  have  seen  occasion  for  waiting 
himself ;  but  he  saw  rather  the  need  of  the 
crippled  ship.  The  Revenge  took  position  on 
the  IntrepicCs  lee  quarter,  to  support  her  against 
the  enemy's  fire,  concentrated  on  her  when  her 
mast  was  seen  to  fall.  As  her  way  slackened, 
the  Revenge  approached  her,  and  about  fifteen 
minutes  later  the  ship  following,  the  Princess 
Louisa,  —  one  of  those  for  which  Byng  had 
waited, — loomed  up  close  behind  Cornwall,  who 
expected  her  to  run  him  on  board,  her  braces 
being  shot  away.  She  managed,  however,  with 
the  helm  to  back  her  sails,  and  dropped  clear; 
but  in  so  doing  got  in  the  way  of  the  vessel 
next  after  her,  the  Trident,  which  immediately 
preceded  Byng.  The  captain  of  the  Trident, 
slanting  down  with  the  rest  of  the  division, 
saw  the  situation,  put  his  helm  up,  ran  under 
the  stern  of  the  Louisa,  passed  on  her  lee  side, 
—  nearest  the  enemy,  —  and  ranged  up  behind 
the  Revenge;  but  in  doing  this  he  not  only 
crossed  the  stern  of  the  Louisa,  but  the  bow 
of  the  admiral's  ship  —  the  Ramillies. 

Under     proper    management     the    Ramillies 
doubtless  could  have  done  just  what  the   Trident 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  61 

did,  —  keep  away  with  the  helm,  till  the  ships 
ahead  of  her  were  cleared ;  she  would  be  at 
least  hasting  towards  the  enemy.  But  the  noise 
of  battle  was  in  the  air,  and  the  crew  of  the 
Ramillies  began  to  fire  without  orders,  at  an 
improper  distance.  The  admiral  permitted  them 
to  continue,  and  the  smoke  enveloping  the  ship 
prevented  fully  noting  the  incidents  just  nar- 
rated. It  was,  however,  seen  before  the  firing 
that  the  Louisa  was  come  up  into  the  wind 
with  her  topsails  shaking,  and  the  Trident  pass- 
ing her  to  leeward.  There  should,  therefore, 
have  been  some  preparation  of  mind  for  the 
fact  suddenly  reported  to  the  admiral,  by  a 
military  passenger  on  the  quarter  deck,  that 
a  British  ship  was  close  aboard,  on  the  lee  bow. 
It  was  the  Trident  that  had  crossed  from  wind- 
ward to  leeward  for  the  reasons  given,  and  an 
instant  later  the  Louisa  was  seen  on  the  weather 
bow.  Instead  of  keeping  off,  as  the  Trident 
had  done,  the  admiral  ordered  the  foresail  hauled 
up,  the  helm  down,  luffed  the  ship  to  the  wind, 
and  braced  the  foretopsail  sharp  aback ;  the 
effect  of  which  was  first  to  stop  her  way,  and 
then  to  pay  her  head  off  to  leeward,  clear  of 
the  two  vessels.  About  quarter  of  an  hour 
elapsed,  by  Captain  Gardiner's  evidence,  from 
the  time  that  the  Ramillies1  s  head  pointed  clear 
of  the  Trident  and  Louisa  before  sail  was  again 
made  to  go  forward  to  aid  the  van.  The  battle 
was  already  lost,  and  in  fact  had  passed  out 


62  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

of  Byng's  control,  owing  to  his  previous  action ; 
nevertheless  this  further  delay,  though  probably 
due  only  to  the  importance  attached  by  the 
admiral  to  regularity  of  movement,  had  a  dis- 
creditable appearance. 

The  Court  held  that  the  admiral  was  justified 
in  not  trying  to  go  to  leeward  of  the  two  ships, 
under  the  circumstances  when  they  were  seen; 
but  blamed  him  for  permitting  the  useless  can- 
nonade which  prevented  seeing  them  sooner. 
The  results  at  this  moment  in  other  parts  of 
the  field  should  be  summarized,  as  they  show 
both  the  cause  and  the  character  of  the  failures 
due  to  faulty  management. 

The  five  ships  of  the  British  van  had  already 
seen  their  adversaries  withdraw  after  a  sharp 
engagement.  This  seems  to  have  been  due  to 
the  fact  that  two  were  individually  overmatched 
and  driven  off;  whereupon  the  other  three 
retired  because  unable  to  contend  with  five. 
But  no  support  reached  the  British  van  at 
this  important  moment ;  on  the  contrary,  the 
British  rear  was  now  two  or  three  miles  distant, 
astern  and  to  windward.  The  lagging  of  the 
crippled  Intrepid  held  back  the  Revenge.  Corn- 
wall was  detained  some  time  by  the  old  idea 
that  he  needed  a  signal  to  pass  her,  because 
to  do  so  was  breaking  the  order  established  by 
the  admiral ;  but  concluding  at  last  that  Byng 
was  unaware  of  the  conditions,  and  seeing  that 
his  immediate  opponent  —  the  French  admiral 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  63 

—  was  drawing  ahead,  he  sent  word  to  the 
Intrepid  to  hold  her  fire  for  a  few  moments 
till  he  could  go  by.  He  then  made  sail. 

The  French  rear  with  its  commander-in-chief 
had  been  watching  the  incidents  narrated  :  the 
crippling  of  the  Intrepid,  the  consequent  disorder 
in  the  British  rear,  and  the  increasing  distance 
between  it  and  the  van.  When  the  Revenge, 
however,  passed  ahead,  and  Byng  disentangled 
his  flag-ship,  the  moment  for  a  decisive  step 
arrived.  The  French  rear  vessels  were  nearer 
the  British  van  than  Byng's  division  was.  They 
now  filled  their  topsails,  made  more  sail,  stood 
for  the  British  leading  ships,  already  partially 
unrigged,  passed  by,  and  in  so  doing  gave  them 
the  fire  of  a  number  of  substantially  fresh  vessels, 
which  had  undergone  only  a  distant  and  ineffec- 
tive cannonade.  Byng  saw  what  was  about  to 
happen,  and  also  set  more  canvas ;  but  it  was  no 
longer  possible  to  retrieve  the  preceding  errors. 
The  French  admiral  had  it  in  his  power  very 
seriously  to  damage,  if  not  to  destroy  the  hostile 
van ;  but  in  accordance  with  the  tradition  of  his 
nation  he  played  an  over-prudent  game,  strictly 
defensive,  and  kept  too  far  off.  After  exchang- 
ing distant  broadsides,  he  steered  northwest  to- 
wards Marion,  satisfied  that  he  had  for  the  time 
disabled  his  opponent.  The  British  that  eve- 
ning tacked  off-shore  and  stood  to  the  southeast. 
Four  days  later  they  abandoned  the  field,  return- 
ing to  Gibraltar.  The  fall  of  Minorca  followed. 


64  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

Nothing  could  have  been  much  worse  than  the 
deplorable  management  of  this  action  on  the  part 
of  the  commander-in-chief.  It  is  a  conspicuous 
instance  of  weak  and  halting  execution,  superim- 
posed upon  a  professional  conception  radically 
erroneous ;  and  it  reflected  throughout  the  timid 
hesitancy  of  spirit  which  dictated  the  return  to 
Gibraltar,  under  the  always  doubtful  sanction*  of 
a  Council  of  War.  But  the  historical  value  of 
the  lesson  is  diminished  if  attention  is  confined 
to  the  shortcomings  of  the  admiral,  neglectful 
of  the  fact  that  his  views  as  to  the  necessity 
to  observe  the  routine  of  the  Fighting  Instruc- 
tions are  reproduced  in  the  evidence  of  the 
captains  ;  and  that  the  finding  of  the  Court 
censures,  not  the  general  idea,  but  certain  details, 
important  yet  secondary.  Durell,  being  asked 
whether  the  admiral  could  not  have  passed  under 
the  stern  of  the  Trident,  as  the  Trident  had 
under  that  of  the  Louisa,  replies,  "  Yes,  but  she 
would  have  been  to  leeward  of  those  ships 
ahead ; "  that  is,  to  leeward  of  the  line.  Gar- 
diner "knows  no  other  method  than  what  the 
admiral  took,  for  preserving  the  line  regular." 
Cornwall  cannot  pass  the  Intrepid  without  a 
signal,  because  it  would  be  breaking  the  order. 
These  were  all  good  men. 

The  Court,  composed  of  four  admirals  and 
nine  captains,  the  junior  of  whom  had  over  ten 
years  seniority,  give  in  their  finding  no  shadow 
of  disapproval  to  the  broad  outlines  of  the  action. 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  65 

There  can  be,  therefore,  no  doubt  about  service 
standards.  The  questions  put  to  the  witnesses 
reveal  indeed  a  distinct  preference  for  forming 
the  line  of  battle  parallel  to  that  of  the  enemy 
before  bearing  down,  so  that  all  the  ships  may 
have  the  same  distance  to  go,  have  a  clear  field 
ahead  of  each,  and  the  comparatively  simple 
mutual  bearing  of  "abeam"  to  observe;  but  it 
refrains  from  censuring  the  admiral  for  forming 
on  a  line  very  oblique  to  that  of  the  enemy, 
which  entailed  the  burden  of  changing  the  rela- 
tive positions  during  standing  down,  so  as  to 
arrive  all  together,  on  a  line  parallel  to  his ;  while 
the  course  itself  being  oblique  alike  to  their  own 
front  and  the  enemy's,  each  preceding  ship  was 
liable  to  get  in  the  way,  "  to  prove  an  impedi- 
ment," to  its  follower,  —  as  actually  happened. 
It  was  indeed  impossible  to  fault  the  commander- 
in-chief  in  this  particular,  because  his  action  was 
conformable  to  the  letter  of  the  Instructions, 
with  which  he  was  evidently  and  subserviently 
eager  to  comply. 

The  decision  of  the  Court  therefore  was,  in 
substance,  that  in  bearing  down  upon  the  enemy 
Byng  did  not  do  wrong  in  starting  upon  a  line 
oblique  to  them ;  but  that  he  should  have  steered 
such  a  course,  and  maintained  such  spread  of 
sail,  graduated  to  the  speed  of  the  slowest  ship  in 
the  fleet,  that  all  should  reach  point-blank  range 
at  the  same  time,  and  be  then  ranged  on  a 
line  parallel  to  that  of  the  enemy.  "  When  on 

5 


66  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

the  starboard  tack,  the  admiral  should  have 
tacked  the  fleet  all  together  and  immediately  con- 
ducted it  on  a  direct  course  for  the  enemy ;  .  .  . 
each  ship  steering  for  her  opposite  ship  in  the 
enemy's  line,  and  under  such  sail  as  might  have 
enabled  the  worst  sailing  ship,  under  all  her  plain 
sail,  to  preserve  her  station."  It  is  needless  to 
insist  with  any  naval  man,  or  to  any  soldier,  that 
such  an  advance,  in  orderly  fashion,  oblique  to 
the  front,  is  unattainable  except  by  long  drill, 
while  this  fleet  had  been  but  a  few  weeks  assem- 
bled; and  the  difficulty  is  enhanced  when  each 
ship  has  not  only  to  keep  its  station  in  line,  but 
to  reach  a  particular  enemy,  who  may  not  be  just 
where  he  ought,  having  respect  to  the  British 
order.  The  manoeuvre  favored  by  the  Court  for 
the  fleet  as  a  whole  was  in  fact  just  that  which 
Byng  attempted  for  his  own  division,  with  the 
results  that  have  been  narrated.  These  were 
aggravated  by  his  mismanagement,  but  did  not 
originate  from  it. 

The  invariable  result  of  an  attack  thus  at- 
tempted, however  vigorously  made,  was  that  the 
van  of  the  assailant  got  into  action  first,  receiving 
the  brunt  of  the  enemy's  fire  without  proper  sup- 
port. Not  infrequently,  it  also  underwent  a 
second  hammering  from  the  enemy's  rear,  pre- 
cisely in  the  same  way  as  occurred  in  Byng's 
action  ;  and  whether  this  happened  or  not  de- 
pended more  upon  the  enemy  than  upon  the 
British  rear.  In  ignoring,  therefore,  the  idea  of 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  67 

combining  an  attack  in  superior  numbers  upon 
a  part  of  the  enemy,  and  adopting  instead  that  of 
an  onslaught  upon  his  whole,  all  along  the  line, 
the  British  practice  of  the  eighteenth  century 
not  only  surrendered  the  advantage  which  the 
initiative  has,  of  effecting  a  concentration,  but 
subjected  their  own  fleets  to  being  beaten  in 
detail,  subject  only  to  the  skill  of  the  opponent 
in  using  the  opportunity  extended  to  him.  The 
results,  at  best,  were  indecisive,  tactically  con- 
sidered. The  one  apparent  exception  was  in 
June,  1794,  when  Lord  Howe,  after  long  vainly 
endeavoring  a  better  combination  with  a  yet  raw 
fleet,  found  himself  forced  to  the  old  method  ; 
but  although  then  several  ships  were  captured, 
this  issue  seems  attributable  chiefly  to  the  con- 
dition of  the  French  Navy,  greatly  fallen  through 
circumstances  foreign  to  the  present  subject.  It 
was  with  this  system  that  Rodney  was  about  to 
break,  the  first  of  his  century  formally  to  do  so. 
A  false  tactical  standard,  however,  was  not  the 
only  drawback  under  which  the  British  Navy 
labored  in  1739.  The  prolonged  series  of  wars, 
which  began  when  the  establishment  of  civil 
order  under  Cromwell  permitted  the  nation  to 
turn  from  internal  strife  to  external  interests,  had 
been  for  England  chiefly  maritime.  They  had 
recurred  at  brief  intervals,  and  had  been  of  such 
duration  as  to  insure  a  continuity  of  experience 
and  development.  Usage  received  modification 
under  the  influence  of  constant  warlike  practice, 


68  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

and  the  consequent  changes  in  methods,  if  not 
always  thoroughly  reasoned,  at  the  least  reflected 
a  similar  process  of  professional  advance  in  the 
officers  of  the  service.  This  was  consecutively 
transmitted,  and  by  the  movement  of  actual  war 
was  prevented  from  stagnating  and  hardening 
into  an  accepted  finality.  Thus  the  service  and 
its  officers,  in  the  full  performance  of  their  func- 
tions, were  alive  and  growing.  Nor  was  this  all. 
The  same  surroundings  that  promoted  this 
healthful  evolution  applied  also  a  continual  test 
of  fitness  to  persons.  As  each  war  began,  there 
were  still  to  be  found  in  the  prime  of  vigor  and 
usefulness  men  whose  efficiency  had  been  proved 
in  its  predecessor,  and  thus  the  line  of  sustained 
ability  in  leadership  was  carried  on  from  one 
naval  generation  to  another,  through  the  sixty- 
odd  years,  1652-1713,  over  which  these  condi- 
tions extended. 

The  peace  of  Utrecht  in  1713  put  an  end  to 
this  period.  A  disputed  succession  after  the 
death  of  Queen  Anne,  in  1714,  renewed  the  condi- 
tion of  internal  disquietude  which  had  paralyzed 
the  external  action  of  England  under  Charles  I.; 
and  this  co-operated  with  the  mere  weariness  of 
war,  occasioned  by  prolonged  strife,  to  give  both 
the  country  and  the  navy  a  temporary  distaste  to 
further  military  activity.  The  man  of  the  occa- 
sion, who  became  the  exponent  and  maintainer 
of  this  national  inclination,  was  Sir  Robert  Wai- 
pole  ;  to  whom,  during  his  ministry  of  over  twenty 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  69 

years,  can  fairly  be  applied  Jefferson's  phrase 
concerning  himself,  that  his  "  passion  was  peace." 
But,  whatever  the  necessity  to  the  country  of 
such  a  policy,  it  too  often  results,  as  it  did  in  both 
these  cases,  in  neglect  of  the  military  services, 
allowing  the  equipment  to  decay,  and  tending  to 
sap  the  professional  interest  and  competency  of 
the  officers. 

From  this  last  evil  the  United  States  Navy  in 
Jefferson's  day  was  saved  by  the  simple  fact  that 
the  officers  were  young  men,  or  at  the  most  in 
the  early  prime  of  life,  —  the  Navy  itself,  in  1812, 
being  less  than  twenty  years  old  as  a  corporate 
organization.  The  British  Navy  of  1739  was  in 
very  different  case.  For  a  quarter  of  a  century 
the  only  important  military  occurrence  had  been 
the  Battle  of  Cape  Passaro,  in  1718,  where  the 
British  fleet  in  a  running  fight  destroyed  a  much 
inferior  Spanish  force ;  and  the  occasion  then 
was  not  one  of  existent  war,  but  of  casual  hostili- 
ties, which,  precipitated  by  political  conditions, 
began  and  ended  with  the  particular  incident,  as 
far  as  the  sea  was  concerned.  Back  of  this  lay 
only  Malaga,  in  1704;  for  the  remaining  years  of 
war,  up  to  1713,  had  been  unmarked  by  fleet 
battles.  The  tendency  of  this  want  of  experience, 
followed  by  the  long  period  —  not  of  peace  only, 
but  —  of  professional  depression  resultant  upon 
inactivity  and  national  neglect,  was  to  stagna- 
tion, to  obviate  which  no  provision  existed  or  was 
attempted.  Self-improvement  was  not  a  note  of 


yo  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

the  service,  nor  of  the  times.  The  stimulus  of 
occupation  and  the  corrective  of  experience  being 
removed,  average  men  stuck  where  they  were, 
and  grew  old  in  a  routine  of  service,  or,  what  was 
perhaps  worse,  out  of  the  service  in  all  but  name. 
In  naval  warfare,  the  Battle  of  Malaga,  the  last 
point  of  performance,  remained  the  example,  and 
the  Fighting  Instructions  the  passively  accepted 
authority.  The  men  at  the  head  of  the  Navy,  to 
whom  the  country  naturally  looked,  either  had  no 
record — no  proof  of  fitness — because  but  youths 
in  the  last  war,  or  else,  in  simple  consequence  of 
having  then  had  a  chance  to  show  themselves, 
were  now  superannuated.  This  very  fact,  how- 
ever, had  the  singular  and  unfortunate  result  that, 
because  the  officers  of  reputation  were  old,  men 
argued,  by  a  curious  perversion  of  thought,  that 
none  but  the  old  should  be  trusted. 

Of  this  two  significant  cases  will  tell  more 
than  many  words.  Mathews,  who  commanded  at 
Toulon  in  1744,  was  then  sixty-seven  years  old, 
and  had  not  been  at  sea  between  1724  and  1742. 
Hawke,  in  1 747,  when  he  had  already  established 
an  excellent  reputation  as  a  captain,  and  for  enter- 
prise in  recent  battle,  was  thought  young  to  be 
entrusted  with  a  squadron  of  a  dozen  ships-of-the- 
line,  although  he  was  forty-two,  — two  years  older 
than  Nelson  at  the  Nile,  but  four  years  younger 
than  Napoleon  and  Wellington  at  Waterloo,  and 
one  year  less  in  age  than  Grant  at  the  close  of 
the  American  Civil  War.  Such  instances  are  not 


of  the  Eighteenth   Century  71 

of  merely  curious  interest ;  they  are  symptoms  of 
professional  states  of  mind,  of  a  perplexity  and 
perversion  of  standards  which  work  disastrously 
whenever  war  succeeds  to  a  prolonged  period  of 
peace,  until  experience  has  done  its  work  by 
sorting  out  the  unsound  from  among  the  fair- 
seeming,  and  has  shown  also  that  men  may  be 
too  old  as  well  as  too  young  for  unaccustomed 
responsibility.  The  later  prevalence  of  juster 
views  was  exemplified  in  the  choice  of  Wolfe, 
who  was  but  thirty-two  when  he  fell  before 
Quebec  in  1759,  charged  with  one  of  the  most 
difficult  enterprises  that  had  then  been  entrusted 
to  a  British  general. 

It  is  these  two  factors,  therefore,  an  erroneous 
standard  and  a  lethargic  peace,  which  princi- 
pally caused  the  weakness  of  the  British  offi- 
cial staff  for  battle  service  at  the  period  of 
lowest  descent,  which  was  reached  in  the  first 
quarter  of  the  eighteenth  century,  but  was  pro- 
longed and  intensified  by  a  protracted  interval 
of  professional  apathy.  Other  grievous  evils 
doubtless  existed,  serious  defects  in  administra- 
tion, involving  indifferent  equipment,  bad  and 
scanty  provisions,  inferior  physique  in  the  ships' 
companies,  and  wretched  sanitary  arrangements ; 
but  while  all  these  unquestionably  gravely  affected 
general  efficiency  for  war,  they  belonged  rather 
to  the  civil  than  the  military  side  of  the  profes- 
sion. In  the  hour  of  battle  it  was  not  these, 
but  the  tone  and  efficiency  of  the  officers,  that 


yt  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

chiefly  told.  A  false  pattern  of  action  had  been 
accepted  at  a  moment  favorable  to  its  perpetu- 
ation, when  naval  warfare  on  the  grand  scale  had 
ceased,  owing  to  the  decline  of  the  principal 
enemy,  the  navy  of  France ;  while  the  average 
competency  of  naval  officers  had  been  much  low- 
ered through  want  of  professional  incentive,  and 
the  absence  of  any  sifting  process  by  which  the 
unfit  could  be  surely  eliminated.  That  plenty  of 
good  material  existed,  was  sufficiently  shown  by 
the  number  of  names,  afterwards  distinguished, 
which  soon  began  to  appear.  Weeding  went  on 
apace ;  but  before  its  work  was  done,  there  had  to 
be  traversed  a  painful  period,  fruitful  of  evidences 
of  unfitness,  of  personal  weakness,  of  low  or  false 
professional  ideas. 

It  is  with  this  period  that  we  have  first  had  to 
do  as  our  point  of  departure,  by  which  not  only 
to  estimate  the  nature  and  degree  of  the  sub- 
sequent advance,  but  to  illustrate  also  the  part 
specifically  contributed  to  it  by  Hawke  and 
Rodney,  through  their  personal  and  professional 
characteristics.  While  types,  they  are  more  than 
mere  exponents  of  the  change  as  a  whole,  and 
will  be  found  to  bear  to  it  particular  relations, 
—  its  leaders  in  fact,  as  well  as  in  name.  It  is 
not  merely  fanciful  to  say  that  Hawke  stands 
for  and  embodies  the  spirit  of  the  new  age, 
while  Rodney  rather  exemplifies  and  develops 
the  form  in  which  that  spirit  needed  ultimately 
to  cloth  itself  in  order  to  perfect  its  working. 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  73 

The  one  is  a  protest  in  act  against  the  pro- 
fessional faintheartedness,  exaggerated  into  the 
semblance  of  personal  timidity,  shown  by  the  cap- 
tains off  Toulon  in  1774;  the  other,  in  the 
simple  but  skilful  methods  and  combinations 
adopted  by  him,  both  represents  and  gives  effect 
to  a  reaction  against  the  extravagant  pedantry, 
which  it  fell  to  Byng,  in  all  the  honesty  of 
a  thoroughly  commonplace  man,  to  exhibit  in 
unintentional  caricature. 

In  thus  ascribing  to  these  great  men  com- 
plementary parts  in  leading  and  shaping  the 
general  movement,  it  is  not  meant  that  either 
is  deficient  on  the  side  attributed  to  the  other. 
Hawke  showed  by  his  actions  that  he  was  by 
no  means  indifferent  to  tactical  combinations, 
which  is  another  way  of  saying  that  he  appre- 
ciated the  advantage  of  form  in  warfare;  while 
Rodney,  though  a  careful  organizer  and  driller 
of  fleets,  and  patient  in  effort  to  obtain  advan- 
tage before  attacking,  exhibited  on  occasion 
headlong,  though  not  inconsiderate,  audacity, 
and  also  tenacious  endurance  in  fight.  Still, 
it  will  probably  be  admitted  by  the  student  of 
naval  biography  that  to  him  Hawke  suggests 
primarily  the  unhesitating  sudden  rush  —  the 
swoop — upon  the  prey,  while  Rodney  resembles 
rather  the  patient  astute  watcher,  carefully  keep- 
ing his  own  powers  in  hand,  and  waiting  for 
the  unguarded  moment  when  the  adversary  may 
be  taken  suddenly  at  unawares.  Certain  it  is 


74  Naval  Warfare  at  the  Beginning 

that,  with  opportunities  much  more  numerous 
than  were  permitted  to  Hawke,  his  successes 
would  have  been  far  greater  but  for  an  excess 
of  methodical  caution.  There  was  a  third,  who 
combined  in  due  proportion,  and  possessed  to 
an  extraordinary  degree,  the  special  qualities 
here  assigned  to  each.  It  is  one  of  the  ironies 
of  history  that  the  first  Sir  Samuel  Hood  should 
have  had  just  opportunity  enough  to  show  how 
great  were  his  powers,  and  yet  have  been  denied 
the  chance  to  exhibit  them  under  conditions 
to  arrest  the  attention  of  the  world ;  nay,  have 
been  more  than  once  compelled  to  stand  by 
hopelessly,  and  see  occasions  lost  which  he 
would  unquestionably  have  converted  into  signal 
triumphs.  In  him,  as  far  as  the  record  goes, 
was  consummated  the  advance  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  He  was  the  greatest  of  the  sowers. 
It  fell  to  Nelson,  his  pupil,  —  in  part  at  least, — 
to  reap  the  harvest. 

Before  closing  this  part  of  our  subject,  the 
necessary  preliminary  to  understanding  the 
progress  of  naval  warfare  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, it  is  pertinent  to  note  the  respect  in  which 
advance  there  differs  from  that  of  the  nineteenth, 
and  in  some  degree,  though  less,  from  that 
of  the  seventeenth  centuries.  The  period  was 
not  one  of  marked  material  development.  Im- 
provements there  were,  but  they  were  slow, 
small  in  ultimate  extent,  and  in  no  sense  revolu- 
tionary. Ships  and  guns,  masts  and  sails,  grew 


of  the  Eighteenth  Century  75 

better,  as  did  also  administrative  processes;  it 
may  indeed  be  asserted,  as  an  axiom  of  pro- 
fessional experience,  that  as  the  military  tone 
of  the  sea-officers  rises,  the  effect  will  be  trans- 
mitted to  those  civil  functions  upon  which  effi- 
ciency for  war  antecedently  depends.  Still, 
substantially,  the  weapons  of  war  were  in  princi- 
ple, and  consequently  in  general  methods  of 
handling,  the  same  at  the  end  of  the  period 
as  at  the  beginning.  They  were  intrinsically 
more  efficient ;  but  the  great  gain  was  not  in 
them,  but  in  the  spirit  and  intellectual  grasp 
of  the  men  who  wielded  them.  There  was  no 
change  in  the  least  analogous  to  that  from 
oars  to  sails,  or  from  sails  to  steam. 

Under  such  conditions  of  continued  similarity  in 
means,  advance  in  the  practice  of  any  profession  is 
effected  rather  in  the  realm  of  ideas,  in  intellectual 
processes ;  and  even  their  expert  application  in- 
volves mind  rather  than  matter.  In  the  nineteenth 
century  such  intellectual  processes  have  been 
largely  devoted  to  the  purposes  of  material  develop- 
ment, and  have  found  their  realization,  in  the  navy 
as  elsewhere,  in  revolutionizing  instruments,  in 
providing  means  never  before  attainable.  The 
railroad,  the  steamer,  the  electric  telegraph,  find 
their  counterpart  in  the  heavily  armored  steam- 
ship of  war.  But  in  utilizing  these  new  means  the 
navy  must  still  be  governed  by  the  ideas,  which 
are,  indeed,  in  many  ways  as  old  as  military 
history,  but  which  in  the  beginning  of  the  eigh- 


76     Naval  Warfare  in  the  Eighteenth  Century 

teenth  century  had  passed  out  of  the  minds  of 
naval  men.  It  was  the  task  of  the  officers  of 
that  period  to  recall  them,  to  formulate  them 
anew,  to  give  them  a  living  hold  upon  the  theory 
and  practice  of  the  profession.  This  they  did, 
and  they  were  undoubtedly  helped  in  so  doing 
by  the  fact  that  their  attention  was  not  diverted 
and  absorbed,  as  that  of  our  day  very  largely  has 
been,  by  decisive  changes  in  the  instruments  with 
which  their  ideas  were  to  be  given  effect.  Thus 
they  were  able  to  make  a  substantial  and  distinc- 
tive contribution  to  the  art  of  naval  warfare,  and 
that  on  its  highest  side.  For  the  artist  is  greater 
than  his  materials,  the  warrior  than  his  arms ; 
and  it  was  in  the  man  rather  than  in  his  weapons 
that  the  navy  of  the  eighteenth  century  wrought 
its  final  conspicuous  triumph. 


H  A  WKE 
1705-1781 

THE  first  great  name  in  British  naval  annals 
belonging  distinctively  to  the  eighteenth 
century  rather  than  to  the  seventeenth,  is  that  of 
Edward  Hawke.  He  was  born  in  1705,  of  a 
family  of  no  marked  social  distinction,  his  father 
being  a  barrister,  and  his  grandfather  a  Lon- 
don merchant.  His  mother's  maiden  name  was 
Bladen.  One  of  her  brothers  held  an  important 
civil  office  as  Commissioner  of  Trade  and  Planta- 
tions, and  was  for  many  years  a  member  of  Par- 
liament. Under  the  conditions  which  prevailed 
then,  and  for  some  generations  longer,  the  in- 
fluence attaching  to  such  positions  enabled  the 
holder  to  advance  substantially  the  professional 
interests  of  a  naval  officer.  Promotion  in  rank, 
and  occupation  both  in  peace  and  war,  were 
largely  a  matter  of  favor.  Martin  Bladen  nat- 
urally helped  his  nephew  in  this  way,  a  service 
especially  valuable  in  the  earlier  part  of  a  career, 
lifting  a  man  out  of  a  host  of  competitors  and 
giving  him  a  chance  to  show  what  was  in  him. 
It  may  readily  be  believed  that  Hawke's  marked 


7  8  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

professional  capacity  speedily  justified  the  advan- 
tage thus  obtained,  and  he  seems  to  have  owed 
his  promotion  to  post-captain  to  a  superior 
officer  when  serving  abroad ;  though  it  is  never 
possible  to  affirm  that  even  such  apparent  official 
recognition  was  not  due  either  to  an  intimation 
from  home,  or  to  the  give  and  take  of  those  who 
recognized  Bismarck's  motto,  "  Do  ut  des." 

However  this  may  have  been,  the  service  did 
not  suffer  by  the  favors  extended  to  Hawke. 
Nor  was  his  promotion  unduly  rapid,  to  the  in- 
jury of  professional  character,  as  often  happened 
when  rank  was  prematurely  reached.  It  was 
not  till  March  20,  1 734,  that  he  was  "  made 
post,"  as  the  expression  went,  by  Sir  Chaloner 
Ogle  into  the  frigate  Flamborough,  on  the  West 
India  Station.  Being  then  twenty-nine  years 
old,  in  the  prime  of  life  for  naval  efficiency,  he 
had  reached  the  position  in  which  a  fair  oppor- 
tunity for  all  the  honors  of  the  profession  lay 
open  to  him,  provided  he  could  secure  occupation 
until  he  was  proved  to  be  indispensable.  Here 
also  his  uncle's  influence  stood  good.  Although 
the  party  with  which  the  experienced  politician 
was  identified  had  gone  out  of  power  with  Sir 
Robert  Walpole,  in  1742,  his  position  on  the 
Board  dealing  with  Colonial  affairs  left  him  not 
without  friends.  "  My  colleague,  Mr.  Cavendish," 
he  writes,  "  has  already  laid  in  his  claim  for 
another  ship  for  you.  But  after  so  long  a  voy- 
age "  (he  had  been  away  over  three  years)  "  I 


Hawke 


79 


think  you  should  be  allowed  a  little  time  to  spend 
with  your  friends  on  shore.  It  is  some  consola- 
tion, however,  that  I  have  some  friends  on  the 
new  Board  of  Admiralty."  "  There  has  been  a 
clean  sweep,"  he  says  again, "  but  I  hope  I  may  have 
some  friends  amongst  the  new  Lords  that  will 
upon  my  account  afford  you  their  protection." 

This  was  in  the  beginning  of  1743,  when 
Hawke  had  just  returned  from  a  protracted 
cruise  on  the  West  India  and  North  American 
stations,  where  by  far  the  greater  part  of  his  early 
service  was  passed.  He  never  again  returned 
there,  and  very  shortly  after  his  uncle's  letter, 
just  quoted,  he  was  appointed  to  the  Berwick,  a 
ship-of-the-line  of  seventy  guns.  In  command  of 
her  he  sailed  in  September,  1743,  for  the  Mediter- 
ranean ;  and  a  few  months  after,  by  his  decided  and 
seamanlike  course  in  Mathews's  action,  he  estab- 
lished his  professional  reputation  and  fortunes, 
the  firm  foundations  of  which  had  been  laid  dur- 
ing the  previous  years  of  arduous  but  inconspicu- 
ous service.  Two  years  later,  in  1746,  Martin 
Bladen  died,  and  with  him  political  influence,  in 
the  ordinary  acceptation,  departed  from  Hawke. 
Thenceforth  professional  merit,  forced  upon  men's 
recognition,  stood  him  in  stead. 

He  was  thirty-nine  when  he  thus  first  made 
his  mark,  in  1744.  Prior  to  this  there  is 
not  found,  in  the  very  scanty  records  that 
remain  of  his  career,  as  in  that  of  all  officers  of 
his  period  while  in  subordinate  positions,  any 


8o  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

certain  proof  that  he  had  ever  been  seriously 
engaged  with  an  enemy.  War  against  Spain 
had  been  declared,  October  19,  1739.  He  had 
then  recently  commissioned  a  fifty-gun  ship,  the 
Portland,  and  in  her  sailed  for  the  West  Indies, 
where  he  remained  until  the  autumn  of  1742; 
but  the  inert  manner  in  which  Spain  maintained 
the  naval  contest,  notwithstanding  that  her  trans- 
marine policy  was  the  occasion  of  the  quarrel, 
and  her  West  Indian  possessions  obviously  en- 
dangered, removed  all  chance  of  active  service 
on  the  large  scale,  except  in  attacking  her  colo- 
nies; and  in  none  of  those  enterprises  had  the 
Portland  been  called  upon  to  share. 

Meantime,  a  general  European  war  had  begun 
in  1740,  concerning  the  succession  to  the  Aus- 
trian throne ;  and,  in  the  political  combinations 
which  followed,  France  and  Great  Britain  had  as 
usual  ranged  themselves  on  opposite  sides,  though 
without  declaring  war  upon  each  other.  Further, 
there  had  existed  for  some  time  a  secret  defen- 
sive alliance  between  France  and  Spain,  binding 
each  party  to  support  the  other,  under  certain 
conditions,  with  an  effective  armed  force,  to  be 
used  not  for  aggressive  purposes,  but  in  defence 
only.  It  was  claimed,  indeed,  that  by  so  doing 
the  supporting  country  was  not  to  be  considered 
as  going  to  war,  or  even  as  engaged  in  hostilities, 
except  as  regarded  the  contingent  furnished. 
This  view  received  some  countenance  from  in- 
ternational law,  in  the  stage  of  development  it 


Hawke  8 1 

had  then  reached ;  yet  it  is  evident  that  if  a  Brit- 
ish admiral  met  a  Spanish  fleet,  of  strength  fairly 
matching  his  own,  but  found  it  accompanied  by 
a  French  division,  the  commander  of  which  noti- 
fied him  that  he  had  orders  to  fight  if  an  attack 
were  made,  friendly  relations  between  the  two 
nations  would  be  strained  near  to  the  breaking 
point.  This  had  actually  occurred  to  the  British 
Admiral  Haddock,  in  the  Mediterranean,  in  1741 ; 
and  conditions  essentially  similar,  but  more  ex- 
asperated, constituted  the  situation  under  which 
Hawke  for  the  first  time  was  brought  into  an 
action  between  two  great  fleets. 

On  the  nth  of  January,  1744,  when  the  Ber- 
wick joined  the  British  fleet,  it  had  rendezvoused 
at  the  Hyeres  Islands,  a  little  east  of  Toulon, 
watching  the  movements  of  twelve  Spanish  ships- 
of-the-line,  which  had  taken  refuge  in  the  port. 
As  these  were  unwilling  to  put  to  sea  trusting  to 
their  own  strength,  the  French  Admiral  De 
Court  was  ordered  to  accompany  and  protect 
them  when  they  sailed.  This  becoming  known, 
Admiral  Mathews  had  concentrated  his  fleet, 
which  by  successive  reinforcements  —  the  Ber- 
wick among  others  —  numbered  twenty-eight  of- 
the-line  when  the  allies,  in  about  equal  force, 
began  to  come  out  on  the  2Oth  of  February. 

The  action  which  ensued  owes  its  historical 
significance  wholly  to  the  fact  that  it  illustrated 
conspicuously,  and  in  more  than  one  detail,  the 
degenerate  condition  of  the  official  staff  of  the 


82  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

British  navy;  the  demoralization  of  ideals,  and 
the  low  average  of  professional  competency.1 
That  there  was  plenty  of  good  metal  was  also 
shown,  but  the  proportion  of  alloy  was  danger- 
ously great.  That  the  machinery  of  the  organi- 
zation was  likewise  bad,  the  administrative  system 
culpably  negligent  as  well  as  inefficient,  had  been 
painfully  manifested  in  the  equipment  of  the 
ships,  in  the  quality  of  the  food,  and  in  the 
indifferent  character  of  the  ships'  crews ;  but  in 
this  respect  Hawke  had  not  less  to  complain  of 
than  others,  having  represented  forcibly  to  the 
Admiralty  the  miserable  unfitness  of  the  men  sent 
him.  Nevertheless,  despite  all  drawbacks,  includ- 
ing therein  a  signalling  system  so  rudimentary 
and  imperfect  as  to  furnish  a  ready  excuse  to  the 
unwilling,  as  well  as  a  recurrent  perplexity  to 
those  honestly  wishing  to  obey  their  orders,  he 
showed  that  good  will  and  high  purpose  could 
not  only  lead  a  man  to  do  his  full  duty  as 
directed,  but  guide  him  to  independent  initia- 
tive action  when  opportunity  offered.  Under  all 
external  conditions  of  difficulty  and  doubt,  or  even 
of  cast-iron  rule,  the  principle  was  as  true  then  as 
when  Nelson  formulated  it,  that  no  captain  when 
in  doubt  could  do  very  wrong  if  he  placed  his  ship 
alongside  an  enemy.  That  Hawke  so  realized  it 
brought  out  into  more  glaring  relief  the  failure 
of  so  many  of  his  colleagues  on  this  occasion. 

1  For  the  account  of  Mathews's  action,  including  Hawke's  personal 
share  in  it,  see  ante,  pp.  21-47. 


Hawke  83 

But  the  lesson  would  be  in  great  part  lost,  if 
there  were  to  be  seen  in  this  lapse  only  the  per- 
sonal element  of  the  delinquents,  and  not  the 
widespread  decline  of  professional  tone.  Un- 
doubtedly, of  course,  it  is  true  that  the  personal 
equation,  as  always,  made  itself  felt,  but  here  as 
intensifying  an  evil  which  had  its  principal 
source  elsewhere. 

Hawke  carried  Nelson's  maxim  into  effect. 
Upon  the  signal  for  battle  he  took  his  own  ship 
into  close  action  with  the  antagonist  allotted  to 
him  by  the  order  of  the  fleet ;  but  after  beating 
her  out  of  the  line  he  looked  round  for  more 
work  to  do.  Seeing  then  that  several  of  the 
British  vessels  had  not  come  within  point-blank, 
but,  through  professional  timidity,  or  over-cau- 
tious reverence  for  the  line  of  battle,  were 
engaging  at  long  range  a  single  Spaniard,  he 
quitted  his  own  position,  brought  her  also  to  close 
quarters,  and  after  an  obstinate  contest,  creditable 
to  both  parties,  forced  her  to  surrender.  She  was 
the  only  ship  to  haul  down  her  flag  that  day,  and 
her  captain  refused  to  surrender  his  sword  to 
any  but  Hawke,  whom  alone  he  accepted  as  his 
vanquisher. 

A  generation  or  two  later  Hawke's  conduct  in 
this  matter  would  have  drawn  little  attention ;  it 
would  not  have  been  exceptional  in  the  days  of 
St.  Vincent  and  Nelson,  nor  even  in  that  of 
Howe.  At  the  time  of  its  occurrence,  it  was 
not  only  in  sharp  contrast  with  much  that  hap- 


84  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

pened  on  the  same  field  of  battle,  but  it  was 
somewhat  contrary  to  rule.  It  possessed  so  far 
the  merit  of  originality ;  and  that  on  the  right 
side,  —  the  side  of  fighting.  As  in  all  active  life, 
so  in  war  a  man  is  more  readily  pardoned  for 
effecting  too  much  than  too  little;  and  it  was 
doubly  so  here,  because  it  was  evident  from  the 
behavior  of  his  peers  that  he  must  expect  no 
backing  in  the  extra  work  he  took  upon  himself. 
Their  aloofness  emphasized  his  forwardness ;  and 
the  fact  that  through  the  withdrawal  of  his 
admiral  for  the  night,  the  prize  was  ultimately 
retaken,  together  with  an  officer  and  seamen  he 
had  placed  on  board,  fixed  still  further  attention 
upon  the  incident,  in  which  Hawke's  action  was 
the  one  wholly  creditable  feature. 

The  effect  of  the  battle  upon  his  fortunes  was 
summed  up  in  a  phrase.  When  his  first  lieuten- 
ant was  sent  to  report  the  loss  of  the  prize-crew 
to  Rear-Admiral  Rowley,  the  commander  of  the 
division,  the  latter  replied,  among  other  things, 
that  "he  had  not  been  well  acquainted  with 
Captain  Hawke  before,  but  he  should  now  be 
well  acquainted  with  him  from  his  behavior." 
Like  Nelson  at  St.  Vincent,  Hawke  was  now 
revealed,  not  to  the  navy  only  but  to  the  nation, 
—  "through  his  behavior."  Somewhat  excep- 
tionally, the  king  personally  took  knowledge  of 
him,  and  stood  by  him.  George  II.  paid  most 
interested  attention  to  the  particulars  elicited  by 
the  Courts-Martial,  —  a  fact  which  doubtless  con- 


Hawke  85 

tributed  to  make  him  so  sternly  unyielding  in 
the  case  of  Byng,  twelve  years  later.  To  the  king 
Hawke  became  "  my  captain  ;  "  and  his  influence 
was  directly  used  when,  in  a  flag  promotion  in 
1747,  some  in  the  Admiralty  proposed  to  include 
Hawke  in  the  retirement  of  senior  captains,  which 
was  a  common  incident  in  such  cases.  "  I  will 
not  have  Hawke  '  yellowed,'  "  was  the  royal  fiat; 
a  yellow  admiral  being  the  current  phrase  for  one 
set  aside  from  further  active  employment. 

Such  were  the  circumstances  under  which 
Hawke  first  received  experience  of  the  fighting 
conditions  of  the  navy.  Whatever  his  previous 
attitude  towards  accepted  traditions  of  profes- 
sional practice,  this  no  doubt  loosened  the  fet- 
ters ;  for  they  certainly  never  constrained  him 
in  his  subsequent  career.  He  remained  in  the 
Mediterranean  fleet,  generally  upon  detached 
services  in  command  of  divisions  of  ships,  until 
the  end  of  1745.  Returning  then  to  England, 
he  saw  no  further  active  service  until  he  became 
a  Rear-Admiral  —  of  the  White  —  on  July  15, 


The  promotions  being  numerous,  Hawke's 
seniority  as  captain  carried  him  well  up  the  list 
of  rear-admirals,  and  he  was  immediately  em- 
ployed ;  hoisting  his  flag  July  22d.  He  then 
became  second  to  Sir  Peter  Warren,  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  "Western  Squadron."  This 
cruised  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  from  Ushant  to 
Finisterre,  to  intercept  the  naval  divisions,  and 


86  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

the  accompanying  convoys  of  merchant  and 
transport  ships,  with  which  the  French  were  then 
seeking  to  maintain  their  colonial  empire  in 
North  America  and  in  India :  an  empire  already 
sorely  shaken,  and  destined  to  fall  finally  in  the 
next  great  war. 

Hawke  was  now  in  the  road  of  good  luck,  pure 
and  unadulterated.  His  happy  action  in  captur- 
ing the  Poder  illustrates  indeed  opportunity  im- 
proved ;  but  it  was  opportunity  of  the  every  day 
sort,  and  it  is  the  merit  that  seized  it,  rather  than 
the  opportunity  itself,  that  strikes  the  attention. 
The  present  case  was  different.  A  young  rear- 
admiral  had  little  reason  to  hope  for  independent 
command ;  but  Warren,  a  well-tried  officer,  pos- 
sessing the  full  confidence  of  the  First  Lord, 
Anson,  himself  a  master  in  the  profession,  was  in 
poor  health,  and  for  that  reason  had  applied  for 
Hawke  to  be  "joined  with  him  in  the  command," 
apparently  because  he  was  the  one  flag-officer 
immediately  available.  He  proposed  that  Hawke 
should  for  the  present  occasion  take  his  place, 
sail  with  a  few  ships  named,  and  with  them  join 
the  squadron,  then  at  sea  in  charge  of  a  captain. 
Anson  demurred  at  first,  on  the  ground  of 
Hawke's  juniority,  —  he  was  forty-two,  —  and 
Warren,  while  persisting  in  his  request,  shares 
the  doubt ;  for  he  writes,  "  I  observe  what  you 
say  about  the  ships  abroad  being  under  so  young 
an  officer.  I  am,  and  have  been  uneasy  about  it, 
though  I  hope  he  will  do  well,  and  it  could  not 


Hawke  87 

then  be  avoided''  Anson,  however,  was  not  fixed 
in  his  opposition ;  for  Warren  continued,  "  From 
your  letter  I  have  so  little  reason  to  doubt  his 
being  put  under  my  command,  that  I  have  his 
instructions  all  ready;  and  he  is  prepared  to  go 
at  a  moment's  notice."  The  instructions  were 
issued  the  following  day,  August  8th,  and  on  the 
9th  Hawke  sailed.  But  while  there  was  in  this 
so  much  of  luck,  he  was  again  to  show  that  he 
was  not  one  to  let  occasion  slip.  Admiral  Farra- 
gut  is  reported  to  have  said,  "  Every  man  has  one 
chance."  It  depends  upon  himself  whether  he  is 
by  it  made  or  marred.  Burrish  and  Hawke  toed 
the  same  line  on  the  morning  of  February  22d,  and 
they  had  had  that  day  at  least  equal  opportunity. 
Hawke's  adequacy  to  his  present  fortune  be- 
trayed itself  again  in  a  phrase  to  Warren,  "  I 
have  nothing  so  much  at  heart  as  the  faithful  dis- 
charge of  my  duty,  and  in  such  manner  as  will 
give  satisfaction  both  to  the  Lords  of  the  Admi- 
ralty and  yourself.  This  shall  ever  be  my  utmost 
ambition,  and  no  lucre  of  profit,  or  other  views, 
shall  induce  me  to  act  otherwise."  Not  prize- 
money  ;  but  honor,  through  service.  And  this 
in  fact  not  only  ruled  his  thought  but  in  the 
moment  of  decision  inspired  his  act.  Curiously 
enough,  however,  he  was  here  at  odds  with  the 
spirit  of  Anson  and  of  Warren.  The  latter,  in 
asking  Hawke's  employment,  said  the  present 
cruise  was  less  important  than  the  one  to  succeed 
it,  "  for  the  galleons  "  —  the  Spanish  treasure- 


88  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

ships  —  "  make  it  a  general  rule  to  come  home 
late  in  the  fall  or  winter."  Warren  by  prize- 
money  and  an  American  marriage  was  the  richest 
commoner  in  England,  and  Anson  it  was  that 
had  captured  the  great  galleon  five  years  before, 
to  his  own  great  increase;  but  it  was  Hawke  who, 
acknowledging  a  letter  from  Warren,  as  this 
cruise  was  drawing  to  its  triumphant  close,  wrote, 
"  With  respect  to  the  galleons,  as  it  is  uncertain 
when  they  will  come  home  and  likewise  impos- 
sible for  me  to  divide  my  force  in  the  present 
necessitous  condition  of  the  ships  under  my 
command,  I  must  lay  aside  all  thoughts  of  them 
during  this  cruise."  In  this  unhesitating  subor- 
dination of  pecuniary  to  military  considerations 
we  see  again  the  temper  of  Nelson,  between  whom 
and  Hawke  there  was  much  community  of  spirit, 
especially  in  their  independence  of  ordinary  mo- 
tives and  standards.  "  Not  that  I  despise  money," 
wrote  Nelson  near  the  end  of  a  career  in  which 
he  had  never  known  ease  of  circumstances  ; 
"  quite  the  contrary,  I  wish  I  had  a  hundred 
thousand  pounds  this  moment ; "  but  "  I  keep  the 
frigates  about  me,  for  I  know  their  value  in  the 
day  of  battle,  and  compared  with  that  day,  what 
signifies  any  prizes  they  might  take  ?  "  Yet  he 
had  his  legal  share  in  every  such  prize. 

The  opening  of  October  i4th,  the  eighth  day 
after  Hawke's  letter  to  Warren  just  quoted, 
brought  him  the  sight  of  his  reward.  At  seven 
that  morning,  the  fleet  being  then  some  four 


Hawke  89 

hundred  miles  west  of  La  Rochelle  in  France,  a 
number  of  sails  were  seen  in  the  southeast.  Chase 
was  given  at  once,  and  within  an  hour  it  was  evi- 
dent, from  the  great  crowd  of  vessels,  that  it  was  a 
large  convoy  outward-bound  which  could  only  be 
enemies.  It  was  in  fact  a  fleet  of  three  hundred 
French  merchantmen,  under  the  protection  of 
eight  ships-of-the-line  and  one  of  fifty  guns, 
commanded  by  Commodore  L'Etenduere.  The 
force  then  with  Hawke  were  twelve  of-the-line 
and  two  of  fifty  guns.  Frigates  and  lighter 
vessels  of  course  accompanied  both  fleets.  The 
average  size  and  armament  of  the  French  vessels 
were  considerably  greater  than  those  of  the  Brit- 
ish ;  so  that,  although  the  latter  had  an  un- 
doubted superiority,  it  was  far  from  as  great  as 
the  relative  numbers  would  indicate.  Prominent 
British  officers  of  that  day  claimed  that  a  French 
sixty-gun  ship  was  practically  the  equal  of  a 
British  seventy-four.  In  this  there  may  have 
been  exaggeration ;  but  they  had  good  oppor- 
tunity for  judging,  as  many  French  ships  were 
captured. 

When  L'Etenduere  saw  that  he  was  in  the 
presence  of  a  superior  enemy,  he  very  manfully 
drew  out  his  ships  of  war  from  the  mass,  and 
formed  them  in  order  of  battle,  covering  the  con- 
voy, which  he  directed  to  make  its  escape  ac- 
companied by  one  of  the  smaller  ships-of-the-line 
with  the  light  cruisers.  He  contrived  also  to 
keep  to  windward  of  the  approaching  British. 


90  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

With  so  strong  a  force  interposed,  Hawke  saw 
that  no  prize-money  was  easily  to  be  had,  but 
for  that  fortune  his  mind  was  already  prepared. 
He  first  ordered  his  fleet  to  form  order  of  battle ; 
but  finding  time  was  thereby  lost  he  changed  the 
signal  to  that  for  a  general  chase,  which  freed  the 
faster  sailers  to  use  their  utmost  speed  and  join 
action  with  the  enemy,  secure  of  support  in  due 
time  by  their  consorts  as  they  successively  came 
up. 

Half  an  hour  before  noon  the  leading  British 
reached  the  French  rear,  already  under  short 
canvas.  The  admiral  then  made  signal  to  en- 
gage, and  the  battle  began.  As  the  ships  under 
fire  reduced  sail,  the  others  overtook  them,  passed 
by  the  unengaged  side  and  successively  attacked 
from  rear  to  van.  As  Hawke  himself  drew  near, 
Rodney's  ship,  the  Eagle,  having  her  wheel  and 
much  of  her  rigging  shot  away,  was  for  the  time 
unmanageable  and  fell  twice  on  board  the  flag- 
ship, the  Devonshire,  driving  her  to  leeward,  and 
so  preventing  her  from  close  action  with  the 
French  flag-ship  Tonnant,  of  eighty  guns,  a  force 
far  exceeding  that  of  the  Devonshire,  which  had 
but  sixty-six.  "  This  prevented  our  attacking  Le 
Monarque,  74,  and  the  Tonnant,  within  any  dis- 
tance to  do  execution.  However  we  attempted 
both,  especially  the  latter.  While  we  were  en- 
gaged with  her,  the  breechings  of  all  our  lower- 
deck  guns  broke,  and  the  guns  flew  fore  and  aft, 
which  obliged  us  to  shoot  ahead,  for  our  upper 


Hawke  91 

guns  could  not  reach  her."  The  breaking  of 
the  breechings  —  the  heavy  ropes  which  take  the 
strain  of  the  guns'  recoil  —  was  doubtless  ac- 
celerated by  the  undue  elevation  necessitated  by 
the  extreme  range.  The  collision  with  the  Eagle 
was  one  of  the  incidents  common  to  battle,  but 
it  doubtless  marred  the  completeness  of  the  vic- 
tory. Of  the  eight  French  ships  engaged,  six  were 
taken ;  two,  the  Tonnant  and  her  next  astern, 
escaped,  though  the  former  was  badly  mauled. 

Despite  the  hindrance  mentioned,  Hawke's 
personal  share  in  the  affair  was  considerable, 
through  the  conspicuous  activity  of  the  flag-ship. 
Besides  the  skirmish  at  random  shot  with  the 
Tonnant,  she  engaged  successively  the  Trident, 
64,  and  the  Terrible,  74,  both  which  were  among 
the  prizes.  He  was  entirely  satisfied  also  with 
the  conduct  of  all  his  captains,  —  save  one.  The 
freedom  of  action  permitted  to  them  by  the  gen- 
eral chase,  with  the  inspiring  example  of  the 
admiral  himself,  was  nobly  used.  "  Captain  Har- 
land  of  the  Tilbury,  60,  observing  that  the  Ton- 
nant fired  single  guns  at  us  in  order  to  dismast 
us,  stood  on  the  other  tack,  between  her  and  the 
Devonshire,  and  gave  her  a  very  smart  fire."  It 
was  no  small  gallantry  for  a  60  thus  to  pass  close 
under  the  undiverted  broadside  of  an  80,  — nearly 
double  her  force,  —  and  that  without  orders  ;  and 
Hawke  recognized  the  fact  by  this  particular 
notice  in  the  despatch.  With  similar  initiative,  as 
the  Tonnant  and  Intrepide  were  seen  to  be  escap- 


92  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

ing,  Captain  Saunders  of  the  Yarmouth,  64,  pursued 
them  on  his  own  motion,  and  was  accompanied, 
at  his  suggestion,  by  the  sixty-gun  ships  of  Rod- 
ney and  of  Saumarez.  A  detached  action  of  an 
hour  followed,  in  which  Saumarez  fell.  The 
enemy  escaped,  it  is  true ;  but  that  does  not  im- 
peach the  judgment,  nor  lessen  the  merits,  of  the 
officers  concerned,  for  their  ships  were  both 
much  smaller  and  more  injured  than  those  they 
attacked.  Harland  and  Saunders  became  dis- 
tinguished admirals ;  of  Rodney  it  is  needless 
to  say  the  same. 

In  his  report  of  the  business,  Hawke  used  a 
quaint  but  very  expressive  phrase,  "  As  the 
enemy's  ships  were  large,  they  took  a  great  deal 
of  drubbing,  and  (consequently)  lost  all  their 
masts,  except  two,  who  had  their  foremasts  left. 
This  has  obliged  me  to  lay-to  for  these  two  days 
past,  in  order  to  put  them  into  condition  to  be 
brought  into  port,  as  well  as  our  own,  which  have 
suffered  greatly."  Ships  large  in  tonnage  were 
necessarily  also  ships  large  in  scantling,  heavy 
ribbed,  thick-planked,  in  order  to  bear  their  artil- 
lery ;  hence  also  with  sides  not  easy  to  be  pierced 
by  the  weak  ordnance  of  that  time.  They  were 
in  a  degree  armored  ships,  though  from  a  cause 
differing  from  that  of  to-day ;  hence  much  "  drub- 
bing "  was  needed,  and  the  prolongation  of  the 
drubbing  entailed  increase  of  incidental  injury 
to  spars  and  rigging,  both  their  own  and  those 
of  the  enemy.  Nor  was  the  armor  idea,  directly, 


Hawke 


93 


at  all  unrecognized  even  then;  for  we  are  told 
of  \.\IQ  Real  Felipe  in  Mathews's  action,  that,  being 
so  weakly  built  that  she  could  carry  only  twenty- 
four-pounders  on  her  lower  deck,  she  had  been 
"  fortified  in  the  most  extraordinary  surprising 
manner ;  her  sides  being  lined  four  or  five  foot 
thick  everywhere  with  junk  or  old  cables  to 
hinder  the  shot  from  piercing." 

It  has  been  said  that  the  conduct  of  one  cap- 
tain fell  under  Hawke's  displeasure.  At  a  Coun- 
cil of  War  called  by  him  after  the  battle,  to 
establish  the  fitness  of  the  fleet  to  pursue  the 
convoy,  the  other  captains  objected  to  sitting 
with  Captain  Fox  of  the  Kent,  until  he  had 
cleared  himself  from  the  imputation  of  misbe- 
havior in  incidents  they  had  noticed.  Hawke 
was  himself  dissatisfied  with  Fox's  failure  to 
obey  a  signal,  and  concurred  in  the  objection. 
On  the  subsequent  trial,  the  Court  expressly 
cleared  the  accused  of  cowardice,  but  found  him 
guilty  of  certain  errors  of  judgment,  and  specifically 
of  leaving  the  Tonnant  while  the  signal  for  close 
action  was  flying.  As  the  Tonnant  escaped,  the 
implication  of  accountability  for  that  result  nat- 
urally follows.  For  so  serious  a  consequence  the 
sentence  only  was  that  he  be  dismissed  his  ship, 
and,  although  never  again  employed,  he  was  re- 
tired two  years  after  as  a  rear-admiral.  It  was 
becoming  increasingly  evident  that  error  of  judg- 
ment is  an  elastic  phrase  which  can  be  made  to 
cover  all  degrees  of  faulty  action,  from  the  mis- 


94  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

takes  to  which  every  man  is  liable  and  the  most 
faithful  cannot  always  escape,  to  conduct  wholly 
incompatible  with  professional  efficiency  or  even 
manly  honor. 

The  case  of  Fox  was  one  of  many  occurring  at 
about  this  period,  which,  however  differing  in 
detail  between  themselves,  showed  that  through- 
out the  navy,  both  in  active  service  before  the 
enemy,  and  in  the  more  deliberate  criteria  of 
opinion  which  influence  Courts-Martial,  there 
was  a  pronounced  tendency  to  lowness  of  stand- 
ard in  measuring  officer-like  conduct  and  official 
responsibility  for  personal  action ;  a  misplaced 
leniency,  which  regarded  failure  to  do  the  utmost 
with  indulgence,  if  without  approval.  In  the  strin- 
gent and  awful  emergencies  of  war  too  much  is  at 
stake  for  such  easy  tolerance.  Error  of  judgment 
is  one  thing ;  error  of  conduct  is  something  very 
different,  and  with  a  difference  usually  recogniz- 
able. To  style  errors  of  conduct  "  errors  of  judg- 
ment "  denies,  practically,  that  there  are  standards 
of  action  external  to  the  individual,  and  condones 
official  misbehavior  on  the  ground  of  personal 
incompetency.  Military  standards  rest  on  dem- 
onstrable facts  of  experience,  and  should  find 
their  sanction  in  clear  professional  opinion.  So 
known,  and  so  upheld,  the  unfortunate  man  who 
falls  below  them,  in  a  rank  where  failure  may 
work  serious  harm,  has  only  himself  to  blame ; 
for  it  is  his  business  to  reckon  his  own  capacity 
before  he  accepts  the  dignity  and  honors  of  a 


Hawke  95 

position  in  which  the  interests  of  the  nation  are 
intrusted  to  his  charge. 

An  uneasy  consciousness  of  these  truths,  forced 
upon  the  Navy  and  the  Government  by  wide- 
spread short-comings  in  many  quarters  —  of 
which  Mathews's  battle  was  only  the  most  con- 
spicuous instance  —  resulted  in  a  very  serious 
modification  of  the  Articles  of  War,  after  the 
peace.  Up  to  1 748  the  articles  dealing  with 
misconduct  before  the  enemy,  which  had  been  in 
force  since  the  first  half  of  the  reign  of  Charles 
II.,  assigned  upon  conviction  the  punishment  of 
"  death,  or  other  punishment,  as  the  circum- 
stances of  the  offence  shall  deserve  and  the 
Court- Martial  shall  judge  fit."  After  the  experi- 
ences of  this  war,  the  last  clause  was  omitted. 
Discretion  was  taken  away.  Men  were  dissatis- 
fied, whether  justly  or  not,  with  the  use  of  their 
discretion  made  by  Courts-Martial,  and  deprived 
them  of  it.  In  the  United  States  Navy,  similarly, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War,  the  Govern- 
ment was  in  constant  struggle  with  Courts- 
Martial  to  impose  sentences  of  severity  adequate 
to  the  offence ;  leaving  the  question  of  remission, 
or  of  indulgence,  to  the  executive.  These  facts 
are  worthy  of  notice,  for  there  is  a  facile  popular 
impression  that  Courts-Martial  err  on  the  side  of 
stringency.  The  writer,  from  a  large  experience 
of  naval  Courts,  upon  offenders  of  many  ranks, 
is  able  to  affirm  that  it  is  not  so.  Marryat,  in 
his  day,  midway  between  the  two  periods  here 


96  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

specified,  makes  the  same  statement,  in  "  Peter 
Simple."  "There  is  an  evident  inclination  to- 
wards the  prisoner;  every  allowance  and  every 
favor  granted  him,  and  no  legal  quibbles  attended 
to."  It  may  be  added  that  the  inconvenience  and 
expense  of  assembling  Courts  make  the  executive 
chary  of  this  resort,  which  is  rarely  used  except 
when  the  case  against  an  accused  is  pretty  clear,  — 
a  fact  that  easily  gives  rise  to  a  not  uncommon 
assertion,  that  Courts-Martial  are  organized  to 
convict. 

This  is  the  antecedent  history  of  Byng's  trial 
and  execution.  There  had  been  many  examples 
of  weak  and  inefficient  action  —  of  distinct  errors 
of  conduct  —  such  as  Byng  was  destined  to  illus- 
trate in  the  highest  rank  and  upon  a  large  scale, 
entailing  an  unusual  and  conspicuous  national 
disaster;  and  the  offenders  had  escaped,  with 
consequences  to  themselves  more  or  less  serious, 
but  without  any  assurance  to  the  nation  that  the 
punishment  inflicted  was  raising  professional 
standards,  and  so  giving  reasonable  certainty  that 
the  like  derelictions  would  not  recur.  Hence 
it  came  to  pass,  in  1749,  not  amid  the  agita- 
tions of  war  and  defeats,  but  in  profound  peace, 
that  the  article  was  framed  under  which  Byng 
suffered : 

"  Every  person  in  the  fleet,  who  through  cowardice, 
negligence,  or  disaffection,  shall  in  time  of  action,  .  .  . 
not  do  his  utmost  to  take  or  destroy  every  ship  which  it 
shall  be  his  duty  to  engage ;  and  to  assist  all  and  every 


Hawke  qj 

of  His  Majesty's  ships,  or  those  of  His  allies,  which  it 
shall  be  his  duty  to  assist  and  relieve,  .  .  .  being  con- 
victed thereof  by  sentence  of  a  Court- Martial,  shall  suffer 
death." 

Let  it  therefore  be  observed,  as  historically 
certain,  that  the  execution  of  Byng  in  1757  is 
directly  traceable  to  the  war  of  1739-1747.  It 
was  not  determined,  as  is  perhaps  generally 
imagined,  by  an  obsolete  statute  revived  for  the 
purpose  of  a  judicial  murder;  but  by  a  recent  Act, 
occasioned,  if  not  justified,  by  circumstances  of 
marked  national  humiliation  and  injury.  The 
offences  specified  are  those  of  which  repeated 
instances  had  been  recently  given;  and  negli- 
gence is  ranked  with  more  positive  faults,  because 
in  practice  equally  harmful  and  equally  culpable. 
Every  man  in  active  life,  whatever  his  business, 
knows  this  to  be  so. 

At  the  time  his  battle  with  L'Etenduere  was 
fought,  Hawke  was  actually  a  commander-in-chief ; 
for  Warren,  through  his  disorder  increasing  upon 
him,  had  resigned  the  command,  and  Hawke  had 
been  notified  of  the  fact.  Hence  there  did  not 
obtain  in  his  case  the  consideration,  so  absurdly 
advanced  for  limiting  Nelson's  reward  after  the 
Nile,  that  he  was  acting  under  the  orders  of  a 
superior  several  hundred  miles  away.  Neverthe- 
less, Hawke,  like  Nelson  later,  was  then  a  new 
man, —  "a  young  officer;"  and  the  honor  he 
received,  though  certainly  adequate  for  a  victory 
over  a  force  somewhat  inferior,  was  not  adequate 

7 


98  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

when  measured  by  that  given  to  Anson,  the  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  for  a  much  less  nota- 
ble achievement  six  months  before.  Anson 
was  raised  to  the  peerage ;  Hawke  was  only 
given  the  Order  of  the  Bath,  the  ribbon  which 
Nelson  coveted,  because  a  public  token,  visible 
to  all,  that  the  wearer  had  done  distinguished 
service.  It  was  at  that  period  a  much  greater  dis- 
tinction than  it  afterwards  became,  through  the 
great  extension  in  numbers  and  the  division  into 
classes.  He  was  henceforth  Sir  Edward  Hawke ; 
and  shortly  after  the  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
signed  April  30,  1748,  another  flag-promotion 
raised  him  to  the  rank  of  Vice-Admiral,  of  the 
Blue  Squadron. 

Such  rank,  accompanied  by  such  recognized 
merit,  insured  that  he  should  thenceforth  always 
command  in  chief;  and  so  it  was,  with  a  single 
brief  interval  due  to  a  very  special  and  exceptional 
cause  to  be  hereafter  related.  During  the  years 
of  peace,  from  1748  to  1755,  his  employment  was 
mainly  on  shore,  in  dock-yard  command,  which 
carried  with  it  incidentally  a  good  deal  of  pre- 
siding over  Courts- Martial.  This  duty,  in  his 
hands,  could  hardly  fail  to  raise  professional 
standards,  with  all  the  effect  that  precedents, 
established  by  the  rulings  and  decisions  of  Courts, 
civiJ  and  military,  exert  upon  practice.  Such  a 
period,  however,  affords  but  little  for  narration, 
either  professional  or  personal,  except  when  the 
particular  occupations  mentioned  are  the  subject 


Hawke  99 

of  special  study.  General  interest  they  cannot 
be  said  to  possess. 

But  while  thus  unmarked  on  the  biographical 
side,  historically  these  years  were  pregnant  with 
momentous  events,  which  not  only  affected  the 
future  of  great  nations  then  existing,  but  were 
to  determine  for  all  time  the  extension  or  restric- 
tion of  their  social  systems  and  political  ten- 
dencies in  vast  distant  regions  yet  unoccupied 
by  civilized  man,  or  still  in  unstable  political 
tenure.  The  balance  of  world  power,  in  short, 
was  in  question ,  and  that  not  merely  as  every 
occurrence,  large  or  small,  contributes  its  some- 
thing to  a  general  result,  but  on  a  grand  and 
decisive  scale.  The  phrase  "world  politics,"  if 
not  yet  invented,  characterizes  the  issues  then 
eminently  at  stake,  though  they  probably  were 
not  recognized  by  contemporaries,  still  blinded 
by  the  traditions  which  saw  in  Europe  alone  the 
centre  of  political  interests. 

To  realize  the  conditions,  and  their  bearing 
upon  a  future  which  has  become  our  present,  we 
should  recall  that  in  1748  the  British  Empire,  as 
we  understand  the  term,  did  not  exist;  that 
Canada  and  Louisiana  —  meaning  by  the  latter 
the  whole  undefined  region  west  of  the  Missis- 
sippi —  were  politically  and  socially  French ; 
that  between  them  the  wide  territory  from  the 
Alleghanies  to  the  Mississippi  was  claimed  by 
France,  and  the  claim  vigorously  contested  not 
only  by  Great  Britain  herself,  but  by  the  thirteen 


ioo  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

British  colonies  which  became  the  United  States 
of  America ;  that  in  India  the  representatives  of 
both  mother  countries  were  striving  for  mastery, 
not  merely  through  influence  in  the  councils  of 
native  rulers,  but  by  actual  territorial  sway,  and  that 
the  chances  seemed  on  the  whole  to  favor  France. 

In  the  great  struggle  for  Anglo-Saxon  pre- 
dominance, which  had  begun  under  William  III., 
but  was  now  approaching  its  crisis  and  final  de- 
cision in  the  Seven  Years  War,  the  determining 
factor  was  to  be  the  maritime  strength  of  Great 
Britain.  It  is,  therefore,  the  distinctive  and  dis- 
tinguished significance  of  Hawke's  career  that 
during  so  critical  a  period  he  not  only  was  the 
most  illustrious  and  able  officer  of  her  navy  — 
the  exponent  of  her  sea-power  —  but  that  by 
the  force  of  his  personality  he  chiefly  shaped  the 
naval  outcome.  He  carried  on  the  development 
of  naval  warfare,  revolutionized  ideas,  raised  pro- 
fessional standards,  and  thereby  both  affected 
the  result  in  his  own  time,  and  perpetuated  an 
influence,  the  effect  of  which  was  to  be  felt  in  the 
gigantic  contests  of  later  days.  In  this  eminent 
particular,  which  involves  real  originality,  no  sea 
officer  of  the  eighteenth  century  stands  with  him ; 
in  this  respect  only  he  and  Nelson,  who  be- 
longs rather  to  the  nineteenth,  are  to  be  named 
together. 

In  the  years  of  nominal  peace,  1748-1755,  the 
Navy  of  Great  Britain  was  permitted  by  a  politi- 
cally cautious  Government  to  decline  much  in 


Hawke  101 

power ;  but  there  was  compensation  in  the  fact 
that  that  of  France  drooped  equally.  In  both 
countries  there  was  then,  as  there  has  been  ever 
since,  a  party  opposed  to  over-sea  enterprise. 
"  The  partisans  of  the  Ministry,"  wrote  Walpole 
in  1755,  "d — n  the  Plantations  [Colonies],  and 
ask  if  we  are  to  involve  ourselves  in  a  war  for 
them."  The  French  government  underwent  a 
like  revulsion  of  feeling  as  regarded  India,  and  in 
1754  recalled  Dupleix  in  mid-career,  in  order  to 
quiet  the  remonstrances  of  Great  Britain.  It 
would  be  irrelevant,  were  it  not  signally  instruc- 
tive, to  remark  that  both  nations  passed  under 
the  influence  of  the  same  ideas  a  hundred  years 
later.  In  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
the  preponderant  expression  in  England  was  that 
the  colonies  were  unprofitable  incumbrances,  and, 
if  occasion  arose,  should  be  encouraged  to  sepa- 
rate rather  than  urged  to  remain ;  while  France, 
through  whatever  motive,  at  a  critical  moment 
abandoned  the  field  in  Egypt,  by  refusing  joint 
action.  It  is,  therefore,  probably  the  result  of 
a  true  national  genius,  asserting  itself  above 
temporary  aberrations,  that  the  close  of  the 
nineteenth  century  saw  France  wholly  excluded, 
politically,  from  Egypt,  as  she  had  before  been 
from  India,  and  Great  Britain  involved  in  an 
expensive  war,  the  aim  of  which  was  the  preser- 
vation of  the  imperial  system,  in  the  interest 
not  only  of  the  mother  country,  but  of  the  colo- 
nies as  well. 


IO2  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

And  that  it  was  in  the  interest  of  her  colonies 
was  precisely  the  all  important  part  which  differ- 
entiated the  Seven  Years  War  in  its  day,  and  the 
South  African  War  in  our  day,  from  the  struggle, 
so  disastrous  to  the  Empire,  that  is  known  as  the 
American  Revolution.  "  There  is  no  repose  for 
our  thirteen  colonies,"  wrote  Franklin  a  hundred 
and  fifty  years  ago,  "  so  long  as  the  French  are 
masters  of  Canada."  "  There  is  no  repose  for 
British  colonists  in  South  Africa,"  was  the  virtual 
assertion  of  Natal  and  the  Cape  Colony,  "  so  long 
as  the  Boer  political  methods  are  maintained  in 
the  Transvaal  with  the  pledged  support  of  the 
Orange  Free  State."  Irreconcilable  differences 
of  political  and  social  systems,  when  brought  into 
close  contact,  involve  irrepressible  conflict,  and 
admit  of  no  lasting  solution  except  the  subjuga- 
tion and  consequent  submersion  of  one  or  the 
other. 

Such  a  final  settlement  was  attained  in  North 
America  and  in  India  by  the  Seven  Years  War. 
The  full  results  thereof  even  we  of  this  day  have 
not  yet  seen ;  for  who  can  yet  predict  the  effect 
upon  the  question  of  the  Pacific  and  of  China, 
that  by  this  war  was  assured  the  dominance  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  political  and  legal  tradition  over 
the  whole  American  continent  north  of  the 
tropics,  and  that  the  same  tradition  shall,  for  a 
future  yet  indeterminate,  decisively  shape  the 
course  of  India  and  the  Philippines?  The  pre- 
ceding war,  1739-1748,  had  been  substantially 


Hawke  103 

inconclusive  on  the  chief  points  at  issue,  because 
European  questions  intervening  had  diverted  the 
attention  of  both  France  and  Great  Britain  from 
America  and  from  India ;  and  the  exhaustion 
of  both  had  led  to  a  perfunctory  compact,  in 
which  the  underlying  contention  was  substantially 
ignored  in  order  to  reach  formal  agreement. 
That  the  French  conquest  of  Madras,  in  India, 
was  yielded  in  exchange  for  Louisburg  and  Cape 
Breton  Island,  which  the  American  colonists  had 
won  for  England,  typifies  concisely  the  status  quo 
to  which  both  parties  were  willing  momentarily 
to  revert,  while  they  took  breath  before  the  inevi- 
table renewal  of  the  strife,  with  added  fury,  a  few 
years  later;  but  then  upon  its  proper  scene,  the 
sea  and  the  over-sea  regions  in  dispute. 

In  this  great  arbitrament  Hawke  was  at  once 
called  forth  to  play  his  part.  In  1754  diplomatic 
contention  had  become  acrimonious,  and  various 
events  showed  that  the  moment  of  open  conflict 
was  approaching.  The  squadron  in  India  was 
then  considerably  increased.  In  the  beginning 
of  1755  Hawke  was  again  afloat  to  command  the 
Channel  Fleet,  the  operations  of  which  extended 
ordinarily  from  the  Channel,  over  the  Bay  of 
Biscay,  to  Cape  Finisterre.  A  naval  force  was 
collecting  at  the  same  time  at  Portsmouth,  under 
Boscawen,  to  counteract  the  preparations  the 
French  were  known  to  be  making  in  North 
America.  It  sailed  soon  afterwards,  with  orders 
to  intercept  a  squadron  convoying  reinforcements 


IO4  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

for  Canada ;  and  on  the  8th  of  June  two  of  these 
ships  were  captured  off  the  mouth  of  the  St. 
Lawrence,  the  remainder  escaping  under  cover  of 
a  fog.  In  July  Hawke  went  out,  with  instructions 
to  take  any  French  ships-of-the-line  that  he  might 
meet;  and  in  August  he  was  further  directed  to 
send  into  port  French  ships  of  every  kind,  mer- 
chant and  other,  that  he  might  encounter.  Before 
the  end  of  the  year  three  hundred  trading  vessels, 
valued  at  $6,000,000,  had  been  thus  seized.  War 
had  not  yet  been  declared,  but  the  captured 
vessels  were  held,  as  on  other  occasions  before 
and  after,  as  hostages  to  await  the  settlement  of 
existing  difficulties. 

The  French  government  protested  of  course, 
and  recalled  its  ambassador,  but  it  did  not  pro- 
ceed to  formal  hostilities.  A  great  stroke  was  in 
preparation  at  Toulon,  which  could  be  covered 
for  a  while  by  diplomatic  correspondence,  coupled 
with  angry  demonstrations  on  the  Atlantic  and 
Channel  coasts.  On  the  loth  of  April,  1756, 
twelve  French  ships-of-the-line  and  fifteen  thou- 
sand troops  sailed  for  Minorca,  then  a  British 
possession,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  hostile  fleet 
effected  a  landing  without  opposition.  The  Brit- 
ish cabinet  having  taken  alarm  too  late,  Admiral 
Byng  had  sailed  from  Portsmouth,  with  ten  ships, 
only  three  days  before  the  French  left  Toulon  ; 
when  he  arrived  off  Port  Mahon,  six  weeks  later, 
a  practicable  breach  in  the  works  had  already 
been  made.  The  French  fleet  was  cruising  out- 


Hawke  105 

side  in  support  of  the  siege,  and  Byng,  whose 
force  had  been  increased  to  thirteen  ships,  engaged 
it  on  May  20.  The  action  was  in  itself  indeci- 
sive ;  but,  upon  the  opinion  of  a  council  of  war 
that  nothing  more  could  be  done,  Byng  retired  to 
Gibraltar.  The  result  to  him  personally  is  well 
known.  Port  Mahon  surrendered  on  June  28. 
War  had  by  this  been  declared ;  by  Great  Britain 
on  the  i yth  of  May,  and  by  France  June  20,  1756. 
When  the  news  of  Byng's  retreat  was  received 
in  England,  Hawke  was  sent  out  to  supersede 
him.  He  went  only  personally,  accompanied  by 
a  second  in  command,  but  with  no  fleet,  and  with 
sealed  instructions.  Opening  these  when  he 
reached  Gibraltar,  he  found  orders  to  send  home 
Byng  and  his  second  in  command,  and  to  institute 
an  inquiry  into  the  conduct  of  the  captains,  sus- 
pending any  one  found  "  not  to  have  acted  with 
due  spirit  and  vigor."  An  investigation  of  this 
kind  would  enable  him  to  form  an  opinion  of 
Byng's  own  conduct  even  more  exact  and  authentic 
than  his  other  official  opportunities  for  personal 
intercourse  with  the  chief  actors,  but  he  must 
have  refrained  with  much  discretion  from  express- 
ing his  judgment  on  the  affair  in  such  way  as  to 
reach  the  public  ear.  It  was  stated  in  the  "  Gentle- 
man's Magazine,"  in  1766,  that  an  inquiry  was 
provoked  in  the  House  of  Commons,  shortly  after 
these  events,  by  Pitt,  who  took  Byng's  side ;  but 
that  Hawke,  being  a  member  of  the  House,  denied 
some  of  Pitt's  allegations  as  to  the  inadequacy  of 


io6  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

Byng's  fleet,  on  the  strength  of  his  own  personal 
observation  after  taking  over  the  command. 
Thereupon,  so  the  account  says,  the  categorical 
test  question,  the  argumentum  ad  hominem,  was 
put  to  him  whether  with  Byng's  means  he  could 
have  beat  the  enemy ;  and  the  manner  of  the  first 
Pitt,  in  thus  dealing  with  an  opponent  in  debate, 
can  be  imagined  from  what  we  know  of  him  other- 
wise. Whether  the  story  be  true  or  not,  Hawke 
was  not  a  man  to  be  so  overborne,  and  the  reply 
related  is  eminently  characteristic,  "  By  the  grace 
of  God,  he  would  have  given  a  good  account  of 
them."  Whatever  the  reason,  there  seems  little 
doubt  that  Pitt  did  not  like  Hawke  ;  but  the  latter 
was  at  once  too  independent  to  care,  and  too 
necessary  to  be  discarded. 

He  remained  in  the  Mediterranean  only  six 
months,  returning  to  England  in  January,  1757. 
His  tenure  of  this  command  was  marked  by  an 
incident  which  exemplifies  the  vigorous  exercise 
of  power  frequent  in  naval  commanders,  in  the 
days  when  neither  steam  nor  telegraph  existed  to 
facilitate  reference  home  for  instructions ;  when 
men  with  their  strong  right  arms  redressed  on 
the  spot  what  they  thought  a  wrong.  A  British 
ship  carrying  supplies  to  Gibraltar,  where  Hawke 
was  then  lying,  was  captured  by  a  French  privateer 
and  taken  into  the  Spanish  port  of  Algeciras,  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  bay.  Her  surrender  was 
demanded  from  the  governor  of  the  port,  Spain 
being  then  neutral ;  but,  being  refused,  the  admiral 


Hawke  107 

sent  the  boats  of  the  squadron  and  cut  her  out. 
This  being  resisted  by  the  Spanish  forts,  a  hun- 
dred British  seamen  were  killed  or  wounded.  On 
the  admiral's  return  home,  Pitt  is  reported  to 
have  told  him  that  he  thought  he  would  himself 
have  acted  in  the  same  way,  but  would  have  made 
some  concession  afterwards.  Hawke  replied  that 
his  duty,  having  the  country's  force  in  his  hands, 
was  to  act  as  he  had,  —  not  to  make  concessions ; 
but  that  the  Ministry  could  deal  with  the  case 
subsequently  as  it  thought  fit.  In  other  words,  as 
in  joint  operations  with  the  army,  later  in  the  year, 
he  took  the  ground  that  the  land  officers  were  the 
judges  of  their  own  business,  but  that  he  would 
see  them  put  safe  on  shore,  as  a  first  step ;  so 
in  a  matter  affecting  national  honor,  as  he  con- 
ceived it,  he  would  do  the  seaman's  part  and 
redress  the  injury,  after  which  the  civil  authority 
could  arrange  with  the  other  party.  The  known 
details  of  this  transaction  are  not  full  enough  to 
permit  a  decided  opinion  as  to  how  far  the  admiral 
was  justified  in  his  action,  judged  even  by  the  in- 
ternational law  of  the  day.  It  was  not  necessarily 
a  breach  of  neutrality  to  admit  a  belligerent  with 
her  prize;  but  it  would  have  been,  had  the  French 
ship  gone  out  from  Algeciras,  seized  her  prey, 
and  returned  with  it.  Whatever  the  facts,  how- 
ever, the  episode  illustrates  interestingly  the  spirit 
of  Hawke  himself,  and  of  the  service  of  that  day, 
as  well  as  his  characteristic  independence  towards 
superiors  when  he  felt  himself  right. 


io8  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

From  this  time  forward  Hawke's  service  was 
confined  to  the  Channel  Fleet.  This  was,  during 
that  war,  the  post  for  the  most  capable  of  British 
officers ;  for,  while  the  matter  at  stake  was  over- 
sea predominance  and  conquest,  yet  both  these 
depended  upon  the  communications  of  the  French 
colonies  and  distant  possessions  with  the  mother 
country.  The  source  of  all  their  strength,  the 
one  base  indispensable  to  their  operations,  was 
the  coast  of  France ;  to  close  exit  from  this  was 
therefore  to  strike  at  the  root.  This  was  much 
less  true  for  the  colonies  of  Great  Britain,  at 
least  in  America ;  their  numbers,  and  resources 
in  every  way,  were  so  far  superior  to  those  of 
Canada  that  they  needed  only  to  be  preserved 
from  interference  by  the  navy  of  France,  —  an 
end  also  furthered  by  the  close  watch  of  the 
French  ports.  This  blockade,  as  it  is  often,  but 
erroneously,  styled,  Hawke  was  the  first  to  main- 
tain thoroughly  and  into  the  winter  months ; 
and  in  so  doing  he  gave  an  extension  to  the 
practice  of  naval  warfare,  which  amounted  to  a 
veritable  revolution  in  naval  strategy.  The  con- 
ception was  one  possible  only  to  a  thorough  sea- 
man, who  knew  exactly  and  practically  what  ships 
could  do ;  one  also  in  whom  professional  knowl- 
edge received  the  moral  support  of  strong  natural 
self-confidence,  —  power  to  initiate  changes,  to 
assume  novel  responsibility,  through  the  inner 
assurance  of  full  adequacy  to  bear  it. 

All  this  Hawke  had.     The  method,  therefore, 


Hawke 


109 


the  holding  the  sea,  and  the  exposure  of  heavy 
ships  to  weather  before  thought  impossible,  was 
well  within  the  range  of  his  ability,  —  of  his 
native  and  acquired  faculties  ;  but  it  is  due  to  him 
to  recognize  the  intellectual  force,  the  originality, 
which  lifted  him  above  the  accepted  tradition  of 
his  predecessors,  and  by  example  transmitted  to 
the  future  a  system  of  warfare  that  then,  as  well 
as  in  his  own  hands,  was  to  exercise  a  decisive 
effect  upon  the  course  of  history.  It  is  also  to 
be  remembered  that  he  took  this  weighty  step 
with  instruments  relatively  imperfect,  and  greatly 
so.  The  bottoms  of  ships  were  not  yet  coppered ; 
in  consequence  they  fouled  very  rapidly,  the 
result  of  which  was  loss  of  speed.  This  meant 
that  much  greater  power,  press  of  canvas,  was 
needed  to  force  them  through  the  water,  and  that 
they  had  to  be  sent  frequently  into  port  to  be 
cleaned.  Thus  they  were  less  able  than  ships  of 
later  days  to  overtake  an  enemy,  or  to  keep  off 
a  lee  shore,  while  more  intricate  administration 
and  more  ships  were  required  to  maintain  the 
efficiency  of  the  squadron  by  a  system  of  reliefs. 
Hawke  noted  also  another  difficulty,  —  the  fatigue 
of  the  crews  in  cleaning  their  ships'  bottoms.  It 
was  even  more  important  to  success,  he  said,  to 
restore  the  seaman,  worn  by  cruising,  by  a  few 
days  quiet  and  sleep  in  port,  than  to  clean  thor- 
oughly at  the  expense  of  exhausting  them.  "  If 
the  enemy  should  slip  out  and  run,"  he  writes, 
"  we  must  follow  as  fast  as  we  can."  Details 


no  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

such  as  these,  as  well  as  the  main  idea,  must  be 
borne  in  mind,  if  due  credit  is  to  be  given  to 
Hawke  for  one  of  the  most  decisive  advances 
ever  made  in  the  practice  of  naval  campaigning. 

Some  time,  however,  was  to  elapse  before  the 
close  watch  of  the  French  ports  became  a  leading 
feature  in  the  naval  policy  of  the  government. 
The  early  disasters  of  the  war  had  forced  the 
king,  after  much  resistance,  finally  to  accept  the 
first  Pitt  as  the  leading  minister  of  the  Crown, 
in  June,  1757.  Pitt's  military  purpose  embraced 
two  principal  objects:  i,  the  establishment  of  the 
British  colonial  system  by  the  destruction  of  that 
of  France,  which  involved  as  a  necessary  prece- 
dent the  control  of  the  sea  by  a  preponderant 
navy ;  and,  2,  the  support  of  Frederic  of  Prussia, 
then  engaged  in  his  deadly  contest  with  the 
combined  armies  of  France,  Austria,  and  Russia. 
Frederic's  activity  made  a  heavy  drain  upon  the 
troops  and  the  treasure  of  France,  preventing  her 
by  just  so  much  from  supporting  her  colonies 
and  maintaining  her  fleet ;  but,  heavily  outnum- 
bered as  he  was,  it  was  desirable  to  work  all 
possible  diversion  in  his  favor  by  attacks  else- 
where. This  Pitt  proposed  to  do  by  a  series  of 
descents  upon  the  French  coast,  compelling  the 
enemy  to  detach  a  large  force  from  before  the 
Prussian  king  to  protect  their  own  shores. 

As  far  as  the  home  naval  force  was  concerned, 
the  years  1757  and  1758  were  dominated  by  this 
idea  of  diversion  in  favor  of  Frederic  the  Great.. 


Hawke  1 1 1 

From  the  general  object  of  these  enterprises,  the 
army  was  necessarily  the  principal  agent;  but  the 
navy  was  the  indispensable  auxiliary.  Hawke's 
association  with  them  is  interesting  chiefly  as 
illustrative  of  professional  character;  for  there 
was  little  or  no  room  for  achievement  of  naval 
results.  The  first  expedition  in  which  he  was 
concerned  was  that  against  Rochefort  in  1757. 
This,  though  now  long  forgotten,  occasioned  by 
its  failure  a  storm  of  contemporary  controversy. 
Whatever  chances  of  success  it  may  under  any 
circumstances  have  had  were  lost  beforehand, 
owing  to  the  lateness  of  the  season  —  June  —  in 
which  Pitt  took  office.  Preparation  began  at  the 
moment  when  execution  was  due.  The  troops 
which  should  have  sailed  in  early  summer  could 
not,  from  delays  apparently  unavoidable  under 
the  conditions,  get  away  before  September  10. 
Hawke  himself  hoisted  his  flag  —  assumed  active 
command  —  only  on  August  15.  The  previous 
administration  was  responsible  for  whatever  de- 
fect in  general  readiness  increased  this  delay ;  as 
regards  the  particular  purpose,  Pitt's  government 
was  at  fault  in  attempting  at  all  an  undertaking 
which,  begun  so  late  in  the  year,  could  not  expect 
success  under  the  notorious  inadequacy  of  organi- 
zation bequeathed  to  him  by  his  predecessors. 
But  there  will  always  be  found  at  the  beginning 
of  a  war,  or  upon  a  change  of  commanders,  a 
restless  impatience  to  do  something,  to  make  a 
showing  of  results,  which  misleads  the  judgment 


H2  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

of  those  in  authority,  and  commonly  ends,  if  not 
in  failure,  at  least  in  barren  waste  of  powder 
and  shot. 

Not  the  least  of  the  drawbacks  under  which  the 
enterprise  labored  was  extremely  defective  infor- 
mation—  especially  hydrographic.  The  char- 
acter of  the  coast,  the  places  suited  for  landing, 
the  depths  of  water,  and  the  channels,  were  prac- 
tically unknown.  Hence  a  necessity  for  recon- 
noissances,  pregnant  of  indefinite  delay,  as  might 
have  been  foreseen.  Among  Hawke's  memo- 
randa occur  the  words,  "  Not  to  undertake  any- 
thing without  good  pilots."  The  phrase  is  doubly 
significant,  for  he  was  not  a  man  to  worry  need- 
lessly about  pilots,  knowing  that  pilots  look  not 
to  military  results,  but  merely  to  their  own 
responsibility  not  to  take  the  ground ;  and  it 
shows  the  total  ignorance  under  which  labored 
all  who  were  charged  with  an  undertaking  that 
could  only  succeed  as  a  surprise,  executed  with 
unhesitating  rapidity.  Hawke  himself  was 
astounded  at  finding  in  Basque  Roads,  before 
Rochefort,  "  a  safe  spacious  road  in  which  all  the 
navy  of  England,  merchant  ships  included,  may 
ride  without  the  least  annoyance.  Before  I  came 
here,  the  place  was  represented  as  very  difficult 
of  access,  and  so  narrow  that  ships  could  not  lie 
in  safety  from  the  forts  —  nay,  the  pilots  made 
many  baulks  before  we  came  in."  In  fact,  want 
of  good  pilotage  summed  up  the  fault  of  the  ex- 
pedition, from  its  inception  in  the  Cabinet  through- 


Hawke  113 

out  all  the  antecedent  steps  of  consultation  and 
preparation.  Pitt's  impetuosity  doubtless  acted 
as  a  spur  to  laggards,  but  it  was  accompanied  by 
a  tendency  to  overbearing  insolence  that  not  in- 
frequently browbeats  cautious  wisdom.  When 
applied  to  a  man  like  Hawke,  strong  in  natural 
temper  and  in  conscious  fnastery  of  his  profession, 
the  tone  characteristic  of  Pitt  provokes  an  equally 
resolute  self-assertion,  as  far  removed  from  sub- 
jection as  it  is  from  insubordination;  but  friend- 
ship becomes  impossible,  and  even  co-operation 
difficult. 

Throughout  all  Hawke  kept  his  head,  and  made 
no  serious  mistake ;  but  he  accepts  no  unmerited 
censures.  Seeing  that  the  transports  are  not 
enough  for  the  healthful  carriage  of  the  troops, 
he  so  represents  it.  The  government,  already 
impatient  at  any  report  of  defects,  hopes  that 
things  are  now  arranged  to  his  satisfaction.  "  I 
am  astonished  at  this  expression,"  he  says,  "  it  is 
my  duty  to  represent  defects,  but  I  am  satisfied 
with  any  decision  you  make."  Again,  "  I  have 
received  your  letter  signifying  His  Majesty's  direc- 
tions to  use  the  utmost  diligence  in  embarking 
the  troops  and  getting  to  sea.  As  I  cannot  doubt 
my  letter  of  Sunday  being  immediately  communi- 
cated to  you,  I  should  have  expected  that  before 
yours  was  sent  His  Majesty  would  have  been  fully 
satisfied  that  I  needed  no  spur  in  executing  his 
orders."  As  Hawke  and  Anson  —  the  First  Lord 
—  were  friends,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  we 

8 


114  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

see  here  a  firm  protest  against  the  much  lauded 
tone  to  which  the  efficiency  of  the  British  army 
and  navy  under  Pitt  has  been  too  exclusively 
attributed.  It  was  in  the  civil  administration,  the 
preparation  that  underlies  military  success,  which 
being  at  home  was  under  his  own  eye,  that  Pitt's 
energy  was  beneficially  felt,  and  also  in  his  prompt 
recognition  of  fit  instruments;  but  he  had  no 
need  to  discover  Hawke  or  Boscawen.  He  might 
as  well  be  thought  to  have  discovered  the  sun. 

In  discharging  his  part  of  the  expedition  Hawke's 
course  is  consistent  and  clear.  It  must  in  the 
first  place  be  recognized  that  such  enterprises  are 
of  secondary  importance,  and  do  not  warrant  the 
risks  which  are  not  only  justifiable  but  imperative 
when  a  decisive  issue  is  at  stake.  Hawke's  heroic 
disregard  of  pilotage  difficulties  at  Quiberon,  in 
1759,  would  have  been  culpable  temerity  at  Basque 
Roads,  in  1757.  But,  save  delays  on  this  account, 
no  time  is  lost  by  him.  When  the  decision  to 
land  is  reached,  he  is  clear  as  to  the  possibility  of 
landing ;  but  when  the  generals  think  it  impos- 
sible to  effect  certain  results,  he  replies  that  is 
their  business,  on  which  he  does  not  pretend  to 
judge.  In  his  evidence  before  the  Court  after- 
wards, he  said,  "  Whether  they  should  land  or 
not,  he  constantly  thought  it  the  part  of  the 
generals  to  determine.  He  could  not  but  suppose 
they  were  infinitely  better  judges  of  their  own 
business  than  he  could  be."  Their  conduct  was 
marked  by  vacillations  strange  to  him,  and  which 


Hawke  115 

apparently  displeased  him ;  the  troops  being,  on 
one  occasion,  embarked  in  the  boats  for  some 
hours,  and  yet  returning  to  the  ships  without  pro- 
ceeding. He  then  addressed  a  formal  letter  to 
the  commanding  general,  saying  that  if  he  had  no 
further  operation  to  propose  the  fleet  would  return 
at  once  to  England,  and  he  declined  to  attend  a 
Council  of  War  to  decide  either  of  these  points. 
The  Army  should  decide,  alone,  whether  it  could 
effect  anything  by  landing ;  if  not,  he,  without 
asking  counsel,  would  stay  no  longer.  On  Octo- 
ber yth  he  reached  Spithead. 

Pitt,  who  had  espoused  Byng's  cause  against 
the  previous  administration,  followed  its  precedent 
in  throwing  the  blame  on  the  military  and  naval 
leaders.  In  Parliament,  he  "declared  solemnly 
his  belief  that  there  was  a  determined  resolution, 
both  in  the  naval  and  military  commanders,  against 
any  vigorous  exertion  of  the  national  power." 
For  far  less  than  this  accusation  Byng  had  been 
condemned  ;  but  in  fact  the  fault  at  Rochefort  lay 
clearly  on  those  who  issued  the  orders,  —  upon 
the  Cabinet ;  upon  the  character  of  the  expedition 
itself,  — a  great  risk  for  a  secondary  and  doubtful 
object ;  upon  the  inconsiderate  haste  which  disre- 
garded alike  the  season  and  the  inadequate  know- 
ledge ;  upon  defective  preparation  in  the  broadest 
sense  of  the  words.  Diversions,  in  truth,  are 
feints,  in  which  the  utmost  smoke  with  the  least 
fire  is  the  object.  Carried  farther,  they  entail 
disaster ;  for  they  rest  on  no  solid  basis  of  adequate 


n6  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

force,  but  upon  successful  deception.  Pitt's  angry 
injustice  met  with  its  due  rebuke  the  next  year  at 
St.  Cas.  It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  words 
such  as  those  quoted  were  responsible,  in  part  at 
least,  for  the  disastrous  issue  of  that  diversion,  the 
story  of  which  belongs,  if  to  the  navy  at  all,  to  the 
life  of  Howe. 

That     Hawke    resented     this     lan^ua^e    can 

o       o 

scarcely  be  doubted,  and  none  the  less  that  he 
evidently  himself  felt  that  something  might  have 
been  attempted  by  the  troops.  He  was  clear  of 
fault  in  his  own  consciousness  ;  but  in  the  general 
censure  he  was  involved  with  his  associates  — 
known,  so  to  say,  by  his  friends,  implicated  in  the 
meshes  of  a  half-truth,  where  effort  to  clear  one's 
self  results  in  worse  entanglement.  He  had  the 
manly  cast  of  character  which  will  not  struggle 
for  self-vindication ;  but  his  suppressed  wrath 
gathered  force,  until  a  year  later  it  resulted,  upon 
occasion  of  official  provocation,  in  an  explosion 
that  has  not  a  close  parallel  in  naval  history. 

He  had  hoisted  his  flag  again  on  February 
28,  1758.  His  first  service  was  directed  against 
a  French  squadron  of  five  ships-of-the-line,  fitting 
at  Rochefort  to  convoy  troops  for  the  relief  of 
Louisburg,  in  Cape  Breton  Island,  then  about 
to  be  besieged  by  British  and  colonial  forces. 
Hawke's  observations  of  the  previous  year  had 
ascertained  the  hitherto  unknown  facilities  of 
Basque  Roads  for  occupation  by  a  fleet  and  con- 
sequent effectual  interception  of  such  an  expedi- 


Hawke  117 

tion.  Upon  making  the  land  the  French  vessels 
were  found  already  in  the  Roads,  therefore  soon 
to  sail  ;  but  before  this  superior  force  of  seven 
ships  they  cut  their  cables,  and  fled  across  the 
shoals  up  the  river  Charente,  on  which  Rochefort 
lies.  Hawke,  instructed  by  his  previous  expe- 
rience, had  earnestly  but  fruitlessly  demanded  fire- 
ships  and  bomb-vessels  to  destroy  the  enemy  in 
case  they  grounded  on  the  flats ;  which  they  did, 
and  for  some  hours  lay  exposed  to  such  an  attack. 
Not  having  these  means,  he  had  to  watch  help- 
lessly the  process  of  lightening  and  towing  by 
which  they  at  last  made  their  escape.  He  then 
returned  to  England,  having  frustrated  the  relief 
expedition  but,  through  defective  equipment,  not 
destroyed  the  vessels.  The  Admiralty,  upon  re- 
ceiving his  report  of  the  transaction,  made  no 
acknowledgments  to  him. 

Pitt  had  profited  by  Hawke's  ineffectual  re- 
quest for  small  vessels  and  his  suffering  from  the 
want  of  them  ;  but  he  utilized  the  suggestions  in  a 
manner  that  robbed  their  author  of  any  share  in 
the  results.  A  squadron  of  that  sort  was  to  be 
constituted,  to  operate  on  the  French  coast  in 
diversions  like  that  of  1757;  but  it  was  to  be  an 
independent  command,  under  an  officer  chosen 
by  the  Government  without  consulting  the  ad- 
miral. To  the  main  fleet  was  assigned  the  nec- 
essary, but  in  credit  very  secondary,  office  of 
cruising  off  Brest,  to  prevent  interruption  by  the 
French  ships  there ;  to  play,  in  short,  the  incon- 


1 1 8  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

spicuous  role  of  a  covering  force,  while  the  light 
squadron  had  the  brilliant  part  of  fighting.  The 
officer  selected  for  the  latter  was  Howe,  deservedly 
a  favorite  of  Hawke's,  but  not  therefore  acceptable 
to  him  as  a  supplanter  in  his  honors. 

The  admiral  had  been  for  some  time  superin- 
tending the  equipment  of  the  vessels  for  the  light 
division,  when,  on  May  10,  1758,  Howe  reported 
to  him,  bringing  his  orders.  Hawke  boiled  over 
at  once ;  and,  in  a  heat  evidently  beyond  his 
will  to  control,  despatched  the  following  letter, 
three  hours  after  Howe's  arrival. 

PORTSMOUTH,  7  o'clock  p.  m.  loth  May,  1758. 

SIR,  —  About  4  o'clock  arrived  here  Captain  Howe, 
and  delivered  me  their  Lordships'  order  of  the  gth.  In 
last  September  I  was  sent  out  to  command  an  expedi- 
tion under  all  the  disadvantages  one  could  possibly 
labor  under,  arising  chiefly  from  my  being  under  the 
influence  of  land-officers  in  Councils  of  War  at  sea.1 
Last  cruise  (March-April,  1758)  I  went  out  on  a  partic- 
ular service,  almost  without  the  least  means  of  perform- 
ing it.  Now  every  means  to  ensure  success  is  provided  ; 
another  is  to  reap  the  credit ;  while  it  is  probable  that 
I,  with  the  capital  ships,  might  be  ordered  to  cruise  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  prevent  his  failing  in  this  attempt. 
To  fit  out  his  ships  for  this  service  I  have  been  kept 
here,2  and  even  now  have  their  Lordships'  directions,  at 
least  in  terms,  to  obey  him.  He  is  to  judge  of  what  he 
wants  for  his  expedition ;  he  is  to  make  his  demands, 

1  By  express  orders  from  the  Ministry  Councils  of  War  had  to  be 
held. 

*  An  application  for  four  days'  leave  for  private  business  had  been 
refused. 


Hawke  119 

and  I  am  to  comply  with  them.  I  have  therefore 
directed  my  flag  immediately  to  be  struck,  and  left  their 
Lordships'  orders  with  Vice-Admiral  Holburne.  For 
no  consequence  that  can  attend  my  striking  it  without 
orders  shall  ever  outbalance  with  me  the  wearing  it  one 
moment  with  discredit. 

I  am,  etc. 

E.  HAWKE. 

It  is  impossible  to  justify  so  extreme  a  step  as 
abandoning  one's  command  without  permission, 
and  especially  under  circumstances  that  permitted 
the  orderly  course  of  asking  for  detachment. 
Nevertheless,  Hawke  did  well  to  be  angry ;  and, 
as  is  sometimes  the  case,  an  injudicious  and,  in 
point  of  occasion,  unseemly  loss  of  temper,  doubt- 
less contributed  to  insure  for  him  in  the  future,  to 
a  degree  which  forbearance  or  mere  remonstrance 
would  not  have  assured,  the  consideration  essen- 
tial to  his  duties.  Many  will  remember  the  effect 
produced  by  Plimsoll's  unparliamentary  outbreak. 
The  erroneous  impression,  that  admirals  and  gen- 
erals fit  to  be  employed  at  all  were  to  be  ridden 
booted  and  spurred,  needed  correction.  Hawke 
had  misapprehended  the  intention  of  the  Govern- 
ment, in  so  far  as  believing  that  the  light  squadron 
was  to  be  employed  in  Basque  Roads,  the  scene 
of  last  years  failure;  but  he  was  right  in  thinking 
that  intrusting  the  enterprise  to  another,  on  that 
occasion  his  junior,  would  be  a  reflection  upon 
himself,  intensified  by  making  the  command 
practically  independent,  while  he  was  limited  to 


I2O  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

the  covering  duty.  Under  these  circumstances, 
erroneously  imagined  by  him,  the  squadron  should 
have  been  attached  to  his  command,  and  the 
particular  direction  left  to  him  ;  the  Government 
giving  to  him,  instead  of  to  Howe,  the  general 
orders  which  it  issued,  and  arranging  with  him 
beforehand  as  to  the  command  of  the  detached 
squadron. 

But  even  under  the  actual  conditions,  of  an 
intention  to  operate  on  the  western  Channel  coast 
of  France,  it  would  have  been  graceful  and  ap- 
propriate to  recognize  Hawke's  eminent  past,  and 
recent  experience,  by  keeping  under  his  command 
the  ships  he  had  himself  fitted  for  the  service,  and 
directing  him  to  despatch  Howe  with  the  necessary 
instructions.  It  was  as  in  the  Nile  campaign, 
where  the  general  directions  were  sent  to  St. 
Vincent,  with  a  clear  expression  of  the  Govern- 
ment's preference  for  Nelson  as  the  officer  to  take 
charge.  The  intended  scene  of  Howe's  opera- 
tions, if  not  formally  within  Hawke's  district,  was 
far  less  distant  from  Brest  than  Toulon  and  Italy 
were  from  Cadiz,  where  St.  Vincent  covered  Nel- 
son's detachment.  In  the  wish  for  secrecy,  per- 
haps, or  perhaps  through  mere  indifference  to  the 
effect  produced  upon  Hawke,  as  a  man  assumed 
to  need  curb  and  spur,  he  was  left  in  ignorance, 
to  imagine  what  he  pleased ;  and  this  action,  suc- 
ceeding previous  neglects  and  Pitt's  imputations 
of  the  previous  year,  elicited  an  outburst  which, 
while  it  cannot  be  justified  in  its  particular  mani- 


Hawke  121 

festation,  was  in  spirit  inevitable.  A  man  sub- 
missive to  such  treatment  as  he  had  good  cause 
to  suspect,  would  be  deficient  in  the  independence 
of  character,  and  sensitive  regard  to  official  repu- 
tation, without  which  he  was  unfit  to  command 
the  Channel  Fleet. 

Hawke  was  summoned  at  once  to  the  Admir- 
alty, and  in  the  interview  which  ensued,  as  shown 
by  the  minutes  endorsed  on  his  own  letter,  his 
misconception  as  to  the  quarter  in  which  Howe 
was  to  act  afforded  standing  ground  for  a  com- 
promise. Hawke  having  committed  himself 
officially,  and  upon  a  mistaken  premise,  the 
Admiralty  had  him  technically  at  their  mercy; 
but  such  a  triumph  as  they  could  win  by  dis- 
ciplining him  would  be  more  disastrous  than  a 
defeat.  He  disclaimed  resentment  towards  any 
person,  and  reiterated  that  his  action  was  in- 
tended merely  to  defend  his  character  and  honor, 
which  he  said  —  to  quote  the  minute  exactly  — 
"  were  not  so  much  touched  as  he  apprehended 
when  the  suspicion  he  had  of  Mr.  Howe's  going 
to  Basque  Roads  arose  —  from  the  Lords  asking 
him  some  days  since  for  a  draft  of  the  Roads." 
The  italics  are  the  present  writer's ;  but  the  words 
as  they  stand  would  indicate  that  he  did  not  yield 
his  view  of  the  matter  in  general,  nor  leave 
hearers  under  any  doubt  as  to  how  far  he  could 
safely  be  treated  with  contumely  or  slight.  There 
can  be  little  doubt  that  the  substantial  result 
was  to  strengthen  his  position  in  the  exact- 


122  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

ing  duty  that  lay  before  him  in  the  following 
year. 

The  whole  business  was  then  salved  over 
by  the  First  Lord,  Anson,  taking  command  of 
the  Channel  Fleet  for  the  particular  occasion. 
Hawke  accompanied  him  as  second  in  command, 
while  Howe  went  his  way  with  the  light  squadron 
and  the  troops.  Both  divisions  sailed  on  the  ist 
of  June.  On  the  i8th  our  admiral  was  so  unwell 
with  a  severe  fever  and  cold  —  a  complaint  to 
which  he  was  much  subject  —  that  he  had  to  ask 
to  be  sent  into  port.  He  went  ashore  before  the 
end  of  the  month,  and  remained  unemployed  till 
the  following  May. 

The  year  1759  is  the  culminating  epoch  of 
Hawke's  career.  In  it  occurred  the  signal  tri- 
umph of  Quiberon  Bay,  the  seal  of  his  genius, 
significant  above  all  as  demonstrating  that  the 
ardor  of  the  leader  had  found  fulfilment  in  his 
followers,  that  the  spirit  of  Hawke  had  become 
the  spirit  of  the  Navy.  This  year  also  yielded 
proof  of  his  great  capacity  as  a  seaman  and  ad- 
ministrator, in  the  efficient  blocking  of  Brest, 
prolonged  through  six  months  of  closest  watching 
into  the  period  of  the  winter  gales,  in  face  of 
which  it  had  hitherto  been  thought  impossible  to 
keep  the  sea  with  heavy  ships  massed  in  fleets  ; 
for,  as  he  most  justly  said,  in  explaining  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  the  rendezvous  fixed  by 
him,  "  A  single  ship  may  struggle  with  a  hard 
gale  of  wind  when  a  squadron  cannot.  In  work- 


Hawke  123 

ing  against  a  strong  westerly  gale  in  the  Channel, 
where  it  cannot  make  very  long  stretches,"  — 
because  it  finds  shores  and  shoals  on  either  side, 
— "  it  must  always  by  wearing  lose  ground,  but 
more  especially  if  it  should  so  blow  as  to  put  it 
past  carrying  sail."  The  method  used  by  Hawke 
was  not  only  an  innovation  on  all  past  practice, 
but,  as  has  before  been  said,  constituted  the  pat- 
tern whereon  were  framed  the  great  blockades  of 
the  Napoleonic  period,  which  strangled  both  the 
naval  efficiency  and  the  commercial  and  financial 
resources  of  the  Empire.  These  were  but  devel- 
opments of  Hawke's  fine  achievement  of  1759; 
the  prestige  of  originality  belongs  to  him.  Even 
their  success,  with  better  ships  and  the  improve- 
ment of  detail  always  accompanying  habit,  is  fore- 
shadowed by  his.  "  I  may  safely  affirm  that, 
except  the  few  ships  that  took  refuge  in  Conquet, 
hardly  a  vessel  of  any  kind  has  been  able  to  enter 
or  come  out  of  Brest  for  four  months,"  —  ending 
October  loth.  "  They  have  been  obliged  to  un- 
load near  forty  victuallers  at  Quimperley  and 
carry  their  cargoes  by  land  to  Brest.  It  must 
be  the  fault  of  the  weather,  not  ours,  if  any  of 
them  escape." 

It  was  suitable  indeed  that  so  strenuous  and 
admirable  an  exhibition  of  professional  ability,  — 
of  naval  generalship,  —  alike  in  strategic  combi- 
nation, tactical  disposition,  and  administrative 
superintendence,  should  terminate  in  a  brilliant 
triumph,  at  once  its  fruit  and  its  crown ;  wherein 


124  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

sedulous  and  unremittent  readiness  for  instant 
action,  comprehended  by  few,  received  a  startling 
demonstration  which  none  could  fail  to  understand. 
As  Nelson  was  pursued  by  ignorant  sneers  before 
the  Nile,  so  Hawke  was  burned  in  effigy  by  the 
populace,  at  the  very  moment  when  laborious 
effort  was  about  to  issue  in  supreme  achievement. 
The  victory  in  either  case  is  less  than  the  ante- 
cedent labor,  as  the  crown,  after  all,  is  less  than 
the  work,  the  symbol  than  the  fact  symbolized. 

A  brief  account  of  preceding  conditions,  and 
of  the  dispositions  maintained  to  meet  them,  is 
therefore  necessary  to  due  appreciation  of  the 
victory  of  Quiberon  Bay.  Although  the  diver- 
sions of  1758  had  not  very  materially  aided 
Frederic  of  Prussia,  they  had  inflicted  distinct 
humiliation  and  harassment  upon  France.  This, 
added  to  defeat  upon  the  Continent  and  in  North 
America,  had  convinced  the  French  Government, 
as  it  convinced  Napoleon  a  half-century  later,  that 
a  determined  blow  must  be  struck  at  England 
herself  as  the  operative  centre  upon  which  rested, 
and  from  which  proceeded,  the  most  serious 
detriment  to  their  cause  and  that  of  their  allies. 
It  was  resolved,  therefore,  to  attempt  an  invasion 
of  England ;  to  the  threat  of  which  the  English 
people  were  always  extremely  sensitive. 

From  local  conditions  the  French  preparations 
had  to  be  made  in  several  separate  places ;  it  was 
the  task  of  the  British  Navy  to  prevent  the  con- 
centration of  these  different  detachments  in  a 


Hawke  125 

joint  effort.  The  troops  must  embark,  of  course, 
from  some  place  near  to  England ;  their  principal 
points  of  assembly  were  on  the  Channel,  whence 
they  were  to  cross  in  flat-boats,  and  in  the  Biscay 
ports,  from  Brest  to  the  mouth  of  the  Loire. 
The  Bay  of  Quiberon,  from  which  Hawke's  ac- 
tion takes  its  name,  lies  between  the  two  latter 
points.  It  is  sheltered  from  the  full  force  of  the 
Atlantic  gales  by  a  peninsula  of  the  same  name, 
and  by  some  shoals  which  prolong  the  barrier 
to  the  southward  of  the  promontory. 

To  cross  safely,  it  was  necessary  to  provide 
naval  protection.  To  this  end  squadrons  were 
equipped  in  Toulon  and  in  Brest.  Combined  at 
the  latter  point,  and  further  strengthened  by 
divisions  expected  to  return  from  North  America, 
they  would  constitute  a  force  of  very  serious  con- 
sideration in  point  of  numbers.  Rochefort  also 
was  an  element  in  the  problem,  though  a  minor 
one ;  for  either  the  small  force  already  there 
might  join  the  concentration,  or,  if  the  port  were 
unwatched,  the  American  or  other  divisions 
might  get  in  there,  and  be  at  least  so  much 
nearer  to  Brest,  or  to  a  neighboring  point  of 
assembly,  as  Quiberon  Bay. 

As  the  French  Navy  was  essential  to  the 
French  crossing,  as  its  junction  was  essential  to 
action,  as  the  point  of  junction  was  at  or  near 
Brest  —  for  there  was  the  district  near  which  the 
troops  were  assembling  —  and  as  by  far  the 
largest  detachment  was  already  in  Brest,  that  port 


126  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

became  the  important  centre  upon  blocking  which 
depended  primarily  the  thwarting  of  the  invasion. 
If  the  French  Navy  succeeded  in  concentrating 
at  Brest,  the  first  move  in  the  game  would  be  lost. 
Hawke  therefore  had  the  double  duty  of  not  allow- 
ing the  squadron  there  to  get  out  without  fight- 
ing, and  of  closing  the  entrance  to  reinforcements. 
The  latter  was  far  the  more  difficult,  and  could 
not  be  assured  beyond  the  chance  of  failure, 
because  an  on-shore  gale,  which  would  carry  his 
fleet  into  the  Channel  to  avoid  being  driven  on 
the  French  coast,  would  be  fair  for  an  outside 
enemy  to  run  into  the  port,  friendly  to  him. 
This  actually  occurred  at  a  most  critical  moment, 
but  it  could  only  happen  by  a  combination  of 
circumstances ;  that  is,  by  the  hostile  squadron 
chancing  to  arrive  at  a  moment  when  the  British 
had  been  blown  off.  If  it  approached  under  ordi- 
nary conditions  of  weather  it  would  run  into  the 
midst  of  foes. 

The  great  names  of  the  British  Navy  were 
then  all  afloat  in  active  command.  Rodney  was 
before  Havre,  which  he  bombarded  in  the  course 
of  the  summer,  doing  a  certain  amount  of  dam- 
age, harassing  the  local  preparations  for  invasion, 
and  intercepting  vessels  carrying  supplies  to  the 
Brest  fleet  and  coastwise.  Boscawen,  second  only 
to  Hawke,  was  before  Toulon,  to  hold  there 
the  dozen  ships-of-the-line  under  De  la  Clue,  as 
Hawke  was  charged  to  stop  the  score  under 
Conflans. 


Hawke  127 

In  broad  conception,  Hawke's  method  was 
simple  and  can  be  easily  stated  ;  the  difficulty 
lay  in  carrying  it  out.  The  main  body  of  his 
force  had  a  rendezvous,  so  chosen  that  in  violent 
weather  from  the  westward  it  could  at  worst 
drift  up  Channel,  but  usually  would  have  a  fair 
wind  for  Torbay,  a  roadstead  on  the  British 
coast  about  a  hundred  miles  distant.  To  the 
rendezvous  the  fleet  was  not  tied  under  ordi- 
nary circumstances  ;  it  was  merely  a  headquarters 
which  admitted  of  cruising,  but  where  despatches 
from  home  would  always  find  the  admiral  in  per- 
son, or  news  of  his  whereabouts.  Near  Brest 
itself  was  kept  an  inshore  squadron  of  three  or 
four  ships,  which  under  ordinary  circumstances 
could  see  the  enemy  inside,  noting  his  forward- 
ness ;  for  the  cannon  of  the  day  could  not  molest 
a  vessel  more  than  a  mile  from  the  entrance, 
while  the  conditions  within  of  spars  and  sails 
indicated  to  a  seaman  the  readiness  or  intention 
to  move,  to  a  degree  not  ascertainable  with  ships 
dependent  on  steam  only. 

With  these  dispositions,  if  a  westerly  gale 
came  on,  the  fleet  held  its  ground  while  it  could, 
but  when  expedient  to  go  put  into  Torbay.  Ow- 
ing to  the  nearness  of  the  two  places,  the  weather, 
when  of  a  pronounced  character,  was  the  same 
at  both.  While  the  wind  held  to  the  westward 
of  south,  or  even  at  south-southeast,  a  ship-of-the- 
line  could  not  beat  out  from  Brest;  much  less  a 
fleet.  The  instant  the  wind  went  east,  fair  for 


128  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

exit,  the  British  left  Torbay,  with  certainty  of 
not  being  too  late ;  for,  though  the  enemy  might 
get  out  before  their  return,  the  east  wind  would 
not  suffer  them  to  close  with  the  French  coast 
at  another  point  soon  enough  to  avoid  a  meet- 
ing. While  in  Torbay  the  time  was  improved  by 
taking  on  board  stores  and  provisions ;  nor  was 
the  night's  rest  at  anchor  a  small  consideration 
for  seamen  worn  with  continual  cruising. 

The  practical  merits  displayed  by  Hawke  in 
maintaining  this  simple  but  arduous  service  were, 
first  and  supremely,  the  recognition  of  its  pos- 
sibility, contrary  to  a  tradition  heretofore  as  com- 
monly and  as  blindly  accepted  as  those  of  the 
line-of-battle,  and  of  the  proper  methods  for  fleet 
attack  before  described.  It  must  be  remembered 
also  that  in  these  wars,  1739-1763,  for  the  first 
time  the  British  Navy  found  the  scene  of  action, 
in  European  waters,  to  be  the  Biscay  coast  of 
France.  In  the  former  great  wars  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  French  fleets  entered  the  Channel, 
and  pitched  battles  were  fought  there  and  in 
the  North  Sea.  Thence  the  contest  shifted 
to  the  Mediterranean,  where  the  great  fleets 
operated  in  the  later  days  of  William  III.,  and  the 
reign  of  Anne.  Then,  too,  the  heavy  ships,  like 
land  armies,  went  into  winter  quarters.  It  was 
by  distinguished  admirals  considered  profes- 
sionally criminal  to  expose  those  huge  yet  cum- 
brous engines  of  the  nation's  power  to  the  buffet- 
ings  of  winter  gales,  which  might  unfit  them  next 


Hawke  129 

year  to  meet  the  enemy,  snugly  nursed  and 
restored  to  vigor  in  home  ports  during  the  same 
time.  The  need  of  periodical  refitting  and  clean- 
ing the  bottoms  clinched  the  argument  in  favor 
of  this  seasonable  withdrawal  from  the  sea. 

With  this  presumed  necessity,  attention  had 
not  been  paid  to  developing  a  system  of  mainte- 
nance and  refit  adapted  to  the  need  of  a  fleet  per- 
forming what  Hawke  undertook.  In  this,  of 
course,  there  cannot  be  assigned  to  him  the  in- 
dividuality of  merit  that  may  belong  to  a  concep- 
tion, and  does  belong  to  the  man  who  initiates 
and  assumes,  as  he  did,  the  responsibility  for  a 
novel  and  hazardous  course  of  action.  Many 
agents  had  to  contribute  to  the  forwarding  of 
supplies  and  repairs ;  but,  while  singleness  of 
credit  cannot  be  assumed,  priority  is  justly  due  to 
him  upon  whose  shoulders  fell  not  only  all  blame, 
in  case  his  enterprise  failed,  but  the  fundamental 
difficulty  of  so  timing  the  reliefs  of  the  vessels 
under  his  command,  so  arranging  the  order  of 
rotation  in  their  going  and  coming  as  to  keep 
each,  as  well  as  the  whole  body,  in  a  constant  con- 
dition of  highest  attainable  efficiency  —  in  num- 
bers, in  speed,  and  in  health — for  meeting  the 
enemy,  whose  time  of  exit  could  not  be  foreknown. 
Naturally,  too,  the  man  on  whom  all  this  fell,  and 
who  to  the  nation  would  personify  success  or 
failure,  as  the  event  might  be,  —  terms  which  to 
him  would  mean  honor  or  ruin,  —  that  man,  when 
professionally  so  competent  as  Hawke,  would  be 

9 


1 30  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

most  fruitful  in  orders  and  in  suggestions  to  attain 
the  desired  end.  In  this  sense  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  he  was  foremost,  and  his  correspon- 
dence bears  evidence  of  his  preoccupation  with 
the  subject. 

Into  particulars  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  go. 
Administrative  details  are  interesting  only  to 
specialists.  But  one  quality  absolutely  essential, 
and  in  which  most  men  fail,  he  manifested  in  high 
degree.  He  feared  no  responsibility,  either 
towards  the  enemy,  or  towards  the  home  authori- 
ties. Superior  and  inferior  alike  heard  plainly 
from  him  in  case  of  defects;  still  more  plainly  in 
case  of  neglect.  "  It  is  a  matter  of  indifference 
to  me  whether  I  fight  the  enemy,  should  they 
come  out,  with  an  equal  number,  one  ship  more, 
or  one  ship  less."  "  I  depend  not  on  intelligence 
from  the  French  ports ;  what  I  see  I  believe,  and 
regulate  my  conduct  accordingly  ; "  a  saying  which 
recalls  one  of  Farragut's,  —  "  The  officers  say  I 
don't  believe  anything.  I  certainly  believe  very 
little  that  comes  in  the  shape  of  reports.  They 
keep  everybody  stirred  up.  I  mean  to  be  whipped 
or  to  whip  my  enemy,  and  not  to  be  scared 
to  death."  Agitation,  to  a  very  considerable 
degree,  was  the  condition  of  Hawke's  superiors ; 
to  say  the  least,  anxiety  strained  to  the  point  of 
approaching  panic.  But  Hawke  could  have 
adopted  truly  as  his  own  Farragut's  other  words, 
"  I  have  full  confidence  in  myself  and  in  my  judg- 
ment,"—  that  is,  of  course,  in  professional  mat- 


Hawke  131 

ters  ;  and  he  spoke  reassuringly  out  of  the  firmness 
of  his  self-reliance.  "  Their  Lordships  will  pardon 
me  for  observing  that  from  the  present  disposition 
of  the  squadron  I  think  there  is  little  room  for 
alarm  while  the  weather  continues  tolerable." 
Again,  a  few  days  later,  "  Their  Lordships  may 
rest  assured  there  is  little  foundation  for  the  pre- 
sent alarms.  While  the  wind  is  fair  for  the 
enemy's  coming  out,  it  is  also  favorable  for  our 
keeping  them  in ;  and  while  we  are  obliged  to 
keep  off  they  cannot  stir."  This  was  in  October, 
when  the  weather  was  already  wild  and  the  days 
shortening. 

With  equally  little  hesitancy,  though  without 
breach  of  subordination,  he  overbears  the  Admir- 
alty when  they  wish  to  pay  what  he  considers 
exaggerated  care  to  cleaning  the  bottoms,  trace- 
able, no  doubt,  to  the  prejudices  of  the  Sea  Lords. 
"  If  the  ships  take  up  a  month  by  cleaning,  from 
the  time  they  leave  me  to  their  return,  it  will  be 
impossible  for  me  to  keep  up  the  squadron.  The 
only  practicable  way  is  to  heel,  etc.,  and  confine 
them  to  ten  days  in  port  for  the  refreshment  of 
their  companies  in  case  they  should  miss  the 
spring  tide."  "  Their  Lordships  will  give  me  leave 
to  observe  that  the  relief  of  the  squadron  depends 
more  on  the  refreshment  of  the  snips'  companies 
than  on  cleaning  the  ships.  By  the  hurry  the 
latter  must  be  performed  in,  unless  the  ship  con- 
tinues a  month  or  five  weeks  in  port,  which  the 
present  exigency  will  by  no  means  admit  of,  the 


Types  of  Naval  Officers 


men  would  be  so  harassed  and  fatigued  that  they 
would  return  to  me  in  a  worse  condition  than 
when  they  left  me.  .  .  .  However,  I  shall  endeavor 
to  comply  with  all  their  Lordships'  directions  in 
such  manner  as,  to  the  best  of  my  judgment^  will 
answer  their  intentions  in  employing  me  here" 
The  words  italicized  strike  the  true  note  of  subor- 
dination duly  tempered  with  discretion. 

To  the  Navy  Board,  a  civil  adjunct  to  the 
Admiralty,  but  possessed  of  considerable  indepen- 
dent power  to  annoy  officers  in  active  military 
service,  he  took  a  more  peremptory  tone.  He 
had  discharged  on  his  own  authority,  and  for  rea- 
sons of  emergency,  a  mutinous  surgical  officer. 
For  this  he  was  taken  to  task,  as  Nelson  a  gen- 
eration later  was  rebuked  by  the  same  body.  "  I 
have  to  acquaint  you,"  he  replied,  "  that  there  was 
no  mistake  in  his  being  ordered  by  me  to  be  dis- 
charged." He  then  gives  his  reasons,  and  con- 
tinues, "  For  the  real  good  of  the  service  I  ordered 
him  to  be  discharged,  and  his  crime  noted  on  his 
list  of  pay,  for  your  information.  I  shall  not  enter 
into  any  dispute  with  you  about  my  authority  as 
a  Commanding  Officer,  neither  do  I  ever  think  of 
inconveniences  or  prejudices  to  myself,  as  a  party, 
according  to  your  insinuations,  where  the  good  of 
the  service  is  concerned."  It  must  be  added  that 
to  subordinates  he  was  as  liberal  with  praise  as  he 
was  with  censure,  where  either  was  merited  ;  nor 
did  he  fail  in  kindly  personal  intervention  upon 
due  occasion  for  deserving  or  unfortunate  men. 


Hawke  133 

More  reserved,  apparently,  than  Nelson,  he  seems 
to  have  been  like  him  sympathetic ;  and  hence  it 
was  that,  as  before  observed,  it  was  his  spirit  that 
he  communicated  to  the  navy  rather  than  a  system, 
admirable  as  was  the  strategic  system  embodied 
in  his  methods  of  blockade.  It  was  by  personal 
influence  rather  than  by  formulated  precept  that 
Hawke  inspired  his  service,  and  earned  a  just  claim 
to  be  reckoned  the  greatest  force  of  his  century 
in  naval  development. 

The  general  conditions  being  as  described,  the 
fighting  in  the  naval  campaign  of  1759  began  in 
the  Mediterranean.  On  June  8th  Boscawen,  hav- 
ing driven  two  French  frigates  into  a  fortified  bay 
near  Toulon,  attacked  them  with  three  ships-of- 
the-line.  The  attack  failed,  and  the  British  ships 
were  badly  injured ;  a  timely  lesson  on  the  gen- 
eral inexpediency  of  attacking  shore  batteries  with 
vessels,  unless  for  special  and  adequate  reasons 
of  probable  advantage.  In  July  he  returned  to 
Gibraltar,  to  refit  and  for  provisions.  In  the 
absence  of  details,  positive  criticism  is  unwar- 
ranted ;  but  it  is  impossible  not  to  note  the  differ- 
ence between  this  step,  during  summer  weather, 
and  the  Toulon  blockades  of  Lord  St.  Vincent, 
who,  when  before  Brest,  modelled  his  course  upon 
that  of  Hawke.  The  port  being  thus  left  open, 
De  la  Clue  sailed  on  the  5th  of  August  for  Brest. 
On  the  1 7th  he  was  near  the  straits  of  Gibraltar, 
hugging  the  African  coast,  and  falling  night  gave 
promise  of  passing  unseen,  when  a  British  look- 


134  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

out  frigate  caught  sight  of  his  squadron.  She 
hauled  in  for  Gibraltar  at  once,  firing  signal  guns. 
Boscawen's  ships  were  in  the  midst  of  repairs,  mostly 
dismantled;  but,  the  emergency  not  being  unfore- 
seen, spars  and  sails  were  sent  rapidly  aloft,  and 
within  three  hours  they  were  underway  in  pursuit. 
The  French  division  separated  during  the  night. 
Five  ships  put  into  Cadiz.  The  British  next 
morning  caught  sight  of  the  remaining  seven, 
among  which  was  the  admiral,  and  a  sharp  chase 
resulted  in  the  destruction  of  five.  From  August 
1 8th  the  Toulon  fleet  was  eliminated  from  the  cam- 
paign ;  though  the  vessels  in  Cadiz  remained  to 
the  end  a  charge  upon  Hawke's  watchfulness, 
similar  to  that  caused  by  the  enemy's  divisions 
expected  from  America. 

That  one  of  the  latter  was  already  on  its  way 
home,  under  the  command  of  Commodore  Bom- 
part,  was  notified  to  our  admiral  on  September 
2ist  by  a  despatch  from  England.  He  immedi- 
ately sent  a  division  of  heavy  ships  to  reinforce 
the  light  squadron  to  the  southward.  "  If  the 
alarm  is  great  now,"  he  said,  "  it  will  be  much 
greater  if  he  get  into  Rochefort."  Further  infor- 
mation from  the  West  Indies  contradicted  the 
first  report,  and  on  October  roth  Hawke  recalled 
the  ships-of-the-line,  apparently  at  the  wish  of  the 
Admiralty ;  for  he  expresses  his  regret  at  doing 
so,  and  asks  for  more  of  the  "  many  ships  "  then 
in  England,  that  Rochefort  may  be  blocked  as 
well  as  Brest.  The  incident  has  now  little  impor- 


Hawke  135 

tance,  except  as  indicating  the  general  national 
nervousness,  and  the  difficulty  under  which  he 
labored  through  force  inadequate  to  the  numerous 
and  exacting  duties  entailed  by  constant  holding 
the  sea  in  war.  From  this  point  of  view  it  bears 
upon  his  conduct. 

That  Bompart  was  coming  proved  to  be  true. 
On  November  loth  Hawke  anchored  with  the  fleet 
in  Torbay,  after  three  days  of  struggle  against  a 
very  heavy  westerly  storm.  "  Bompart,  if  near, 
may  get  in,"  he  wrote  the  Admiralty,  "  but  no 
ship  can  get  out  from  any  port  in  the  Bay."  The 
weather  had  then  moderated,  but  was  still  too 
rough  for  boating,  even  in  the  sheltered  roadstead ; 
hence  he  could  get  no  reports  of  the  state  of  the 
ships,  which  shows  incidentally  the  then  defective 
system  of  signalling.  On  the  i2th  he  sailed,  on 
the  1 3th  was  again  forced  into  Torbay  by  a  south- 
wester,  but  on  the  I4th  got  away  finally.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  i6th  the  fleet  was  twenty-five 
miles  from  the  Island  of  Ushant,  near  Brest,  and 
there  learned  from  transports,  returning  from  the 
the  light  division  off  Quiberon,  that  the  French 
fleet  had  been  seen  the  day  before,  seventy-five 
miles  northwest  of  Belleisle ;  therefore  some  fifty 
or  sixty  miles  southeast  of  the  point  where  this 
news  was  received.  Conflans  had  sailed  the  same 
day  that  the  British  last  left  Torbay,  but  before 
his  departure  Bompart  had  opportunely  arrived, 
as  Hawke  had  feared.  His  ships  were  not  able 
to  go  at  once  to  sea  on  so  important  a  mission, 


136  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

but  their  seasoned  crews  were  a  welcome  reinforce- 
ment and  were  distributed  through  the  main  fleet, 
which  numbered  twenty-one  ships-of-the-line. 
Hawke  had  twenty-three. 

Concluding  that  the  enemy  were  bound  for 
Quiberon,  Hawke  carried  a  press  of  sail  for  that 
place.  He  knew  they  must  be  within  a  hundred 
miles  of  him  and  aimed  to  cut  them  off  from  their 
port.  During  the  iyth  the  wind,  hanging  to  the 
south  and  east,  was  adverse  to  both  fleets,  but  on 
the  1 8th  and  igth  it  became  more  favorable.  At 
half-past  eight  on  the  morning  of  the  2oth,  one  of 
the  look-out  frigates  ahead  of  the  British  made 
the  signal  for  sighting  a  fleet.  It  was  then  blow- 
ing strong  from  the  west-northwest,  and  Belleisle, 
which  is  ten  miles  west  of  Quiberon  Bay,  and 
south  of  which  the  fleets  must  pass,  was  by  the 
English  reckoning  forty  miles  distant.  A  course 
of  some  fifty  or  sixty  miles  was  therefore  to  be 
run  before  the  enemy  could  close  the  land,  and 
there  remained  about  eight  hours  of  sun. 

Hawke's  day  had  come.  Towards  ten  o'clock 
he  had  the  enemy  sufficiently  in  view  to  see  that 
they  were  intent  upon  securing  their  arrival, 
rather  than  fighting.  He  therefore  made  signal 
for  the  seven  ships  nearest  them  "  to  chase  and 
draw  into  a  line-of-battle  ahead  of  me,  and  en- 
deavour to  stop  them  till  the  rest  of  the  squadron 
should  come  up,  who  also  were  to  form  as  they 
chased  that  no  time  might  be  lost  in  the  pursuit." 
The  French  "  kept  going  off  under  such  sail  as 


Hawke  137 

all  their  squadron  could  carry  and  yet  keep  to- 
gether, while  we  crowded  after  him  with  every  sail 
our  ships  could  bear''  The  words  italicized  sum 
up  the  whole  philosophy  of  a  general  chase. 
The  pursued  are  limited  to  the  speed  of  the 
slowest,  otherwise  he  who  cannot  but  lag  is 
separated  and  lost ;  the  pursuer  need  slacken 
no  whit,  for  his  friends  are  ever  coming  up  to 
his  aid.  Overtaking  is  inevitable,  unless  the  dis- 
tance is  too  short. 

At  half-past  two  firing  began  between  the 
French  rear  and  the  leading  British.  Of  the  two 
foremost  in  the  chase,  who  thus  opened  the  fight, 
one  was  the  same  Dorsetshire  which  in  Mathews's 
battle  had  played  the  laggard.  Her  captain,  who 
thus  rose  to  his  opportunity,  was  one  of  the  two 
to  whom  Hawke  addressed  the  enthusiastic  com- 
pliment that  they  had  "  behaved  like  angels." 
Hawke  himself  was  at  this  moment  south  of 
Belleisle,  with  several  ships  ahead  of  him ;  while 
the  French  admiral  was  leading  his  fleet,  in  order 
better  to  pilot  them  over  dangerous  ground,  and 
by  his  own  action  show  more  surely  than  was 
possible  by  signal  what  he  wished  done  from 
moment  to  moment.  At  the  southern  extreme  of 
the  shoals  which  act  as  a  breakwater  to  Quiberon 
Bay  are  some  formidable  rocks,  known  as  the 
Cardinals.  Around  these  M.  de  Conflans  passed 
soon  after  the  firing  began,  his  rear  being  then  in 
hot  action. 

Hawke  himself  was  without  a  pilot,  as   were 


138  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

most  of  his  captains.  The  sailing  master  of  the 
flag-ship  was  charged  with  that  duty  for  the  fleet, 
but  had  of  the  ground  before  him  no  exact  per- 
sonal knowledge ;  nor  could  reliance  be  placed 
upon  the  imperfect  surveys  of  a  locality,  which 
it  was  not  the  interest  of  an  almost  constant 
enemy  to  disclose.  Enough,  however,  was  known 
to  leave  no  doubt  of  the  greatness  of  the  risks, 
and  it  was  the  master's  part  to  represent  them. 
The  occasion,  however,  was  not  one  of  a  mere 
diversion,  of  a  secondary  operation,  but  of  one 
vital  to  the  nation's  cause ;  and  Hawke's  reply, 
stamped  with  the  firmness  of  a  great  officer, 
showed  how  little  professional  timidity  had  to 
do  with  his  laudable  care  of  his  fleet  in  Basque 
Roads  two  years  before.  "  You  have  done  your 
duty  in  warning  me,"  he  replied;  "now  lay  us 
alongside  the  French  Commander-in-chief."  So 

O 

amid  the  falling  hours  of  the  day  the  British  fleet, 
under  the  unswerving  impulse  of  its  leader,  moved 
steadfastly  forward,  to  meet  a  combination  of 
perils  that  embraced  all  most  justly  dreaded  by 
seamen,  —  darkness,  an  intricate  navigation,  a 
lee  shore  fringed  with  outlying  and  imperfectly 
known  reefs  and  shoals,  towards  which  they  were 
hurried  by  a  fast-rising  wind  and  sea,  that  for- 
bade all  hope  of  retracing  their  steps  during  the 
long  hours  of  the  night. 

"  Had  we  but  two  hours  more  daylight,"  wrote 
Hawke  in  his  official  report,  "  the  whole  had  been 
totally  destroyed  or  taken  ;  for  we  were  almost 


•        Hawke  139 

up  with  their  van  when  night  overtook  us."  His 
success  would  have  been  greater,  though  not 
more  decisive  of  issues  than  the  event  proved  it ; 
but  nothing  could  have  added  to  the  merit  or 
brilliancy  of  his  action,  to  which  no  element  of 
grandeur  was  wanting.  This  was  one  of  the 
most  dramatic  of  sea  fights."  Forty-odd  tall 
ships,  pursuers  and  pursued,  under  reefed  canvas, 
in  fierce  career  drove  furiously  on  ;  now  rushing 
headlong  down  the  forward  slope  of  a  great  sea, 
now  rising  on  its  crest  as  it  swept  beyond  them ; 
now  seen,  now  hidden ;  the  helmsmen  straining 
at  the  wheels,  upon  which  the  huge  hulls,  tossing 
their  prows  from  side  to  side,  tugged  like  a  mad- 
dened horse,  as  though  themselves  feeling  the 
wild  "rapture  of  the  strife"  that  animated  their 
masters,  rejoicing  in  their  strength  and  defying 
the  accustomed  rein. 

The  French  admiral  had  flattered  himself  that 
the  enemy,  ignorant  of  the  ground,  would  not 
dare  to  follow  him  round  the  Cardinals.  He  was 
soon  undeceived.  Hawke's  comment  on  the 
situation  was  that  he  was  "for  the  old  way  of 
fighting,  to  make  downright  work  with  them." 
It  was  an  old  way,  true;  but  he  had  more  than 
once  seen  it  lost  to  mind,  and  had  himself 
done  most  to  restore  it  to  its  place,  —  a  new  way 
as  well  as  an  old.  The  signals  for  the  general 
chase  and  for  battle  were  kept  aloft,  and  no 
British  ship  slacked  her  way.  Without  ranged 
order,  save  that  of  speed,  the  leaders  mingled 


140  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

with  the  French  rear;  the  roar  and  flashes  of 
the  guns,  the  falling  spars  and  drifting  clouds  of 
smoke,  now  adding  their  part  to  the  wild  mag- 
nificence of  the  scene.  Though  tactically  perfect 
in  the  sole  true  sense  of  tactics,  that  the  means 
adopted  exactly  suited  the  situation,  this  was  a 
battle  of  incidenfs,  often  untold,  —  not  one  of 
manoeuvres.  As  the  ships,  rolling  heavily,  buried 
their  flanks  deeply  in  the  following  seas,  no  cap- 
tain dared  to  open  his  lower  tier  of  ports,  where 
the  most  powerful  artillery  was  arrayed  —  none 
save  one,  the  French  Thesee,  whose  rashness  was 
rebuked  by  the  inpouring  waters,  which  quickly 
engulfed  both  ship  and  crew.  The  Superbe  met 
a  like  fate,  though  not  certainly  from  the  same 
cause.  She  sank  under  the  broadside  of  the 
Royal  George,  Hawke's  flag-ship.  "  The  Royal 
George  s  people  gave  a  cheer,"  wrote  an  eye  wit- 
ness, "  but  it  was  a  faint  one ;  the  honest  sailors 
were  touched  at  the  miserable  state  of  so  many 
hundreds  of  poor  creatures."  Americans  and 
English  can  couple  this  story  of  long  ago  with 
Philip's  ejaculation  off  Santiago  de  Cuba,  but 
three  years  since :  "  Don't  cheer,  boys,  those 
poor  devils  are  dying." 

By  five  o'clock  two  French  ships  had  struck, 
and  two  had  been  sunk.  "  Night  was  now  come," 
wrote  Hawke,  "  and  being  on  a  part  of  the  coast, 
among  islands  and  shoals  of  which  we  were 
totally  ignorant,  without  a  pilot,  as  was  the 
greatest  part  of  the  squadron,  and  blowing  hard 


Hawke  141 

on  a  lee  shore,  I  made  the  signal  to  anchor." 
The  day's  work  was  over,  and  doubtless  looked  to 
him  incomplete,  but  it  was  effectually  and  finally 
done.  The  French  Navy  did  not  again  lift  up 
its  head  during  the  three  years  of  war  that 
remained.  Balked  in  their  expectation  that  the 
foe's  fear  of  the  beach  would  give  them  refuge, 
harried  and  worried  by  the  chase,  harnessed  to  no 
fixed  plan  of  action,  Conflans's  fleet  broke  apart 
and  fled.  Seven  went  north,  and  ran  ashore  at 
the  mouth  of  the  little  river  Vilaine  which  emp- 
ties into  Quiberon  Bay.  Eight  stood  south,  and 
succeeded  in  reaching  Rochefort.  The  fate  of 
four  has  been  told.  Conflans's  flag-ship  anchored 
after  night  among  the  British,  but  at  daybreak 
next  morning  cut  her  cables,  ran  ashore,  and  was 
burned  by  the  French.  One  other,  wrecked  on  a 
shoal  in  the  bay,  makes  up  the  tale  of  twenty-one. 
Six  were  wholly  lost  to  their  navy;  the  seven 
that  got  into  Vilaine  only  escaped  to  Brest  by 
twos,  two  years  later,  while  the  Rochefort  division 
was  effectually  blocked  by  occupying  Basque 
Roads,  the  islands  of  which  and  of  Quiberon 
were  cultivated  as  kitchen  gardens  for  the  re- 
freshment of  British  crews. 

Of  the  British,  one  ship  went  on  a  shoal  during 
the  action,  and  on  the  following  day  another 
coming  to  her  assistance  also  grounded.  Both 
were  lost,  but  most  of  their  people  were  saved. 
Beyond  this  Hawke's  fleet  suffered  little.  "  As 
to  the  loss  we  have  sustained,"  wrote  he,  "  let  it 


142  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

be  placed  to  the  account  of  the  necessity  I  was 
under  of  running  all  risks  to  break  this  strong 
force  of  the  enemy." 

A  contemporary  witness  assigns  to  Hawke's 
own  ship  a  arge  individual  share  in  the  fighting. 
Of  this  he  does  not  himself  speak,  nor  is  it 
of  much  matter.  That  all  was  done  with  her 
that  could  be  done,  to  aid  in  achieving  success, 
is  sufficiently  assured  by  his  previous  record. 
Hawke's  transcendent  merit  in  this  affair  was 
that  of  the  general  officer,  not  of  the  private 
captain.  The  utmost  courage  shown  by  the 
commander  of  a  single  ship  before  the  enemy's 
fire  cannot  equal  the  heroism  which  assumes  the 
immense  responsibility  of  a  doubtful  issue,  on 
which  may  hang  a  nation's  fate ;  nor  would  the 
admiral's  glory  be  shorn  of  a  ray,  if  neither  then, 
nor  at  any  other  time  had  a  hostile  shot  traversed 
his  decks. 

The  night  of  the  2Oth  passed  in  anxieties 
inseparable  from  a  situation  dangerous  at  best, 
but  still  more  trying  to  an  admiral  upon  whom, 
after  such  a  day,  night  had  closed  without  ena- 
bling him  to  see  in  what  case  most  of  his  ships 
were.  "In  the  night,"  he  reports,  "we  heard 
many  guns  of  distress  fired,  but,  blowing  hard, 
want  of  knowledge  of  the  coast,  and  whether  they 
were  fired  by  a  friend  or  an  enemy,  prevented  all 
means  of  relief."  In  the  morning  he  resumed 
his  activity.  Little,  however,  could  be  done. 
The  continuing  violence  of  the  wind,  and  igno- 


Hawke  143 

ranee  of  the  ground,  prevented  approach  within 
gun-shot  to  the  ships  at  the  mouth  of  the  Vilaine, 
while  they,  by  lightening  and  favor  of  the  next 
flood  tide,  warped  their  way  inside  through  the 
mud  flats. 

Hawke  remained  nearly  two  months  longer,  re- 
turning to  England  January  17,  1760.  He  had 
then  been  thirty-five  weeks  on  board,  without  set- 
ting foot  on  shore.  At  the  age  of  fifty-four,  and 
amid  such  manifold  cares,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered 
at  that  he  should  need  relief.  Rather  must  he  be 
considered  fortunate  that  his  health,  never  robust 
in  middle  life,  held  firm  till  his  great  triumph  was 
achieved.  Boscawen  succeeded  him  temporarily 
in  the  command. 

He  was  received  in  England  with  acclamations 
and  with  honors  ;  yet  the  most  conspicuous  mark 
of  approval  conferred  on  admirals  before  and  after, 
the  grant  of  the  peerage,  was  not  given  to  him, 
who  had  wrought  one  of  the  very  greatest  services 
ever  done  for  the  country.  Recent  precedent  — 
that  of  Anson  —  demanded  such  recognition  ;  and 
popular  enthusiasm  would  have  applauded, 
although  the  full  military  merit  of  the  man  could 
scarcely  be  appreciated  by  the  standards  of  his 
generation.  That  no  such  reward  was  bestowed  is 
most  probably  attributable  to  Hawke's  own  indif- 
ference to  self-advancement.  If  demanded  by  him, 
it  could  scarcely  have  been  refused ;  but  he  never 
pushed  his  own  interests.  His  masculine  inde- 
pendence in  professional  conduct,  towards  supe- 


144  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

riors  and  inferiors,  found  its  root  and  its  reflection 
in  personal  unconcern  —  as  well  antecedent  as 
subsequent  —  about  the  results  from  his  actions 
to  his  fortunes.  To  do  his  own  part  to  the 
utmost,  within  the  lines  of  the  profession  he  knew, 
was  his  conception  of  duty.  As  he  would  not 
meddle  with  the  land  officers'  decision  as  to  what 
they  should  or  should  not  do,  so  he  left  to  the 
politicians,  in  whose  hands  the  gifts  lay,  to  decide 
what  they  would,  or  should,  accord  to  a  success- 
ful admiral.  Pitt,  the  Great  Commoner,  left 
Hawke  a  commoner.  Possibly  he  recognized 
that  only  by  stretch  of  imagination  could  Hawke 
be  reckoned  one  of  the  creations  of  a  great  Mini- 
ster's genius. 

Little  remains  to  tell.  On  September  3, 
1762,  the  admiral's  flag  was  hauled  down  for  the 
last  time.  He  never  went  to  sea  again.  In  1766, 
when  Pitt  came  back  to  power  as  Lord  Chatham, 
Hawke  became  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  and 
so  remained  till  1771.  It  was  a  time  of  unbroken 
peace,  succeeding  a  period  of  continuous  wars 
extending  over  a  quarter  of  a  century;  conse- 
quently there  was  in  naval  and  military  matters 
the  lassitude  usual  to  such  a  period.  Hawke  is 
credited  with  formulating  the  principle  that  "the 
British  fleet  could  only  be  termed  considerable  in 
the  proportion  it  bore  to  that  of  the  House  of 
Bourbon ; "  that  is,  to  the  combined  navies  of 
France  and  Spain,  over  which  that  House  then 
reigned.  The  maxim  proves  that  he  had  some 


Hawke 


claim  to  statesmanship  in  his  view  of  affairs  out- 
side his  service ;  and  his  manifested  freedom  from 
self-seeking  is  the  warrant  that  no  secondary  politi- 
cal motives  would  divert  his  efforts  from  this  aim. 
That  he  succeeded  in  the  main,  that  he  was  not  re- 
sponsible for  the  fallen  condition  of  the  fleet  when 
war  again  arose  in  1778,  is  evidenced  by  a  state- 
ment, uncontradicted,  in  the  House  of  Lords  in 
1779,  that  when  he  left  office  the  navy  had  139 
ships-of-the-line,  of  which  81  were  ready  for 
sea. 

In  1 765  Hawke,  who  was  then  already  a  full 
admiral,  wearing  his  flag  at  the  mainmast  head, 
was  made  Vice-Admiral  of  Great  Britain ;  an 
honorary  position,  but  the  highest  in  point  of 
naval  distinction  that  the  nation  had  to  give.  As 
one  who  held  it  three-quarters  of  a  century  later 
wrote,  "  It  has  ever  been  regarded  as  the  most 
distinguished  compliment  belonging  to  our  pro- 
fession." The  coincidence  is  significant  that 
upon  Hawke's  death  Rodney  succeeded  him  in 
it ;  affirming,  as  it  were,  the  consecutiveness  of 
paramount  influence  exercised  by  the  two  on  the 
development  of  the  Navy.  In  1776  the  peerage 
was  at  last  conferred ;  seventeen  years  after  his 
great  victory,  and  when,  having  passed  three  score 
and  ten,  a  man  who  had  ever  disdained  to  ask  must 
have  felt  the  honor  barren  to  himself,  though 
acceptable  for  his  son. 

His  last  recorded  professional  utterances  are  in 
private  letters  addressed  in  the  summer  of  1780 


146  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

to  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Channel  Fleet 
—  Francis  Geary  —  who  had  served  with  him  in 
the  Bay  of  Biscay,  though  he  missed  Quiberon. 
He  recommends  the  maintenance  of  his  old 
station  off  Brest,  and  says,  "  For  God's  sake,  if 
you  should  be  so  lucky  as  to  get  sight  of  the 
enemy,  get  as  close  to  them  as  possible.  Do  not 
let  them  shuffle  with  you  by  engaging  at  a  dis- 
tance, but  get  within  musket  shot  if  you  can. 
This  will  be  the  means  to  make  the  action  deci- 
sive." In  these  words  we  find  an  unbroken  chain 
of  tradition  between  Hawke  and  Nelson.  One  of 
Hawke's  pupils  was  William  Locker ;  and  Locker 
in  turn,  just  before  Hawke's  death,  had  Nelson  for 
a  lieutenant.  To  him  Nelson  in  after  years,  in 
the  height  of  his  glory,  wrote,  "  To  you,  my  dear 
friend,  I  owe  much  of  my  success.  It  was  you 
who  taught  me,  —  '  Lay  a  Frenchman  close  and 
you  will  beat  him.' " 

Hawke  died  October  16,  1781.  On  his  tomb 
appear  these  words,  "  Wherever  he  sailed,  victory 
attended  him."  It  is  much  to  say,  but  it  is  not 
all.  Victory  does  not  always  follow  desert.  "  It 
is  not  in  mortals  to  command  success,"  —  a  favor- 
ite quotation  with  the  successful  admirals  St.  Vin- 
cent and  Nelson.  Hawke's  great  and  distinctive 
glory  is  this,  —  that  he,  more  than  any  one  man, 
was  the  source  and  origin  of  the  new  life,  the  new 
spirit,  of  his  service.  There  were  many  brave 
men  before  him,  as  there  were  after;  but  it  fell  to 
him  in  a  time  of  great  professional  prostration 


Hawke  147 

not  only  to  lift  up  and  hand  on  a  fallen  torch,  but 
in  himself  to  embody  an  ideal  and  an  inspiration 
from  which  others  drew,  thus  rekindling  a  light 
which  it  is  scarcely  an  exaggeration  to  say  had 
been  momentarily  extinguished. 


RODNEY 

1719-1792 

UNLIKE  Hawke,  Rodney  drew  his  descent 
from  the  landed  gentry  of  England,  and 
had  relatives  among  the  aristocracy.  The  name 
was  originally  Rodeney.  We  are  told  by  his  son- 
in-law  and  biographer  that  the  Duke  of  Chandos, 
a  connection  by  marriage,  obtained  the  command 
of  the  Royal  yacht  for  the  admiral's  father,  Henry 
Rodney.  In  one  of  the  trips  which  George  I. 
frequently  made  between  England  and  Hanover, 
he  asked  his  captain  if  there  were  anything  he 
could  do  for  him.  The  reply  was  a  request  that 
he  would  stand  sponsor  for  his  son,  who  accord- 
ingly received  the  name  of  George  ;  his  second 
name  Brydges  coming  from  the  family  through 
which  Chandos  and  the  Rodneys  were  brought 
into  relationship.  The  social  position  and  sur- 
roundings resulting  from  such  antecedents  con- 
tributed of  course  to  hasten  the  young  officer's 
advancement,  irrespective  of  the  unquestionable 
professional  merit  shown  by  him,  even  in  early 
years ;  but  to  them  also,  combined  with  narrow 
personal  fortune,  inadequate  to  the  tastes  thus 


Rodney  149 

engendered,  was  probably  due  the  pecuniary  em- 
barrassment which  dogged  him  through  life,  and 
was  perhaps  the  moving  incentive  to  doubtful 
procedures  that  cast  a  cloud  upon  his  personal 
and  official  reputation. 

Rodney  was  born  in  February,  1719,  and  went 
to  sea  at  the  age  of  thirteen  ;  serving  for  seven 
years  in  the  Channel  Fleet.  Thence  he  was 
transferred  to  the  Mediterranean,  where  he  was 
made  lieutenant  in  1739.  In  1742  he  went  again 
to  the  Mediterranean  with  Admiral  Mathews, 
who  there  gave  him  command  of  a  "  post "  ship, 
with  which  he  brought  home  the  trade,  —  three 
hundred  merchant  vessels,  —  from  Lisbon.  Upon 
arriving  in  England  his  appointment  by  Mathews 
was  "confirmed"  by  the  Admiralty.  Being  then 
only  twenty-four,  he  anticipated  by  five  years  the 
age  at  which  Hawke  reached  the  same  rank  of 
post-captain,  the  attainment  of  which  fixed  a  man's 
standing  in  the  navy.  Beyond  that,  advancement 
went  by  seniority ;  a  post-captain  might  be 
"yellowed," — retired  as  a  rear  admiral,  —  but 
while  in  active  service  he  kept  the  advantage  of 
his  early  promotion. 

When  Rodney  was  in  later  years  commander- 
in-chief  in  the  West  Indies,  he  made  his  son  a 
post-captain  at  fifteen ;  an  exercise  of  official 
powers  which,  though  not  singular  to  him,  is 
too  characteristic  of  the  man  and  the  times  to 
be  wholly  unmentioned.  His  own  promotion, 
though  rapid,  was  not  too  much  so  for  his  pro- 


150  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

fessional  good ;  but  it  is  likely  that  neither  that 
consideration,  nor  the  good  of  the  service,  counted 
for  much  alongside  of  the  influence  he  possessed. 
He  appears,  however,  to  have  justified  from  the 
first  the  favor  of  his  superiors.  His  employment 
was  continuous,  and  in  a  military  point  of  view 
he  was  more  fortunate  than  Hawke  was  at  the 
same  period  of  his  career.  Within  two  years, 
when  in  command  of  a  forty-gun  ship,  he  fought 
and  took  a  French  privateer  of  the  same  nominal 
force,  and  with  a  crew  larger  by  one  hundred 
than  his  own.  Thence  he  was  advanced  into  the 
Eagle,  sixty,  in  which,  after  some  commerce- 
destroying  more  lucrative  than  glorious,  he  bore 
an  extremely  honorable  part  in  Hawke's  battle 
with  L'Etenduere,  already  related.  The  Eagle 
was  heavily  engaged,  and  was  one  of  the  three 
small  ships  that  on  their  own  initiative  pursued 
and  fought,  though  unsuccessfully,  the  two  es- 
caping French  vessels.  Rodney  shared  Hawke's 
general  encomium,  that  "  as  far  as  fell  within  my 
notice,  the  commanders,  their  officers,  and  ships' 
companies,  behaved  with  the  greatest  spirit  and 
resolution."  Rodney  came  under  his  close  obser- 
vation, for,  the  Eagles  "  wheel  being  shot  to 
pieces  and  all  the  men  at  it  killed,  and  all  her 
braces  and  bowlines  gone,"  she  drove  twice  on 
board  the  flag-ship.  This  -was  before  her  pursuit 
of  the  two  fliers. 

In  the  subsequent  trial  of  Captain  Fox, — the 
minutes  of  which  the  present  writer  has  not  seen, 


Rodney  151 

—  it  appears,  according  to  the  biographer  of 
Lord  Hawke,1  that  it  was  Captain  Saunders's 
and  Captain  Rodney's  "  sense  of  being  deserted 
by  Fox,  and  of  the  two  French  ships  having 
escaped  through  his  failure  of  duty,  which  forms 
the  chief  feature  of  the  Court- Martial.  Rodney 
especially  describes  his  being  exposed  to  the  fire 
of  four  of  the  enemy's  ships,  when,  as  he  asserted, 
Fox's  ship  might  well  have  taken  off  some  of  it." 
The  incident  is  very  noteworthy,  for  it  bears  the 
impress  of  personal  character.  Intolerance  of 
dereliction  of  duty,  and  uncompromising  con- 
demnation of  the  delinquent,  were  ever  leading 
traits  in  Rodney's  course  as  a  commander-in- 
chief.  He  stood  over  his  officers  with  a  rod, 
dealt  out  criticism  unsparingly,  and  avowed  it  as 
his  purpose  and  principle  of  action  so  to  rule. 
It  is  not  meant  that  his  censures  were  unde- 
served, or  even  excessive  ;  but  there  entered  into 
them  no  ingredient  of  pity.  His  despatches  are 
full  of  complaints,  both  general  and  specific. 
When  he  spared,  it  was  from  a  sense  of  expe- 
diency,—  or  of  justice,  a  trait  in  which  he  was  by 
no  means  deficient ;  but  for  human  weakness  he 
had  no  bowels.  Hawke  complains  of  but  this 
one  captain,  Fox,  and  towards  him  he  seems  not 
to  have  evinced  the  strong  feeling  that  animated 
his  juniors.  Each  man  has  his  special  gift,  and 
to  succeed  must  needs  act  in  accordance  with  it. 

1  Life  of  Lord  Hawke,  by  Captain  Montagu  Burrows,  Royal  Navy, 
p.  194. 


152  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

There  are  those  who  lead  and  those  who  drive; 
Hawke  belonged  to  the  one  class,  Rodney  to  the 
other. 

In  direct  consequence  of  this  difference  of 
temperament,  it  will  be  found,  in  contrasting  the 
schools  of  which  Hawke  and  Rodney  are  the 
conspicuous  illustrations,  that  the  first  represents 
the  spirit,  and  the  second  the  form,  which  were 
the  two  efficient  elements  of  the  progress  made 
during  the  eighteenth  century.  The  one  intro- 
duces into  a  service  arrested  in  development, 
petrified  almost,  by  blindly  accepted  rules  and 
unintelligent  traditions,  a  new  impulse,  which 
transforms  men  from  within,  breaking  through 
the  letter  of  the  law  in  order  to  realize  its  for- 
gotten intent ;  the  other  gives  to  the  spirit,  thus 
freed  from  old  limitations,  a  fresh  and  sagacious 
direction,  but  needs  nevertheless  to  impose  its 
own  methods  by  constraint  from  without.  It  is 
the  old  struggle,  ever  renewed,  between  liberty 
and  law;  in  the  due,  but  difficult,  combination  of 
which  consist  both  conservation  and  progress. 

And  so  in  the  personality  of  the  two  great 
admirals  who  respectively  represent  these  con- 
trasting schools  of  practice;  while  we  find  in 
both  these  two  elements,  as  they  must  exist  in 
every  efficient  officer,  yet  it  is  to  be  said  that  the 
one  inspires  and  leads,  the  other  moulds  and  com- 
pels. The  one,  though  seemingly  reserved,  is  in 
character  sympathetic,  and  influences  by  example 
chiefly ;  the  other,  austerely  courteous,  is  towards 


Rodney  153 

associates  distant  and  ungenial,  working  by  fear 
rather  than  by  love.  For  these  broad  reasons  of 
distinction  it  is  Mathews's  battle  that  best  meas- 
ures the  reaction  of  which  Hawke  is  the  type, 
for  there  was  especially  illustrated  defect  of  spirit, 
to  cover  which  the  letter  of  the  law  was  invoked ; 
whereas  in  Byng's  action,  extremely  bad  form,  in 
the  attempt  to  conform  to  the  letter  of  the  Instruc- 
tions, emphasizes  the  contrast  with  Rodney's 
methods,  precise  and  formal  unquestionably,  but 
in  which  form  ceases  to  be  an  end  in  itself  and 
is  reduced  to  its  proper  function  as  the  means 
to  carry  into  effect  a  sound  military  conception. 
Of  these  two  factors  in  the  century's  progress,  it 
needs  hardly  to  be  said  that  the  one  contributed 
by  Hawke  is  the  greater.  In  spirit  and  in  achieve- 
ment he,  rather  than  Rodney,  is  the  harbinger  of 
Nelson. 

A  short  time  after  the  action  with  L'Etenduere 
the  cruise  of  the  Eagle  came  to  an  end.  When 
she  was  paid  off  Rodney  was  presented  at  Court 
by  Anson,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty ;  a 
merited  and  not  unusual  honor  after  distinguished 
service  in  battle.  The  King  was  struck  by  his 
youthful  appearance,  and  said  he  had  not  known 
there  was  so  young  a  captain  in  the  Navy.  As 
he  was  then  nearly  thirty,  and  had  seen  much 
and  continuous  service,  it  is  singular  that  his 
face  should  not  have  borne  clear  traces  of  the 
facts.  Anson  replied  that  he  had  been  a  captain 
for  six  years,  and  it  was  to  be  wished  that  His 


154  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

Majesty  had  a  hundred  more  as  good  as  he. 
Making  allowance  for  courtly  manners  and  fair- 
speaking,  the  incident  may  be  accepted  as  show- 
ing, not  only  that  aptitude  for  the  service  which 
takes  its  hardships  without  undue  wear  and 
tear,  but  also  an  official  reputation  already  well 
established  and  recognized. 

Professional  standing,  therefore,  as  well  as 
family  influence,  probably  contributed  to  obtain 
for  him  in  1749  the  appointment  of  Commodore 
and  Commander-in-chief  on  the  Newfoundland 
station ;  for  he  was  still  junior  on  the  list  of 
captains,  and  had  ten  years  more  to  run  before 
obtaining  his  admiral's  flag.  He  remained  in 
this  post  from  1749  to  1752.  They  were  years 
of  peace,  but  of  peace  charged  full  with  the  ele- 
ments of  discord  which  led  to  the  following  war. 
Canada  was  still  French,  and  the  territorial  limits 
between  the  North  American  possessions  of  the 
two  nations  remained  a  subject  of  dispute  and 
intrigue.  The  uncertain  state  of  political  rela- 
tions around  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  added  to 
the  responsibility  of  Rodney's  duty,  and  empha- 
sized the  confidence  shown  in  assigning  him  a 
position  involving  cautious  political  action. 

Explicit  confirmation  of  this  indirect  testimony 
is  found  in  a  private  letter  to  him  from  the  Earl 
of  Sandwich,  who  had  succeeded  Anson  as  First 
Lord  in  1748.  "I  think  it  necessary  to  inform 
you  that,  if  the  Governor  of  Nova  Scotia  should 
have  occasion  to  apply  to  you  for  succor,  and 


Rodney  155 

send  to  you  for  that  purpose  to  Newfoundland,  it 
would  be  approved  by  Government  if  you  should 
comply  with  his  request.  It  is  judged  improper, 
as  yet,  to  send  any  public  order  upon  a  business 
of  so  delicate  a  nature,  which  is  the  reason  of  my 
writing  to  you  in  this  manner ;  and  I  am  satisfied 
that  your  prudence  is  such  as  will  not  suffer  you 
to  make  any  injudicious  use  of  the  information 
you  now  receive.  There  are  some  people  that 
cannot  be  trusted  with  any  but  public  orders,  but 
I  shall  think  this  important  affair  entirely  safe 
under  your  management  and  secrecy."  Lan- 
guage such  as  this  undoubtedly  often  covers  a 
hint,  as  well  as  expresses  a  compliment,  and  may 
have  done  so  in  this  instance ;  nevertheless,  in 
after  life  it  is  certain  that  Rodney  gave  proof  of  a 
very  high  order  of  professional  discretion  and  of 
independent  initiative.  It  is  therefore  perfectly 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  he  had  thus  early 
convinced  the  Government  that  he  was  a  man 
competent  and  trustworthy  under  critical  condi- 
tions, such  as  then  characterized  the  intercolonial 
relations  of  the  two  states.  The  particular  inci- 
dent is  farther  noteworthy  in  connection  with  the 
backwardness,  and  even  reluctance,  of  the  Gov- 
ernment to  employ  him  in  the  War  of  the  Amer- 
ican Revolution,  though  Sandwich  was  again  First 
Lord,  and  Rodney  a  strong  political  supporter  of 
the  party  in  power.  The  precise  cause  for  this 
is  probably  not  ascertainable ;  but  it  is  a  matter 
of  perfectly  reasonable  inference  that  the  early 


156  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

promise  of  the  young  officer  had  meanwhile 
become  overclouded,  that  distrust  had  succeeded 
to  confidence,  for  reasons  professional,  but  not 
strictly  military.  Rodney's  war  record  continued 
excellent  from  first  to  last;  one  not  good  only, 
but  of  exceptional  and  singular  efficiency. 

In  October,  1752,  Rodney  returned  to  England, 
having  been  elected  to  Parliament.  The  Seven. 
Years  War,  which,  after  two  years  of  irregular 
hostilities,  began  formally  in  1756,  found  him  still 
a  captain.  With  its  most  conspicuous  opening 
incident,  the  attempted  relief  of  Minorca,  and 
the  subsequent  trial  and  execution  of  the 
unsuccessful  commander,  Admiral  Byng,  he  had 
no  connection,  personal  or  official ;  nor  was  he  a 
member  of  the  Court- Martial,  although  he  seems 
to  have  been  in  England  at  the  time,  and  was 
senior  to  at  least  one  of  the  sitting  captains. 
The  abortive  naval  engagement  off  Port  Mahon, 
however,  stands  in  a  directly  significant  relation 
to  his  career,  for  it  exemplifies  to  the  most  exag- 
gerated degree,  alike  in  the  purpose  of  the  admiral 
and  the  finding  of  the  Court,  the  formal  and 
pedantic  conception  of  a  correctly  fought  fleet 
action,  according  to  the  rules  and  regulations  "in 
such  cases  prescribed  "  by  the  Fighting  Instruc- 
tions.1 It  was  Rodney's  lot  to  break  with  this 
tradition,  and  to  be  the  first  to  illustrate  juster 
ideas  in  a  fairly  ranged  battle,  where  the  enemy 
awaited  attack,  as  he  had  done  at  Malaga  in  1704, 

1  For  account  and  analysis  of  Byng's  action,  see  ante,  pp.  47-67. 


Rodney  157 

and  at  Minorca  in  1756.  Precisely  such  an  op- 
portunity never  came  to  Hawke;  for,  although 
L'Etenduere  waited,  he  did  so  under  conditions 
and  dispositions  which  gave  the  ensuing  affair 
a  nearer  analogy  to  a  general  chase  than  to  a 
pitched  battle.  Though  the  British  approach 
then  was  in  a  general  sense  parallel  to  the 
enemy's  line,  it  was  from  the  rear,  not  from  the 
beam ;  and  through  this  circumstance  of  overtak- 
ing, and  from  the  method  adopted,  their  vessels 
came  under  fire  in  succession,  not  together. 
This  was  perfectly  correct,  the  course  pre-emi- 
nently suited  to  the  emergency,  and  therefore 
tactically  most  sound  ;  but  the  conditions  were 
not  those  contemplated  by  the  Fighting  Instruc- 
tions, as  they  were  in  the  case  of  Byng,  and  also 
in  the  battle  most  thoroughly  characteristic  of 
Rodney  —  that  of  April  17,  1780.  The  contrast 
in  conduct  between  the  two  commanders  is  strik- 
ingly significant  of  progress,  because  of  the  close 
approach  to  identity  in  circumstances. 

Rodney  accompanied  the  Rochefort  expedition 
of  1757,  under  Hawke,  some  account  of  which  is 
given  in  the  life  of  that  admiral ;  and  he  com- 
manded also  a  ship-of-t he-line  in  Boscawen's  fleet 
in  1758,  when  the  reduction  of  Louisburg  and 
Cape  Breton  Island  was  effected  by  the  combined 
British  and  colonial  forces.  After  this  important 
service,  the  necessary  and  effectual  antecedent  of 
the  capture  of  Quebec  and  the  fall  of  Canada  in 
the  following  year,  he  returned  to  England,  where 


158  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

on  the  i gth  of  May,  1759,  he  was  promoted  to 
Rear  Admiral ;  being  then  forty.  He  was  next, 
and  without  interval  of  rest,  given  command  of  a 
squadron  to  operate  against  Havre,  where  were 
gathering  boats  and  munitions  of  war  for  the 
threatened  invasion  of  England ;  with  the  charge 
also  of  suppressing  the  French  coastwise  sailings, 
upon  which  depended  the  assembling  of  the  vari- 
ous bodies  of  transports,  and  the  carriage  of  sup- 
plies to  the  fleet  in  Brest,  that  Hawke  at  the 
same  time  was  holding  in  check.  The  service 
was  important,  but  of  secondary  interest,  and 
calls  for  no  particular  mention  beyond  that  of  its 
general  efficiency  as  maintained  by  him. 

In  1761,  Rodney  was  again  elected  to  Parlia- 
ment, and,  with  a  certain  political  inconsequence, 
was  immediately  afterwards  sent  out  of  the  coun- 
try, being  appointed  to  the  Leeward  Islands 
Station,  which  embraced  the  smaller  Antilles,  on 
the  eastern  side  of  the  Caribbean  Sea,  with  head- 
quarters at  Barbados;  Jamaica,  to  the  westward, 
forming  a  distinct  command  under  an  admiral  of 
its  own.  He  sailed  for  his  new  post  October  21, 
1761,  taking  with  him  instructions  to  begin  opera- 
tions against  Martinique  upon  the  arrival  of  troops 
ordered  from  New  York.  These  reached  Bar- 
bados December  24th,  a  month  after  himself,  and 
on  the  7th  of  January,  1762,  the  combined  forces 
were  before  Martinique,  which  after  a  month  of 
regular  operations  passed  into  the  possession  of 
the  British  on  the  i6th  of  February.  Its  fall  was 


Rodney  159 

followed  shortly  by  that  of  the  other  French  Les- 
ser Antilles,  —  Grenada,  Santa  Lucia,  and  St. 
Vincent.  Guadaloupe  had  been  taken  in  1759, 
and  Dominica  in  June,  1761. 

Up  to  this  time  the  contest  on  the  seas  had 
been  between  Great  Britain  and  France  only; 
but  on  March  5th  a  frigate  reached  Rodney 
with  instructions,  then  already  nine  weeks  old, 
to  begin  hostilities  against  Spain,  whose  clearly 
inimical  purpose  had  induced  the  British  Gov- 
ernment to  anticipate  her  action,  by  declaring 
war.  The  same  day  another  vessel  came  in  with 
like  orders  from  the  admiral  at  Gibraltar,  while 
a  third  from  before  Brest  brought  word  that  a 
French  squadron  of  seven  ships-of-the-line,  with 
frigates  and  two  thousand  troops,  had  escaped 
from  that  port  at  the  end  of  the  year.  With 
these  circumstances  before  him  Rodney's  con- 
duct was  like  himself ;  prompt  and  officer-like. 
Lookout  ships  were  stationed  along  the  length 
of  the  Caribbees,  to  windward,  to  bring  timely 
intelligence  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy's 
squadron ;  and  as  its  first  destination  was  prob- 
ably Martinique,  the  fall  of  which  was  not  yet 
known  in  Europe,  he  concentrated  his  fleet 
there,  calling  in  outlying  detachments. 

So  far  there  was  nothing  in  his  course  mark- 
edly different  from  that  of  any  capable  officer, 
dealing  with  well  ascertained  conditions  within 

O 

the  limits  of  his  own  command.  Occasion  soon 
arose,  however,  to  require  more  exceptional  ac- 


160  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

tion,  and  thus  to  illustrate  at  once  the  breadth  of 
view,  and  the  readiness  to  assume  responsibility, 
which  already  raised  Rodney  conspicuously  above 
the  average  level.  On  the  Qth  of  March  two 
lookout  vessels  came  in  with  news  that  they  had 
sighted  a  fleet,  corresponding  in  numbers  to  the 
Brest  division,  fifteen  miles  to  windward  of  Mar- 
tinique and  standing  to  the  southward ;  the  trade 
wind  making  it  generally  expedient  to  round  the 
south  point  of  the  island  in  order  to  reach  the 
principal  port  on  the  west  side,  —  Fort  Royal. 
The  British  squadron  at  once  weighed  anchor  in 
pursuit ;  but  the  enemy,  having  ascertained  that 
the  surrender  was  accomplished,  had  turned  back 
north,  and  were  soon  after  reported  from  Guada- 
loupe  as  having  passed  there,  standing  to  the 
westward. 

Rodney  at  once  inferred  that  they  must  be 
gone  to  Santo  Domingo.  To  follow  with  the 
object  of  intercepting  them  was  hopeless,  in  view 
of  the  start  they  had ;  but  the  direction  taken 
threatened  Jamaica,  the  exposed  condition  of 
which,  owing  to  inadequate  force,  had  been  com- 
municated to  him  by  the  military  and  naval 
authorities  there.  His  measures  to  meet  the 
case  were  thorough  and  deliberate,  as  well  as 
rapid;  no  time  was  lost  either  by  hesitancy  or 
delay,  nor  by  the  yet  more  facile  error  of  too 
precipitate  movement.  Orders  for  concentration 
were  already  out,  but  the  point  on  which  to  ef- 
fect it  was  shifted  to  Antigua,  where,  although 


Rodney  161 

inferior  in  natural  resources  to  Martinique,  the 
established  British  naval  station  with  its  accu- 
mulated equipment  was  fixed  ;  and  the  work  of 
provisioning  and  watering,  so  as  to  permit  long 
continuance  at  sea  unhampered  by  necessity  of 
replenishing,  there  went  on  apace.  It  was  the 
admiral's  intention  to  leave  his  own  command  to 
look  out  for  itself,  while  he  took  away  the  mass 
of  his  fleet  to  protect  national  interests  elsewhere 
threatened. 

Such  a  decision  may  seem  superficially  a  com- 
monplace matter  of  course ;  that  it  was  much 
more  is  a  commonplace  historical  certainty.  The 
merit  of  Rodney's  action  appears  not  only  in  the 
details  of  execution,  but  in  its  being  undertaken 
at  all ;  and  in  this  case,  as  in  a  later  instance  in 
his  career,  his  resolution  received  the  concrete 
emphasis  that  a  sharp  and  immediate  contrast 
best  affords.  Prior  to  the  enemy's  arrival  he  had 
laid  the  conditions  before  his  colleague  in  service, 
General  Moncton,  commanding  the  forces  on 
shore,  and  asked  a  reinforcement  of  troops  for 
destitute  Jamaica,  if  necessity  arose.  The  result 
is  best  told  in  his  own  words;  for  they  convey, 
simply  and  without  egotistic  enlargement,  that 
settled  personal  characteristic,  the  want  of  which 
Jervis  and  Nelson  in  their  day  noted  in  many, 
and  which  Rodney  markedly  possessed.  This 
was  the  capacity,  which  Sandwich  eighteen  years 
later  styled  "  taking  the  great  line  of  considering 
the  King's  whole  dominions  under  your  care ; " 


1 62  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

an  attribute  far  from  common,  as  Moncton's 
reply  showed.  "  I  acquainted  him  that  I  should 
certainly  assist  them  with  all  the  naval  force  that 
could  possibly  be  spared  from  the  immediate  pro- 
tection of  His  Majesty's  Caribbee  islands.  I  have 
again  solicited  the  General  for  a  body  of  troops, 
since  the  enemy  left  these  seas,  and  must  do  him 
the  justice  to  say,  that  he  seems  much  concerned 
at  the  present  distress  of  Jamaica,  but  does  not 
think  himself  sufficiently  authorized  to  detach  a 
body  of  troops  without  orders  from  England.  I 
flatter  myself  their  Lordships  will  not  be  dis- 
pleased with  me  if  I  take  the  liberty  to  construe 
my  instructions  in  such  a  manner  as  to  think 
myself  authorized  and  obliged  to  succor  any  of 
His  Majesty's  colonies  that  may  be  in  danger; 
and  shall,  therefore,  without  a  moment's  loss  of 
time,  hasten  to  the  succor  of  Jamaica,  with  ten 
sail-of-the-line,  three  frigates  and  three  bombs.  " 

It  was  not  because,  in  so  doing  this,  the  obliga- 
tion was  absolute,  and  the  authority  indisputable, 
that  Rodney's  course  was  professionally  merito- 
rious. In  such  case  his  action  would  have  risen 
little  above  that  obedience  to  orders,  in  which,  as 
Nelson  said,  the  generality  find  "  all  perfection." 
The  risk  was  real,  not  only  to  his  station,  but 
to  the  possible  plans  of  his  superiors  at  home ; 
the  authority  was  his  own  only,  read  by  himself 
into  his  orders  —  at  most  their  spirit,  not  their 
letter.  Consequently,  he  took  grave  chance  of 

1  The  italics  are  the  author's. 


Rodney  163 

the  penalty  —  loss  of  reputation,  if  not  positive 
punishment,  —  which,  as  military  experience 
shows,  almost  invariably  follows  independent 
action,  unless  results  are  kind  enough  to  justify 
it.  It  is,  however,  only  the  positive  characters 
capable  of  rising  to  such  measures  that  achieve 
reputations  enduring  beyond  their  own  day.  The 
incident  needs  to  be  coupled  with  Sandwich's 
compliment  just  quoted,  as  well  as  with  the  one 
paid  him  when  on  the  Newfoundland  command. 
Taken  together,  they  avouch  a  personality  that 
needs  only  opportunity  to  insure  itself  lasting 
fame. 

As  it  happened,  Rodney  not  only  took  the  re- 
sponsibility of  stripping  his  own  station  to  the 
verge  of  bareness  in  favor  of  the  general  interest, 
but  in  so  doing  he  came  very  near  traversing, 
unwittingly,  the  plans  of  the  general  government 
by  his  local  action,  laudable  and  proper  as  that 
certainly  was.  He  was,  however,  professionally 
lucky  to  a  proverb,  and  escaped  this  mischance 
by  a  hair's  breadth.  The  purposed  detachment 
had  already  started  for  Jamaica,  and  he  was  ac- 
companying it  in  person,  when  there  joined  him 
on  March  25th,  off  the  island  of  St.  Kitt's,  not 
far  from  Antigua,  a  frigate  bearing  Admiralty 
despatches  of  February  5th.  These  required  him 
to  desist  from  any  enterprises  he  might  have  in 
hand,  in  order  to  give  his  undivided  attention  to 
the  local  preparations  for  an  expedition,  as  yet 
secret,  which  was  shortly  to  arrive  on  his  station, 


164  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

under   the  command    of  Admiral    Pocock,  with 
ultimate  destination  against  Havana. 

To  be  thus  arrested  at  the  very  outset  of  a 
movement  from  which  he  naturally  expected  dis- 
tinction was  a  bitter  disappointment  to  Rodney. 
Several  years  later,  in  1771,  he  wrote  to  Sand- 
wich, who  was  not  the  First  Lord  when  Pocock 
was  sent  out,  "  I  had  the  misfortune  of  being  su- 
perseded in  the  command  of  a  successful  fleet, 
entrusted  to  my  care  in  the  West  Indies,  at  the 
very  time  I  had  sailed  on  another  expedition 
against  the  enemy's  squadron  at  Santo  Domingo, 
and  was  thereby  deprived  of  pursuing  those  con- 
quests which  so  honorably  attended  upon  another, 
and  which  secured  him  such  great  emoluments," 
—  for  Havana  proved  a  wealthy  prize.  His 
steps,  however,  upon  this  unexpected  reversal  of 
his  plans,  were  again  characterized  by  an  immedi- 
ateness,  most  honorable  to  his  professional  char- 
acter, which  showed  how  thoroughly  familiar  he 
was  with  the  whole  subject  and  its  possible  con- 
tingencies, and  the  consequent  readiness  of  his 
mind  to  meet  each  occasion  as  it  arose ;  marks, 
all,  of  the  thoroughly  equipped  general  officer. 
The  order  as  to  his  personal  movements  being 
not  discretional,  was  of  course  absolutely  ac- 
cepted ;  but  his  other  measures  were  apparently 
his  own,  and  were  instantaneous.  A  vessel  was 
at  once  sent  off  to  Barbados  to  notify  Admiral 
Pocock  that  the  best  place  in  the  West  Indies  for 
his  rendezvous  was  Fort  Royal  Bay,  in  the  newly 


Rodney  165 

acquired  Martinique.  The  ten  sail-of-the-line,  ac- 
companied by  two  large  transports  from  St.  Kitt's, 
were  then  sent  on  to  Jamaica  to  move  troops 
from  there  to  join  Pocock ;  the  command  of  the 
detachment  being  now  entrusted  to  Sir  James 
Douglas,  who  received  the  further  instruction 
to  send  back  his  fastest  frigate,  with  all  the 
intelligence  he  could  gather,  directing  her  to 
keep  in  the  track  Pocock  would  follow,  in  order 
to  meet  him  betimes.  The  frigate  thus  sent, 
having  first  made  a  running  survey  of  the  unfre- 
quented passage  north  of  Cuba,  by  which  the 
expedition  was  to  proceed,  joined  Pocock,  and,  by 
the  latter's  report,  acted  as  pilot  for  the  fleet. 
"  Having  taken  sketches  of  the  land  and  cayos 
on  both  sides,  Captain  Elphinstone  kept  ahead 
of  the  fleet,  and  led  us  through  very  well."  This 
service  is  claimed  to  the  credit  of  Rodney's  fore- 
sight by  his  biographer.  This  may  very  well  be, 
though  more  particular  inquiry  and  demonstration 
by  his  letters  would  be  necessary  to  establish 
specific  orders  beyond  the  general  instructions 
given  by  him.  It  is,  however,  safe  to  say  that 
such  particularity  and  minuteness  of  detail  would 
be  entirely  in  keeping  with  the  tenor  of  his  course 
at  this  period.  His  correspondence  bears  the 
stamp  of  a  mind  comprehensive  as  well  as  exact; 
grasping  all  matters  with  breadth  of  view  in  their 
mutual  relations,  yet  with  the  details  at  his  fingers' 
ends.  The  certainty  of  his  touch  is  as  obvious  as 
the  activity  of  his  thought. 


1 66  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

In  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  his  instructions, 
Rodney  went  in  person  to  Martinique,  the  spot 
named  by  him  as  best  for  the  rendezvous,  there 
to  superintend  the  preparations ;  to  sow  the  seed 
for  a  harvest  in  which  he  was  to  have  no  share. 
Incidental  mention  reveals  that  the  sending  of 
the  ships-of-the-line  with  Douglas  had  reduced 
him  to  three  for  his  own  command ;  and  also  that 
Moncton,  having  now  superior  authority  to  do  so, 
found  himself  able  to  spare  troops  for  Jamaica, 
which  were  afloat  in  transports  by  the  time 
Pocock  came.  In  the  same  letter  the  admiral 
frankly  admits  his  anxiety  for  his  station,  under 
the  circumstances  of  the  big  detachment  he  had 
made ;  a  significant  avowal,  which  enhances  the 
merit  of  his  spontaneous  action  by  all  the  credit 
due  to  one  who  endures  a  well-weighed  danger 
for  an  adequate  end. 

The  despatch  of  Pocock's  expedition,  which  re- 
sulted in  the  fall  of  Havana,  August  13,  1762, 
practically  terminated  Rodney's  active  service  in 
the  Seven  Years  War.  In  a  career  marked  by 
unusual  professional  good  fortune  in  many  ways, 
the  one  singular  mischance  was  that  he  reached 
a  foremost  position  too  late  in  life.  When  he 
returned  to  England  in  August,  1 763,  he  was  in 
his  full  prime,  and  his  conduct  of  affairs  entrusted 
to  him  had  given  clear  assurance  of  capacity  for 
great  things.  The  same  evidence  is  to  be  found 
in  his  letters,  which,  as  studies  of  official  character 
and  competency,  repay  a  close  perusal.  But  now 


Rodney  167 

fifteen  years  of  peace  were  to  elapse  before  a 
maritime  war  again  broke  out,  and  the  fifteen 
years  between  forty-five  and  sixty  tell  sorely 
upon  the  physical  stamina  which  need  to  under- 
lie the  mental  and  moral  forces  of  a  great  com- 
mander. St.  Vincent  himself  staggered  under 
the  load,  and  Rodney  was  not  a  St.  Vincent  in 
in  the  stern  self-discipline  that  had  braced  the 
latter  for  old  age.  He  had  not  borne  the  yoke  in 
his  youth,  and  from  this  time  forward  he  fought 
a  losing  fight  with  money  troubles,  which  his 
self-controlled  contemporary,  after  one  bitter  ex- 
perience, had  shaken  off  his  shoulders  forever. 

The  externals  of  Rodney's  career  during  the 
period  now  in  question  are  sufficiently  known  ; 
of  his  strictly  private  life  we  are  left  largely  to 
infer  from  indications,  not  wholly  happy.  He 
returned  to  England  a  Vice-Admiral  of  the  Blue, 
and  had  advanced  by  the  successive  grades  of 
that  rank  to  Vice-Admiral  of  the  Red,  when,  in 
January,  1771,  he  was  appointed  Commander-in- 
chief  at  Jamaica.  At  this  time  he  had  been  for 
five  years  Governor  of  Greenwich  Hospital,  and 
he  took  it  hard  that  he  was  not  allowed  to  retain 
the  appointment  in  connection  with  his  new  com- 
mand, alleging  precedents  for  such  a  favor ;  the 
latest  of  which,  however,  was  then  twenty-five 
years  old.  The  application  was  denied  by  Sand- 
wich. From  the  earnest  tone  in  which  it  was 
couched,  as  well  as  the  comparatively  weak 
grounds  upon  which  Rodney  bases  his  claims 


1 68  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

to  such  a  recognition,  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted 
that  pecuniary  embarrassment  as  well  as  mortifica- 
tion entered  into  his  sense  of  disappointment.  It 
is  the  first  recorded  of  a  series  of  jars  between 
the  two,  in  which,  although  the  external  forms  of 
courtesy  were  diligently  observed,  an  underlying 
estrangement  is  evident. 

The  Jamaica  Station  at  that  day  required,  in 
an  even  greater  degree  than  Newfoundland  be- 
fore the  conquest  of  Canada,  a  high  order  of 
political  tact  and  circumspection  on  the  part  of 
the  naval  commander-in-chief.  The  island  lies  in 
the  centre  of  what  was  then  a  vast  semi-circular 
sweep  of  Spanish  colonies  —  Porto  Rico,  Santo 
Domingo,  Cuba,  Mexico,  Central  America,  and  the 
mainland  of  South  America  from  the  Isthmus  to 
the  Orinoco.  Over  this  subject  empire  the  mother 
country  maintained  commercial  regulations  of 
the  most  mediaeval  and  exclusive  type  ;  outrag- 
ing impartially  the  British  spirit  of  commercial 
enterprise,  and  the  daily  needs  of  her  own  colo- 
nists, by  the  restrictions  placed  upon  intercourse 
between  these  and  foreigners.  Smuggling  on  a 
large  scale,  consecrated  in  the  practice  of  both 
parties  by  a  century  of  tradition,  was  met  by  a 
coast-guard  system,  employing  numerous  small 
vessels  called  guarda-costas,  which  girt  the  Span- 
ish coasts,  but,  being  powerless  to  repress  effect- 
ually over  so  extensive  a  shore  line,  served  rather 
to  increase  causes  of  vexation.  The  British  gov- 
ernment, on  the  other  hand,  not  satisfied  to  leave 


Rodney  169 

the  illicit  trade  on  which  Jamaica  throve  to  take 
care  of  itself,  sought  to  increase  the  scope  of 
transactions  by  the  institution  of  three  free  ports 
on  the  island, — free  in  the  sense  of  being  open  as 
depots,  not  for  the  entrance  of  goods,  but  where 
they  could  be  freely  brought,  and  transshipped 
to  other  parts  of  the  world  by  vessels  of  all  na- 
tions ;  broker  ports,  in  short,  for  the  facilitation 
of  general  external  trade. 

To  this  open  and  ingenuous  bid  for  fuller  ad- 
vantage by  Spanish  resort,  Spain  replied  by 
doubling  her  custom-house  forces  and  introduc- 
ing renewed  stringency  into  her  commercial 
orders.  The  two  nations,  with  France  in  Hayti 
for  a  third,  stood  on  ceaseless  guard  one  against 
the  other;  all  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  exclusive 
trade,  and  differing  only  in  the  method  of  appli- 
cation, according  to  their  respective  day-to-day 
views  of  policy.  The  British  by  the  free-port 
system,  instituted  in  their  central  geographical 
position,  hoped  to  make  the  profits  of  the  middle- 
man. Rodney  reported  that  the  effect  had  been 
notably  to  discourage  the  direct  Spanish  inter- 
course, and  to  destroy  carriage  by  British  colonial 
vessels  in  favor  of  those  of  France,  which  now 
flocked  to  Jamaica,  smuggled  goods  into  the 
island,  and  apparently  cut  under  their  rivals  by 
the  greater  benevolence  shown  them  in  Spanish 
ports.  "  Commerce  by  British  bottoms  has  to- 
tally ceased."  Herewith,  he  added,  disappeared 
the  opportunities  of  British  seamen  to  become 


i  jo  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

familiar  with  the  Spanish  and  French  waters, 
while  their  rivals  were  invited  to  frequent  those 
of  Jamaica;  so  that  in  case  of  war  —  which  in 
those  days  was  periodical  —  the  advantage  of 
pilotage  would  be  heavily  on  the  side  of  Great 
Britain's  enemies.  He  also  stated  that  the  dim- 
inution of  employment  to  British  merchant 
vessels  had  greatly  impaired  his  means  of  obtain- 
ing information  from  within  Spanish  ports;  for 
British  ships  of  war  were  never  allowed  inside 
them,  even  when  sent  with  a  message  from  him. 
The  French  permitted  them  indeed  to  enter,  but 
surrounded  them  throughout  their  visits  with 
flattering  attentions  which  wholly  prevented  the 
making  of  observations. 

Under  these  conditions  of  mutual  jealousy  be- 
tween the  governments  and  officials,  with  the 
subjects  on  either  side  straining  continually  at 
the  leashes  which  withheld  them  from  traffic  mu- 
tually beneficial,  causes  of  offence  were  quick  to 
arise.  Rodney,  like  Sandwich,  was  a  pronounced 
Tory,  in  full  sympathy  with  traditional  British 
policy,  as  well  as  an  officer  naturally  of  haughty 
temper  and  sharing  all  the  prepossessions  of  his 
service ;  but  he  found  himself  almost  at  once  in- 
volved in  a  difference  with  his  superiors  in  his 
political  party,  which  throws  a  good  deal  of  side 
light  on  personal  as  well  as  political  relations. 
The  British  man-of-war  schooner  Hawke  was 
overhauled  off  the  Venezuelan  coast  by  two 
Spanish  guarda-costas  and  compelled  to  enter  the 


Rodney  171 

harbor  of  Cartagena,  under  alleged  orders  from 
the  Governor  of  the  colony.  After  a  brief  deten- 
tion, she  was  let  go  with  the  admonition  that,  if 
any  British  ships  of  war  were  found  again  within 
twelve  leagues  of  the  coast,  they  would  be  taken 
and  their  crews  imprisoned. 

Rodney's  course  was  unimpeachable,  as  far  as 
appears.  He  wrote  a  civil  letter  to  the  Governor, 
and  sent  it  by  a  ship  of  war,  the  captain  of  which 
was  directed  to  deliver  it  in  person.  He  was 
confident,  he, wrote,  that  the  Governor  would  dis- 
avow the  action  by  calling  to  strict  account  the 
officers  concerned,  and  would  also  confirm  his 
own  belief  that  it  was  impossible  such  a  menace 
could  have  proceeded  from  any  adequate  author- 
ity. A  sufficient  intimation  of  what  would  follow 
an  attempt  to  carry  out  the  threat  was  conveyed 
by  the  words :  "  The  British  officer  who  has  dis- 
honoured his  King's  colours  by  a  tame  submis- 
sion to  this  insult  has  been  already  dismissed  the 
service." 

It  is  difficult  to  see  what  less  could  have  been 
done ;  but  the  British  government  was  at  the 
moment  extremely  reluctant  to  war,  and  sensitive 
to  any  step  that  seemed  to  make  towards  it. 
Spain  was  thought  to  be  seeking  a  quarrel.  She 
had  entered  the  Seven  Years  War  so  near  its 
termination  as  not  to  feel  exhaustive  effects ;  and 
the  capture  of  Havana  and  Manila,  with  the  pe- 
cuniary losses  involved,  had  left  her  merely  em- 
bittered by  humiliation,  prone  rather  to  renew 


1 72  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

hostilities  than  to  profit  by  experience.  At  the 
same  time  the  foreign  policy  of  Great  Britain  was 
enfeebled  by  a  succession  of  short  ministries,  and 
by  internal  commotions ;  while  the  discontent  of 
the  American  continental  colonies  over  the 
Stamp  Act  emphasized  the  weakness  of  her  gen- 
eral position.  Barely  a  year  before  the  Hawke 
incident  the  insult  by  Spain  at  the  Falkland 
Islands  had  brought  the  two  nations  to  the  verge 
of  rupture,  which  was  believed  to  have  been 
averted  only  by  the  refusal  of  Louis  XV.,  then 
advanced  in  years,  to  support  the  Spanish  Bour- 
bons at  the  cost  of  another  war. 

Under  these  circumstances  Rodney's  report  of 
the  occurrences  at  Cartagena  filled  the  ministry 
with  apprehensions,  and  brought  him  from  Sand- 
wich an  expression  of  dissatisfaction  little  removed 
from  a  reprimand.  The  communication  is  remark- 
able rather  for  what  it  intimates,  and  from  the  in- 
ferences naturally  deducible,  than  for  its  direct 
utterances.  "  I  cannot  help  cautioning  you,  as  a 
friend,  to  be  upon  your  guard,  to  avoid  by  every 
justifiable  means  the  drawing  this  country  into  a 
war,  which,  if  it  comes  on  too  speedily,  I  fear  we 
shall  have  cause  to  lament."  The  warning  is  re- 
newed in  a  later  part  of  the  letter,  but  in  itself 
has  little  significance  compared  with  other  hints, 
rather  personal  than  official.  "  I  cannot  conceal 
from  you,  that  many  people  have  industriously 
spread  stories  here,  that,  among  the  foreign  min- 
isters and  others,  you  have  expressed  your  wishes 


Rodney  173 

for  a  Spanish  war."  Such  expressions  —  if  used 
—  were  asserted  of  the  time  succeeding  his  ap- 
pointment to  Jamaica,  and  near  his  departure  for 
it ;  for  Sandwich  adds,  "  This  sort  of  declaration 
is  too  little  founded  on  your  instructions,  and  too 
indiscreet,  to  allow  me  to  give  them  the  least 
credit."  It  is  clear,  however,  that  he  thought 
them  not  improbable,  —  a  Spanish  war  was  pop- 
ular with  seamen  for  the  prize-money  it  brought, 
and  Rodney  was  poor,  —  for  he  adds,  "  I  shall  dis- 
credit the  idea  till  I  have  received  your  answer 
to  this  letter."  He  concludes  with  a  warning,  not 
to  be  misunderstood,  that  a  war,  so  far  from  help- 
ing Rodney,  would  probably  cause  his  superses- 
sion. "  I  will  add  one  word  more :  Upon  a  dec- 
laration of  war  larger  squadrons  must  be  sent  out, 
and,  very  probably,  senior  officers  to  most  of  our 
stations  in  foreign  parts."  In  face  of  an  intima- 
tion thus  thinly  veiled,  one  scarcely  needs  to  be 
told  what  was  being  said  round  the  table  of  the 
Cabinet. 

That  Rodney  would  have  welcomed  war  for 
reasons  personal  as  well  as  professional,  for 
money  and  for  glory,  can  readily  be  believed  ;  but 
his  measures  in  this  case  give  no  ground  for  such 
an  innuendo  as  Sandwich  conveyed.  Therefore, 
after  making  full  allowance  for  the  panic  of  minis- 
ters ready  to  fear  the  worst,  and  to  throw  blame  on 
anybody,  it  is  the  more  significant  that  he  should 
have  been  suspected  of  an  unworthy  personal 
motive  underlying  a  worthy  official  act.  It  is  an 


174  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

indication  of  reputation  already  compromised  by 
damaging  association  with  pecuniary  embarrass- 
ments; an  evidence  of  latent  distrust  easily 
quickened  into  active  suspicion.  An  officer  of 
his  rank  and  service,  so  far  from  home,  and  with 
the  precedents  of  his  day,  could  scarcely  be  faulted 
for  what  he  had  done  to  uphold  the  honor  of  the 
country;  and  his  manner  of  doing  it  was  digni- 
fied and  self-restrained,  as  well  as  forcible.  There 
was  no  violence  like  that  of  Hawke  at  Gibraltar, 
less  than  twenty  years  before,  which  that  admiral 
had  boldly  vindicated  to  Pitt  himself ;  but  there 
were  no  weak  joints  in  Hawke's  armor.  In  the 
particular  instance,  time  and  cooler  judgment  set 
Rodney  right  in  men's  opinion ;  but  subsequent 
events  showed  that  his  general  reputation  did 
not  recover,  either  then,  or  through  his  Jamaica 
career. 

After  immediate  apprehension  had  subsided, 
Rodney's  action  was  justified  by  the  government. 
Sandwich  wrote  him,  a  little  later,  that  no  com- 
mander-in-chief  stood  upon  a  better  footing,  and 
assured  him  that  his  private  interests  were  safe 
in  his  hands.  Sandwich,  however,  was  an  ex- 
tremely practical  politician,  who  had  much  per- 
sonal use  for  his  own  patronage ;  and  Rodney's 
necessities  were  great.  Fulfilment  therefore  fell 
far  short  of  promise.  Employment  was  neces- 
sary to  the  admiral,  and  his  hopes  fixed  upon  a 
colonial  governorship  when  his  present  appoint- 
ment should  expire  ;  Jamaica  being  his  first  choice. 


Rodney  175 

Sandwich  renewed  assurances,  but  advised  a 
personal  application  also  to  the  Prime  Minister 
and  other  Cabinet  officers.  New  York  was  men- 
tioned, but  nothing  came  of  it  all.  After  three 
years  Rodney  was  superseded,  with  permission 
to  remain  in  the  island  instead  of  returning  to 
England.  This  he  declined.  "  I  cannot  bear  to 
think  of  remaining  here  in  a  private  station,  after 
commanding  in  chief  with  the  approbation  of  the 
whole  island."  How  far  this  approbation  was 
universal,  or  unqualified,  is  perhaps  doubtful ;  but 
the  letters  quoted  by  his  biographer  from  his  cor- 
respondence bear  continuous  evidence,  in  this 
peace  employment,  of  the  activity  and  perspi- 
cacity of  mind  characteristic  of  his  more  strictly 
military  proceedings. 

In  September,  1774,  Rodney  landed  again  in 
England,  a  disappointed  man  and  in  embar- 
rassed circumstances.  Professional  occupation 
was  almost  hopeless,  for  in  peace  times  there 
were  few  positions  for  an  officer  of  his  rank ; 
and,  although  recognized  for  able,  he  had  not 
then  the  distinction  by  which  he  is  known  to  us. 
It  is  also  evident,  from  subsequent  events,  that  he 
just  now  lacked  the  influence  necessary  to  obtain 
a  preference  over  rivals  in  quest  of  employment. 
Under  the  circumstances,  his  debts  determined 
his  action,  and  to  escape  harassments  he  before 
long  passed  over  into  France  and  settled  in 
Paris.  In  that  capital,  as  in  London,  he  mixed 
with  the  best  society ;  and  there,  as  before,  the 


176  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

mode  of  life  among  his  associates  led  him  beyond 
his  means  and  involved  him  in  further  distresses. 
Consequently,  when  war  between  France  and 
Great  Britain  became  imminent,  in  1778,  the 
vigilance  of  his  creditors  prevented  his  going 
home  in  person  to  offer  his  services.  In  Feb- 
ruary of  that  year,  however,  he  made  formal 
application  to  the  Admiralty  to  be  sent  at  a 
moment's  warning  on  any  enterprise.  To  this 
Sandwich,  who  was  still  First  Lord,  despite  his 
previous  assurances  of  friendship,  paid  no  atten- 
tion beyond  the  formal  customary  acknowledg- 
ment given  to  all  such  letters  when  they  came 
from  officers  of  Rodney's  standing.  No  indica- 
tion was  shown  of  intention,  or  even  of  wish, 
to  employ  him. 

Rodney  was  therefore  compelled  to  look  on 
idly  while  others,  of  well-earned  reputation  indeed 
but  as  yet  of  less  experience  than  himself 
in  high  command,  were  preferred  before  him. 
Howe  had  already  been  sent  to  North  America 
in  1776,  on  a  mission  at  once  diplomatic  and  mil- 
itary ;  and  there  he  still  was  when  war  began. 
As  it  became  imminent,  Keppel  was  appointed 
to  the  Channel  Fleet,  and  Byron  to  the  North 
American  command,  from  which  Howe  had 
asked  to  be  relieved.  All  these  were  junior  to 
Rodney ;  and,  as  though  to  emphasize  the  neglect 
of  him,  rear-admirals  were  sent  to  the  two  West 
India  stations,  Jamaica  and  the  Leeward  Islands, 
which  he  had  formerly  commanded,  and  to  which 


Rodney  177 

it  would  seem,  from  one  of  his  letters,  that  he 
desired  to  return.  He  had,  too,  now  reached  the 
rank,  the  want  of  which  had  formed  the  burden 
of  Sandwich's  warning  that  he  was  in  danger  of 
supersession  at  Jamaica ;  for  in  a  general  flag 
promotion  in  January,  1778,  he  had  become 
Admiral  of  the  White  Squadron,  than  which  no 
higher  then  obtained,  commissions  as  Admirals 
of  the  Red  not  being  issued.  For  this  persistent 
ignoring  of  an  officer  of  his  unquestionable  ability 
there  were  necessarily  reasons  more  controlling 
than  appears  on  the  surface ;  for  the  naval  con- 
ditions and  the  national  emergency  called  for 
men  of  demonstrated  high  capacity.  Such  Rod- 
ney was  professionally ;  and  although  his  age 
—  he  was  now  in  his  sixtieth  year  —  was  against 
him,  this  consideration  did  not  in  those  days 
weigh ;  nor  should  it,  unless  accompanied  by 
probable  indication  of  powers  sapped. 

The  conclusion  is  inevitable  that  the  objection 
lay  in  personal  record  as  bearing  upon  military 
efficiency.  The  Administration,  responsible  for 
results,  knew  Rodney's  capacity,  though  its  full 
extent  was  yet  to  be  revealed ;  the  question  in 
their  minds  clearly  must  have  been,  "  Can  we  de- 
pend upon  its  exertion,  full,  sustained,  and  disin- 
terested?" Sandwich,  despite  the  coldness  with 
which  he  had  received  Rodney's  application,  — 
going  so  far  as  to  refuse  to  support  it  actively,  — 
was  apparently  in  a  minority  among  his  colleagues 
in  believing  that  they  could.  He  declared  in  the 


178  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

House  of  Lords  that,  "  When  it  was  first  pro- 
posed in  the  Council  to  employ  Sir  George,  I, 
who  knew  him  from  a  very  young  man,  declared 
that  Rodney  once  afloat  would  do  his  duty." 
Naval  officers  will  recognize  a  familiar  ring  in 
these  words,  and  will  recall  instances  where  high 
professional  ability  has  been  betrayed  by  personal 
foible.  Nor  does  Sandwich  stand  alone  in  offer- 
ing a  clue  to  the  hesitation  of  the  Government. 
Rodney's  biographer  and  son-in-law  quotes  with- 
out reprobation  the  account  of  Mr.  Richard  Cum- 
berland, who  professed  to  have  interested  himself 
warmly  for  Rodney's  employment  and  to  have 
secured  the  support  of  the  Secretary  for  War, 
Lord  George  Germaine.  "  The  West  India  mer- 
chants had  been  alarmed,  and  clamoured  against 
the  appointment  so  generally  and  so  decidedly  as 
to  occasion  no  small  uneasiness  in  my  friend  and 
patron,  Lord  George,  and  drew  from  him  some- 
thing that  resembled  a  remonstrance  for  the  risk 
I  had  exposed  him  to.  But  in  the  brilliancy  of 
the  capture  of  Langara's  squadron  all  was  done 
away,  and  past  alarms  were  only  recollected  to 
contrast  the  joy  which  this  success  diffused." 
The  opposition  of  the  commercial  class  in  the 
West  Indies  might  arise  from  an  officer's  over- 
faithfulness  to  duty,  as  Nelson  found  to  his  cost ; 
but  it  seems  clear  that  in  this  case  distrust  rested 
upon  personal  observation,  which  raised  doubts  as 
to  the  singlemindedness  of  Rodney's  administra- 
tion of  a  command.  Of  the  particulars  of  obser- 


Rodney  179 

vation  or  experience  from  which  the  feeling 
sprang,  we  have  no  information ;  but  St.  Eus- 
tatius  was  destined  to  show  that  apprehension 
was  not  wholly  unfounded. 

A  summons  to  active  employment  would  at 
once  have  silenced  Rodney's  creditors  by  the  as- 
surance of  increase  of  means,  both  through  regu- 
lar income  and  probable  prize-money ;  Admiralty 
neglect  left  him  in  fetters.  Lady  Rodney  re- 
turned to  England  to  negotiate  the  means  for 
his  liberation ;  but  the  matter  dragged,  and  in 
the  end  he  owed  his  release  to  the  friendly  inter- 
vention of  a  French  nobleman,  the  Marechal 
Biron,  who  volunteered  in  warm  terms  to  make 
him  an  advance  to  the  amount  of  ,£2,000.  This 
chivalrous  offer  was  for  some  time  declined ;  but 
finally  conditions  became  so  threatening,  and 
his  position  so  intolerable,  that  he  accepted  a 
loan  of  about  a  thousand  louis.  "  Nothing  but 
a  total  inattention  to  the  distressed  state  I  was 
in,"  he  wrote  to  his  wife,  "  could  have  prevailed 
upon  me  to  have  availed  myself  of  his  voluntary 
proposal ;  but  not  having  had,  for  a  month  past, 
a  letter  from  any  person  but  Mr.  Hotham  and 
yourself,  and  my  passport  being  expired,  it  was 
impossible  for  me  to  remain  in  this  city  at  the 
risk  of  being  sued  by  my  creditors,  who  grew  so 
clamorous  it  was  impossible  to  bear  it ;  and  had 
they  not  been  overawed  by  the  Lieutenant  of  po- 
lice, would  have  carried  their  prosecutions  to  the 
greatest  length.  Their  demands  were  all  satis- 


180  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

fied  this  day,"  —  May  6th,  1778.  Friends  in 
England  enabled  him  to  repay  Biron  immediately 
after  his  return. 

This  benevolent  interference  on  behalf  of  a  na- 
tional enemy,  although  in  its  spirit  quite  charac- 
teristic, at  once  of  the  country  and  of  the  class  to 
which  the  individual  extending  it  belonged,  has 
retained  a  certain  unique  flavor  of  its  own  among 
military  anecdotes ;  due  undoubtedly  to  the  dis- 
tinction subsequently  acquired  by  Rodney  at  the 
expense  of  the  people  to  which  his  liberator  be- 
longed, rather  than  to  anything  exceptional  in 
its  nature.  As  it  is,  it  has  acquired  a  clear  pre- 
eminence among  the  recorded  courtesies  of  war- 
fare. It  is  pleasant  to  add  that  Great  Britain  had 
the  opportunity  in  after  times  to  requite  Biron's 
daughters  an  act  from  which  she  had  so  greatly 
benefited.  They  having  sought  refuge,  though 
with  loss  of  fortune,  from  the  early  excesses  of 
the  French  Revolution,  received  for  some  time 
pensions  from  the  British  Government. 

Rodney  came  back  to  England  feeling  any- 
thing but  cordial  towards  Sandwich,  whose  de- 
cided support  he  had  found  wanting  throughout 
a  very  critical  period  of  his  career.  More  than 
any  one  else  the  First  Lord  had  had  both  the  op- 
portunity and  the  insight  to  see  his  professional 
value.  Tory  though  Rodney  was,  he  hoped  that 
"Lord  Chatham  (Pitt)  would  be  minister,  and 
another  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  be  ap- 
pointed." "  We  hear  of  a  change  of  Administra- 


Rodney  1 8 1 

tion.  I  hope  it  is  true,  and  that  I  may  have  a 
chance  of  being  employed,  should  another  be  at 
the  Admiralty."  "  The  refusal  of  Lord  Sandwich 
does  not  surprise  me.  He  cannot  say  but  I  have 
offered  my  services,  and  some  friend  will  let  the 
King  know  I  have  so  done."  Apparently  he 
was  to  be  ignored  as  well  as  overlooked. 

Circumstances,  however,  soon  compelled  his 
employment.  Sandwich  was  an  able  man,  but 
his  personal  character  inspired  mistrust.  Not 
only  was  he  controlled  by  political  considerations 
in  administration  ;  he  was  suspected  of  corruptly 
using  the  Navy  for  party  advantage.  Whatever 
might  be  thought  of  Byng's  conduct,  his  execu- 
tion, but  twenty  years  before,  was  commonly 
ascribed  to  political  exigency,  making  him  a  vica- 
rious sacrifice  to  cover  the  neglects  of  a  Govern- 
ment. As  in  Byng's  case,  the  material  of  the 
service  was  believed  to  be  now  inadequate  to 
the  emergency  come  upon  it ;  and  it  was  known 
to  have  deteriorated  gravely  during  the  seven 
years  of  Sandwich's  tenure  of  office.  He  was  a 
Tory,  as  were  his  colleagues  of  the  Cabinet ;  the 
leaders  of  the  Navy  in  professional  estimation, 
Hawke  and  Keppel,  with  other  distinguished  of- 
ficers, were  pronounced  Whigs,  whom  it  was 
thought  the  Administration  would  be  willing  to 
destroy.  Keppel  evidently  feared  an  intention  to 
ruin  him  by  the  command  of  the  Channel  Fleet, 
and  the  public  discussion  of  the  Courts-Martial 
which  followed  his  indecisive  action  with  D'Or- 


1 8i  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

villiers,  in  July,  1778,  assumed  a  decided  and 
rancorous  party  tone.  His  accuser  then  was  his 
third-in-command,  Vice-Admiral  Palliser,  who 
had  left  his  place  on  the  Admiralty  Board  to 
take  this  position  in  the  fleet ;  and  popular  out- 
cry charged  him  with  having  betrayed  his  chief 
in  the  battle.  So  far  was  professional  feeling 
moved  that  twelve  prominent  admirals,  —  not  all 
of  whom  were  Whigs,  —  with  Hawke  at  their 
head,  presented  to  the  King  a  memorial,  deprecat- 
ing "  particularly  the  mischief  and  scandal  of  per- 
mitting men,  who  are  at  once  in  high  office  and 
subordinate  military  command,  previous  to  their 
making  recriminating  accusations  against  their 
commander-in-chief,  to  attempt  to  corrupt  the  pub- 
lic judgment  by  the  publication  of  libels  on  their 
officers  in  a  common  newspaper,  thereby  exciting 
mutiny  in  your  Majesty's  Navy,"  etc.  The  words 
italicized  show  that  this  was  aimed  at  Palliser ; 
and  at  Sandwich,  who  inferentially  had  "per- 
mitted" his  action,  and  ultimately  rewarded  him 
with  the  Governorship  of  Greenwich  Hospital. 

In  this  demoralized  condition  of  professional 
sentiment  the  Admiralty  could  no  longer  com- 
mand the  services  of  the  best  men.  Howe  came 
home  in  disgust  from  America.  Keppel  threw 
up  the  command  of  the  Channel  Fleet,  and  Bar- 
rington  subsequently  refused  itf  on  the  expressed 
ground  of  self-distrust,  underlying  which  was 
real  distrust  of  the  ministry.  He  would  serve 
as  second,  but  not  as  first.  Byron,  after  reliev- 


Rodney  183 

ing  Howe  in  New  York,  went  to  the  West 
Indies,  there  made  a  failure,  and  so  came  home 
in  the  summer  of  1779.  The  Channel  squadron 
fell  into  the  hands  of  men  respectable,  indeed, 
but  in  no  way  eminent,  and  advanced  in  years, 
whose  tenures  of  office  were  comparatively  short. 
Hardy  was  sixty-three,  Geary  seventy ;  and  on 
both  Hawke,  who  was  friendly  to  them,  passed 
the  comment  that  they  were  "  too  easy."  The 
first  had  allowed  "  the  discipline  of  the  fleet  to 
come  to  nothing,"  and  he  feared  the  same  for 
the  other.  Not  until  the  fall  of  the  ministry, 
consequent  upon  Cornwallis's  surrender,  was  the 
post  filled  by  a  distinguished  name,  when  Howe 
took  the  command  in  1782. 

The  Administration  was  thus  forced  back  upon 
Rodney ;  fortunately  for  itself,  for,  as  far  as  his- 
tory has  since  revealed,  there  was  no  other  man 
then  in  the  service,  and  of  suitable  rank,  exactly 
fitted  to  do  the  work  he  did.  Samuel  Hood 
alone,  then  an  unproved  captain,  and  practically 
in  voluntary  retirement,  could  have  equalled  and 
surpassed  him.  Howe,  like  Rodney,  was  an  ac- 
complished tactician,  and  in  conception  far  in 
advance  of  the  standards  of  the  day.  In  his 
place  he  did  admirable  service,  which  has  been 
too  little  appreciated,  and  he  was  fortunate  in 
that  the  work  which  fell  to  him,  at  the  first,  and 
again  at  the  last  of  this  war,  was  peculiarly  suited 
to  his  professional  characteristics ;  but  he  was 
not  interchangeable  with  Rodney.  In  the  latter 


184  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

there  was  a  briskness  of  temper,  a  vivacity,  very 
distinguishable  from  Howe's  solidity  of  persist- 
ence; and  he  was  in  no  sense  one  to  permit  "dis- 
cipline to  come  to  nought,"  the  direction  in  which 
Howe's  easy  though  reserved  disposition  tended. 
The  West  Indies  were  to  be  the  great  scene  of 
battles,  and,  while  the  tactical  ideas  of  the  two 
appear  to  have  been  essentially  alike,  in  the  com- 
mon recognition  of  combination  as  imperative  to 
success,  the  seventy  of  Rodney  was  needed  to  jerk 
the  West  India  fleet  sharply  out  of  sleepy  tradi- 
tion ;  to  compel  promptness  of  manoeuvre  and  in- 
telligent attention  to  the  underlying  ideas  which 
signals  communicate.  Flexibility  of  movement, 
earnestness  and  rapidity  of  attack,  mutual  sup- 
port by  the  essential  coherence  of  the  battle  order 
without  too  formal  precision, — these  were  the 
qualities  which  Rodney  was  to  illustrate  in  prac- 
tice, and  to  enforce  by  personal  impression  upon 
his  officers.  The  official  staff  of  the  fleet  had  to 
pass  under  the  rod  ot  the  schoolmaster,  to  receive 
new  ideas,  and  to  learn  novel  principles  of  obedi- 
ence, —  to  a  living  chief,  not  to  a  dead  letter 
crusted  over  by  an  unintelligent  tradition.  Not 
till  this  step  had  been  made,  till  discipline  had 
full  hold  of  men's  affections  and  understanding, 
was  there  room  for  the  glorious  liberty  of  action 
which  Nelson  extended  to  his  officers ;  preaching 
it  in  word,  and  practising  it  in  act.  Hawke  re- 
begat  the  British  Navy  in  the  spirit  he  imparted 
to  it;  Rodney,  first  of  several,  trained  its  ap- 


Rodney  185 

preaching  maturity  in  habits  which,  once  ac- 
quired, stand  by  men  as  principles  ;  Nelson 
reaped  the  fulness  of  the  harvest. 

On  October  i,  1779,  Rodney  was  again  ap- 
pointed to  the  command  of  the  Leeward  Islands 
Station.  The  year  had  been  one  of  maritime  mis- 
fortune and  discouragement.  The  French  decla- 
ration of  war  in  1778  had  been  followed  by  that 
of  Spain  in  June,  1779;  and  a  huge  allied  fleet  — 
sixty-six  ships-of-the-line,  to  which  the  British 
could  oppose  only  thirty-five  —  had  that  summer 
entered  and  dominated  the  English  Channel. 
Nothing  was  effected  by  it,  true  ;  but  the  im- 
pression produced  was  profound.  In  the  West 
Indies  Grenada  had  been  lost,  and  Byron  badly 
worsted  in  an  attempt  to  relieve  it.  On  assum- 
ing his  command,  Rodney  could  not  but  feel  that 
he  had  more  to  do  than  to  establish  a  reputation ; 
he  had  a  reputation  to  redeem,  and  that  under  a 
burden  of  national  depression  which  doubly  en- 
dangered the  reputation  of  every  officer  in  re- 
sponsible position.  He  must  have  known  that, 
however  undeservedly,  he  had  not  the  full  confi- 
dence of  the  government,  although  party  and 
personal  ties  would  naturally  have  predisposed 
it  in  his  favor.  He  therefore  entered  upon  his 
career  under  the  necessity  to  do  and  to  dare 
greatly;  he  had  not  a  strong  hand,  and  needed 
the  more  to  play  a  game  not  only  strong,  but  to 
some  extent  adventurous. 

To  the  radical  difference  between  his  personal 


1 86  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

standing  at  this  opening  of  his  command,  and 
that  which  he  had  at  its  close,  in  1782,  may  rea- 
sonably be  attributed  the  clear  difference  in  his 
action  at  the  two  periods.  The  first  was  auda- 
cious and  brilliant,  exhibiting  qualities  of  which 
he  was  capable  on  occasion,  but  which  did  not 
form  the  groundwork  of  his  professional  character. 
The  display  was  therefore  exceptional,  elicited  by 
exceptional  personal  emergency.  It  was  vitally 
necessary  at  the  outset,  if  opportunity  offered,  to 
vindicate  his  selection  by  the  government;  to 
strike  the  imagination  of  the  country,  and  obtain 
a  hold  upon  its  confidence  which  could  not 
easily  be  shaken.  This  prestige  once  established, 
he  could  safely  rest  upon  it  to  bear  him  through 
doubtful  periods  of  suspense  and  protracted  issues. 
It  would  have  been  well  had  he  felt  the  same 
spur  after  his  great  battle  in  1782.  A  necessity 
like  this  doubtless  lies  upon  every  opening  career, 
and  comparatively  few  there  be  that  rise  to  it ; 
but  there  is  an  evident  distinction  to  be  drawn 
between  one  in  the  early  prime  of  life,  who  may 
afford  to  wait,  who  has  at  least  no  errors  to  atone, 
and  him  who  is  about  to  make  his  last  cast, 
when  upon  the  turning  of  a  die  depends  a  fair 
opportunity  to  show  what  is  in  him.  Rodney 
was  near  sixty-one,  when  he  took  up  the  com- 
mand which  has  given  him  his  well  earned  place 
in  history. 

He  experienced  at  once  indications  of  the  atti- 
tude towards  him ;    and  in  two  directions,  from 


Rodney  187 

the  Admiralty  and  from  his  subordinates.  A  . 
month  before  he  was  ready,  Sandwich  urges  him, 
with  evident  impatience,  to  get  off.  "  For  God's 
sake,  go  to  sea  without  delay.  You  cannot  con- 
ceive of  what  importance  it  is  to  yourself,  to  me, 
and  to  the  public  "  (this  very  order  of  importance  • 
is  suggestive),  "  that  you  should  not  lose  this  fair 
wind;  if  you  do,  I  shall  not  only  hear  of  it  in 
Parliament,  but  in  places  to  which  I  pay  more 
attention.  ...  I  must  once  more  repeat  to  you 
that  any  delay  in  your  sailing  will  have  the  most 
disagreeable  consequences."  On  the  other  hand, 
he  had  to  complain  not  only  of  inattention  on 
the  part  of  the  dockyard  officials,  but  of  want  of 
zeal  and  activity  in  the  officers  of  the  fleet,  many 
of  whom  behaved  with  a  disrespect  and  want  of 
cordiality  which  are  too  often  the  precursor  of 
worse  faults.  Rodney  was  not  the  man  to  put  up 
with  such  treatment.  That  it  was  offered,  and 
that  he  for  the  moment  bore  with  it,  are  both 
significant;  and  are  to  be  remembered  in  con- 
nection with  the  fast  approaching  future. 

Gibraltar  was  then  at  the  beginning  of  the 
three  years  siege,  and  his  intended  departure  was 
utilized  to  give  him  command  of  the  first  of  the 
three  great  expeditions  for  its  relief,  which  were 
among  the  characteristic  operations  of  this  war. 
He  sailed  from  Plymouth  on  the  2gth  of  Decem- 
ber, 1779,  having  under  him  twenty-two  sail-of- 
the-line,  of  which  only  four  were  to  continue  with 
him  to  the  West  Indies.  With  this  great  fleet, 


1 88  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

and  its  attendant  frigates,  went  also  a  huge  col- 
lection of  storeships,  victuallers,  ordnance  vessels, 
troop  ships,  and  merchantmen ;  the  last  compris- 
ing the  "trade "for  Portugal  and  the  West  Indies, 
as  the  other  classes  carried  the  reinforcements  for 
the  Rock. 

On  January  yth,  the  West  India  trade  parted 
company  off  Cape  Finisterre,  and  the  next  day 
began  the  wonderful  good  fortune  for  which 
Rodney's  last  command  was  distinguished.  It 
is  no  disparagement  to  his  merit  to  say  that  in 
this  he  was,  to  use  Ball's  phrase  about  Nelson, 
"  a  heaven-born  admiral."  A  Spanish  convoy  of 
twenty-two  sail,  seven  of  which  were  ships  of 
war,  the  rest  laden  with  supplies  for  Cadiz,  were 
sighted  at  daylight  of  the  8th,  and  all  taken  ;  not 
one  escaped.  Twelve  loaded  with  provisions 
were  turned  into  the  British  convoy,  and  went  on 
with  it  to  feed  the  Gibraltar  garrison.  A  prince 
of  the  blood-royal,  afterwards  King  William  IV., 
was  with  the  fleet  as  a  midshipman.  One  of  the 
prizes  being  a  line-of-battle  ship,  Rodney  had  an 
opportunity  to  show  appositely  his  courtliness  of 
breeding.  "  I  have  named  her  the  Prince  Wil- 
liam, in  respect  to  His  Royal  Highness,  in  whose 
presence  she  had  the  honor  to  be  taken." 

Repeated  intelligence  had  reached  the  admiral 
that  a  Spanish  division  was  cruising  off  Cape  St. 
Vincent.  Therefore,  when  it  was  sighted  at  i 
P.M.  of  January  i6th,  a  week  after  the  capture  of 
the  convoy,  he  was  prepared  for  the  event.  A 


Rodney  189 

brief  attempt  to  form  line  was  quickly  succeeded 
by  the  signal  for  a  general  chase,  the  ships  to  en- 
gage to  leeward  as  they  came  up  with  the  enemy, 
who,  by  taking  flight  to  the  southeast,  showed 
the  intention  to  escape  into  Cadiz.  The  wind 
was  blowing  strong  from  the  westward,  giving  a 
lee  shore  and  shoals  to  the  British  fleet  in  the 
approaching  long  hours  of  a  wintry  night;  but 
opportunity  was  winging  by,  with  which  neither 
Rodney  nor  the  Navy  could  afford  to  trifle.  He 
was  already  laid  up  with  an  attack  of  the  gout 
that  continued  to  harass  him  throughout  this 
command,  and  the  decision  to  continue  the  chase 
was  only  reached  after  a  discussion  between  him 
and  his  captain,  the  mention  of  which  is  trans- 
mitted by  Sir  Gilbert  Blane,  the  surgeon  of  the 
ship,  who  was  present  professionally.  The  merit 
of  the  resolution  must  remain  with  the  man  who 
bore  the  responsibility  of  the  event ;  but  that  he 
reached  it  at  such  a  moment  only  after  consul- 
tation with  another,  to  whom  current  gossip  at- 
tributed the  chief  desert,  must  be  coupled  with 
the  plausible  claim  afterwards  advanced  for  Sir 
Charles  Douglas,  that  he  suggested  the  breaking 
of  the  enemy's  line  on  April  i2th.  Taken  to- 
gether, they  indicate  at  least  a  common  contem- 
porary professional  estimate  of  Rodney's  tem- 
perament. No  such  anecdote  is  transmitted  of 
Hawke.  The  battle  of  Cape  St.  Vincent,  there- 
fore, is  not  that  most  characteristic  of  Rodney's 
genius.  Judged  by  his  career  at  large,  it  is  ex- 


190  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

ceptional ;  yet  of  all  his  actions  it  is  the  one  in 
which  merit  and  success  most  conspicuously  met. 
Nor  does  it  at  all  detract  from  his  credit  that  the 
enemy  was  much  inferior  in  numbers ;  eleven  to 
twenty-one.  As  in  Hawke's  pursuit  of  Conflans, 
with  which  this  engagement  is  worthy  to  be 
classed,  what  was  that  night  dared,  rightly  and 
brilliantly  dared,  was  the  dangers  of  the  deep, 
not  of  the  foe.  The  prey  was  seized  out  of  the 
jaws  of  disaster. 

The  results  were  commensurate  to  the  risk. 
The  action,  which  began  at  4  p.  M.,  lasted  till  two 
the  following  morning,  the  weather  becoming 
tempestuous  with  a  great  sea,  so  that  it  was 
difficult  to  take  possession  of  the  captured  ves- 
sels. Many  of  the  heavy  British  ships  continued 
also  in  danger  during  the  lyth,  and  had  to 
carry  a  press  of  sail  to  clear  the  shoals,  on  which 
two  of  their  prizes  were  actually  wrecked.  One 
Spanish  ship-of-the-line  was  blown  up  and  six 
struck,  among  them  the  flag-ship  of  Admiral  Lan- 
gara,  who  was  taken  into  Gibraltar.  Only  four 
escaped. 

Two  such  strokes  of  mingled  good  fortune  and 
good  management,  within  ten  days,  formed  a  rare 
concurrence,  and  the  aggregate  results  were  as 
exceptional  as  the  combination  of  events.  Sand- 
wich congratulated  Rodney  that  he  had  already 
"  taken  more  line-of-battle  ships  than  had  been 
captured  in  any  one  action  in  either  of  the  two 
last  preceding  wars."  Militarily  regarded,  it  had 


Rodney  191 

a  further  high  element  of  praise,  for  the  enemy's 
detachment,  though  in  itself  inferior,  was  part  of 
a  much  superior  force ;  twenty-four  allied  ships- 
of-the-line  besides  it  being  at  the  moment  in 
Cadiz  Bay.  It  is  the  essence  of  military  art 
thus  to  overwhelm  in  detail.  A  technical  cir- 
cumstance like  this  was  doubtless  overlooked  in 
the  general  satisfaction  with  the  event,  the  most 

o 

evident  feature  in  which  was  the  relief  of  the 
Government,  who  just  then  stood  badly  in  need 
of  credit.  "  The  ministerial  people  feel  it  very 
sensibly,"  Lady  Rodney  wrote  him.  "  It  is  a 
lucky  stroke  for  them  at  this  juncture."  Salutes 
were  fired,  and  the  city  illuminated ;  the  press 
teemed  with  poetical  effusion.  Sandwich,  some- 
what impudently  when  the  past  is  considered,  but 
not  uncharacteristically  regarded  as  an  office- 
holder, took  to  himself  a  large  slice  of  the  credit. 
"  The  worst  of  my  enemies  now  allow  that  I 
have  pitched  upon  a  man  who  knows  his  duty, 
and  is  a  brave,  honest,  and  able  officer.  ...  I 
have  obtained  you  the  thanks  of  both  houses 
of  Parliament."  The  letter  does  not  end  with- 
out a  further  caution  against  indiscreet  talking 
about  the  condition  of  his  ships.  It  all  comes 
back  on  the  Government,  he  laments.  What 
Rodney  may  have  said  to  others  may  be  uncer- 
tain ;  to  his  wife,  soon  after  reaching  his  station, 
he  wrote,  "  What  are  the  ministers  about  ?  Are 
they  determined  to  undo  their  country  ?  Is  it 
fair  that  the  British  fleet  should  be  so  inferior  to 


192  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

the  French,  and  that  the  British  officers  and  men 
are  always  to  be  exposed  to  superior  numbers  ? 
What  right  had  the  administration  to  expect  any- 
thing but  defeat  ?  "  Then  he  passes  on  to  remark 
himself,  what  has  been  alluded  to  above,  the 
change  in  his  personal  position  effected  by  his 
successes.  "  Thank  God,  I  now  fear  no  frowns 
of  ministers,  and  hope  never  again  to  stand  in 
need  of  their  assistance.  I  know  them  well.  All 
are  alike,  and  no  dependence  is  to  be  placed  on 
their  promises."  It  is  to  be  feared  his  sense  of 
obligation  to  Sandwich  did  not  coincide  with 
the  latter's  estimate. 

In  his  official  report  Rodney  gave  much  credit 
to  his  officers  for  the  St.  Vincent  affair.  "  The 
gallant  behaviour  of  the  admirals,  captains,  of- 
ficers and  men,  I  had  the  honour  to  command, 
was  conspicuous ;  they  seemed  animated  with  the 
same  spirit,  and  were  eager  to  exert  themselves 
with  the  utmost  zeal."  Here  also,  however,  he 
was  biding  his  time  for  obvious  reasons ;  for  to 
his  wife  he  writes,  "  I  have  done  them  all  like 
honour,  but  it  is  because  I  would  not  have  the 
world  believe  that  there  were  officers  slack  in  their 
duty.  Without  a  thorough  change  in  naval  affairs, 
the  discipline  of  our  navy  will  be  lost.  I  could 
say  much,  but  will  not.  You  will  hear  of  it  from 
tliemsehes ; "  that  is,  probably,  by  their  mutual 
recriminations.  Such  indulgent  envelopment  of 
good  and  bad  alike  in  a  common  mantle  of  com- 
mendation is  far  from  unexampled  ;  but  it  rarely 


Rodney  193 

fails  to  return  to  plague  its  authors,  as  has  been 
seen  in  instances  more  recent  than  that  of  Rod- 
ney. He  clearly  had  told  Sandwich  the  same  in 
private  letters,  for  the  First  Lord  writes  him,  "  I 
fear  the  picture  you  give  of  the  faction  in  your 
fleet  is  too  well  drawn.  Time  and  moderation 
will  by  degrees  get  the  better  of  this  bane  of  dis- 
cipline. I  exceedingly  applaud  your  resolution 
to  shut  your  ears  against  the  illiberal  language  of 
your  officers,  who  are  inclined  to  arraign  each 
other's  conduct."  In  this  two  things  are  to  be 
remarked:  first,  the  evident  and  undeniable  ex- 
istence of  serious  cause  of  complaint,  which  was 
preparing  Rodney  for  the  stern  self-assertion  soon 
to  be  shown ;  and,  second,  that  such  imputations 
are  frequent  with  him,  while  he  seems  in  turn  to 
have  had  a  capacity  for  eliciting  insubordination 
of  feeling,  though  he  can  repress  the  act.  It 
is  a  question  of  personal  temperament,  which 
explains  more  than  his  relations  with  other  men. 
Hawke  and  Nelson  find  rare  fault  with  those  be- 
neath them  ;  for  their  own  spirit  takes  possession 
of  their  subordinates.  Such  difference  of  spirit 
reveals  itself  in  more  ways  than  one  in  the  active 
life  of  a  military  community. 

If  there  was  joy  in  England  over  Rodney's 
achievement,  still  more  and  more  sympathetic 
was  the  exultation  of  those  who  in  the  isolation 
of  Gibraltar's  Rock,  rarely  seeing  their  country's 
flag  save  on  their  own  flagstaff,  witnessed  and 
shared  the  triumph  of  his  entrance  there  with  his 

'3 


194  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

train  of  prizes.  The  ships  of  war  and  transports 
forming  the  convoy  did  not  indeed  appear  in  one 
body,  but  in  groups,  being  dispersed  by  the  light 
airs,  and  swept  eastward  by  the  in-drag  of  the 
current  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Mediterranean ; 
but  the  presence  of  the  great  fleet,  and  the  pres- 
tige of  its  recent  victory,  secured  the  practical 
immunity  of  merchant  vessels  during  its  stay. 
Of  the  first  to  come  in,  on  January  i5th,  an  eye- 
witness wrote,  "  A  ship  with  the  British  flag 
entering  the  Bay  was  so  uncommon  a  sight  that 
almost  the  whole  garrison  were  assembled  at  the 
southward  to  welcome  her  in  ;  but  words  are  in- 
sufficient to  describe  their  transports  on  being 
informed  that  she  was  one  of  a  large  convoy 
which  had  sailed  the  latter  end  of  the  preceding 
month  for  our  relief."  The  admiral  himself  had 
been  carried  beyond  and  gone  into  Tetuan,  in 
Morocco,  whence  he  finally  arrived  on  January 
26th,  having  sent  on  a  supply  fleet  to  Minorca, 
the  garrison  of  which  was  undergoing  a  sever- 
ance from  the  outer  world  more  extreme  even 
than  that  of  Gibraltar.  Upon  the  return  thence 
of  the  convoying  ships  he  again  put  to  sea,  Feb- 
ruary 1 3th,  with  the  entire  fleet,  which  accom- 
panied him  three  days  sail  to  the  westward,  when 
it  parted  company  for  England  ;  he  with  only 
four  ships-of-the-line  pursuing  his  way  to  his  sta- 
tion. On  March  27th  he  reached  Santa  Lucia, 
where  he  found  seventeen  of-the-line,  composing 
his  command.  Three  weeks  later  he  met  the 


Rodney  195 

enemy ;  barely  three  months,  almost  to  a  day, 
after  the  affair  at  St.  Vincent. 

The  antecedent  circumstances  of  the  war,  and 
the  recent  history  of  the  French  navy,  gave  a 
singular  opportuneness  of  occasion,  and  of  per- 
sonal fitness,  to  Rodney's  arrival  at  this  moment. 
The  humiliations  of  the  Seven  Years  War,  with 
the  loss  of  so  much  of  the  French  colonial  em- 
pire, traceable  in  chief  measure  to  naval  deca- 
dence, had  impressed  the  French  government  with 
the  need  of  reviving  their  navy,  which  had  conse- 
quently received  a  material  development  in  qual- 
ity, as  well  as  in  quantity,  unparalleled  since  the 
days  of  Colbert  and  Seignelay,  near  a  century 
before.  Concomitant  with  this  had  been  a  sin- 
gular progress  in  the  theory  of  naval  evolu- 
tions, and  of  their  handmaid,  naval  signalling, 
among  French  officers ;  an  advance  to  which 
the  lucid,  speculative,  character  of  the  national 
genius  greatly  contributed.  Although  they  as 
yet  lacked  practice,  and  were  numerically  too 
few,  the  French  officers  were  well  equipped  by 
mental  resources,  by  instruction  and  reflection, 
to  handle  large  fleets;  and  they  now  had  large 
fleets  to  handle.  No  such  conjunction  had 
occurred  since  Tourville;  none  such  recurred 
during  the  Revolution. 

The  condition  was  unique  in  naval  history 
of  the  sail  period.  To  meet  it,  assuming  an 
approach  to  equality  in  contending  fleets,  was 
required,  first,  a  commander-in-chief,  and  then  a 


196  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

competent  body  of  officers.  The  latter  the  Brit- 
ish had  only  in  the  sense  of  fine  seamen  and  gal- 
lant men.  In  courage  there  is  no  occasion  to 
institute  comparisons  between  the  two  nations; 
in  kind  there  may  have  been  a  difference,  but 
certainly  not  in  degree.  The  practical  superiority 
of  seamanship  in  the  British  may  be  taken  as  a 
set-off  to  the  more  highly  trained  understanding 
of  military  principles  and  methods  on  the  part  of 
their  enemy.  For  commander-in-chief,  there  were 
at  this  time  but  two,  Howe  and  Rodney,  whose 
professional  equipment,  as  shown  in  practice, 
fitted  them  to  oppose  the  French  methods.  Of 
these  Rodney  was  the  better,  because  possessed 
of  a  quicker  power  of  initiative,  and  also  of 
that  personal  severity  required  to  enforce  strict 
conformity  of  action  among  indifferent  or  sullen 
subordinates. 

Rodney  has  therefore  a  singularly  well  defined 
place  among  British  naval  chiefs.  He  was  to 
oppose  form  to  form,  theory  to  theory,  evolution 
to  evolution,  upon  the  battle  ground  of  the  sea ; 
with  purpose  throughout  tactically  offensive,  not 
defensive,  and  facing  an  adversary  his  equal  in 
professional  equipment.  Had  he  arrived  a  year 
before  he  would  have  met  no  fair  match  in 
D'Estaing,  a  soldier,  not  a  sailor,  whose  defi- 
ciencies as  a  seaman  would  have  caused  a  very 
different  result  from  that  which  actually  followed 
his  encounter  with  Byron,  who  in  conduct 
showed  an  utter  absence  of  ideas  and  of  method 


Rodney  197 

inconceivable  in  Rodney.  The  French  were 
now  commanded  by  De  Guichen,  considered  the 
most  capable  of  their  officers  by  Rodney,  whose 
recent  abode  in  Paris  had  probably  familiarized 
him  with  professional  reputations  among  the 
enemy.  Everything  therefore  conspired  to  make 
the  occasion  one  eminently  fitted  to  his  capaci- 
ties. Such  are  the  conditions  —  the  man  and  the 
hour  —  that  make  reputations ;  though  they 
do  not  form  characters,  which  are  growths  of 
radically  different  origin. 

De  Guichen  put  to  sea  from  Martinique  on 
April  1 5th,  with  a  convoy  for  Santo  Domingo 
which  he  intended  to  see  clear  of  British  inter- 
ference. Rodney,  whose  anchorage  was  but 
thirty  miles  away,  learned  instantly  the  French 
sailing  and  followed  without  delay.  On  the  even- 
ing of  April  1 6th,  the  two  fleets  were  in  sight  of 
each  other  to  leeward  of  Martinique,  the  British 
to  windward ;  an  advantage  that  was  diligently 
maintained  during  the  night.  At  daylight  of  the 
i  yth  the  two  enemies  were  twelve  to  fifteen  miles 
apart,  ranged  on  nearly  parallel  lines,  the  British 
twenty  heading  northwest,  the  French  twenty- 
three  southeast.  The  numerical  difference  repre- 
sents sufficiently  nearly  the  actual  difference  of 
force,  although  French  vessels  averaged  more 
powerful  than  British  of  the  same  rates. 

At  6.45  A.  M.  Rodney  signalled  that  it  was 
his  intention  to  attack  the  enemy's  rear  with  his 
whole  force.  This  was  never  annulled,  and  the 


198  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

purpose  governed  his  action  throughout  the  day. 
This  combination  —  on  the  rear — is  the  one 
generally  preferable  to  be  attempted  when  under- 
way, and  the  relative  situations  of  the  fleets  at 
this  moment  made  it  particularly  opportune  ;  for 
the  British,  in  good  order,  two  cables  interval 
between  the  ships,  were  abreast  the  rear  centre 
and  rear  of  the  enemy,  whose  line  was  in  com- 
parison greatly  extended, —  the  result  probably  of 
inferior  practical  seamanship.  To  increase  his 
advantage,  Rodney  at  7  ordered  his  vessels  to  close 
to  one  cable,  and  at  8.30,  when  the  antagonists 
were  still  heading  as  at  daybreak,  undertook  to 
lead  the  fleet  down  by  a  series  of  signals  direc- 
tive of  its  successive  movements.  In  this  he  was 
foiled  by  De  Guichen,  who  by  wearing  brought 
what  was  previously  his  van  into  position  to 
support  the  extreme  threatened.  "  The  differ- 
ent movements  of  the  enemy, "  wrote  Rodney, 
"  obliged  me  to  be  very  attentive  and  watch  every 
opportunity  of  attacking  them  at  advantage ; " 
a  sentence  that  concisely  sums  up  his  special 
excellencies,  of  which  the  present  occasion 
offers  the  most  complete  illustration.  It  may  be 
fully  conceded  also  that  it  would  have  vindicated 
his  high  title  to  fame  by  conspicuous  results,  had 
the  intelligence  of  his  officers  seconded  his 
dispositions. 

The  forenoon  passed  in  manoeuvres,  skilfully 
timed,  to  insure  a  definite  issue.  At  11.50 
Rodney  considered  that  his  opportunity  had 


Rodney  199 

arrived.  Both  fleets  were  then  heading  in  the 
same  direction,  on  the  starboard  tack,  and  he  had 
again  succeeded  in  so  placing  his  own  that,  by 
the  words  of  his  report,  he  expected  to  bring 
"  the  whole  force  of  His  Majesty's  fleet  against 
the  enemy's  rear,  and  of  course  part  of  their 
centre,  by  which  means  the  twenty  sail  of  British 
ships  would  have  been  opposed  to  only  fifteen 
sail  of  the  enemy's,  and  must  in  all  probability 
have  totally  disabled  them  before  their  van  could 
have  given  them  any  assistance."  It  would  be 
difficult  to  cite  a  clearer  renouncement  of  the 
outworn  "  van  to  van,"  ship  to  ship,  dogma ;  but 
Rodney  is  said  to  have  expressed  himself  in  more 
emphatic  terms  subsequently,  as  follows  :  "  Dur- 
ing all  the  commands  Lord  Rodney  has  been 
entrusted  with,  he  made  it  a  rule  to  bring  his 
whole  force  against  a  part  of  the  enemy's,  and 
never  was  so  absurd  as  to  bring  ship  against  ship, 
when  the  enemy  gave  him  an  opportunity  of  act- 
ing^otherwise."  Though  not  distinctly  so  stated, 
it  would  seem  that  his  first  movement  on  the 
present  occasion  had  failed  because  of  the  long 
distance  between  the  fleets  permitting  the  enemy 
to  succor  the  part  threatened,  before  he  could 
close.  He  was  now  nearer,  for  at  this  second 
attempt  only  an  hour  proved  to  be  needed  for 
the  first  British  ship  to  open  fire  at  long  range. 
It  may  be  for  this  reason,  also,  that  he  at  this 
stage  threw  himself  upon  his  captains,  no  longer 
prescribing  the  successive  movements,  but  issuing 


2oo  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

the  general  signal  to  bear  down,  each  vessel  to 
"steer,"  according  to  the  2ist  Article  of  the 
Additional  Fighting  Instructions,  "for  the  ship 
of  the  enemy  which  from  the  disposition  of  the 
two  squadrons  it  must  be  her  lot  to  engage,  not- 
withstanding the  signal  for  the  line  ahead  will  be 
kept  flying:  making  or  shortening  sail  in  such 
proportion  as  to  preserve  the  distance  assigned  by 
the  signal  for  the  line,  in  order  that  the  whole 
squadron  may,  as  near  as  possible,  come  into 
action  at  the  same  time." 

Unfortunately  for  his  manoeuvre,  the  Admiral 
here  ran  up  against  the  stolid  idea  of  the  old  — 
and  still  existing  —  Fighting  Instructions  con- 
cerning the  line-of-battle  in  action,  embodied  in 
a  typical  representative  in  the  senior  captain  of 
his  fleet.  This  gentleman,  Robert  Carkett,  had 
risen  from  before  the  mast,  and  after  a  lieuten- 
ancy of  thirteen  years  had  become  post  in  1758, 
by  succeeding  to  the  command  when  his  captain 
was  killed,  in  one  of  the  most  heroic  single-ship 
fights  of  the  British  navy.  Unluckily,  his  sen- 
iority gave  him  the  lead  of  the  fleet  as  it  was  now 
formed  on  the  starboard  tack,  and  he  considered 
that  the  signal  for  attacking  the  enemy's  rear  was 
annulled  by  the  present  situation.  "  Both  fleets," 
he  stated  in  a  letter  to  the  Admiralty,  "  were  at 
11.15  parallel  to  and  abreast  of  each  other.  As 
I  was  then  the  leading  ship,  it  became  my  duty 
to  engage  the  leading  ship  of  the  French  fleet, 
as  this  signal  disannulled  all  former  ones  rela- 


Rodney  201 

tive  to  the  mode  of  attack."  The  word  "  abreast," 
critically  used,  would  imply  that  the  fleets  were 
abreast,  ship  to  ship,  van  to  van ;  but  there 
appears  no  reason  to  question  Rodney's  state- 
ment of  the  facts  made  to  Carkett  himself :  "  For- 
getting that  the  signal  for  the  line  was  only  at 
two  cables  length  distance  from  each  other,  the 
van  division  was  by  you  led  to  more  than  two 
leagues  distance  from  the  centre  division,  which 
was  thereby  exposed  to  the  greatest  strength  of 
the  enemy,  and  not  properly  supported."  Rodney, 
in  short,  meant  by  opposite  the  enemy's  ship 
opposite  at  the  moment  the  signal  was  made; 
and  he  also  expected  that  the  movements  of  his 
ships  would  be  further  controlled  by  the  words  of 
the  2ist  Article,  "  preserve  the  distance  assigned 
by  the  signal  for  the  line,"  which  distance  was 
to  be  taken  from  the  centre ;  or,  as  sometimes 
worded  in  the  Instructions,  "  the  distance  shall 
be  that  between  the  admiral  and  the  ships  next 
ahead  and  astern  of  him."  Carkett  conceived 
that  he  was  to  attack  the  ship  opposite  him  in 
numerical  order,  that  is,  the  leader  of  the  enemy, 
and  that  the  remaining  British  would  take  dis- 
tance from  him. 

Why  the  rest  of  the  van  should  also  have  been 
led  thus  astray  can  be  explained  only  on  the 
ground  that  Carkett's  general  views  were  shared 
by  the  divisional  commander,  a  rear-admiral,  who, 
as  was  proved  a  year  later,  possessed  high  cour- 
age of  the  pure  game-cock  order,  but  was  wholly 


202  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

thoughtless  of  gaining  an  unfair  advantage,  two 
against  one,  by  tactical  ingenuity.  The  result 
was  that  the  van  as  a  body  left  the  centre  to  itself, 
and  thereby  not  only  wrecked  the  concentration 
at  which  Rodney  aimed,  but  was  out  of  hand  to 
support  his  flag  and  his  division,  when  badly 
battered  by  the  enemy's  fire.  This  was  the 
great  tactical  blunder  which  brought  to  nought 
Rodney's  patient,  wary  manoeuvres  of  the  past 
six  hours.  To  it  especially,  but  not  to  it  alone, 
he  referred  in  the  stinging  words  of  his  despatch: 
"  'T  is  with  concern  inexpressible,  mixt  with  in- 
dignation, that  the  duty  I  owe  my  sovereign  and 
country  obliges  me  to  acquaint  their  Lordships 
that,  during  the  action  with  the  French  fleet  on 
the  i;th  instant  [and]  His  Majesty's,  the  British 
flag  was  not  properly  supported."  To  the  specific 
error  of  the  van  was  added  a  wide-spread  dis- 
regard of  the  order  for  close  action,  despite  the 
example  of  the  commander-in-chief,  who  pressed 
the  enemy  so  hard  that  towards  the  end  his 
flag-ship  was  to  leeward  of  De  Guichen's  wake. 
"  Perceiving  several  of  our  ships  engaging  at  a 
distance,  I  repeated  the  signal  for  close  action. 
With  truth,  but  sorrow,  I  must  say  it  was  little 
attended  to."  It  is  noticeable  that  one  of  the 
ships  thus  censured,  the  Cornwall,  next  ahead  of 
Rodney,  lost  as  heavily  in  killed  and  wounded  as 
did  the  flag-ship  herself;  one  of  many  instances 
showing  that  distance  lessened  efficiency  without 
increasing  safety.  The  forwardness  of  Rodney's 


Rodney  203 

flag  on  this  occasion  proves  clearly  enough  his 
consciousness  that  tactics,  to  succeed,  must  be 
more  than  a  veil  for  timidity;  that  hard  hitting 
is  as  essential  as  skilful  leading. 

This  combination  of  steady,  patient,  wary,  skil- 
ful guidance,  with  resolute  and  tenacious  personal 
leadership,  constituted  the  firm  tissue  of  Rodney's 
professional  character,  and  at  no  time  received 
such  clear  illustration  as  in  the  case  before  us; 
for  no  like  opportunity  recurred.  One  experience 
was  enough  for  De  Guichen ;  he  did  not  choose 
again  to  yield  the  advantage  of  the  weather  gage, 
and  he  had  the  tactical  skill  necessary  to  retain 
it  in  his  future  contacts  with  this  adversary. 
The  battle  of  April  12,  1782,  upon  which  Rod- 
ney's fame  has  rested,  was  rather  an  accident 
than  an  achievement,  and  as  a  revelation  of  char- 
acter its  most  conspicuous  feature  is  wariness 
exaggerated  into  professional  timidity.  He  him- 
self has  weighed  the  relative  professional  value 
of  the  two  affairs.  A  letter  published  in  1809, 
anonymous,  but  bearing  strong  internal  evidence 
of  being  written  by  Sir  Gilbert  Blane,  long  on 
a  trusted  physician's  terms  of  intimacy  with  Rod- 
ney, states  that  he  "  thought  little  of  his  victory 
on  the  1 2th  of  April."  He  would  have  preferred 
to  rest  his  reputation  upon  this  action  with  De 
Guichen,  and  "looked  upon  that  opportunity  of 
beating,  with  an  inferior  fleet,  such  an  officer, 
whom  he  considered  the  best  in  the  French  ser- 
vice, as  one  by  which,  but  for  the  disobedience  of 


204  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

his  captains,  he  might  have  gained  an  immortal 
renown." 

The  misconduct  of  his  officers  brought  out  in 
full  vigor  the  severity  which  was  a  salient  feature 
of  Rodney's  professional  character.  In  the  St. 
Vincent  business  he  may  have  been  partly  actu- 
ated to  spare,  by  the  reflection  that  the  offenders 
were  not  his  own  captains ;  that  they  were  about 
to  quit  him  finally.  Moreover,  there  had  been 
then  a  very  considerable  tangible  success  ;  results 
cover  a  multitude  of  sins.  No  such  extenua- 
tions applied  here.  The  wreck  of  his  reasonable 
hopes  of  personal  distinction  coincided  with  failure 
towards  the  nation  itself.  Rodney's  hand  came 
down  heavy  upon  the  offenders ;  but  so  far  as 
seen  it  was  the  hand  always  of  a  gentleman.  In 
private  letters  his  full  feelings  betrayed  them- 
selves in  vehemence ;  but  in  public  they  were 
measured  to  austerity.  To  Carkett,  when  ques- 
tioned concerning  the  rumored  expressions  in  his 
despatch,  he  is  withering  in  the  pointed  enumera- 
tion of  varied  shortcomings ;  but  he  never  lapses 
into  a  breach  of  professional  decorum  of  utter- 
ance. The  unfortunate  man  represented  to  the 
Admiralty  his  view  of  the  matter,  —  already  cited ; 
but  it  bears  no  indorsement  to  show  that  it  had 
passed  under  Rodney's  eye.  Captain,  ship,  and 
ship's  company,  were  swept  away  a  few  months 
later  in  the  memorable  hurricane  of  October, 
1780. 

The  despatch  specified  no  other  delinquent  by 


Rodney  205 

name ;  but  the  selection  of  five  captains  to  receive 
personal  commendation,  and  the  persistent  refusal 
of  the  same  to  all  other  subordinates,  including 
the  junior  flag-officers,  made  censure  sufficiently 
individual;  and  the  admiral's  subsequent  line  of 
conduct  emphasized  rebuke  bitterly.  The  cruise 
was  not  yet  finished  ;  for  the  French  having  taken 
refuge  at  Guadaloupe,  it  was  important  to  prevent 
them  from  regaining  Martinique,  their  chief  depot 
and  place  of  repairs.  To  intercept  them  there, 
Rodney  at  first  took  station  off  Fort  Royal,  and 
when  compelled  for  a  moment  to  return  to  Santa 
Lucia,  kept  lookouts  to  warn  him  betimes  of  the 
enemy's  appearance.  So,  when  De  Guichen  ap- 
proached from  the  windward  side  of  the  islands, 
on  May  Qth,  he  found  the  British  getting  under- 
way to  meet  him.  From  that  time  until  the  2oth 
—  eleven  days  —  the  fleets  were  manoeuvring  in 
sight  of  one  another,  beating  to  windward ;  the 
British  endeavoring  to  force  action,  the  French 
to  avoid  it.  De  Guichen's  orders  from  home 
were  "  to  keep  the  sea,  so  far  as  the  force  main- 
tained by  England  in  the  Windward  Islands  would 
permit,  without  too  far  compromising  the  fleet  en- 
trusted to  him."  Such  instructions  compelled  him 
to  defensive  tactics ;  as  Rodney's  views,  and  those 
traditional  in  his  service,  impelled  him  to  attack. 
Hence  ensued  a  struggle  of  sustained  vigilance, 
activity,  and  skill,  profoundly  interesting  profes- 
sionally, but  which  does  not  lend  itself  to  other 
than  technical  narrative.  "  For  fourteen  days 


206  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

and  nights,"  wrote  Rodney,  "  the  fleets  were  so 
near  each  other  that  neither  officers  nor  men 
could  be  said  to  sleep.  Nothing  but  the  good- 
ness of  the  weather  and  climate  could  have  en- 
abled us  to  endure  so  continual  a  fatigue.  Had 
it  been  in  Europe,  half  the  people  must  have 
sunk  under  it.  For  my  part,  it  did  me  good." 
No  evidence  of  professional  aptness  could  be 
given  clearer  than  the  last  words.  A  man  is 
easy  under  such  circumstances  only  when  they  fit 
him.  De  Guichen  asked  to  be  superseded;  "my 
health  cannot  endure  such  continual  fatigue  and 
anxiety."  Twice  the  wary  Frenchman  was  nearly 
caught,  but  the  wind  did  not  favor  Rodney  long 
enough  to  give  him  the  weather  position,  the 
only  sure  one  for  offence.  But,  while  thus  un- 
able to  compass  results,  he  gave  conclusive  evi- 
dence of  the  quickness  of  his  eye,  the  alertness 
of  his  action,  and  the  flexibility  which  he  was 
enabled  to  impress  upon  his  fleet  by  sheer  force 
of  personal  character.  The  contest  resembled 
that  of  two  expert  swordsmen ;  more  intermit- 
tent doubtless,  but  also  much  more  prolonged. 
There  can  be  no  trifling  with  such  conditions. 
A  moment's  relaxation,  or  inaptness,  may  forfeit 
opportunity,  offered  only  by  chance  and  not  to  be 
regained  by  effort.  Rodney  was  fixed  that  no 
such  slip  should  occur  through  the  neglect  of 
others,  and  his  stern  supervision,  as  represented 
by  himself  to  his  wife,  was  that  of  a  slave  driver, 
lash  in  hand.  "  As  I  had  given  public  notice  to 


Rodney  207 

all  my  captains,  etc.  that  I  should  hoist  my  flag 
on  board  one  of  my  frigates,  and  that  I  expected 
implicit  obedience  to  every  signal  made,  under 
the  certain  penalty  of  being  instantly  superseded, 
it  had  an  admirable  effect,  as  they  were  all  con- 
vinced, after  their  late  gross  behaviour,  that  they 
had  nothing  to  expect  at  my  hands  but  instant 
punishment  to  those  who  neglected  their  duty. 
My  eye  on  them  had  more  dread  than  the 
enemy's  fire,  and  they  knew  it  would  be  fatal. 
No  regard  was  paid  to  rank,  —  admirals  as  well 
as  captains,  if  out  of  their  station,  were  instantly 
reprimanded  by  signals,  or  messages  sent  by  frig- 
ates :  and,  in  spite  of  themselves,  I  taught  them 
to  be  what  they  had  never  been  before  —  officers; 
and  showed  them  that  an  inferior  fleet,  properly 
conducted,  was  more  than  a  match  for  one  far 
superior."  Making  allowance  for  exaggeration  in 
the  irresponsible  utterances  of  family  life,  the 
above  is  eminently  characteristic  of  temperament. 
It  must  be  added,  as  equally  characteristic  of  an 
underlying  justice  which  Rodney  possessed,  that 
in  his  official  account  of  these  last  manoeuvres  he 
gave  credit  to  his  subordinates  as  a  whole.  "  I 
must  inform  their  Lordships,  in  justice  to  the 
commanders  and  officers  of  the  fleet  under  my 
command,  that  since  the  action  of  the  iyth  of 
April,  and  during  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy's  fleet, 
and  in  the  two  rencontres  with  them,  all  my  officers, 
of  every  rank  and  denomination,  were  obedient 
and  attentive  to  orders  and  signals,  and,  I  am 


208  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

convinced,  if  the  enemy  had  given  them  an 
opportunity,  they  would  have  done  their  duty  to 
their  King  and  Country."  The  claims  of  justice 
against  its  own  strict  requirements  he  also  rec- 
ognized to  Carkett.  "Nothing  but  the  former 
service  you  had  done  your  King  and  Country, 
and  my  firm  belief  of  your  being  a  brave  man, 
could  have  induced  me,  as  commander  of  a  great 
fleet,  to  overlook."  It  will  not  escape  attention 
that  this  exact  observance  of  credit,  where  due, 
lends  increased  weight  to  censure,  when  inflicted. 
To  the  pursuit  of  the  French  fleet,  relin- 
quished forty  leagues  eastward  of  Martinique 
after  the  brush  of  May  iQth,  succeeded  a  period 
marked  only  by  the  routine  administrative  cares 
attendant  upon  an  admiral  charged  with  the  de- 
fence of  a  lengthy,  exposed  chain  of  islands,  and 
an  extensive  trade,  against  enemies  numerically 
much  superior.  The  details  serve  to  show  the 
breadth  of  intelligence,  the  sound  judgment,  and 
clear  professional  conceptions  that  characterized 
Rodney  in  small  things  as  well  as  great ;  but  it 
would  be  wearisome  to  elaborate  demonstration  of 
this,  and  these  qualities  he  had  in  common  with 
many  men  otherwise  inferior  to  himself.  Reaction 
from  the  opening  strain  of  the  campaign,  with  the 
relaxation  of  vigor  from  the  approach  of  the  hot 
rainy  season,  now  began  to  tell  on  his  health  ;  and 
to  this  contributed  the  harassment  of  mind  due 
to  the  arrival  of  a  large  Spanish  fleet,  while  rein- 
forcements promised  him  unaccountably  failed  to 


Rodney  209 

appear.  Nevertheless,  his  personal  efficiency  was 
not  impaired,  and  towards  the  end  of  July  he 
resolved  to  execute  a  project  which  he  had  long 
entertained,  of  carrying  the  mass  of  his  fleet  from 
the  islands  to  the  Continental  waters  of  North 
America. 

During  the  year  between  his  return  from  Paris 
and  his  present  appointment,  he  had  laid  before 
the  Admiralty  two  papers,  containing  an  admir- 
able summary  of  the  leading  strategic  conditions 
of  the  whole  scene  of  war  in  the  western  hemi- 
sphere, with  suggestions  for  action  amounting 
to  a  plan  of  campaign.  One  feature  of  this  was 
based  upon  the  weather  differences,  which  ren- 
dered cruising  dangerous  in  the  West  Indies 
when  most  favorable  to  the  northward,  and  un- 
sure in  North  America  when  most  certain  among 
the  islands.  He  proposed  to  utilize  this  alterna- 
tion of  seasons,  by  shifting  a  mobile  reinforcement 
suddenly  and  secretly  from  one  end  to  the  other 
of  the  long  front  of  operations.  This  is  a  com- 
mon enough  expedient  in  military  art,  but  had 
rarely  received  the  convincing  formulation  which 
he  gave  it ;  while  that  such  a  conception  was  a 
novelty  to  the  average  naval  mind  of  the  day,  may 
be  inferred  from  the  startled  wrath  of  the  admiral 
in  North  America  at  Rodney's  unexpected  intru- 
sion upon  his  bailiwick. 

Sandwich,  however,  had  entertained  the  project, 
and  in  October,  1779,  just  as  Rodney's  appoint- 
ment issued,  a  vessel  sailed  from  England  with 

H 


2io  Types  of  Naval-  Officers 

letters  to  Admiral  Arbuthnot  in  New  York, 
directing  him  to  send  several  ships-of-the-line  to 
the  West  Indies  for  the  winter  campaign.  The 
vessel  lost  a  mast,  kept  off  to  Nassau  in  the 
Bahamas,  and  after  arrival  there  her  captain, 
while  spending  some  months  in  repairs,  did  not 
think  to  send  on  the  despatches.  Arbuthnot, 
therefore,  received  them  only  on  March  16,  1780; 
too  late,  doubtless,  to  collect  and  equip  a  force 
in  time  to  reach  Rodney  before  the  affair  of 
April  i  yth. 

At  the  end  of  July,  1780,  the  conditions  in  the 
West  Indies  were  that  the  allied  French  and 
Spanish  fleets  had  gone  to  leeward  from  Martin- 
ique; to  Havana,  and  to  Cap  Fran9ois,  in  Hayti. 
At  the  latter  port  was  assembling  a  large  trade 
convoy  —  three  hundred  ships,  according  to  Rod- 
ney's information.  He  reasoned  that  this  must 
go  to  Europe,  but  would  not  require  the  full 
strength  of  the  French  fleet;  therefore,  transfer- 
ring his  own  insight  to  the  enemy's  mind,  he  con- 
vinced himself  that  a  part  of  their  vessels  would 
seek  Narragansett  Bay,  to  reinforce  the  seven 
ships-of-the-line  that  had  reached  there  on  July 
1 2th,  under  De  Ternay,  of  whose  arrival  Rodney 
now  knew.  Great  possibilities  might  be  open  to 
such  a  combination,  skilfully  handled  against  the 
inferior  numbers  of  Arbuthnot.  "  As  it  plainly 
appeared  to  me  that  His  Majesty's  territory,  fleet, 
and  army,  in  America  were  in  imminent  danger 
of  being  overpowered  by  the  superior  force  of 


Rodney  211 

the  public  enemy,  I  deemed  it  a  duty  incumbent 
upon  me  to  forego  any  emoluments  that  might 
have  accrued  by  the  enterprise  intended  by  Gen- 
eral Vaughan  and  myself  during  the  hurricane 
months,  and  without  a  moment's  hesitation  flew 
with  all  despatch  possible  to  prevent  the  enemy's 
making  any  impression  upon  the  continent  before 
my  arrival  there."  The  protestation  of  disinter- 
estedness here  is  somewhat  intrusive,  and  being 
wholly  unnecessary  excites  rather  criticism  than 
confidence. 

Although  reasonable  precautions  had  been 
taken  for  the  security  of  his  own  station,  and  all 
circumstances  carefully  weighed,  there  was  in 
this  step  of  Rodney's  an  assumption  of  responsi- 
bility,—  of  risk,  —  as  in  his  similar  action  of 
1762,  before  noted.  This,  as  well  as  the  military 
correctness  of  the  general  conception,  deserves  to 
be  noted  to  the  credit  of  his  professional  capacity. 
Making  the  land  about  Charleston,  South  Caro- 
lina, he  swept  along  the  coast  to  the  northward, 
until  he  anchored  off  Sandy  Hook,  September 
1 4th.  The  following  day  he  issued  an  order 
to  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  directing  him  to  put 
himself  under  his  command  and  to  obey  his 
instructions. 

Rodney's  coming  was  a  grievous  blow  to  Wash- 
ington, who  instead  had  hoped,  as  Rodney  had 
feared,  the  arrival  of  De  Guichen,  or  at  the  least 
of  a  strong  French  naval  division.  The  enemy's 
disappointment  is  perhaps  the  best  proof  of  sagac- 


212  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

ity  in  a  military  movement,  but  Sandwich's  clear 
approval  was  also  forthcoming.  "  It  is  impossible 
for  us  to  have  a  superior  fleet  in  every  part ;  and 
unless  our  commanders-in-chief  will  take  the  great 
line,  as  you  do,  and  consider  the  King's  whole 
dominions  as  under  their  care,  our  enemies  must 
find  us  unprepared  somewhere,  and  carry  their 
point  against  us."  Arbuthnot,  nevertheless,  saw 
only  personal  injury  to  himself;  a  natural  feeling, 
but  one  which  should  not  be  allowed  display. 
Rodney  had  given  various  particular  orders,  and 
had  suggested  that  it  would  be  better  that  the 
commander-in-chief  on  the  station  should  keep 
headquarters  at  New  York,  leaving  the  blockade 
of  Ternay,  a  hundred  and  thirty  miles  distant,  to 
a  junior  admiral ;  also,  he  intimated  the  opinion 
that  such  a  blockade  would  be  better  conducted 
underway  than  anchored  in  Gardiner's  Bay,  fifty 
miles  from  the  enemy's  port.  Though  sugges- 
tion did  not  override  discretion,  Arbuthnot  re- 
sented it  in  all  its  forms.  After  explaining  his 
reasons,  he  added,  "  How  far,  Sir,  your  conduct 
(similarly  circumstanced  as  you  are)  is  praise- 
worthy and  proper,  consequences  must  determine. 
Your  partial  interference  in  the  conduct  of  the 
American  War  is  certainly  incompatible  with 
principles  of  reason,  and  precedents  of  service. 
The  frigates  attending  on  a  cruising  squadron 
you  have  taken  upon  you  to  counter-order,  (a  due 
representation  of  which  and  other  circumstances 
I  shall  make  where  it  will  have  every  possible 


Rodney  213 

effect),  and  thus  I  have  been  for  some  time  with- 
out even  a  repeater  of  signals." 

Though  Rodney's  step  was  unusual,  his  posi- 
tion as  Arbuthnot's  superior  officer,  locally  pres- 
ent, was  impregnable.  He  nevertheless  kept  his 
temper  under  provocation,  and  the  dignified 
restraint  of  his  reply  is  notable ;  indeed,  the 
only  significant  feature  of  this  incident,  from  the 
biographical  point  of  view.  "  No  offence  to  you 
was  intended  on  my  part.  Every  respect  due  to 
you,  as  an  officer  and  a  gentleman,  my  inclination 
as  well  as  my  duty  led  me  to  pay  you  in  the 
strictest  sense."  He  leaves  no  doubt,  however, 
that  he  does  not  intend  to  allow  his  functions  to 
lapse  into  a  mere  official  primacy,  —  that  he  will 
rule,  as  well  as  reign.  "  Duty,  not  inclination, 
brought  me  to  North  America.  I  came  to  inter- 
fere in  the  American  War,  to  command  by  sea  in 
it,  and  to  do  my  best  endeavours  towards  the 
putting  an  end  thereto.  I  knew  the  dignity  of 
my  own  rank  entitled  me  to  take  the  supreme 
command,  which  I  ever  shall  do  on  every  station 
where  His  Majesty's  and  the  public  service  may 
make  it  necessary  for  me  to  go,  unless  I  meet  a 
superior  officer,  in  which  case  it  will  be  my  duty 
to  obey  his  orders."  He  then  proceeds  to  exer- 
cise his  authority,  by  explicit  directions  and  some 
criticism  of  existing  arrangements. 

Afterwards,  in  submitting  the  papers  to  the 
Admiralty,  Rodney  wrote,  "  I  am  ashamed  to 
mention  what  appears  to  me  the  real  cause,  and 


214  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

from  whence  Mr.  Arbuthnot's  chagrin  proceeds, 
but  the  proofs  are  so  plain  that  prize-money  is 
the  occasion  that  I  am  under  the  necessity  of 
transmitting  them.  I  can  solemnly  assure  their 
Lordships  that  I  had  not  the  least  conception  of 
any  other  prize-money  on  the  coast  of  America 
but  that  which  would  be  most  honourably  ob- 
tained by  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  ships  of 
war  and  privateers  —  but  when  prize-money  ap- 
peared predominant  in  the  mind  of  my  brother 
officer,  I  was  determined  to  have  my  share 
of  that  bounty  so  graciously  bestowed  by  His 
Majesty  and  the  public."  Nelson's  retort  to 
Arbuthnot's  successor,  two  years  later,  may  be 
recalled.  "  You  have  come  to  a  good  station 
for  prize-money."  "  Yes,  but  the  West  Indies  is 
the  station  for  honour." 

The  visit  to  continental  waters  was  on  this  oc- 
casion productive  of  little  result.  Contrary  alike 
to  Rodney's  anticipations  and  those  of  Washing- 
ton, De  Guichen's  whole  fleet  had  returned  to 
Europe.  Some  slight  redistribution  of  cruisers, 
the  more  frequent  capture  of  privateers,  with  in- 
creased security  to  the  trade  of  New  York  and 
incidental  support  to  some  rather  predatory  land 
operations,  were  all  that  Rodney  could  show  of 
tangible  consequence  from  his  presence.  Arbuth- 
not  alone  was  superior  to  Ternay  if  neither  re- 
ceived reinforcements.  Rodney's  health  .felt  the 
keener  atmosphere,  so  that  he  had  to  go  ashore 
in  New  York,  and  he  accepted  the  views  of 


Rodney  215 

Arbuthnot  as  to  the  strength  of  the  French 
fleet's  position  in  Newport,  without  examining 
it  himself.  Had  he  done  so,  however,  it  is  un- 
likely that  he  would  have  formed  more  stren- 
uous purposes.  The  disposition  of  the  enemy's 
squadron  there  was  so  imposing  that  only  the 
genius  of  a  Nelson,  mindful  as  at  Revel  of  the 
moral  influence  of  a  great  blow  at  a  critical 
period  of  the  war,  could  have  risen  to  the  neces- 
sity of  daring  such  a  hazard.  His  phrase  was 
there  applicable,  "  Desperate  affairs  require  des- 
perate remedies."  There  is  no  indication  of  this 
supreme  element  in  Rodney's  composition.  It  is 
interesting  to  note,  however,  that  personal  obser- 
vation had  given  conviction  of  success  at  New- 
port to  the  officer  who  was  afterwards  Nelson's 
gallant  second  at  Copenhagen,  —  Sir  Thomas 
Graves. 

This  paucity  of  results  in  no  way  lessens  the 
merit  of  the  movement  from  the  West  Indies  to 
the  continent.  It  was  indubitably  correct  in  idea, 
and,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  the  conception  was 
Rodney's  own,  the  possibilities  were  great,  the 
risk  in  many  ways  undeniable ;  when  these  can 
be  affirmed  of  a  military  action,  failure  to  obtain 
results,  because  conditions  take  an  improbable 
direction,  does  not  detract  from  credit.  Nor 
should  the  obviousness  of  this  measure  hide  the 
fact  that  the  suggestion  appears  to  have  been 
original  with  him,  occurring  fully  developed  in 
his  memorandum  of  May,  1778,  to  the  Admi- 


2i6  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

ralty ;  whether  written  in  Paris  or  England  does 
not  appear.  The  transfer  of  Hotham's  squadron 
to  the  southward  in  the  following  December, 
1779,  enabling  Barrington  to  conquer  Santa 
Lucia,  —  a  place  insisted  upon  in  the  same  mem- 
orandum as  of  the  first  importance, —  may  not 
improbably  be  attributed  to  this  fruitful  paper. 
In  the  next  year,  1781,  a  detachment  was  again 
sent  to  New  York,  and  had  Rodney  been  able 
to  accompany  it  in  person  there  is  no  room 
to  doubt  that  he  would  have  saved  Cornwallis  ; 
reversing  issues,  at  least  momentarily,  certainly 
prolonging  the  war,  possibly  deciding  the  contest 
otherwise  than  as  befell. 

Rodney's  return  to  the  West  Indies  in  Decem- 
ber, 1780,  concluded  the  most  eventful  and 
illustriously  characteristic  year  of  his  life.  The 
destruction  of  Langara's  fleet  in  January,  the 
brilliant  tactical-  displays  of  April  i7th,  and  of 
the  chase  manoeuvres  in  May,  the  strategic  trans- 
ference in  August  of  a  large  division,  unawares  to 
the  enemy,  from  one  point  of  the  field  of  action 
to  another,  are  all  feats  that  testify  to  his  great 
ability  as  a  general  officer.  Nor  should  there  be 
left  out  of  the  account  the  stern  dignity  of  con- 
duct which  assured  his  personal  control  of  the 
fleet,  his  certainty  of  touch  in  the  face  of  an 
enemy.  Thus  considered,  it  was  a  year  full  of 
events,  successful  throughout  as  regards  per- 
sonal desert,  and  singularly  significant  of  abil- 
ity and  temperament. 


Rodney  217 

The  year  1781  was  far  less  happy,  nor  does  the 
great  victory,  which  in  1 782  crowned  his  career 
with  glory,  contribute  to  the  enhancement  of 
his  professional  distinction ;  rather  the  contrary. 
Upon  reaching  Barbados,  December  5th,  he 
found  the  island  shorn  to  the  ground  by  the 
noted  hurricane,  which  in  the  previous  October 
had  swept  the  Caribbean,  from  the  Lesser  Antilles 
to  Jamaica.  Eight  of  the  division  left  by  him  in 
the  West  Indies  had  been  wrecked, —  two  being 
ships-of-the-line ;  and  the  efficiency  of  the  whole 
fleet  was  grievously  impaired  by  the  wide-spread 
injury  to  vessels. 

An  event  charged  with  more  serious  conse- 
quences to  himself  soon  followed.  On  the  27th 
of  January,  1781,  at  Barbados,  despatches  from 
the  Admiralty  notified  him  that  Great  Britain 
had  declared  war  against  Holland,  and  directed 
him  to  proceed  at  once  against  the  Dutch 
shipping  and  West  Indies.  First  among  the 
enumerated  objects  of  attack  was  the  small  island 
of  St.  Eustatius.  This,  having  enjoyed  the  ad- 
vantages of  neutrality  at  a  time  when  almost  the 
whole  Caribbean  was  in  hostilities,  had  become  a 
depot  for  the  accumulation  and  distribution  of 
stores,  commercial  and  warlike.  Ostensibly,  it 
served  all  parties,  giving  to  and  receiving  from 
Europe,  America,  and  the  Caribbean  alike.  The 
political  sympathies  of  Holland,  however,  and  it 
may  be  added  those  of  the  West  Indies  in  gen- 
eral, even  of  the  British  islands  themselves,  were 


2i 8  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

rather  adverse  to  Great  Britain  in  the  current 
struggle ;  and  this,  combined  with  the  greater 
self-sufficingness  of  the  British  naval  and  commer- 
cial administration,  had  made  the  neutral  support 
of  St.  Eustatius  more  benevolent,  and  much  more 
useful,  to  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain,  includ- 
ing the  revolted  colonists,  than  it  was  to  the 
mother  country.  Rodney  asserted  that  help 
from  there  was  readily  forth-coming  to  supply 
French  and  Spanish  requirements,  while  profes- 
sions of  inability  abounded  whenever  his  fleet 
made  a  demand  in  occasional  emergencies. 

He  was  therefore  full  of  gall  against  the  island 
and  its  merchants,  the  more  so  because  he  sus- 
pected that  British  subjects,  unpatriotically  ardent 
for  gain,  were  largely  concerned  in  maintaining 
conditions  thus  hurtful  to  their  country ;  and, 
when  the  orders  to  act  came,  it  needed  but  three 
days  for  himself  and  General  Vaughan  to  sail 
on  an  errand  of  which  they  probably  had  previ- 
ous intimations.  On  the  3d  of  February  they 
arrived  off  St.  Eustatius,  which  in  the  face  of 
their  imposing  force  submitted  at  once.  They 
took  possession  of  the  island,  with  goods  stored 
to  the  estimated  value  of  ,£3,000,000, —  an  im- 
mense spoil  in  those  days.  A  Dutch  ship-of-war, 
with  a  hundred  and  fifty  sail  of  traders  of  various 
nationalities,  were  also  seized ;  while  a  convoy  of 
thirty  merchant  ships,  which  had  sailed  thirty-six 
hours  before,  was  pursued  and  captured  by  a 
British  detachment,  —  the  Dutch  admiral  com- 


Rodney  219 

manding  the  ships-of-war  being  killed  in  the  at- 
tendant action. 

From  one  point  of  view  this  was  an  enormous 
success,  though  unproductive  of  glory.  It  de- 
stroyed at  a  blow  a  centre  of  commerce  and  sup- 
ply powerfully  contributive  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  enemies  of  Great  Britain ;  both  to  their 
hostile  operations,  and  to  the  indirect  but  no  less 
vital  financial  support  that  trade  gives  to  national 
endurance,  —  to  the  sinews  of  war.  Besides  this, 
however,  there  was  the  unprecedented  immediate 
booty,  transferable  as  so  much  asset  to  the 
conquerors.  It  was  upon  this  present  tangible 
result  that  Rodney's  imagination  fastened,  with 
an  engrossment  and  tenacity  that  constitute  a 
revelation  of  character.  It  perverted  his  under- 
standing of  conditions,  and  paralyzed  his  proper 
action  as  commander-in-chief.  It  is  needless  in 
this  connection  to  consider  whether  it  was  the 
matter  of  personal  profit,  through  legitimate  prize- 
money,  that  thus  influenced  him,  —  an  effect  to 
some  extent  pardonable  in  a  man  who  had  long 
suffered,  and  still  was  suffering,  from  pecuniary 
straitness,  —  or  whether,  as  he  loudly  protested, 
it  was  the  interest  to  the  nation  that  made  his 
personal  superintendence  of  the  proceeds  impera- 
tive. In  either  case  the  point  to  be  noted  is  not 
a  palpable  trait  of  covetousness,  —  if  such  it  were, 
—  but  the  limitation  to  activity  occasioned  by 
preoccupation  with  a  realized,  but  imperfect,  suc- 
cess. The  comparatively  crude  impression  of 


220  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

greediness,  produced  by  apparent  absorption  in  a 
mere  money  gain,  has  prevented  the  perception 
of  this  more  important  and  decisive  element  in 
Rodney's  official  character,  revealed  at  St.  Eusta- 
tius  and  confirmed  on  the  evening  of  the  I2th  of 
April.  What  he  had  won,  he  had  won ;  what 
more  he  might  and  should  do,  he  would  not  see, 
nor  would  he  risk. 

His  discontent  with  his  junior  flag-officers  in 
the  West  Indies,  and  the  peculiar  demoralization 
of  professional  tone  at  the  moment,  had  made  it 
difficult  for  the  Admiralty  to  provide  him  a  sat- 
isfactory second  in  command.  In  order  to  do 
this,  they  had  "  to  make  a  promotion,"  as  the 
phrase  went ;  that  is,  in  order  to  get  the  man 
wanted,  the  seniors  on  the  captains'  list  were  pro- 
moted down  to  and  including  him.  The  choice 
had  fallen  on  Sir  Samuel  Hood,  —  in  later  days 
Nelson's  honored  Lord  Hood,  —  than  which  none 
could  have  been  happier  in  respect  of  capacity. 
It  has  been  truly  said  that  he  was  as  able  as 
Rodney,  and  more  energetic  ;  but  even  this  falls 
short  of  his  merit.  He  had  an  element  of  pro- 
fessional—  as  distinguished  from  personal  —  dar- 
ing, and  an  imaginative  faculty  that  penetrated 
the  extreme  possibilities  of  a  situation,  quickened 
by  the  resolve,  in  which  Rodney  was  deficient,  to 
have  all  or  nothing ;  and  these  invaluable  traits 
were  balanced  by  the  sound  and  accurate  judg- 
ment of  a  thorough  seaman,  without  which  imag- 
ination lures  to  disaster.  The  man  who  as  a 


Rodney  221 

junior  formed  the  idea  of  seizing  De  Grasse's 
anchorage  in  the  Chesapeake  in  1781,  to  effect 
the  relief  of  Cornwallis,  and  who  in  1782,  when 
momentarily  in  chief  command,  illustrated  the 
idea  by  actual  performance  under  similar  condi- 
tions in  the  West  Indies,  rose  to  heights  of  con- 
ception and  of  achievement  for  which  we  have  no 
equivalent  in  Rodney's  career.  Unfortunately  for 
him,  though  thus  mighty  in  act,  opportunity  for 
great  results  never  came  to  him.  The  hour  never 
met  the  man. 

Hood  with  eight  ships-of-the-line  and  a  large 
convoy  arrived  on  the  station  in  January,  1781, 
and  was  at  St.  Eustatius  with  the  commander-in- 
chief  when  Rodney  received  a  report,  which 
proved  to  be  false,  that  eight  to  ten  French  ships- 
of-the-line,  with  a  numerous  supply-fleet,  had  been 
sighted  in  European  waters  evidently  bound  for 
the  West  Indies.  He  thereupon  detached  Hood, 
on  February  i2th,  and  directed  him  with  seven- 
teen of-the-line  to  await  the  enemy  to  windward 
of  Martinique,  their  probable  destination.  A 
month  later  he  ordered  the  position  to  be  shifted 
to  leeward  of  the  island,  in  front  of  the  French 
arsenal  port,  Fort  Royal.  Hood  dissented  from 
this,  remonstrating  vigorously,  and  the  event 
proved  him  right ;  but  Rodney  insisted,  the  more 
injudiciously  in  that  he  was  throwing  the  tactical 
burden  upon  his  junior  while  fettering  thus  his 
tactical  discretion.  Meantime,  twenty  French 
ships-of-the-line  did  sail  on  March  22d  for  Mar- 


222  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

tinique,  under  Count  De  Grasse  :  beginning  then 
the  campaign  which  ended  in  the  great  disaster  of 
April  12,  1782,  but  not  until  it  had  been  signal- 
ized by  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis,  due  to  this 
fleet,  as  Washington  said.  On  the  28th  of  April 
it  came  in  sight  of  Hood ;  but,  owing  to  the  lee- 
wardly  position  insisted  upon  by  Rodney,  the 
English  commander  could  not  prevent  the  junc- 
tion to  it  of  four  French  ships  then  in  the  port. 
A  battle  followed  next  day,  of  eighteen  British  — 
one  having  just  joined  —  against  twenty-four 
enemies;  odds  which,  combined  with  the  weather 
gage  held  by  the  French,  should  have  insured 
them  a  decisive  victory.  This  result  was  pre- 
vented by  the  tentative  action  of  De  Grasse, 
encountering  the  tactical  capacity  and  impertur- 
bable self-possession  of  Hood. 

Rodney  could  not  have  bettered  Hood's  man- 
agement, though  he  of  course  attributed  to  him 
the  blame  for  results.  It  is  evident,  however, 
that  for  various  reasons  the  commander-in-chief 
should  have  been  with  the  body  of  his  fleet. 
Even  barring  certain  and  timely  information  of 
the  French  coming,  which  Hood  at  least  did  not 
have,  there  was  every  reasonable  probability  that 
such  an  expedition  would  arrive  at  about  the  sea- 
son it  did.  Hood's  insight,  which  was  adequate 
to  divining  possibilities  as  well  as  to  dealing  with 
ascertained  conditions,  had  taught  him  that  the 
latter  half  of  April  —  and  not  sooner  —  was  the 
time  by  which  the  British  should  be  refitted, 


Rodney  223 

provisioned  and  watered  full,  and  in  all  respects 
ready  for  prolonged  operations  against  a  powerful 
enemy ;  as  well  as  concentrated  to  windward.  He 
reasoned  thus  from  the  fact  that  the  French  navy, 
to  the  number  of  forty  odd,  —  being  the  combined 
fleets  of  D'Estaing  from  Brest  and  De  Guichen 
from  the  West  Indies, — had  been  assembled  in 
Cadiz  towards  the  end  of  1 780,  and  did  not  return 
to  Brest  until  January,  1781.  To  refit,  sail,  and 
reach  Martinique  again,  would  in  his  judgment 
postpone  arrival  to  the  middle  of  April,  and  this 
respite  should  be  improved  by  getting  the  British 
ships  into  the  best  campaigning  condition,  so  as 
not  to  be  hampered  in  subsequent  movements 
by  necessities  of  repair  and  supply.  With  this 
persuasion  he  became  eager,  by  the  first  of  the 
month,  for  the  admiral's  presence;  the  more  so 
because  confident  that,  if  he  were  on  the  spot,  he 
would  see  the  necessity  of  changing  position  from 
leeward  to  windward.  "  I  begin  to  be  extremely 
impatient  for  the  honour  of  being  and  acting 
immediately  under  your  flag,  as  I  do  not  find 
myself  pleasant  in  being  to  leeward;  for  should  an 
enemy's  fleet  attempt  to  get  into  Martinique,  and 
the  commander  of  it  inclines  to  avoid  battle, 
nothing  but  a  skirmish  will  probably  happen, 
which  in  its  consequences  may  operate  as  a  defeat 
to  the  British  squadron,  though  not  a  ship  is  lost 
and  the  enemy  suffer  most." 

This  is  a  clear  case  in  which  events  that  actu- 
ally befell   were  foreseen ;    not   by  supernatural 


224  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

illumination,  but  by  the  clear  light  of  unbiassed 
reason  acting  upon  evident  considerations. 
There  was  but  a  skirmish,  the  British  did  suffer 
badly,  and  the  consequences  were  equivalent  to 
defeat ;  for,  had  the  whole  British  force  of  the 
line  been  present  to  windward,  it  would  have 
prevented  the  junction  of  the  French,  and  there- 
fore have  been  so  nearly  equal  to  the  main  body 
as  to  have  assured  an  action  inflicting  very 
serious  injury,  incapacitating  the  enemy  for  the 
attacks  upon  Santa  Lucia  and  Tobago,  before 
which  the  latter  fell,  and  not  improbably  deter- 
ring De  Grasse  from  the  expedition  to  the  Chesa- 
peake which  forced  the  capitulation  of  Cornwallis. 
Such  deductions  are  of  course  dependent  upon 
the  contingencies  inseparable  from  warfare. 
They  are  not  certainties,  indeed;  but  they  are 
inferences  of  very  great  probability.  So  much 
hinged  upon  the  presence  of  an  officer  with  the 
full  discretion  denied  to  Hood ;  of  the  officer 
primarily  responsible  for  the  fleet,  which  was 
intrusted  to  him  and  not  to  another. 

Probable  also  is  Hood's  solution  of  Rodney's 
persistence  in  remaining  at  St.  Eustatius,  and 
keeping  the  squadron  under  the  command  of  his 
second  to  leeward  of  Martinique.  He  was  pos- 
sessed with  the  fancied  paramount  necessity  of 
protecting  St.  Eustatius  against  a  sudden  attack 
by  the  enemy,  which  he  imagined  might  be  sup- 
ported by  the  small  division  in  Fort  Royal ;  and 
the  value  of  the  booty  shut  his  eyes  to  every  other 


Rodney  225 

consideration.  As  on  the  evening  of  the  i2th 
of  April,  the  great  day  of  glory  in  his  career,  the 
captures  already  made  assumed  sufficiency  in 
his  eyes,  and  co-operating  with  surmisings  as  to 
what  the  beaten  and  scattered  French  might  do 
deterred  him  from  further  action ;  so  now  the 
prize  already  secured  at  St.  Eustatius  combined 
with  the  imaginative  "  picture  he  made  for  him- 
self"—  to  use  Napoleon's  phrase  —  of  its  pos- 
sible dangers,  to  blind  him  to  the  really  decisive 
needs  of  the  situation.  It  is  clear,  however,  that 
local  naval  provision  for  the  safety  of  a  petty 
island  was  in  point  of  difficulty,  as  of  conse- 
quence, a  secondary  matter,  within  the  compe- 
tence of  many  of  his  captains ;  and  that  the 
primary  factor,  on  which  all  depended,  was  the 
control  of  the  sea,  by  the  British  fleet  predomi- 
nating over  the  enemy's.  Consequently  the 
commander-in-chief  should  have  been  where  his 
second  was,  at  the  centre  of  decisive  action, 
where  an  enemy's  fleet  was  to  be  expected. 

This  was  the  more  incumbent  because  Rodney 
himself,  writing  to  Admiral  Parker  in  Jamaica  on 
April  1 6th,  said,  "As  the  enemy  hourly  expect 
a  great  fleet  in  these  seas,  I  have  scarcely  a 
sufficient  number  of  line-of-battle-ships  to  block- 
ade the  island  of  Martinique,  or  to  engage  the 
enemy's  fleet  should  they  appear,  if  their  number 
should  be  so  large  as  reported,"  —  twenty-four. 
This  report  came  from  French  sources,  and  it 
will  be  noted,  from  the  date  of  his  letter,  was  in 

15 


226  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

his  possession  twelve  days  before  the  enemy 
arrived.  It  was  both  specific  and  antecedently 
probable,  and  should  have  determined  the  ad- 
miral's action.  Whether  he  had  similar  news 
from  home  does  not  appear.  Sandwich  writing 
him  on  March  2ist,  the  day  before  the  French 
left  Brest,  professed  ignorance  of  their  destination, 
but  added,  "  the  most  prevailing  and  most  probable 
opinion  is  that  they  are  to  go  to  the  West  India 
Islands,  and  afterwards  to  North  America." 
Their  number  he  estimated  at  twenty-five,  which 
tallied  with  Rodney's  intelligence  of  twenty-four. 
The  latter  was  exact,  save  that  four  were  armed 
en  flute;  that  is,  as  transports,  with  their  guns 
below,  to  be  subsequently  mounted.  Despite 
everything,  the  admiral  remained  at  St.  Eustatius 
until  May  4th,  when  the  arrival  of  a  crippled  ship 
from  Hood  brought  him  the  news  of  the  skirmish. 
He  was  attending,  doubtless,  to  details  pertaining 
to  his  command,  but  he  was  chiefly  occupied  with 
the  disposition  of  the  property  seized  on  the 
island ;  a  matter  which  he  afterwards  found  to 
his  cost  would  have  been  much  better  committed 
to  administrators  skilled  in  the  law.  "  Had  they 
abided  by  the  first  plan  settled  before  I  left  them," 
wrote  Hood,  "  and  not  have  interfered,  but  have 
left  the  management  to  the  land  and  sea  folk 
appointed  for  that  purpose,  all  would  have  gone 
smooth  and  easy." 

However  this  might  have  proved,  the  immedi- 
ate supervision  of  the  island  and  its  spoils  was  no 


Rodney  227 

business  for  a  commander-in-chief  in  active  war 
time;  particularly  when  it  entailed  leaving  the 
charge  of  his  main  fleet,  at  a  critical  moment,  to 
a  junior  admiral  of  very  recent  appointment,  and 
still  unproved.  It  was  not  the  separate  import- 
ance of  the  position  intrusted  to  Hood  that  made 
it  peculiarly  the  station  for  the  commander-in- 
chief.  It  might  have  been  intrinsically  as  im- 
portant, yet  relatively  secondary ;  but  actually  it 
was  the  centre  and  key  upon  which,  and  upon 
which  alone,  the  campaign  could  turn  and  did 
turn.  Neither  was  the  question  one  of  the  rela- 
tive merits,  as  yet  unknown,  of  Rodney  and 
Hood.  A  commander-in-chief  cannot  devolve 
his  own  proper  functions  upon  a  subordinate, 
however  able,  without  graver  cause  than  can  be 
shown  in  this  instance.  The  infatuation  which 
detained  Rodney  at  a  side  issue  can  only  be  ex- 
cused—  not  justified  —  by  a  temporary  inability 
to  see  things  in  their  true  proportion,  induced  on 
more  than  one  occasion  by  a  temperamental 
defect,  —  the  lack  of  the  single  eye  to  military 
considerations,  —  which  could  find  contentment 
in  partial  success,  and  be  indifferent  to  further 
results  to  be  secured  by  sustained  action. 

There  is  a  saying,  apt  to  prove  true,  that  war 
does  not  forgive.  For  his  initial  error  Rodney 
himself,  and  the  British  campaign  in  general, 
paid  heavily  throughout  the  year  1781.  The 
French  fleet  in  undiminished  vigor  lay  a  dead 
weight  upon  all  his  subsequent  action,  which, 


228  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

like  the  dispositions  prior  to  its  arrival,  under- 
went the  continued  censure  of  Hood ;  acrid,  yet 
not  undiscriminating  nor  misplaced.  As  already 
observed,  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis  can  with 
probability  be  ascribed  to  this  loss  of  an  oppor- 
tunity afforded  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  outset, 
when  the  enemy  was  as  yet  divided,  embarrassed 
with  convoy,  raw  in  organization  and  drill,  in  all 
which  it  could  not  but  improve  as  the  months 
passed.  The  results  began  at  once  to  be  ap- 
parent, and  embarrassments  accumulated  with 
time.  Hood's  ships,  though  no  one  was  wholly 
disabled,  had  suffered  very  considerably;  and, 
while  indispensable  repairs  could  temporarily  be 
made,  efficiency  was  affected.  They  needed,  be- 
sides, immediate  water  and  supplies,  as  Rodney 
himself  stated  —  a  want  which  Hood  would  have 
anticipated.  To  increase  difficulty,  the  French 
mounted  the  batteries  of  the  vessels  en  flute,  and 
so  raised  their  total  nominal  force  to  twenty-eight. 
Hood  was  unable  to  regain  Santa  Lucia,  because 
his  crippled  ships  could  not  beat  against  the 
current.  He  therefore  left  it  to  itself,  and  bore 
away  to  the  northward,  where  he  joined  Rodney 
on  May  nth,  between  St.  Kitts  and  Antigua. 
The  campaign  of  1781,  destined  to  be  wholly  de- 
fensive for  the  British,  opened  under  these  odds, 
the  responsibility  for  which  lies  in  considerable 
measure  on  Rodney. 

After   the   junction,  the  British  fleet  went  to 
Barbados,   where    it   arrived   May    i8th.     Mean- 


Rodney  229 

time,  the  French  had  proceeded  in  force  against 
Santa    Lucia,   landing   a   considerable    body    of 
troops,  and  investing  the  island  with  twenty-five 
sail-of-the-line,  two  of  which   with    1300  soldiers 
went  on  to  attempt   the   British   Tobago.     The 
attack  on  Santa  Lucia  failed,  and  the  French  re- 
turned to   Martinique ;  but  learning   there    that 
Rodney  was  at  sea,  heading  southward,  De  Grasse 
became   alarmed  for  his  detachment  at  Tobago, 
and  moved   to  its  support  with  his  entire  fleet. 
Rodney,  knowing  of  the  detachment  only,  sent 
against  it  six  ships  under  Rear  Admiral  Drake ; 
a  half-measure  severely  censured  by  Hood,  whose 
comments  throughout  indicate  either  a  much  su- 
perior natural  sagacity,  or  else  the  clearer  insight 
of  a  man  whose  eye  dwells  steadfastly  on  the  mili- 
tary situation,   untroubled  by  conflicting  claims. 
"  What  a  wonderful  happy  turn  would  have  been 
given  to  the  King's  affairs  in  this  country  had  Sir 
George    Rodney  gone  with  his  whole   force   to 
Tobago  as  soon  as  he  might,  and  in  my  humble 
opinion  ought  to  have  done.     Nay,  had  he  even 
gone  when  Mr.  Drake  did,  the  island  would  have 
been  saved.     I  laboured  much  to  effect  it,  but  all 
in  vain,  and  fully  stated  my  reasons  in  writing  as 
soon  as  the  intelligence  came.     Every  ship  there 
with  all  the  troops  must  have  fallen  into  our  hands 
two  days  before   De   Grasse  got   there  with  his 
twenty-one  sail ;  "  to  which  Rodney,  in  full  strength, 
would    again  have  opposed    twenty.     "  Now  the 
enemy  may  do  as  they  will ; "  for  they  were  united 


230  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

in  Martinique,  twenty-eight  to  twenty.  In  short, 
Rodney  saw  at  Tobago  only  the  one  French 
detachment ;  Hood  saw  therein  the  definition  of 
the  enemy's  purpose,  the  necessity  laid  on  them 
to  fly  to  the  aid  of  their  exposed  division,  and  the 
chance  to  anticipate  them,  —  to  gain  an  advan- 
tage first,  and  to  beat  them  afterwards. 

Rodney's  tentative  and  inadequate  action  was 
not  improbably  induced  partly  by  the  "extreme 
want  of  water,"  which  he  reported  in  his  de- 
spatches; and  this  again  was  due  to  failure  to 
prepare  adequately  during  the  period  of  respite 
foreseen  by  Hood,  but  unnoted  by  his  own  pre- 
occupied mind.  The  result  is  instructive.  Drake 
fell  in  with  the  main  body  of  the  French,  and  of 
course  had  to  retire,  —  fortunate  in  regaining 
his  commander-in-chief  unmolested.  De  Grasse's 
movement  had  become  known  in  Barbados,  and 
as  soon  as  Drake  appeared  Rodney  sailed  with 
the  fleet,  but  upon  arriving  off  Tobago,  on  June 
5th,  learned  that  it  had  surrendered  on  the  2d.  Its 
fall  he  duly  attributed  to  local  neglect  and  cow- 
ardice ;  but  evidently  the  presence  of  the  British 
fleet  might  have  had  some  effect.  He  then  re- 
turned to  Barbados,  and  during  the  passage  the 
hostile  fleets  sighted  each  other  on  the  Qth,  - 
twenty  British  to  twenty-three  French ;  but  Rod- 
ney was  unwilling  to  engage  lest  he  might  be 
entangled  with  the  foul  ground  about  Grenada. 
As  that  island  was  then  in  the  enemy's  hands,  he 
could  get  no  anchorage  there,  and  so  might  be 


Rodney  23 1 

driven  to  leeward  of  his  opponent,  exposing  Bar- 
bados. It  is  perhaps  needless  to  point  out  that 
had  he  been  to  windward  of  Martinique  when  De 
Grasse  first  arrived,  as  Hood  wished,  he  would 
have  been  twenty  to  twenty,  with  clear  ground, 
and  the  antagonist  embarrassed  with  convoy. 
His  present  perplexities,  in  .their  successive 
phases,  can  be  seen  throughout  to  be  the  result 
of  sticking  to  St.  Eustatius,  not  only  physically, 
but  mentally. 

And  so  it  was  with  what  followed.  On  reach- 
ing Barbados  again,  he  had  to  report  that  the 
French  were  back  in  Martinique,  and  now  twenty- 
eight  through  the  arming  of  the  ships  en  flute. 
Despite  their  superiority,  "  they  do  not  venture 
to  move,"  he  said  somewhat  sneeringly,  and  doubt- 
less his  "  fleet  in  being  "  had  an  effect  on  them ; 
but  they  were  also  intent  on  a  really  great 
operation.  On  July  5th,  De  Grasse  sailed  for 
Cap  Fran9ois  in  Hayti,  there  to  organize  a  visit 
to  the  continent  in  support  of  Washington's 
operations.  Rodney,  pursuant  to  his  sagacious 
plan  of  the  previous  years,  sent  also  a  detach- 
ment of  fourteen  ships  under  Hood,  which  he 
endeavored,  but  unsuccessfully,  to  have  increased 
by  some  from  Jamaica.  That  De  Grasse  would 
take  his  whole  fleet  to  North  America,  leaving 
none  in  the  West  Indies,  nor  sending  any  to 
Europe,  was  a  step  that  neither  Rodney  nor 
Hood  foresaw.  The  miscalculation  cannot  be 
imputed  to  either  as  an  error  at  this  time.  It 


23  2  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

was  simply  one  of  the  deceptions  to  which  the 
defensive  is  ever  liable ;  but  it  is  fairly  chargeable 
to  the  original  fault  whereby  the  French  admiral 
was  enabled  to  enter  Fort  Royal  uninjured  in 
the  previous  April.  From  the  time  his  fleet 
was  concentrated,  the  British  had  to  accept  the 
defensive  with  its  embarrassments. 

Rodney  had  contemplated  going  in  person  with 
his  ships,  which  Sandwich  also  had  urged  upon 
him ;  but  his  health  was  seriously  impaired,  and 
the  necessity  for  a  surgical  operation  combined 
to  induce  his  return  to  England.  The  final  deci- 
sion on  this  point  he  postponed  to  the  last  mo- 
ment of  the  homeward  voyage,  keeping  a  frigate 
in  company  in  which  to  go  to  New  York,  if 
able ;  but  ultimately  he  felt  compelled  to  give 
up.  This  conclusion  settled  Cornwallis's  fate, 
antecedently  but  finally.  That  year  Great  Britain 
fell  between  two  stools.  In  view  of  De  Grasse's 
known  expressions,  it  may  be  affirmed  with  great 
confidence  that  he  would  have  seen  reason  to 
abandon  the  Chesapeake,  leaving  open  the  sea- 
road  for  Cornwallis  to  escape,  had  either  Rodney 
or  Hood  commanded  the  British  fleet  there  in 
the  battle  of  September  5th ;  but  Rodney  was 
away,  and  Hood  second  only  to  an  incompetent 
superior. 

Rodney  landed  in  England,  September  iQth, 
and  was  again  afloat  by  December  i2th,  although 
he  did  not  finally  sail  for  his  station  until  the 
middle  of  January,  1782.  This  brief  period  was 


Rodney  233 

one  of  the  deepest  military  depression  ;  for  during 
it  occurred  Cornwallis's  surrender,  October  iQth, 
under  conditions  of  evident  British  inferiority, 
on  sea  and  shore  alike,  which  enforced  the  con- 
viction that  the  colonies  must  be  granted  their 
independence.  Not  only  so,  but  the  known 
extensive  preparations  of  the  Bourbon  courts 
pointed  to  grave  danger  also  for  the  Caribbean 
colonies,  the  sugar  and  import  trade  of  which 
counted  largely  in  the  financial  resources  of  the 
empire.  Amid  the  general  gloom  Rodney  had 
his  own  special  vexation ;  for,  before  he  left,  news 
was  received  of  the  recapture  of  St.  Eustatius 
by  a  small  French  expedition,  prior  to  the  re- 
turn of  Hood  to  the  West  Indies  from  the  un- 
fortunate operations  on  the  continent.  As  in 
the  case  of  Tobago,  Rodney  severely  blamed  the 
local  defence,  and  very  possibly  justly  ;  but  atten- 
tion should  not  wander  from  the  effect  that  must 
have  been  produced  upon  all  subsequent  con- 
ditions by  preparation  and  action  on  the  part  of 
the  British  fleet,  in  the  spring  of  1781,  on  the 
lines  then  favored  by  Hood. 

Shortly  before  he  had  sailed  for  home,  Rod- 
ney had  written  his  wife,  "  In  all  probability,  the 
enemy,  when  they  leave  these  seas,  will  go  to 
America.  Wherever  they  go,  I  will  watch  their 
motions,  and  certainly  attack  them  if  they  give 
me  a  proper  opportunity.  The  fate  of  England 
may  depend  upon  the  event."  The  last  sentence 
was  in  measure  a  prophecy,  so  far,  that  is,  as 


234  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

decisive  of  the  original  issue  at  stake,  —  the  sub- 
jugation or  independence  of  the  United  Col- 
onies ;  but,  without  further  laboring  the  point 
unduly,  it  may  be  permitted  here  to  sum  up 
what  has  been  said,  with  the  remark  that  in  the 
summer  of  1781  control  of  events  had  passed  out 
of  Rodney's  hands.  From  the  time  of  the  original 
fault,  in  suffering  the  French  to  meet  Hood  to 
leeward  of  Martinique,  with  an  inferior  force, 
more  and  more  did  it  become  impossible  to  him 
to  assure  conditions  sufficiently  favorable.  With 
the  highest  personal  courage,  he  did  not  have 
eminent  professional  daring ;  nor,  with  consider- 
able tactical  acquirement,  was  he  gifted  with 
that  illuminative  originality  which  characterized 
Hood  and  Nelson.  He  therefore  needed  either 
a  reasonable  probability  of  success,  or  the  spur 
of  imminent  emergency,  to  elicit  the  kind  of 
action  needed  to  save  the  British  cause.  The 
chances  to  windward  of  Martinique  would  have 
been  ninety  out  of  a  hundred ;  from  that  time 
forward  they  diminished  with  continually  increas- 
ing rapidity.  With  such  a  situation  he  was  not 
the  man  to  cope. 

On  reaching  Barbados,  February  19,  1782, 
Rodney  learned  that  the  garrison  of  St.  Kitts 
was  besieged  in  Brimstone  Hill,  and  the  island 
itself  beleaguered  by  the  French  fleet,  thirty- 
three  of-the-line,  which  Sir  Samuel  Hood,  with 
two  thirds  their  number,  had  so  far  held  in  check 
by  a  series  of  manoeuvres  unusually  acute  in  con- 


Rodney  235 

ception  and  brilliant  in  execution.  Proceeding 
immediately  to  Antigua,  he  there  heard  on  the 
23d  that  St.  Kitts  had  capitulated  on  the  i3th. 
Two  days  later  he  was  joined  by  Hood,  and  then 
took  the  united  fleet  to  Santa  Lucia,  where  he 
was  on  March  5th.  The  knowledge  of  a  large 
supply  fleet  expected  for  the  French,  and  essen- 
tial to  the  known  project  of  the  allies  against 
Jamaica,  carried  the  British  fleet  again  to  sea ; 
but  it  failed  to  intercept  the  convoy,  and  returned 
once  more  to  Santa  Lucia,  where  it  anchored  in 
Gros  Ilet  Bay,  thirty  miles  from  Fort  Royal, 
where  the  French  were  lying.  Various  changes 
made  the  respective  numbers,  when  operations 
opened,  British  thirty-six  of-the-line,  French 
thirty-five,  with  two  fifty-gun  ships  ;  a  near  ap- 
proach to  equality. 

Rodney's  faculties  were  now  all  alert.  He  had 
had  some  needed  repose,  and  he  was  again  under 
the  stimulus  of  reputation  to  restore;  for  it  would 
have  been  vain  to  assert,  even  to  himself,  that  he 
was  entirely  clear,  not  merely  of  error,  to  which 
the  most  careful  is  liable,  but  of  serious  fault  in 
the  previous  year.  Moreover,  he  had  been 
sharply  assailed  in  Parliament  for  the  transac- 
tions at  St.  Eustatius  on  the  civil  side,  distinct 
from  his  military  conduct.  To  such  ills  there  is 
no  plaster  so  healing  as  a  victory ;  and  the  occa- 
sion about  to  arise  proved,  in  its  successive  stages, 
—  until  the  last,  —  admirably  adapted  to  his 
natural  and  acquired  qualifications.  First,  a 


236  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

series  of  manoeuvres  protracted  over  three  or  four 
days ;  and  afterwards  a  hard  fought  battle,  con- 
verted by  a  happy  yet  by  no  means  unusual  acci- 
dent into  a  decided  and  showy  success.  Decided, 
but  not  decisive ;  for,  like  the  soldier  desperate 
in  deed  before  rewarded,  but  who,  when  sum- 
moned again,  advised  that  the  chance  be  given  to 
a  man  who  had  not  a  purse  of  gold,  Rodney  pre- 
ferred to  pause  on  that  personally  safe  side  of 
moderation  in  achievement  which  is  rarely  con- 
ducive to  finality,  and  is  nowhere  so  ill-placed  as 
in  the  aims  of  a  commander-in-chief.  The  true 
prudence  of  war,  —  as  it  is  also  its  mercy,  to 
friend  and  to  foe,  —  is  to  strike  without  cessation 
or  slackness  till  power  of  future  action  is  crushed. 

De  Grasse's  immediate  task  was  to  protect  a 
large  convoy  from  Martinique  to  Cap  Frangois 
(now  Cap  Haytien),  in  Hayti,  a  distance  of  about 
a  thousand  miles.  Cumbered  with  merchant 
vessels,  and  aware  that  Rodney  would  be  at  once 
on  his  track,  he  could  not  go  straight  across  the 
Caribbean;  the  British  fleet,  not  so  hampered, 
would  be  sure  to  overtake  and  destroy.  He 
purposed,  therefore,  to  skirt  the  Antilles,  keep- 
ing continually  in  reach  of  a  port  of  refuge. 
Rodney,  knowing  the  aim  to  be  Jamaica,  had 
little  doubt  of  overtaking  in  any  case,  if  started 
promptly.  He  therefore  kept  himself  in  signal 
touch  of  Fort  Royal  by  a  chain  of  frigates,  ex- 
tending from  its  offing  to  his  own  anchorage. 

On  the  8th  of  April  the  French  sailed.     The 


Rodney  237 

British  followed  instantly,  and  before  sundown 
had  them  in  sight,  not  only  by  lookout  vessels, 
but  from  the  mastheads  of  the  main  fleet.  At 
daybreak  next  morning  they  were  visible  from 
the  decks  of  the  British  van;  a  very  marked  gain. 
De  Grasse  saw  that  at  that  rate,  unless  he  got  rid 
of  the  convoy,  he  would  certainly  be  overtaken, 
which  it  was  his  aim  to  elude  in  pursuance  of  the 
usual  French  policy  of  ulterior  purposes;  so, 
being  then  north  of  Dominica,  he  sent  the  mer- 
chant vessels  into  Guadaloupe,  and  undertook 
to  carry  the  ships-of-war  through  the  passage 
between  the  two  islands,  beating  to  windward. 
This  would  draw  the  British  away  from  the  con- 
voy, unless  they  were  content  to  let  the  fleet  go, 
which  was  not  to  be  expected. 

Between  8  A.  M.  and  2  p.  M.  of  April  Qth,  sev- 
eral sharp  skirmishes  took  place  between  the 
French  and  the  British  van,  under  Hood.1  De 
Grasse  had  here  an  opportunity  of  crushing  a 
fraction  of  the  enemy,  but  failed  to  use  it,  thus 
insuring  his  own  final  discomfiture.  Rodney, 
who  was  becalmed  with  the  centre  and  rear  of 
his  command,  could  do  nothing  but  push  forward 
reinforcements  to  Hood  as  the  wind  served ;  and 
this  he  did.  Pursuit  was  maintained  tenaciously 
during  the  following  night  and  the  next  two  days, 

1  The  writer  does  not  purpose  to  give  an  account  of  these  actions, 
except  so  far  as  Rodney  himself  is  concerned.  They  can  be  found  in 
Mahan's  "  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History,"  pp.  480-495,  or  in  the 
"  History  of  the  Royal  Navy,"  (Sampson  Low,  Marston  &  Co.),  edited 
by  Mr.  W.  Laird  Clowes,  vol.  iii.  pp.  520-535. 


238  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

— April  loth  and  i  ith  ;  but  in  sustained  chases  of 
bodies  of  ships,  the  chased  continually  drops  units, 
which  must  be  forsaken  or  else  the  retreat  of  the 
whole  must  be  retarded.  So  in  this  case,  certain 
of  De  Grasse's  ships  were  either  so  leewardly  or 
so  ill  handled  that  the  bulk  of  the  fleet,  which 
had  gained  considerably  to  windward,  had  to  bear 
down  to  them,  thus  losing  the  ground  won. 
Under  such  circumstances  the  chapter  of  acci- 
dents—  or  of  incidents  —  frequently  introduces 
great  results ;  and  so  it  proved  here. 

At  2  A.M.  of  April  1 2th,  De  Grasse's  flag-ship, 
the  Ville  de  Paris,  and  the  seventy-four-gun  ship 
Z'ele,  crossing  on  opposite  tacks,  came  into  collision. 
The  former  received  little  damage,  but  the  Z'ele 
lost  her  foremast  and  bowsprit.  De  Grasse  then 
ordered  her  into  Guadaloupe,  in  tow  of  a  frigate. 
When  day  broke,  about  five  o'clock,  these  two  were 
only  about  six  miles  from  the  British  rear,  under 
Hood,  whose  division  had  been  shifted  from  the 
van  in  consequence  of  injuries  received  on  the 
9th.  The  British  column  was  then  standing 
east-northeast,  closehauled  on  the  starboard  tack, 
the  crippled  vessel  under  its  lee,  but  the  French 
of  the  main  body  well  to  windward.  To  draw 
them  within  reach,  Rodney  signalled  Hood  to 
send  chasers  after  the  Z'el'e.  De  Grasse  took  the 
bait  and  ran  down  to  her  support,  ordering  his 
ships  to  form  line-of-battle  on  the  port  tack,  which 
was  done  hastily  and  tumultuously.  The  two 
lines  on  which  the  antagonists  were  respectively 


Rodney  239 

advancing  now  pointed  to  a  common  and  not 
distant  point  of  intersection,  which  the  French, 
despite  the  loss  of  ground  already  undergone, 
reached  first,  passing  in  front  and  to  windward  of 
the  head  of  the  British  column.  Eight  ships  thus 
went  by  clear,  but  the  ninth  arrived  at  the  same 
moment  with  the  leading  British  vessel,  which 
put  her  helm  up  and  ran  along  close  to  leeward 
of  the  French  line  towards  its  rear,  followed  in 
so  doing  by  the  rest  of  her  fleet. 

The  battle  thus  assumed  the  phase  of  two 
fleets  passing  each  other  in  opposite  directions, 
on  parallel  lines;  a  condition  usually  unproduc- 
tive of  results,  and  amounting  to  little  more  than 
a  brush,  as  had  been  the  case  in  two  rencounters 
between  Rodney  and  De  Guichen  in  the  pro- 
longed chase  of  May,  1780.  Chance  permitted  a 
different  issue  on  this  occasion.  The  wind  at 
the  moment  of  first  collision,  shortly  before  8 
A.  M.,  was  east,  and  so  continued  till  five  minutes 
past  nine,  when  it  shifted  suddenly  to  the  south- 
eastward, ahead  for  the  French,  abaft  for  the 
British.  The  former,  being  already  close  to  the 
wind,  could  keep  their  sails  full  only  by  bearing 
away,  which  broke  up  their  line  ahead,  the  order 
of  battle  as  ranged  for  mutual  support ;  while 
the  British  being  able  to  luff  could  stand  into  the 
enemy's  line.  Rodney's  flag-ship,  the  Formidable, 
90,  was  just  drawing  up  with  the  Glorieux,  74, 
nineteenth  from  the  van  in  the  French  order  and 
fourth  astern  of  the  Ville  de  Paris,  De  Grasse's 


240  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

flag-ship.  Luffing  to  the  new  wind,  she  passed 
through  the  French  line  at  this  point,  followed 
by  the  five  ships  astern  of  her ;  while  the  sixth 
astern,  the  Bedford,  74,  luffing  on  her  own  ac- 
count, broke  also  through  the  French  astern  of 
the  Cesar  and  the  Hector,  74'$,  eleventh  and 
twelfth  in  their  order.  The  twelve  British  vessels 
in  rear  of  the  Bedford  followed  in  her  wake. 
Hood  was  in  one  of  these,  the  Barfleur,  90.  Of 
the  ships  ahead  of  Rodney  the  nearest  one  imi- 
tated his  example  instantly  and  went  through 
the  line ;  the  remainder,  sixteen  in  all,  continued 
northward  for  a  space. 

These  sudden  and  unexpected  movements  over- 
powered the  Cesar,  Hector,  and  Glorieux  under  a 
weight  of  successive  broadsides  that  completely 
crushed  them,  separated  De  Grasse  with  six  com- 
panion vessels  from  his  van  and  his  rear,  and 
placed  the  British  main  body  to  windward  of  the 
French.  Both  sides  were  disordered,  but  the 
French  were  not  only  disordered  but  severed,  into 
three  formless  groups,  not  to  be  united  except  by 
a  good  breeze  and  exceeding  good  management, 
neither  of  which  was  forthcoming.  Even  to 
frame  a  plan  operative  under  such  conditions  re- 
quires in  an  admiral  accuracy  of  judgment  and 
readiness  rarely  bestowed ;  but  to  communicate 
his  designs  and  enforce  execution  upon  captains 
under  such  a  staggering  shock  of  disaster  is  even 
more  uncommon  of  accomplishment.  During  the 
remainder  of  the  day  light  airs  from  the  eastward 


Rodney  241 

prevailed,  interspersed  with  frequent  calms ;  con- 
ditions unfavorable  to  movement  of  any  kind,  but 
far  more  to  the  French,  deprived  of  concert  of 
purpose,  than  to  the  British,  whose  general  course 
was  sufficiently  defined  by  the  confusion  of  the 
enemy,  and  the  accident  of  a  small  group  sur- 
rounding their  commander-in-chief,  to  capture 
whom  was  always  a  recognized  principal  object. 
The  very  feebleness  of  the  breeze  favored  them 
by  comparison ;  for  they  had  but  to  go  before 
it  with  all  their  light  sails,  while  their  opponents, 
in  order  to  join,  were  constrained  to  lateral  move- 
ment, which  did  not  allow  the  same  canvas. 

There  was,  in  short,  during  the  rest  of  the  day 
an  unusual  opportunity  for  success,  on  such  a 
scale  as  should  be  not  only  brilliant,  but  really 
decisive  of  the  future  course  of  the  war ;  oppor- 
tunity to  inflict  a  maritime  blow  from  which  the 
enemy  could  not  recover.  Does  it  need  to  say 
clearly  that  here  the  choice  was  between  a  per- 
sonal triumph,  already  secured  for  the  successful 
admiral,  and  the  general  security  of  the  nation 
by  the  "  annihilation  "  —  the  word  is  Nelson's  — 
of  the  enemy  ?  That  Rodney  thus  phrased  the 
alternative  to  himself  is  indeed  most  unlikely; 
but  that  he  failed  to  act  efficiently,  to  rise  to 
an  emergency,  for  the  possible  occurrence  of 
which  he  had  had  ample  time  as  well  as  warning 
to  prepare,  is  but  too  certain.  Even  after  the 
British  had  got  to  windward  of  the  enemy  and 
seen  their  disorder,  although  the  signal  for  the 

16 


242  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

line  was  hauled  down,  none  was  made  for  a  gen- 
eral chase.  That  for  close  action,  hoisted  at  i 
P.M.,  was  discontinued  thirty  minutes  later,  when 
five  full  hours  of  daylight  remained.  Even  in 
example  the  admiral  was  slack,  by  Hood's  ac- 
count. "  He  pursued  only  under  topsails  (some- 
times his  foresail  set,  and  at  other  times  his  miz- 
zen  topsail  aback)  the  greatest  part  of  the  after- 
noon, though  the  flying  enemy  had  all  the  sail  set 
their  very  shattered  state  would  allow."  Hood, 
curbed  by  his  superior's  immediate  presence, 
did  what  he  could  by  putting  all  sail  on  the 
Barfleiir,  and  signalling  the  various  ships  of  his 
personal  command  to  do  the  same  ;  "  not  one  but 
chased  in  the  afternoon  with  studding  sails  below 
and  aloft."  It  was  bare  poetic  justice,  therefore, 
that  the  Ville  de  Paris,  the  great  prize  of  the 
day,  though  surrounded  by  numerous  foes,  struck 
formally  to  him. 

The  Hector,  Cesar,  and  Glorieux,  already  par- 
alyzed ere  the  chase  began,  were  the  only  results 
of  this  languid  movement,  except  the  French 
flag-ship  and  the  Ardent,  64.  The  latter  was 
taken  because,  notwithstanding  her  being  an  in- 
different sailer,  she  gallantly  tried  to  pass  from 
her  own  division,  the  van,  to  support  her  com- 
mander-in-chief  in  his  extremity.  It  was  6.29  p.  M. 
when  the  Ville  de  Paris  struck  ;  sixteen  minutes 
later,  6.45,  Rodney  made  signal  to  bring-to  for 
the  night  —  to  give  over  pursuit.  Only  the  Ville 
de  Paris  and  the  Ardent  can  be  considered  to 


Rodney  243 

have  been  secured  by  following,  after  the  battle 
proper  closed. 

Nor  was  any  other  attempt  made  to  profit  by 
the  victory.  On  the  i3th  the  fleet  began  to 
move  very  slowly  towards  Jamaica,  the  local  pro- 
tection of  which  had  become  imperative  through 
the  failure  to  annihilate  the  enemy,  who  must 
now  go  to  leeward  —  to  Hayti ;  but  after  four 
hours  Rodney  brought-to  again,  and  on  the  i6th, 
according  to  Hood,  was  in  "  the  exact  same  spot 
off  Guadaloupe.  It  has  indeed  been  calm  some 
part  of  the  time,  but  we  might  have  been  more 
than  twenty  leagues  farther  to  the  westward." 
The  Cesar  having  been  accidentally  burned  on  the 
night  of  the  battle,  the  prizes  ffecforand  Glorieux 
were  sent  ahead  in  charge  of  three  ships-of-the- 
line.  This  was  a  questionable  disposition,  as  they 
were  advancing  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy, 
without  being  covered  by  the  interposition  of 
the  main  fleet.  The  Ville  de  Paris  Rodney  kept 
close  by  his  own  side,  unable  to  tear  himself  from 
her ;  so  at  least  said  Hood,  who  "  would  to  God 
she  had  sunk  the  moment  she  had  yielded  to  the 
arms  of  His  Majesty,"  for  "  we  would  then  have 
had  a  dozen  better  ships  in  lieu  of  her."  Rodney 
was  so  tickled  with  her  that  he  "can  talk  of 
nothing  else,  and  says  he  will  hoist  his  flag  on 
board  of  her." 

On  April  iyth  Hood,  having  vainly  urged  his 
commander  to  improve  the  situation  by  more  en- 
ergetic action,  represented  to  him  that  the  small 


244  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

detachment  convoying  the  Hector  and  Glorieux 
might  fall  in  with  a  superior  enemy,  if  not  sup- 
ported. Rodney  then  directed  him  to  go  ahead 
with  ten  ships  until  as  far  as  Altavela,  midway 
on  the  south  side  of  Santo  Domingo,  where  he 
was  to  await  the  main  body.  Hood  gave  a  wide 
construction  to  these  orders,  and  pushed  for  the 
Mona  Passage,  between  Santo  Domingo  and 
Porto  Rico,  where  on  the  igth  he  intercepted  two 
sixty-four  gun  ships,  and  two  smaller  cruisers.  In 
reporting  this  incident  to  Rodney,  he  added,  "It 
is  a  very  mortifying  circumstance  to  relate  to 
you,  Sir,  that  the  French  fleet  which  you  put  to 
flight  on  the  I2th  went  through  the  Mona  Chan- 
nel on  the  1 8th,  only  the  day  before  I  was  in  it." 
That  sustained  vigorous  chase  could  not  have 
been  fruitless  is  further  shown  by  the  fact  that 
Rodney  himself,  deliberately  as  he  moved,  appar- 
ently lying-to  each  night  of  the  first  half-dozen 
succeeding  the  battle,  reached  Jamaica  three  days 
only  after  the  main  body  of  the  defeated  French 
gained  Cap  Fran9ois,  though  they  had  every 
motive  to  speed. 

Of  the  reasons  for  such  lethargic  action,  wholly 
inconsistent  with  true  military  principle,  and  bit- 
terly criticised  by  Hood,  —  who  affirmed  that 
twenty  ships  might  have  been  taken,  —  Rodney 
drew  up  an  express  account,  which  cannot  be 
considered  as  adequate  to  his  justification.  In 
this  he  argued  that,  if  he  had  pursued,  the  enemy, 
who  "  went  off  in  a  close  connected  body,  might 


Rodney  245 

have  defeated  by  rotation  the  ships  that  had 
come  up  with  them,  and  thereby  exposed  the 
British  fleet,  after  a  victory,  to  a  defeat."  "  They 
went  off  in  a  body  of  twenty-six  ships-of-the- 
line,  and  might,  by  ordering  two  or  three  of  their 
best-sailing  ships  or  frigates  to  have  shown  lights 
at  times,  and  by  changing  their  course,  have  in- 
duced the  British  fleet  to  have  followed  them, 
while  the  main  of  their  fleet,  by  hiding  their 
lights,  might  have  hauled  their  wind,  have  been 
far  to  windward  before  daylight,  and  intercepted 
the  captured  ships,  and  the  most  crippled  ships  of 
the  English ;"  and  he  even  conceived  that,  as  the 
main  body  of  the  British  would  at  the  same  time 
have  gone  far  to  leeward,  the  French,  regaining 
their  own  ports  in  Guadaloupe  and  Martinique, 
might  have  taken  Antigua,  Barbados,  and  Santa 
Lucia. 

The  principal  impression  produced  by  this  for- 
mal summary  of  reasons  is  that  of  unwisdom 
after  the  event,  and  that  it  was  elicited  by  the 
remonstrances  of  Hood  to  himself,  which  are 
known  to  have  voiced  discontent  prevalent  in 
the  fleet,  and  rendered  some  ready  reply  expe- 
dient. The  substance  of  them,  when  analyzed, 
is  that  war  must  be  rendered  effective  by  not 
running  risks,  and  that  calculation  to  that  effect 
is  to  be  made  by  attributing  every  chance  and 
advantage  to  the  enemy,  and  none  to  one's  self. 
Further,  no  account  is  to  be  taken  of  that  most 
notable  factor,  ultimate  risk,  —  as  distinguished 


246  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

from  present  risk.  This  phantasm,  of  the  sudden 
assumption  of  the  offensive  by  a  beaten  and  dis- 
ordered fleet,  which,  through  the  capture  of  its 
chief,  had  changed  commanders  at  nightfall,  is 
as  purely  and  mischievously  imaginative  as  the 
fiction,  upon  which  it  rests,  of  the  close  con- 
nected body.  Instead  of  being  close-connected, 
the  French  were  scattered  hopelessly,  utterly 
disabled  for  immediate,  or  even  proximate,  re- 
sistance to  a  well  sustained  chase  and  attack. 
During  the  next  twenty-four  hours  their  new  ad- 
miral had  with  him  but  ten  ships ;  and  only  five 
joined  in  the  following  twelve  days,  to  April  25th, 
when  he  reached  Cap  Fran9ois,  where  four  more 
were  found.  Six  others  had  strayed  to  Cura9ao, 
six  hundred  miles  distant,  whence  they  did  not 
rejoin  the  flag  until  May.  Neither  in  Rodney's 
surmises,  nor  in  the  actual  facts  of  the  case,  is  to 
be  found  any  reasonable  excuse  for  failure  to  ob- 
serve the  evident  military  duty  of  keeping  touch 
with  the  enemy  during  the  dark  hours,  —  "  pur- 
sue under  easy  sail,"  to  use  Hood's  words,  "  so  as 
never  to  have  lost  sight  of  the  enemy  in  the 
night,"  —  with  a  view  to  resume  the  engagement 
next  day,  at  farthest.  This,  and  to  regain  to 
windward,  were  as  feasible  to  the  victor  as  to  the 
vanquished. 

A  truer  explanation  of  this  grave  negligence  is 
to  be  found  in  Rodney's  more  casual  words  re- 
corded by  Hood.  "  I  lamented  to  Sir  George  on 
the  twelfth  that  the  signal  for  a  general  chase 


Rodney  247 

was  not  made  when  that  for  the  line  was  hauled 
down,  and  that  he  did  not  continue  to  pursue  so 
as  to  keep  sight  of  the  enemy  all  night ;  to  which 
he  only  answered,  '  Come,  we  have  done  very 
handsomely  as  it  is.'  I  could  therefore  say  no 
more  upon  the  subject."  He  did,  however,  re- 
sume the  subject  with  Sir  Charles  Douglas,  the 
chief  of  staff.  Douglas  was  of  the  same  opinion 
as  Hood,  and  for  making  the  suggestion  at  the 
proper  moment  had  been  snubbed  by  Rodney, 
who  had  established  over  him  a  domination  of 
manner  which  precluded  proper  insistence,  or 
even  due  representation,  such  as  became  his  office. 
"  His  answer  was,  '  Sir  George  chose  to  pursue  in 
a  body ; ' "  that  is,  in  regular  order,  not  by  general 
chase.  "  '  Why,  Sir  Charles,'  I  replied,  '  if  that 
was  Sir  George's  wish,  could  it  have  been  more 
effectually  complied  with  than  by  the  signal  for  a 
general  chase,  with  proper  attention  ?  Because,  if 
a  ship  is  too  wide  on  the  starboard  wing,  you 
have  a  signal  to  make  her  steer  more  to  port.  If  a 
ship  is  too  wide  on  the  larboard  wing,  you  have  a 
signal  to  make  her  steer  more  to  starboard.  If 
a  ship  is  too  far  ahead,  you  can  by  signal  make 
her  shorten  sail,'  "  etc.  This  by  daylight ;  while, 
"'if  Sir  George  was  unwilling  his  ships  should  en- 
gage in  the  night,  there  is  a  signal  to  call  every 
ship  in,  and,  that  followed  by  the  one  for  the 
form  of  sailing,  the  fleet  might  have  gone  on  in 
sight  of  the  enemy  all  night  in  the  most  compact 
and  safe  order  for  completing  the  business  most 


248  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

gloriously  the  next  day.'  Sir  Charles  walked  off 
without  saying  another  word."  There  was  in 
fact  nothing  to  say.  Hood's  methods  were  not 
only  correct,  but  in  no  respect  novel.  Every 
capable  officer  was  familiar  with  them  before,  as 
well  as  after  the  battle.  The  trouble  was  that 
Rodney  was  content  with  a  present  clear  success, 
and  averse  from  further  risk.  He  had  reached 
his  limitations.  It  is  known  now  that  Douglas 
agreed  with  Hood,  but  he  was  too  loyal  to  his 
chief  to  say  so  publicly,  then  or  afterwards ;  and 
especially,  doubtless,  to  so  irritable  a  talker. 

As  illustrative  of  Rodney's  professional  charac- 
ter the  events  of  April  8th  to  i2th  are  therefore 
unfavorable  rather  than  the  reverse.  Concern- 
ing his  stronger  qualities  their  evidence  is  simply 
cumulative;  the  new  light  thrown  reveals  defects, 
not  unsuspected  excellencies.  The  readiness  in 
which  his  fleet  was  held  at  Santa  Lucia,  the 
promptness  with  which  he  followed,  the  general 
conduct  of  the  chase  as  far  as  appears,  though 
doubtless  open  to  criticism  in  detail  as  in  the  ever 
censorious  remarks  of  Hood,  —  all  these  show 
the  same  alert,  accomplished,  and  diligent  officer, 
resolute  to  the  utmost  of  his  natural  and  ac- 
quired faculties.  It  is  the  same  after  the  battle 
joins,  so  long  as  its  progress  does  not  transcend 
his  accepted  ideas,— which  were  much  in  advance 
of  the  great  mass  of  his  contemporaries, — though 
under  the  conditions  he  saw  no  chance  to  apply 
the  particular  methods  familiar  to  his  thought. 


Rodney  249 

But  when  sudden  opportunity  offered,  of  a 
kind  he  had  not  anticipated,  he  is  found  unequal 
to  it.  Neither  natural  temper,  nor  acquired 
habit  of  mind,  respond  to  the  call.  To  pass 
through  the  French  line,  when  the  wind  shifted, 
was  an  instigation  too  sudden  and  a  risk  too 
great  for  his  own  initiative.  The  balance  of  evi- 
dence shows  that  it  was  due  to  the  suggestion, 
and  even  more  to  the  pressure,  of  Sir  Charles 
Douglas.  Carried  beyond  his  habitual  submission 
by  the  impulse  of  a  great  thought,  and  unbur- 
dened by  the  ultimate  responsibility  which  must 
remain  with  the  admiral,  the  Captain  of  the  Fleet 
not  only  urged  luffing  through  the  enemy's  line,  but 
—  so  the  story  runs  —  in  the  excitement  of  the 
moment,  and  seeing  the  chance  slipping  past, 
even  under  the  then  sluggish  breeze,  he  ordered 
the  helm  down.  The  admiral,  thus  faced,  coun- 
termanded the  order.  A  moment  of  silence  fol- 
lowed, during  which  the  two  men  stepped  apart, 
the  admiral  even  entering  the  cabin,  which  would 
be  but  a  few  paces  from  the  wheel.  Returning, 
he  permitted  Douglas  to  have  his  way ;  an  act 
which,  whether  done  courteously  or  grudgingly, 
does  not  bespeak  professional  conviction,  but 
the  simple  acceptance  of  another's  will  in  place 
of  one's  own  indecision. 

The  incident  is  in  entire  keeping  with  the 
picture  of  Rodney's  irresolution,  and  consequent 
uncertain  course,  drawn  in  successive  touches  by 
Hood  in  the  hours  and  days  succeeding  the 


250  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

victory.  Events  had  called  him  to  deeds  beyond 
his  limitations.  Age  of  course  counted  for  much; 
fatigue,  after  three  days  of  doubtful  chase  and 
one  of  prolonged  battle,  for  more  ;  but  it  may 
here  be  recalled  that  an  older  man,  after  a  more 
wearisome  and  doubtful  exposure,  willed  of  his 
own  motion  to  do  what  Rodney  left  undone. 
Sir  Byam  Martin  has  recorded,1  "  After  the  battle 
of  the  ist  of  June,  Lord  Howe  was  quite  ex- 
hausted, as  well  indeed  he  might,  considering 
that  they  had  been  manoeuvring  and  fighting  for 
three  days.  Although  feeble  in  body,  and  so 
exhausted  as  to  be  obliged  to  sit  down  in  a  chair 
on  deck,  he  expressed  a  wish  to  pursue  the 
flying  enemy ;  but  Sir  Roger  Curtis,  the  Cap- 
tain of  the  Fleet  (Chief  of  Staff,  as  Douglas  to 
Rodney)  said,  '  I  vow  to  God,  my  lord,  if  you 
do  they  will  turn  the  tables  upon  us.'  This 
anecdote  I  had  from  the  late  Admiral  Bowen, 
who  was  master  of  the  Queen  Charlotte  and  a 
party  to  the  conversation."  Under  circumstances 
approaching  similarity,  —  so  far  as  North  Atlantic 
fogs  and  weather  resemble  West  India  climate, 
—  Howe  was  sixty-eight,  Rodney  sixty-three,  at 
the  moment  of  testing.  The  one  lost  the  sup- 
port of  the  man  —  Curtis  —  upon  whom  he  must 
chiefly  rely  for  observation  and  execution;  the 
other  was  urged  in  vain  by  the  officer  who  held 
the  same  relation  to  him.  Nelson  once  spoke 

1  Journals  of  Sir  T.  Byam   Martin,  Navy  Records  Society,  vol.  iil 
P-  '37- 


Rodney  251 

slightingly  of  "  a  Lord  Howe's  victory,  take  a 
part,  and  retire  into  port ; "  as  a  trait  of  official 
character,  however,  Howe's  purpose  was  far  in 
advance  of  Rodney's,  as  this  was  viewed  by 
Nelson's  ideal  admiral,  Hood.  It  is  now  known, 
by  a  letter  of  Nelson's  very  recently  published, 
that  he  held  the  same  opinion  of  Rodney's  remiss- 
ness  in  this  instance,  although  he  cordially  recog- 
nized the  general  obligation  of  the  country  and 
the  navy  to  that  eminent  seaman.  Writing  in 
1804  t°  his  intimate  friend  Cornwallis,  one  of 
Rodney's  captains,  he  used  these  words  :  "  On 
the  score  of  fighting,  I  believe,  my  dear  friend, 
that  you  have  had  your  full  share,  and  in  obtain- 
ing the  greatest  victory,  if  it  had  been  followed 
up,  that  our  country  ever  saw."  1  It  was  a  clear 
case  of  spirit  being  brought  into  subjection  to 
form. 

Rodney's  professional  career  may  be  reckoned 
to  have  ended  with  his  arrival  at  Jamaica  on  the 
29th  of  April.  The  change  of  ministry  conse- 
quent upon  Cornwallis's  surrender  brought  into 
power  his  political  opponents,  and  in  May  the 
new  Admiralty  superseded  him.  News  of  the 
victory  reached  England  just  too  late  to  permit 
them  to  revoke  the  order ;  his  successor,  Admiral 
Pigot,  having  already  sailed.  On  the  2 ad  of 
July  Rodney  left  Jamaica,  and  on  the  I5th  of 
September  landed  at  Bristol.  Although  not  so 

1  The  Blockade  of  Brest,  Navy  Records  Society.  Introduction, 
p.  xvi.  Author's  italics. 


252  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

intended,  his  recall  may  be  considered  in  line 
with  his  proverbial  good  fortune.  He  left  his 
successor  to  grapple  with  difficulties,  and  with 
numbers,  the  continued  existence  of  which  was 
due  chiefly  to  his  own  neglect  after  April  i2th, 
and  by  the  burden  of  which  the  conditions  of 
peace  were  influenced  adversely  to  Great  Britain. 
To  quote  again  Hood's  apt  comment,  "  Had  Sir 
George  Rodney's  judgment,  after  the  enemy  had 
been  so  totally  put  to  flight,  bore  any  proportion 
to  the  high  courage,  zeal  and  exertion,  shown 
by  every  captain,  officer,  and  man  under  his  com- 
mand in  battle,  all  difficulty  would  now  have 
been  at  an  end.  We  might  have  done  just  as  we 
pleased,  instead  of  being  at  this  hour  (April  3oth) 
upon  the  defensive."  This  is  ultimate  risk, 
which  is  entailed  by  exaggerated  concern  for 
immediate  apparent  security,  and  ends  in  sapping 
endurance. 

The  auspicious  moment  at  which  the  news  of 
the  battle  reached  England,  and  the  surface 
brilliancy  of  the  achievement,  —  especially  the 
capture  of  the  enemy's  commander-in-chief, — 
diverted  attention  from  any  examination  of  pos- 
sible shortcomings.  Rodney  received  a  vote  of 
thanks  from  Parliament,  and  was  advanced  to 
the  peerage  by  the  King.  A  pension  of  ,£2,000 
per  annum  was  also  voted,  additional  doubtless 
to  a  similar  sum  granted  after  his  destruction 
of  Langara's  squadron  and  relief  of  Gibraltar. 
Other  rewards  and  recognition  had  already  at- 


Rodney  253 

tended  his  naval  career.  He  had  been  made  a 
baronet  in  1764,  at  the  expiration  of  his  first 
tenure  of  the  Leeward  Islands  Station;  in  1780 
the  order  of  the  Bath  was  bestowed  upon  him, 
—  the  distinction  being  enhanced  by  not  await- 
ing a  vacancy,  but  making  him  a  supernu- 
merary member,  —  and  in  1781,  upon  the  death 
of  Lord  Hawke,  he  became  Vice-Admiral  of  Great 
Britain,  the  highest  professional  honor  in  the 
service. 

After  his  return  to  England  Rodney  lived 
generally  in  retirement.  His  latter  years  were 
harassed  by  law  suits,  growing  chiefly  out  of  his 
proceedings  at  St.  Eustatius,  and  the  attendant 
expenses  kept  him  poor.  He  died  in  May, 
1792,  at  the  age  of  seventy-three. 


HOWE 

1726-1799 

THE  name  of  Howe,  albeit  that  of  a  stranger 
to  the  land,  has  a  special  claim  upon  the 
esteem  and  cordial  remembrance  of  Americans. 
The  elder  brother  of  the  subject  of  this  sketch, 
during  the  few  short  months  in  which  he  was 
brought  into  close  contact  with  the  colonists  of 
1758,  before  the  unlucky  campaign  of  Ticonder- 
oga,  won  from  them  not  merely  the  trust  inspired 
by  his  soldierly  qualities  and  his  genius  for  war,  — 
the  genius  of  sound  common  sense  and  solidity 
of  character,  —  but  got  a  deep  hold  upon  their 
affections  by  the  consideration  and  respect  shown 
to  them  by  him,  traits  to  which  they  had  been 
too  little  accustomed  in  the  British  officers  of 
that  day.  Nor  was  this  attitude  on  his  part  only 
a  superficial  disguise  assumed  by  policy  to  secure 
a  needed  support.  The  shrewd,  suspicious  pro- 
vincials would  soon  have  penetrated  a  veil  so  thin, 
that  covered  only  the  usual  supercilious  arro- 
gance which  they  had  heretofore  encountered. 
Lord  Howe,  almost  alone  among  his  military 
contemporaries,  warmly  greeted  them  as  fellow- 


Howe  255 

countrymen,  men  of  no  alien  or  degenerate  blood. 
He  admitted  at  once  the  value  of  their  experi- 
ence, sought  their  advice,  and  profited  by  both ; 
thus  gaining,  besides  the  material  advantage  of 
methods  adapted  to  the  difficulties  before  him, 
the  adhesion  of  willing  hearts  that  followed  en- 
thusiastically, confident  in  their  leader's  wisdom, 
and  glowing  with  the  unaccustomed  sense  of 
being  appreciated,  of  receiving  recognition  long 
withheld,  but  now  at  last  ungrudgingly  accorded. 
"  The  army  felt  him,  from  general  to  drummer 
boy.  He  was  its  soul ;  and  while  breathing 
into  it  his  own  energy  and  ardor,  he  broke 
through  the  traditions  of  the  service,  and  gave  it 
new  shapes  to  suit  the  time  and  place.  .  .  .  He 
made  himself  greatly  beloved  by  the  provincial 
officers,  and  he  did  what  he  could  to  break  down 
the  barriers  between  the  colonial  soldiers  and  the 
British  regulars."1 

In  campaign,  Lord  Howe  adopted  the  tried 
expedients  of  forest  warfare,  associating  with 
himself  its  most  practised  exponents ;  and  on 
the  morning  of  his  death,  in  one  of  those  petty 
skirmishes  which  have  cut  short  the  career  of  so 
many  promising  soldiers,  he  discussed  the  ques- 
tion of  Ticonderoga  and  its  approaches,  lying  on 
a  bearskin  beside  the  colonial  ranger,  John  Stark, 
to  whose  energy,  nineteen  years  later,  was  due 
the  serious  check  that  precipitated  the  ruin  of 
Burgoyne's  expedition.  Endeared  as  he  was  to 

1  Parkman's  "  Montcalm  and  Wolfe,"  vol.  ii.  p.  90. 


256  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

American  soldiers  by  the  ties  of  mutual  labors 
and  mutual  perils  gladly  shared,  and  to  all  classes 
by  genial  bearing  and  social  accomplishments, 
his  untimely  end  was  followed  throughout  the 
Northern  colonies  by  a  spontaneous  outburst  of 
sorrow,  elicited  not  only  by  the  anticipated  fail- 
ure of  the  enterprise  that  hung  upon  his  life,  but 
also  by  a  sense  of  personal  regret  and  loss.  Mass- 
achusetts perpetuated  the  memory  of  her  grief 
by  a  tablet  in  Westminster  Abbey,  which  hands 
down  to  our  day  "  the  affection  her  officers  and 
soldiers  bore  to  his  command." 

Captain  Richard  Howe  of  the  Royal  Navy, 
afterwards  Admiral  and  Earl,  succeeded  him  in 
the  Irish  viscounty  which  had  been  bestowed 
upon  their  grandfather  by  William  III.  Of  a 
temperament  colder,  at  least  in  external  manifes- 
tation, than  that  of  his  brother,  the  new  Lord 
Howe  was  distinguished  by  the  same  fairness  of 
mind,  and  by  an  equanimity  to  which  perturba- 
tion and  impulsive  injustice  were  alike  unknown. 
There  seems  to  have  been  in  his  bearing  some- 
thing of  that  stern,  impassive  gravity  that  marked 
Washington,  and  imposed  a  constraint  upon  by- 
standers ;  but  whatever  apparent  harshness  there 
was  in  the  face  only  concealed  a  genuine  warmth 
of  heart,  which  at  times  broke  with  an  illumining 
smile  through  the  mask  that  covered  it,  and  was 
always  ready  to  respond  to  the  appeals  of  benev- 
olence. If,  as  an  officer,  he  had  a  fault  con- 
spicuously characteristic,  it  was  a  reluctance  to 


Howe  257 

severity,  a  tendency  to  push  indulgence  to  undue 
extremes,  into  which  may  perhaps  have  entered 
not  merely  leniency  of  disposition,  but  the  weak- 
ness of  loving  popularity.  To  be  called  by  the 
seamen,  as  Howe  was,  the  "  sailor's  friend,"  is  in 
the  experience  of  navies  a  suspicious  encomium, 
involving  more  of  flattery  to  a  man's  foibles  than 
of  credit  to  his  discretion  and  his  judgment.  But 
at  the  time  when  the  quarrel  between  Great 
Britain  and  her  colonies  was  fast  becoming  im- 
bittered,  the  same  kindliness,  coupled  with  a  calm 
reasonableness  of  temper,  ruled  his  feelings  and 
guided  his  action.  Although  by  political  creed 
a  moderate  Tory,  he  had  none  of  the  wrong- 
headedness  of  the  party  zealot ;  and  the  growing 
alienation  between  those  whom  he,  like  his 
brother,  regarded  as  of  one  family,  caused  only 
distress  and  an  earnest  desire  to  avert  coming 
evils.  Influenced  by  these  sentiments,  he  sought 
the  acquaintance  of  Franklin,  then  in  London  as 
a  commissioner  from  the  colonies ;  and  the  inter- 
views between  them,  while  resultless  by  reason 
of  the  irreconcilable  differences  of  opinion  sever- 
ing the  two  parties  to  the  dispute,  convinced  the 
wary  American  of  the  good  will  and  open-minded- 
ness  of  the  already  distinguished  British  seaman. 
The  same  qualities  doubtless  suggested  the  selec- 
tion of  Howe  for  the  mission  of  conciliation  to 
America,  in  1776,  where  his  associate  was  his 
younger  brother,  Sir  William,  in  whom  the 
family  virtues  had,  by  exaggeration,  degenerated 

17 


258  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

into  an  indolent  good  humor  fatal  to  his  military 
efficiency.  The  admiral,  on  the  contrary,  was 
not  more  remarkable  for  amiability  and  resolute 
personal  courage  than  he  was  for  sustained  energy 
and  untiring  attention  to  duty,  —  traits  which 
assured  adequate  naval  direction,  in  case  concili- 
ation should  give  place,  as  it  did,  to  coercive 
measures. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  methods,  or  the 
opportunities,  of  naval  biographers  and  historians 
of  the  past  century  have  preserved  to  us  little, 
in  personal  detail  and  anecdote,  of  a  period  the 
peculiarities  of  which,  if  not  exactly  picturesque, 
were  at  least  grotesque  and  amusing.  The 
humor  of  Smollett  has  indeed  drawn  in  broad 
caricature  some  of  the  salient  features  of  the  sea- 
man of  his  day,  which  was  that  of  Howe's  entrance 
into  the  navy;  and  those  who  are  familiar  with 
the  naval  light  literature  based  upon  the  times  of 
Nelson  can  recognize  in  it  characteristics  so  simi- 
lar, though  evidently  softened  by  advancing  civ- 
ilization and  increased  contact  with  the  world,  as 
to  vouch  for  the  accuracy  of  the  general  impres- 
sion conveyed  by  the  earlier  novelist.  It  is,  how- 
ever, correct  only  as  z. general  impression,  in  which, 
too,  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  animus  of 
an  author  who  had  grievances  to  exploit,  and 
whose  great  aim  was  to  amuse,  even  if  exact 
truthfulness  were  sacrificed  at  the  shrine  of  exag- 
gerated portrayal.  Though  not  wholly  without 
occasional  gleams  of  light,  shed  here  and  there 


Howe  259 

by  recorded  incident  and  anecdote  upon  the 
strange  life  of  the  seamen  of  that  period,  the 
early  personal  experiences  of  individuals  have 
had  scant  commemoration ;  and  with  the  excep- 
tion of  St.  Vincent,  who  fortunately  had  a  gar- 
rulous biographer,  we  learn  little  of  men  like 
Hawke,  Howe,  Hood,  and  Keppel,  until,  already 
possessors  of  naval  rank,  they  stand  forth  as 
actors  in  events  rather  historical  than  biograph- 
ical. 

Of  Howe's  first  services,  therefore,  not  much 
record  remains  except  a  bare  summary  of  dates, 
—  of  promotions,  and  of  ships  to  which  he  was 
attached,  —  until  1755,  the  beginning  of  the  Seven 
Years  War,  when  he  was  already  a  post-captain. 
Born  in  1726,  he  entered  the  navy  in  1739,  at  tne 
outbreak  of  the  war  with  Spain  which  initiated  a 
forty  years'  struggle  over  colonies  and  colonial 
trade.  With  short  intervals  of  peace,  this  contest 
was  the  prominent  characteristic  of  the  middle 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  terminated  in 
the  conquest  of  Canada,  the  independence  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  establishment  of  British 
predominance  in  India  and  upon  the  ocean.  This 
rupture  of  a  quiet  that  had  then  endured  a  quar- 
ter of  a  century  was  so  popular  with  the  awak- 
ened intelligence  of  England,  aroused  at  last  to 
the  imminent  importance  of  her  call  to  expansion 
by  sea,  that  it  was  greeted  by  a  general  pealing 
of  the  bells,  which  drew  from  the  reluctant  prime 
minister,  Walpole,  that  bitter  gibe,  "Ay,  to-day 


260  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

they  are  ringing  their  bells,  and  to-morrow  they 
will  be  wringing  their  hands."  Howe  embarked 
with  Anson's  squadron,  celebrated  for  its  suf- 
ferings, its  persistence,  and  its  achievements,  to 
waste  the  Spanish  colonies  of  the  Pacific ;  but 
the  ship  in  which  he  had  started  was  so  racked 
in  the  attempt  to  double  Cape  Horn  that  she  was 
forced  to  return  to  England.  The  young  officer 
afterwards  served  actively  in  the  West  Indies  and 
in  home  waters.  On  the  ist  of  May,  1746,  being 
then  in  command  of  a  small  sloop  of  war,  he 
was  severely  wounded  in  action  with  a  superior 
enemy's  force  off  the  coast  of  Scotland.  A  few 
days  before  that,  on  the  loth  of  April,  he  had 
been  promoted  post-captain,  being  barely  turned 
twenty.  Thus  early  he  was  securely  placed  on 
the  road  to  the  highest  honors  of  his  profes- 
sion, which,  however,  were  not  to  prove  beyond 
the  just  claim  of  his  already  established  personal 
merit. 

During  the  first  thirty  months  of  the  Seven 
Years  War,  Howe  was  closely  engaged  with, 
and  at  times  in  command  of,  the  naval  part  of 
combined  expeditions  of  the  army  and  navy, 
fitted  out  to  harass  the  French  coasts.  The 
chief,  though  not  the  sole  aim  in  these  un- 
dertakings was  to  effect  diversions  in  favor  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  then  plunged  in  his  desper- 
ate struggle  with  the  allied  forces  of  Russia,  Aus- 
tria, and  France.  It  was  believed  that  the  last 
would  be  compelled,  for  the  defence  of  her  own 


Howe  261 

shores  against  those  raids,  —  desultory,  it  is  true 
but  yet  uncertain  as  to  the  time  and  place  where 
the  attack  would  fall,  —  to  withdraw  a  number  of 
troops  that  would  sensibly  reduce  the  great  odds 
then  overbearing  the  Prussian  king.  It  is  more 
than  doubtful  whether  this  direction  of  British 
power,  in  partial,  eccentric  efforts,  produced  re- 
sults adequate  to  the  means  employed.  In  im- 
mediate injury  to  France  they  certainly  failed, 
and  it  is  questionable  whether  they  materially 
helped  Frederick ;  but  they  made  a  brisk  stir  in 
the  Channel  ports,  their  operations  were  within 
easy  reach  of  England  in  a  day  when  news  trav- 
elled slowly,  and  they  drew  the  attention  of  the 
public  and  of  London  society  in  a  degree  wholly 
disproportionate  to  their  importance  relatively  to 
the  great  issues  of  the  war.  Their  failures,  which 
exceeded  their  achievements,  caused  general  scan- 
dal ;  and  their  occasional  triumphs  aroused  exag- 
gerated satisfaction  at  this  earlier  period,  before 
the  round  of  unbroken  successes  under  the  first 
Pitt  had  accustomed  men,  to  use  Walpole's  lively 
phrase,  to  come  to  breakfast  with  the  question, 
"  What  new  victory  is  there  this  morning  ?  " 
The  brilliant  letter-writer's  correspondence  is  full 
of  the  gossip  arising  from  these  usually  paltry 
affairs;  and  throughout,  whether  in  success  or 
disaster,  the  name  of  Howe  appears  frequently, 
and  always  as  the  subject  of  praise.  "  Howe, 
brother  of  the  lord  of  that  name,  was  the  third 
on  the  naval  list.  He  was  undaunted  as  a  rock, 


262  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

and  as  silent,  the  characteristics  of  his  whole 
race.  He  and  Wolfe  soon  contracted  a  friend- 
ship like  the  union  of  cannon  and  gunpowder." 
"  Howe,"  he  says  in  another  place,  "never  made 
a  friendship  except  at  the  mouth  of  a  cannon." 
Of  his  professional  merits,  however,  professional 
opinions  will  be  more  convincing.  A  Frenchman, 
who  had  acted  as  pilot  of  his  ship,  the  Magna- 
nime,  when  going  into  action,  was  asked  if  it  were 
possible  to  take  a  lighter  vessel,  the  Burford, 
close  to  the  walls  of  another  fort  farther  in. 
"  Yes,"  he  replied,  "  but  I  should  prefer  to  take 
the  Afagnanime"  "  But  why?  "  it  was  rejoined  ; 
"  for  the  Burford  draws  less  water."  "  True,"  he 
said,  "mats  le  capitaine  Howe  est  jeune  et  brave" 
Sir  Edward  Hawke,  the  most  distinguished  ad- 
miral of  that  generation,  gave  a  yet  higher  com- 
mendation to  the  "  young  and  brave  "  captain, 
who  at  this  time  served  under  his  orders,  —  one 
that  must  cause  a  sigh  of  regretful  desire  to 
many  a  troubled  superior.  Several  years  later, 
when  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  he  nominated 
Howe,  in  October,  1770,  to  command  a  squadron 
destined  to  the  Mediterranean,  when  hostilities 
with  Spain  were  expected.  The  appointment  was 
criticised  on  the  ground  that  he  was  a  junior 
admiral  in  the  fleet,  having  been  very  recently 
promoted;  but  Hawke,  doubtless  mindful  that 
the  same  objection  had  been  made  to  him  at  a 
similar  period  of  his  career,  answered,  in  the  spirit 
of  St.  Vincent  defending  his  choice  of  Nelson, 


Howe  263 

"  I  have  tried  Lord  Howe  on  most  important 
occasions.  He  never  asked  me  how  he  was  to 
execute  any  service  entrusted  to  his  charge,  but 
always  went  straight  forward  and  did  it?  Some 
quaint  instances  are  recorded  of  the  taciturnity 
for  which  he  was  also  noted.  Amid  the  recrim- 
inations that  followed  the  failure  at  Rochefort, 
Howe  neither  wrote  nor  said  anything.  At  last 
the  Admiralty  asked  why  he  had  not  expressed 
an  opinion.  In  the  somewhat  ponderous  style 
that  marked  his  utterances,  he  replied,  "  With 
regard  to  the  operations  of  the  troops  I  was 
silent,  as  not  being  at  that  time  well  enough 
informed  thereof,  and  to  avoid  the  mention  of 
any  particulars  that  might  prove  not  exactly 
agreeable  to  the  truth."  The  next  year,  an  army 
officer  of  rank,  putting  questions  to  him  and 
receiving  no  answer,  said,  "  Mr.  Howe,  don't  you 
hear  me  ?  I  have  asked  you  several  questions." 
Howe  answered  curtly,  "  I  don't  like  questions," 
—  in  which  he  was  perhaps  not  peculiar. 

It  was  during  the  continuance  of  these  petty 
descents  upon  the  French  coast,  in  1758,  that 
Howe  was  directed  to  receive  on  board,  as  mid- 
shipman, and  for  service  in  the  fleet,  the  Duke 
of  York,  a  grandson  of  the  reigning  monarch ;  in 
connection  with  whom  arose  a  saying  that  was 
long  current,  perhaps  is  still  current,  in  the  Brit- 
ish navy.  The  young  lad  of  nineteen,  before 
beginning  his  routine  duties,  held  a  reception  on 
board  Commodore  Howe's  ship,  at  which  the 


264  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

captains  of  the  squadron  were  presented  to  him. 
The  seamen,  unpractised  in  ceremonial  distinc- 
tions other  than  naval,  saw  with  wonder  that  the 
midshipman  kept  on  his  hat,  while  the  rest  un- 
covered. "  The  young  gentleman,"  whispered 
one,  "  is  n't  over  civil,  as  I  thinks.  Look  if  he 
don't  keep  his  hat  on  before  all  the  captains ! " 
"  Why,"  another  was  heard  to  reply,  "  where 
should  he  learn  manners,  seeing  as  how  he  was 
never  at  sea  before  ?  " 

It  is  likewise  from  this  period  of  Howe's  career 
that  two  of  the  rare  personal  anecdotes  have 
been  transmitted,  illustrative  of  his  coolness  and 
self-possession  under  all  circumstances  of  danger, 
as  well  as  when  under  the  enemy's  fire ;  one  of 
them  also  touched  with  a  bit  of  humor,  —  not  a 
usual  characteristic  of  his  self-contained  reticence. 
The  service  involved  considerable  danger,  being 
close  in  with  the  enemy's  coast,  which  was  in- 
differently well  known  and  subject  to  heavy  gales 
of  wind  blowing  dead  on  shore.  On  one  such 
occasion  his  ship  had  anchored  with  two  anchors 
ahead,  and  he  had  retired  to  his  cabin,  when  the 
officer  of  the  watch  hurriedly  entered,  saying, 
"My  lord,  the  anchors  are  coming  home,"  —  the 
common  sea  expression  for  their  failure  to  grip 
the  bottom,  whereupon  the  ship  of  course  drags 
toward  the  beach.  "  Coming  home,  are  they  ?  " 
rejoined  Howe.  "  I  am  sure  they  are  very  right. 
I  don't  know  who  would  stay  abroad  on  such  a 
night,  if  he  could  help  it."  Yet  another  time  he 


Howe  265 

was  roused  from  sleep  by  a  lieutenant  in  evident 
perturbation :  "  My  lord,  the  ship  is  on  fire  close 
to  the  magazine ;  but  don't  be  frightened ;  we 
shall  get  it  under  shortly."  "  Frightened,  sir !  " 
said  Howe.  "  What  do  you  mean  ?  I  never  was 
frightened  in  my  life."  Then,  looking  the  un- 
lucky officer  in  the  face,  he  continued,  "  Pray, 
Mr. ,  how  does  a  man/^/  when  he  is  fright- 
ened ?  I  need  not  ask  how  he  looks? 

The  even,  unaffected  self-possession  indicated 
by  these  anecdotes  of  the  early  prime  of  life 
remained  with  him  to  the  end,  as  is  shown  by 
another  incident  collected  by  a  biographer  who 
knew  many  of  his  contemporaries.  "  When 
Howe  was  in  command  of  the  Channel  Fleet, 
after  a  dark  and  boisterous  night,  in  which  the 
ships  had  been  in  some  danger  of  running  foul  of 
each  other,  Lord  Gardner,  then  the  third  in  com- 
mand, the  next  day  went  on  board  the  Queen 
Charlotte  and  inquired  of  Lord  Howe  how  he 
had  slept,  for  that  he  himself  had  not  been  able 
to  get  any  rest  from  anxiety  of  mind.  Lord 
Howe  said  he  had  slept  perfectly  well,  for  as  he 
had  taken  every  possible  precaution  he  could 
before  dark,  he  laid  himself  down  with  a  con- 
scious feeling  that  everything  had  been  done, 
which  it  was  in  his  power  to  do,  for  the  safety 
of  the  ships,  and  the  lives  of  those  intrusted  to 
his  care,  and  this  conviction  set  his  mind  at  ease." 
The  apprehensiveness  with  which  Gardner  was 
afflicted  "  is  further  exemplified  by  an  anecdote 


266  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

told  by  Admiral  Sir  James  Whitshed,  who  com- 
manded the  Alligator,  next  him  in  the  line. 
Such  was  his  anxiety,  even  in  ordinary  weather, 
that,  though  each  ship  carried  three  poop  lan- 
terns, he  always  kept  one  burning  in  his  cabin, 
and  when  he  thought  the  Alligator was  approach- 
ing too  near  he  used  to  run  out  into  the  stern 
gallery  with  the  lantern  in  his  hand,  waving  it 
so  as  to  be  noticed."  From  Gardner's  rank  at 
the  time,  the  conversation  narrated  must  have 
occurred  during  the  early  years  of  the  French 
Revolution,  when  Howe  was  over  sixty-seven. 
As  illustrative  of  character  it  is  particularly 
interesting,  for  Gardner  was  not  only  a  much 
younger  man,  but  one  whose  gallantry  and  com- 
petence had  been  eminently  proved  as  a  captain 
in  several  hard  fought  battles,  while  as  an  admiral 
in  chief  command  he  later  acquired  considerable 
reputation  as  a  tactician. 

Composure  under  suspense  is  chiefly  a  matter 
of  temperament ;  of  the  constitutional  outfit  with 
which  Nature  favors  some,  and  does  not  others. 
It  may  be  cultivated  by  its  happy  possessor ;  but 
when  wanting,  the  sufferer  can  supply  its  place 
only  by  laborious  self-control,  the  tension  of  which 
by  itself  expends  the  energies  it  seeks  to  main- 
tain, and  so  imposes  limitations  of  strength  that 
are  often  insuperable  obstacles  to  achievement, 
especially  if  prolonged.  The  strain  of  this  en- 
durance is  prominent  among  those  borne  by  com- 
manders-in-chief,  who  can  at  no  moment  afford 


Howe  267 

to  be  lax,  nor  yet  precipitate;  and  it  increases 
with  time  at  compound  interest.  Howe's  native 
imperturbability  was  therefore  one  of  the  chief 
factors  in  his  great  professional  powers,  making 
possible  the  full  exercise  of  all  the  others.  By 
dint  of  it  principally  he  reached  the  eminence 
which  must  be  attributed  to  him  as  a  general 
officer;  for  it  underlay  the  full,  continuous,  and 
sustained  play  of  the  very  marked  faculties,  per- 
sonal and  professional,  natural  and  acquired, 
which  he  had.  It  insured  that  they  should  be 
fully  developed,  and  should  not  flag;  for  it 
preserved  his  full  command  over  them  by  deliv- 
ering him  from  the  factitious  burdens  of  the 


imagination. 


This  quality  not  only  entered  into  his  external 
professional  life,  but  characterized  the  habitual 
temper  of  his  mind.  "  He  divested  himself  in  a 
remarkable  manner,"  says  his  biographer,  "of 
every  approach  to  a  state  of  anger  or  resentment" 
—  instancing  herein,  it  may  be  noted,  the  improve- 
ment of  a  natural  gift ;  "  and  he  carefully  abstained 
from  all  irritating  language,  whether  in  speaking 
or  writing.  In  the  perusal  of  the  four  hundred 
letters  and  upwards  that  have  been  mentioned, 
embracing  opinions  of,  and  unreserved  discus- 
sions upon,  the  merits  or  otherwise  of  many  and 
various  characters,  of  all  classes  of  individuals, 
it  did  not  fail  forcibly  to  strike  the  reader  of  them, 
how  invariably,  with  one  single  exception,  he 
takes  the  good  natured  and  favorable  side  of 


268  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

every  question.  In  the  whole  series,  the  harshest 
word  employed  is  '  blockhead,'  bestowed  on  his 
steward  for  not  taking  care  of  his  own  interests." 

This  equable  frame  of  mind  was  thus  a  funda- 
mental trait  in  Howe,  private  as  well  as  public, 
personal  as  well  as  professional ;  not  assumed  for 
the  moment,  but  constant  in  operation.  He  had 
none  of  the  irritability  attributed  to  genius,  as 
also  he  gives  no  sign  of  its  inspiration,  —  of 
originality.  He  is  seen  at  his  strongest  in  deal- 
ing stage  by  stage  with  difficult  situations  created 
for  him,  following  step  by  step,  and  step  by  step 
checking,  the  lead  of  another ;  his  action  being 
elicited  by  successive  circumstances,  not  deriving 
from  some  creative,  far-reaching  conception  of  his 
own.  The  temperament  is  one  eminently  prac- 
tical, capable  on  due  opportunity  of  very  great 
deeds,  as  Howe  showed;  for,  having  improved 
much  native  capacity  by  the  constant  cultivation 
of  professional  knowledge,  and  with  the  self-con- 
fidence which  naturally  springs  from  such  acquisi- 
tion, he  rose  readily  to  the  level  of  exertion 
demanded  by  any  emergency  not  in  excess  of  his 
abilities,  and  so  long  as  the  need  lasted  main- 
tained himself  there  easily,  without  consciousness 
of  exhaustive  effort,  or  apprehension  of  improb- 
able contingencies.  "  Never  hasting,  never  rest- 
ing," might  be  safely  affirmed  of  him. 

He  is  seen  therefore  at  his  best  in  a  defensive 
campaign,  such  as  that  against  D'Estaing  in  the 
summer  of  1778,  which  in  the  writer's  opinion 


Howe  269 

was  his  greatest  achievement ;  or  again  in  a  great 
deliberate  operation  like  the  relief  of  Gibraltar, 
—  the  one  of  his  deeds  most  esteemed,  it  is  said, 
by  himself,  —  protracted  over  a  month  in  its  per- 
formance, and  essentially  defensive  in  character, 
not  only  because  of  the  much  superior  fleet  of 
the  enemies,  but  because  the  adverse  forces  of 
nature  and  the  obstinate  incapacity  of  the  cap- 
tains of  supply  ships  had  to  be  counteracted  by 
unremitting  watchfulness,  foresight,  and  skill, 
dealing  however  with  conditions  determined  for 
him,  not  imposed  by  his  own  initiative ;  or,  finally, 
in  the  chase  and  partial  actions  of  May  28  and 
29,  1794,  in  which  persistence,  endurance,  and 
aptitude  are  alike  and  equally  displayed,  assuring 
to  him  beyond  dispute  the  credit  of  a  great  tac- 
tician. Accordingly,  in  direct  consequence  of 
what  has  been  noted,  it  is  as  a  tactician,  and  not 
as  a  strategist,  that  he  can  claim  rank ;  for  what- 
ever may  be  the  fundamental  identity  of  principles 
in  the  military  art,  whether  applied  to  strategy 
or  to  tactics,  it  in  the  end  remains  true  that  the 
tactician  deals  with  circumstances  immediately 
before  him  and  essentially  transient,  while  the 
strategist  has  to  take  wider  views  of  more  lasting 
conditions,  and  into  them  to  introduce  his  own 
conceptions  to  be  modifying  factors.  Creative 
thought  and  faculty  of  initiation  are  therefore 
more  characteristic  of  the  natural  endowments  of 
the  born  strategist.  There  is  also  more  room  for 
them  in  his  work,  because  in  the  larger  and  more 


270  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

complicated  field  there  is  greater  elasticity  and 
opportunity  to  effect  new  combinations,  to  con- 
trive which  makes  a  greater  call  upon  originative 
power. 

In  the  chain  of  eminent  typical  names  which 
leads  up  to  that  of  Nelson,  there  will  be  found 
between  Howe  and  his  next  conspicuous  suc- 
cessor, —  conspicuous,  that  is,  not  only  by  merit,  as 
was  Hood,  but  by  achievement,  which  was  denied 
to  Hood,  —  between  Howe  and  Jervis,  just  that 
difference  which  essentially  separates  the  tac- 
tician from  the  strategist :  the  lifting  of  the  eye 
from  the  moves  of  the  game  immediately  before 
one,  to  glance  over  the  whole  board,  to  view  the 
wider  field,  and  from  its  possibilities  to  form  con- 
ceptions directive  of  immediate  action  for  distant 
ends.  In  both  these  distinguished  general  offi- 
cers,—  for  such  both  were,  —  there  is  seen  a 
similar  close  attention  to  details,  based  upon  and 
guided  by  an  acquaintance  with  their  profession 
profound  as  well  as  extensive,  minute  as  well  as 
general ;  in  both  the  same  diligence  and  iron 
equanimity  in  difficult  situations,  although  in 
Jervis  the  impression  received  is  rather  that  of  a 
burden  borne  with  resolute  fortitude,  whereas  in 
Howe  the  burden  is  thrown  off  by  a  placid,  un- 
foreboding  temper;  but  in  the  adoption  of  meas- 
ures, those  of  Howe  will  be  found  generally  not  to 
extend  beyond  the  situation  immediately  before 
him,  by  which  they  are  dictated,  whereas  Jervis 
seeks  to  bend  circumstances  to  his  will,  according 


Howe  271 

to  a  conception  he  has  formed  of  what  the  situa- 
tion ought  to  be,  and  can  be  forced  to  become. 

The  idiosyncrasy  of  either  officer  is  emphasized 
in  their  respective  plans  of  campaign,  while  com- 
manding the  Channel  Fleet  during  the  French 
Revolution.  Howe  will  maintain  a  certain  sta- 
tion in  port,  keeping  his  fleet  there  in  hand, 
well  conditioned,  and  as  far  as  may  be  well 
drilled  ;  then,  when  the  French  do  something,  he 
also  will  do  something  to  counteract  them.  Jer- 
vis,  on  the  contrary,  confronting  substantially  the 
same  conditions,  frames  his  measures  with  a  view 
to  prevent  the  enemy  from  doing  anything,  and 
all  the  details  of  his  plan  rest  upon  this  one  idea, 
to  the  fulfilment  of  which  they  contribute.  He 
puts  the  fleet  at  once  into  the  position  of  action, 
instead  of  that  of  awaiting,  as  Howe  does.  Both 
are  charged  with  the  same  duty,  —  the  defence  of 
Great  Britain,  —  and  by  the  same  Government, 
which  evidently  in  each  case  frames  its  instruc- 
tions upon  the  ascertained  views  of  the  eminent 
officer  intrusted  with  the  work.  To  carry  out 
this  defensive  campaign,  Howe  of  his  own  choice 
narrows  his  strategic  plan  to  the  sheer  defensive, 
which  follows  the  initiative  of  the  enemy ;  Jervis 
of  set  purpose  seeks  the  same  object  by  offensive 
dispositions,  by  which  the  enemy  is  to  be  forced 
to  regulate  his  movements.  Howe  sees  the  de- 
fence of  the  empire  in  the  preservation  of  his 
own  fleet ;  Jervis  in  the  destruction  of  the  enemy. 
The  one  view  is  local,  narrow,  and  negative ;  the 


272  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

other  general,  broad,  and  positive.  As  often  hap- 
pens—  and  very  naturally  —  Jervis's  preoccupa- 
tion with  considerations  wider  than  his  own  com- 
mand found  expression,  twice  at  least,  in  phrases 
which  pithily  summed  up  his  steadfast  enduring 
habit  of  mind.  On  the  morning  of  St.  Vincent 
he  was  overheard  to  mutter,  "  A  victory  is  very 
necessary  to  England  at  this  time."  The  present 
odds  to  his  own  fleet,  twenty-seven  against  fifteen, 
disappeared  in  the  larger  needs  of  the  country. 
Again,  when  wrestling  with  the  perplexities  and 
exigencies  of  the  wild  Brest  blockade  in  mid- 
winter, in  January,  1801,  he  wrote  concerning 
repairs  to  his  own  vessels,  "  Under  the  present 
impending  storm  from  the  north  of  Europe,  and 
the  necessity  there  is  of  equipping  every  ship  in 
the  royal  ports  that  can  swim,  no  ship  under  my 
command  must  have  anything  done  to  her  at  Ply- 
mouth or  Portsmouth  that  can  be  done  at  this 
anchorage,"  —  at  Torbay,  an  open  though  partially 
sheltered  roadstead.  Here  again  is  seen  the  sub- 
ordination of  the  particular  and  personal  care  to 
the  broad  considerations  of  a  great  strategic 
emergency. 

The  series  of  diversions  upon  the  French  coast 
in  which  Howe  was  employed  during  1758,  ter- 
minated with  that  season,  and  he  returned  to  his 
own  ship,  the  Magnanime,  rejoining  with  her  the 
main  fleet  under  Hawke  in  the  great  Brest  block- 
ade of  1759.  The  French  Government,  after  four 
years  of  disaster  upon  the  continent,  of  naval 


Howe  273 

humiliation,  and  of  loss  of  maritime  and  colonial 
power,  had  now  realized  that  its  worst  evils  and 
chief  danger  sprang  from  the  sea  power  of  Great 
Britain,  and,  like  Napoleon  a  half-century  later, 
determined  to  attempt  an  invasion.  Its  prepa- 
rations and  Hawke's  dispositions  to  counteract 
them,  have  been  described  in  the  life  of  that 
admiral,  as  have  Rodney's  bombardment  of  Havre 
and  interception  of  coastwise  communications; 
all  directed  to  the  same  general  end  of  confound- 
ing designs  against  England,  but  no  longer  as 
mere  diversions  in  favor  of  Frederick.  Howe 
was  still  a  private  captain,  but  he  bore  a  charac- 
teristically conspicuous  part  in  the  stormy  final 
scene  at  Quiberon,  when  Hawke  drove  Conflans 
before  him  to  utter  confusion.  When  the  French 
fleet  was  sighted,  the  Magnanime  had  been  sent 
ahead  to  make  the  land.  She  was  thus  in  the 
lead  in  the  headlong  chase  which  ensued,  and  was 
among  the  first  in  action;  at  3  P.M.,  by  Howe's 
journal,  the  firing  having  begun  at  2.30,  according 
to  Hawke's  despatch.  The  foreyard  being  soon 
shot  away,  the  consequent  loss  of  manoeuvring 
power  impeded  her  captain's  designs  in  placing 
her,  but  she  remained  closely  engaged  throughout, 
compelling  one  French  vessel  to  strike  and  anchor 
alongside  her.  The  bad  weather  prevented  tak- 
ing possession  that  night  of  the  prize,  which,  in 
consequence,  availed  herself  of  her  liberty  by 
running  ashore,  and  so  was  lost  to  her  captors. 
The  Magnanime  was  reported  as  having  thirteen 

18 


274  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

killed  and  sixty-six  wounded,  out  of  a  total  of 
hurt  not  much  exceeding  three  hundred  in  the 
entire  fleet.  The  casualty  list  proves  exposure  to 
fire,  doubtless ;  but  is  no  sure  test  of  the  effective- 
ness of  a  vessel's  action.  The  certainty  of  Howe's 
conduct  in  this  affair,  otherwise  imperfectly  de- 
scribed, rests  on  a  broader  and  firmer  basis  of 
reputation,  won  by  unvarying  efficiency  in  many 
differing  capacities  and  circumstances. 

He  continued  to  serve,  but  without  further 
noteworthy  incident,  up  to  the  peace  made  in  the 
winter  of  1762-63.  From  that  time  until  the 
difficulties  with  the  American  colonies  came  to 
a  head  in  1775,  he  was  not  actively  employed 
afloat,  although  continuously  engaged  upon  pro- 
fessional matters,  especially  as  a  close  student  of 
naval  tactics  and  its  kindred  subjects,  to  which 
he  always  gave  sympathetic  attention.  During 
this  period,  also,  he  became  a  member  of  the 
House  of  Commons,  and  so  continued  until  trans- 
ferred from  the  Irish  peerage  to  that  of  Great 
Britain,  in  1782.  In  1770,  at  the  age  of  forty- 
five,  he  became  a  rear-admiral,  and,  as  has  been 
already  stated,  received  at  once  a  proof  of 
Hawke's  high  confidence,  by  being  appointed  to 
the  command  of  the  squadron  destined  for  the 
Mediterranean,  when  hostilities  concerning  the 
Falkland  Islands  threatened  with  Spain ;  a  dis- 
pute chiefly  memorable  as  the  means  of  bringing 
into  the  navy  both  Nelson  and  Exmouth.  In 
1775  he  was  promoted  to  vice-admiral,  and  in 


Howe  275 

February  of  the  following  year  was  appointed 
commander-in-chief  of  the  North  American  sta- 
tion. Together  with  his  military  duties,  he  was, 
as  has  before  been  said,  given  powers,  conjointly 
with  his  brother,  to  treat  for  the  settlement  of 
existing  troubles. 

Although  his  habitual  reticence  restrained  his 
sentiments  from  finding  expression  in  positive 
words,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  necessity 
of  raising  his  hand  against  the  Americans  caused 
Howe  keener  regret  than  it  did  to  many  of  his 
brother  officers.  He  took  instant  occasion  to 
address  to  Franklin  a  personal  note,  recalling 
their  former  association,  and  expressing  an  ear- 
nest hope  that  their  friendship  might  contribute 
something  to  insure  the  success  of  his  official 
mission.  In  the  five  years  that  had  elapsed,  how- 
ever, Franklin  had  been  in  the  heat  of  the  politi- 
cal struggle,  and,  philosopher  though  he  was, 
he  had  not  Howe's  natural  phlegm.  Hence,  his 
reply,  while  marked  by  respect  and  even  formal 
cordiality  toward  the  admiral  himself,  displayed  a 
vivacity  of  resentment  and  a  bitterness  for  which 
the  latter  had  scarcely  looked.  Still,  his  habitual 
equanimity  was  not  ruffled,  and  he  read  the  letter 
with  the  simple  comment,  "  My  old  friend  ex- 
presses himself  very  warmly." 

Howe's  arrival  antedated  the  signature  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  by  less  than  a 
week.  During  the  period  of  attempted  negotia- 
tion, while  scrupulously  faithful  to  his  instructions, 


276  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

he  showed  to  his  late  fellow-countrymen  all  the 
courtesy  and  consideration  that  the  most  cor- 
dial esteem  could  extend.  The  incident  of  the 
official  communication  addressed  by  the  Howes 
to  Washington,  in  which  they  sought  to  evade 
giving  him  the  title  of  "  General,"  is  sufficiently 
familiar;  but  it  is  more  rarely  recalled  that,  in 
verbal  intercourse  with  American  officers,  the 
admiral  habitually  styled  him  "  General  Wash- 
ington," and  sent  complimentary  messages  to 
him  as  such.  He  even  spoke  of  the  colonies  as 
"states,"  and  at  the  same  time  dwelt  with  evident 
emotion  upon  the  testimonials  of  respect  and 
affection  which  had  been  shown  to  his  brother's 
memory  by  the  colonists. 

To  narrate  Howe's  share  in  the  operations  by 
which  New  York  in  1776,  and  Philadelphia  in 
1777,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  British,  would  be 
only  to  repeat  well-known  historical  episodes, 
enlivened  by  few  or  no  incidents  personal  to 
himself.  In  them  the  navy  played  a  part  at  once 
subordinate  and  indispensable,  as  is  the  office  of 
a  foundation  to  its  superstructure.  The  cause 
of  the  Americans  was  hopeless  as  long  as  their 
waters  remained  in  the  undisputed  control  of  the 
enemy's  ships ;  and  it  was  the  attempt  of  Great 
Britain  to  cast  aside  this  essential  support,  and 
to  rely  upon  the  army  alone  in  a  wild  and  intri- 
cate country,  that  led  to  her  first  great  disaster, 
—  Burgoyne's  surrender  at  Saratoga.  Upon  this, 
France  at  once  recognized  the  independence  of 


Howe  277 

the  colonies,  and  their  alliance  with  that  king- 
dom followed.  A  French  fleet  of  twelve  ships-of- 
the-line  under  the  Count  D'Estaing,  left  Toulon 
April  15,  1778,  for  the  American  coast.  This 
force  far  exceeded  Howe's ;  and  it  was  no  thanks 
to  the  British  Government,  but  only  to  the  ad- 
miral's sleepless  vigilance  and  activity,  seconded, 
as  such  qualities  are  apt  to  be,  by  at  least  an 
average  degree  of  supineness  on  the  part  of  his 
antagonist,  that  his  scanty  squadron  was  not 
surprised  and  overpowered  in  Delaware  Bay, 
when  Sir  Henry  Clinton  evacuated  Philadel- 
phia to  retreat  upon  New  York.  Howe,  who 
had  the  defects  of  his  qualities,  whose  deliberate 
and  almost  stolid  exterior  evinced  a  phlegmatic 
composure  of  spirit  which  required  the  spur  of 
imminent  emergency  to  rouse  it  into  vehement 
action,  never  in  his  long  career  appeared  to 
greater  advantage,  nor  achieved  military  results 
more  truly  brilliant,  than  at  this  time,  and  up  to 
the  abandonment  of  the  attack  on  Rhode  Island 
by  the  Americans  under  Sullivan,  three  months 
later.  Then  only,  if  ever,  did  he  rise  above  the 
level  of  an  accomplished  and  resolute  general 
officer,  and  establish  a  claim  to  genius,  of  that 
order,  however,  which  is  not  originative  in  char- 
acter, but  signalized  by  an  infinite  capacity  for 
taking  pains ;  and  that  not  for  a  short  time 
merely,  but  through  a  long,  protracted  period  of 
strain.  The  display,  nevertheless,  does  not  as- 
sure him  a  place  in  the  front  rank  of  great  com- 


2y 8  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

manders,  whose  actions  find  their  source  in  the 
living  impulse  of  their  own  creative  energy ;  for 
it  is  elicited  by  extreme  circumstances  alone, 
by  obvious  pressure,  to  which  he  must  adapt 
himself.  This  he  does  with  unfailing  adequacy, 
indeed;  resolutely  checkmating,  but  never  initia- 
ting. Steady  as  a  rock,  like  a  rock,  also,  Howe 
only  gave  forth  sparks  under  blows  that  would 
have  broken  weaker  men. 

D'Estaing  was  twelve  weeks  in  coming  from 
Toulon  to  Cape  May,  but  Howe  knew  nothing  of 
his  sailing  until  three  weeks  after  he  had  started. 
Then  orders  were  received  to  abandon  Phila- 
delphia and  concentrate  upon  New  York.  The 
naval  forces  were  scattered,  and  had  to  be  col- 
lected ;  the  supplies  of  the  army,  except  those 
needed  for  the  march  across  Jersey,  were  to  be 
embarked  at  Philadelphia,  and  the  great  train  of 
transports  and  ships  of  war  moved  over  a  hundred 
miles  down  a  difficult  river,  and  thence  to  New 
York.  Despite  every  effort,  a  loss  of  ten  days 
was  incurred,  through  calms,  in  the  mere  transit 
from  Philadelphia  to  the  sea ;  but  during  this 
momentous  crisis  D'Estaing  did  not  appear. 
Two  days  more  sufficed  to  bring  the  fleet  into 
New  York  Bay  on  June  29th;  but  yet  the  grave 
admiral,  roused  to  the  full  tension  of  his  great 
abilities,  rested  not.  With  a  force  little  more 
than  half  that  coming  against  him,  he  knew  that 
all  depended  upon  the  rapidity  with  which  his 
squadron  took  the  imposing  position  he  had  in 


Howe  279 

mind.  Still  D'Estaing  tarried,  giving  to  his  un- 
tiring enemy  twelve  more  precious  days,  during 
which  the  army  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  reaching 
Navesink  beach  the  day  after  the  fleet,  was 
snatched  by  it  from  the  hot  pursuit  of  -the  disap- 
pointed Washington,  and  carried  safely  to  New 
York. 

In  the  expected  French  squadron  were  eight 
ships  of  seventy-four  guns  or  over,  with  three 
sixty-fours.  To  confront  these,  for  the  defence 
of  the  port,  Howe  disposed  of  six,  none  heavier 
than  a  sixty-four ;  but  they  were  ranged  to  com- 
mand the  entrance  of  the  harbor  upon  a  tactical 
plan  that  evinced  both  a  careful  study  of  the 
ground  and  the  resources  of  a  thorough  seaman. 
This  instance  alone,  had  Howe  never  done  any- 
thing else,  would  have  established  his  reputation 
as  a  tactician.  The  ships,  placed  in  echelon, 
and  enabled  to  turn  their  batteries  in  any  direc- 
tion, by  the  provision  of  springs  and  adaptation 
to  the  tide  conditions  at  the  moment  when 
alone  attack  would  be  possible,  could  concentrate 
their  entire  force  of  guns  upon  the  enemy,  rak- 
ing them  as  they  advanced  up  channel ;  while,  if 
they  succeeded  in  coming  abreast,  then  also  the 
broadsides  would  be  turned  upon  them.  When 
D'Estaing  at  last  came,  all  was  ready ;  the  en- 
ergy that  had  improved  every  fleeting  moment 
then  gave  place  to  the  imperturbable  resolution 
which  was  Howe's  greatest  attribute,  and  against 
which,  seconded  by  his  careful  preparation,  sue- 


280  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

cess  could  be  won  only  by  a  desperate  and  san- 
guinary struggle.  The  attempt  was  not  made. 
Ten  days  after  arriving,  the  French  admiral  again 
put  to-  sea,  heading  to  the  southward.  By  com- 
bined energy  and  skill  Howe  had  won  the  first 
move  in  the  game.  Clinton's  army  and  New 
York  were  saved. 

"  The  arrival  of  the  French  fleet,"  wrote  Wash- 
ington a  little  later,  "  is  a  great  and  striking  event ; 
but  the  operations  of  it  have  been  injured  by  a 
number  of  unforeseen  and  unfavorable  circum- 
stances, which  have  lessened  the  importance  of 
its  services  to  a  great  degree.  The  length  of  the 
passage,  in  the  first  instance,  was  a  capital  mis- 
fortune; for,  had  even  one  of  common  length 
taken  place,  Lord  Howe,  with  the  British  ships 
of  war  and  all  the  transports  in  the  river  Dela- 
ware, must  inevitably  have  fallen;  and  Sir  Henry 
Clinton  must  have  had  better  luck  than  is  com- 
monly dispensed  to  men  of  his  profession  under 
such  circumstances,  if  he  and  his  troops  had  not 
shared  at  least  the  fate  of  Burgoyne."  If  this 
narration  of  events  is  so  carefully  worded  as  not 
to  imply  a  censure  upon  D'Estaing,  it  none  the 
less,  however  unintentionally,  measures  the  great 
military  merit  of  Lord  Howe. 

Nor  did  this  end  his  achievements.  Two  or 
three  days  after  the  French  departed  a  small 
reinforcement  from  England  reached  New  York, 
and  in  the  course  of  a  week  Howe,  who  had  not 
failed  to  keep  touch  with  the  enemy's  fleet  till  it 


Howe  281 

was  ninety  miles  at  sea,  heard  that  it  had  been 
seen  again,  heading  for  Narragansett  Bay,  then 
controlled  by  a  British  garrison  on  Rhode  Island. 
This  was  in  pursuance  of  a  prearranged  plan  to 
support  the  American  forces  under  General  Sul- 
livan, which  had  already  advanced  against  the 
place.  Adapting  anew  his  action  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  enemy's  movements,  Howe,  though 
still  much  inferior,  hurried  to  the  spot,  arriving 
and  anchoring  off  Point  Judith,  at  the  entrance 
to  Newport,  on  August  gth,  the  day  after 
D'Estaing  had  run  the  fire  of  the  British  works 
and  entered  the  harbor.  With  correct  strategic 
judgment,  with  a  flash  of  insight  which  did  not 
usually  distinguish  him  when  an  enemy  was  not 
in  view,  and  contrary  to  his  avowed  policy  when 
commander  of  the  Channel  Fleet,  he  saw  that  the 
true  position  for  his  squadron  was  in  face  of  the 
hostile  port,  ready  to  act  as  circumstances  might 
dictate.  His  mere  presence  blocked  this  opera- 
tion also.  D'Estaing,  either  fearing  that  the 
British  admiral  might  take  the  offensive  and  gain 
some  unexpected  advantage,  or  tempted  by  the 
apparent  opportunity  of  crushing  a  small  hostile 
division,  put  to  sea  the  next  day.  Howe,  far  su- 
perior as  a  seaman  to  his  antagonist,  manoeuvred 
to  avoid  a  battle  with  a  force  superior  by  a  half 
to  his  own  ;  and  this  purpose  was  effected  by  his 
skilful  management  of  his  fleet,  aided  by  his  ad- 
versary's irresolution,  notwithstanding  that  the 
unusual  action  of  the  wind  thwarted  his  effort 


282  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

to  control  the  situation  by  gaining  the  weather 
gage.  Both  the  general  manoeuvres,  and  the 
special  dispositions  made  of  his  ships  to  meet 
the  successive  intentions  of  the  enemy,  as  they 
became  apparent,  showed  a  mind  fortified  by  pre- 
vious preparation  as  well  as  by  the  natural  self- 
possession  for  which  he  was  conspicuous.  It  was 
eminently  a  tactical  triumph. 

A  tremendous  gale  followed,  scattered  both 
fleets,  and  dismasted  several  of  the  French. 
D'Estaing  appeared  again  off  Rhode  Island  only 
to  notify  Sullivan  that  he  could  no  longer  aid 
him ;  and  the  latter,  deprived  of  an  indispensa- 
ble support,  withdrew  in  confusion.  The  disap- 
pointment of  the  Americans  showed  itself  by 
mobbing  some  French  seamen  in  Boston,  whither 
their  fleet  retired.  "  After  the  enterprise  upon 
Rhode  Island  had  been  planned,"  continues  Wash- 
ington, in  the  letter  above  quoted,  "  and  was  in 
the  moment  of  execution,  that  Lord  Howe  with 
the  British  ships  should  interpose  merely  to  cre- 
ate a  diversion,  and  draw  the  French  fleet  from 
the  island,  was  again  unlucky,  as  the  Count  had 
not  returned  on  the  iyth  to  the  island,  though 
drawn  from  it  on  the  loth;  by  which  the  whole 
was  subjected  to  a  miscarriage."  What  Wash- 
ington politicly  calls  bad  luck  was  French  bad 
management,  provoked  and  baffled  by  Howe's  ac- 
curate strategy,  untiring  energy,  consummate  sea- 
manship, and  tactical  proficiency.  Clinton's  army 
delivered,  the  forcing  of  New  York  frustrated, 


Howe  283 

Rhode  Island  and  its  garrison  saved,  by  a  squad- 
ron never  more  than  two  thirds  of  that  opposed 
to  it,  were  achievements  to  illustrate  any  career ; 
and  the  more  so  that  they  were  effected  by  sheer 
scientific  fencing,  like  some  of  Bonaparte's  great- 
est feats,  with  little  loss  of  blood.  They  form 
Howe's  highest  title  to  fame,  and  his  only  claim 
as  a  strategist.  It  will  be  observed,  however, 
that  the  characteristic  of  his  course  throughout  is 
untiring  and  adequate  adaption  to  the  exigencies 
of  the  situation,  as  momentarily  determined  by 
the  opponent's  movements.  There  is  in  it  no 
single  original  step.  Such,  indeed,  is  commonly 
the  case  with  a  strictly  defensive  campaign  by  a 
decisively  inferior  force.  It  is  only  the  rare  men 
who  solve  such  difficulties  by  unexpected  excep- 
tional action. 

It  is  indicative  of  Howe's  personal  feelings 
about  the  colonial  quarrel,  during  the  two  years 
in  which  he  thus  ably  discharged  his  official 
duties,  that  both  he  and  his  brother  determined 
to  ask  relief  from  their  commands  as  soon  as  it 
appeared  that  all  hopes  of  conciliation  were  over. 
The  appointment  of  other  commissioners  has- 
tened their  decision,  and  the  permission  to  return 
was  already  in  the  admiral's  hands  when  the 
news  of  D'Estaing's  coming  was  received.  Fight- 
ing a  traditional  foreign  foe  was  a  different  thing 
from  shedding  the  blood  of  men  between  whom 
and  himself  there  was  so  much  in  common  ;  nor 
was  Howe  the  man  to  dodge  responsibility  by 


284  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

turning  over  an  inferior  force,  threatened  by  such 
heavy  odds,  to  a  junior  officer  before  the  new  com- 
mander-in-chief  came.  His  resolution  to  remain 
was  as  happy  for  his  renown  as  it  was  creditable 
to  his  character.  After  the  brief  campaign  just 
sketched,  true  to  his  steady  previous  policy,  he 
followed  the  French  fleet  to  Newport  when  he 
heard  of  its  reappearance  there,  and  thence  to 
Boston,  coming  off  that  port  only  three  days  after 
it ;  but  finding  it  now  sheltered  under  shore  bat- 
teries, impregnable  to  his  still  inferior  numbers, 
and  learning  that  it  was  in  need  of  extensive 
repairs,  he  resigned  the  command  in  New  York 
to  a  rear-admiral,  and  departed  to  Newport  to  meet 
his  successor,  Vice-Admiral  Byron.  Upon  the 
latter's  arrival  he  sailed  for  England,  towards  the 
end  of  September,  1778.  General  Howe  had 
preceded  him  by  four  months. 

The  two  brothers  went  home  with  feelings 
of  great  resentment  against  the  ministry.  The 
course  of  the  war  had  so  far  been  unfortunate. 
The  loss  of  Boston,  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne, 
the  evacuation  of  Philadelphia,  and  finally  the 
entrance  of  France  into  the  contest,  constituted  a 
combination  of  mishaps  which  certainly  implied 
fault  somewhere.  As  usual,  no  one  was  willing 
to  accept  blame,  and  hot  disputes,  with  injurious 
imputations,  raged  in  Parliament.  There  is  here, 
happily,  no  necessity  for  apportioning  the  re- 
sponsibility, except  in  the  case  of  Lord  Howe ; 
and  as  to  him,  it  is  reasonably  clear  that  all  was 


Howe  285 

done  that  could  be  up  to  the  coming  of  the 
French,  while  it  is  incontestable  that  afterwards, 
with  a  force  utterly  inadequate,  for  which  the 
Government  was  answerable,  he  had  averted  im- 
minent disaster  by  most  masterly  management. 
His  words  in  the  House  of  Commons  were  bitter. 
"  He  had  been  deceived  into  his  command,  and 
he  was  deceived  while  he  retained  it.  Tired  and 
disgusted,  he  had  desired  permission  to  resign  it ; 
and  he  would  have  returned  as  soon  as  he  obtained 
leave,  but  he  could  not  think  of  doing  so  while  a 
superior  enemy  remained  in  American  seas  ;  that, 
as  soon  as  that  impediment  was  removed,  he 
gladly  embraced  the  first  opportunity  of  return- 
ing to  Europe.  Such,  and  the  recollection  of 
what  he  had  suffered,  were  his  motives  for  resign- 
ing the  command,  and  such  for  declining  any 
future  service  so  long  as  the  present  ministry 
remained  in  office." 

In  terms  like  these  could  officers  holding  seats 
in  Parliament  speak  concerning  the  Government 
of  the  day.  It  was  a  period  in  which  not  only 
did  party  feeling  run  high,  but  corruption  was  an 
almost  avowed  method  of  political  management. 
The  navy  itself  was  split  into  factions  by  political 
bias  and  personal  jealousies,  and  there  was  a  say- 
ing that  "  if  a  naval  officer  were  to  be  roasted, 
another  officer  could  always  be  found  to  turn  the 
spit."  The  head  of  the  Admiralty,  Lord  Sand- 
wich, was  a  man  of  much  ability,  but  also  of 
profligate  character,  as  well  public  as  private.  He 


286  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

doubtless  wished  the  success  of  his  department, 
—  under  the  terrible  chances  of  war  no  chief  can 
do  otherwise,  for  the  responsibility  of  failure  must 
fall  upon  his  own  head ;  but  through  corrupt 
administration  the  strength  of  the  navy,  upon  the 
outbreak  of  war,  had  been  unequal  to  the  work  it 
had  to  do.  Some  one  must  suffer  for  this  remiss- 
ness,  and  who  more  naturally  than  the  comman- 
der of  a  distant  station,  who  confessed  himself  "  no 
politician  "  ?  Hence,  Howe  certainly  thought, 
the  neglect  with  which  he  had  been  treated.  "  It 
would  not  be  prudent  to  trust  the  little  reputation 
he  had  earned  by  forty  years'  service,  his  personal 
honor  and  everything  else  he  held  dear,  in  the 
hands  of  men  who  have  neither  the  ability  to  act 
on  their  own  judgment,  nor  the  integrity  and 
good  sense  to  follow  the  advice  of  others  who 
might  know  more  of  the  matter."  A  year  later, 
it  was  roundly  charged  that  the  Channel  Fleet  had 
been  brought  home  at  a  most  critical  moment, 
losing  an  exceptional  opportunity  for  striking  the 
enemy,  in  order  to  affect  the  elections  in  a  dock- 
yard town.  Admiral  Keppel  considered  that  he 
had  been  sacrificed  to  party  feeling ;  and  a  very 
distinguished  officer,  Barrington,  refused  to  take 
a  fleet,  although  willing  to  serve  as  second,  even 
under  a  junior.  "  Who,"  he  wrote,  "  would  trust 
himself  in  chief  command  with  such  a  set  of 
scoundrels  as  are  now  in  office  ?  "  Even  a  quar- 
ter of  a  century  later,  Earl  St.  Vincent  gave  to 
George  III.  himself  the  same  reason  for  declin- 


Howe  287 

ing  employment.  After  eliciting  from  him  an 
unfavorable  opinion  as  to  the  discipline  and  effi- 
ciency of  the  Channel  Fleet,  the  king  asked, 
"  Where  such  evils  exist,  does  Lord  St.  Vincent 
feel  justified  in  refusing  his  conspicuous  ability 
to  remedy  them  ? "  "  My  life,"  replied  the  old 
seaman,  "is  at  your  Majesty's  disposal,  and  at 
that  of  my  country  ;  but  my  honour  is  in  my  own 
keeping,  and  I  will  not  expose  myself  to  the  risk 
of  losing  it  by  the  machinations  of  this  ministry, 
under  which  I  should  hold  command."  To  such 
feelings  it  was  due  that  Howe,  Keppel,  and  Har- 
rington did  not  go  to  sea  during  the  anxious 
three  years  that  followed  the  return  of  the  first. 
The  illustrious  Rodney,  their  only  rival,  but  in 
himself  a  host,  was  the  one  distinguished  naval 
chief  who  belonged  heart  and  soul  to  the  party 
with  which  Sandwich  was  identified. 

Thus  it  happened  that  Rodney's  period  of 
activity  during  the  war  of  the  American  Revolu- 
tion coincided  substantially  with  that  of  Howe's 
retirement.  The  same  change  of  administration, 
in  the  spring  of  1782,  that  led  to  the  recall  of  the 
older  man,  brought  Howe  again  into  service,  to 
replace  the  mediocrities  who  for  three  campaigns 
had  commanded  the  Channel  Fleet,  the  mainstay 
of  Great  Britain's  safety.  Upon  it  depended  not 
only  the  protection  of  the  British  Islands  and  of 
the  trade  routes  converging  upon  them,  but  also 
the  occasional  revictualling  of  Gibraltar,  now 
undergoing  the  third  year  of  the  famous  siege. 


288  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

Its  operations  extended  to  the  North  Sea,  where 
the  Dutch,  now  hostile,  flanked  the  road  to  the 
Baltic,  whence  came  the  naval  stores  essential  to 
the  efficiency  of  the  British  fleet ;  to  the  Bay  of 
Biscay,  intercepting  the  convoys  despatched  from 
France  to  her  navies  abroad  ;  and  to  the  Chops 
of  the  Channel,  where  focussed  the  trade  routes 
from  East  and  West,  and  where  more  than  once 
heavy  losses  had  been  inflicted  upon  British 
commerce  by  the  allies.  All  these  services 
received  conspicuous  and  successful  illustration 
during  Howe's  brief  command,  at  the  hands 
either  of  the  commander-in-chief  or  of  his  sub- 
ordinates, among  whom  were  the  very  dis- 
tinguished Barrington  and  Kempenfelt  Howe 
himself,  with  twenty-five  sail-of-the-line,  in  July 
encountered  an  allied  fleet  of  forty  off  Scilly. 
By  an  adroit  tactical  movement,  very  character- 
istic of  his  resolute  and  adequate  presence  of 
mind,  he  carried  his  ships  between  Scilly  and 
Land's  End  by  night,  disappearing  before  morn- 
ing from  the  enemy's  view.  He  thus  succeeded 
in  meeting  to  the  westward  a  valuable  Jamaica 
convoy,  homeward  bound,  and  taking  it  under 
his  protection.  The  allies  being  afterwards 
driven  south  by  a  heavy  gale,  the  vessels  of  war 
and  trade  slipped  by  and  reached  England  safely. 
Thus  does  good  luck  often  give  its  blessing  to 
good  management. 

To   relieve    Gibraltar,  however,   was   the   one 
really  great  task,  commensurate  to  his  abilities, 


Howe  289 

that  devolved  upon  Howe  during  this  short  com- 
mand. In  the  summer  of  1782,  the  Spaniards 
were  completing  ten  heavy  floating  batteries,  ex- 
pected to  be  impervious  to  shot  and  to  combus- 
tion, and  from  an  attack  by  which  upon  the  sea 
front  of  the  works  decisive  results  were  antici- 
pated. At  the  same  time  prolonged  blockade  by 
land  and  sea,  supported  by  forty-nine  allied  ships- 
of-the-line  anchored  at  Algeciras,  the  Spanish 
port  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Bay,  was  produc- 
ing its  inevitable  results,  and  the  place  was  now 
in  the  last  extremity  for  provisions  and  muni- 
tions of  war.  To  oppose  the  hostile  fleets  and 
introduce  the  essential  succors,  to  carry  which 
required  thirty-one  sail  of  supply  ships,  Great 
Britain  could  muster  only  thirty-four  of-the-line, 
but  to  them  were  adjoined  the  superb  professional 
abilities  of  Lord  Howe,  never  fully  evoked  except 
when  in  sight  of  an  enemy,  as  he  here  must  act, 
with  Barrington  and  Kempenfelt  as  seconds ;  the 
one  the  pattern  of  the  practical,  experienced, 
division  commander,  tested  on  many  occasions, 
the  other  an  officer  much  of  Howe's  own  stamp, 
and  like  him  a  diligent  student  and  promoter  of 
naval  manoeuvres  and  naval  signals,  to  the  devel- 
opment of  which  both  had  greatly  contributed. 
To  the  train  of  supply  ships  were  added  for  con- 
voy a  number  of  merchant  vessels  destined  to 
different  parts  of  the 'world,  so  that  the  grand 
total  which  finally  sailed  on  September  nth  was 
183.  While  this  great  body  was  gathering  at 


290  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

Spithead,  there  occurred  the  celebrated  incident 
of  the  oversetting  of  the  Royal  George  at  her 
anchors,  on  August  29th, 

"  When  Kempenfelt  went  down 
With  twice  four  hundred  men." 

Howe  thus  lost  the  man  upon  whom  principally 
he  must  have  relied  for  the  more  purely  tac- 
tical development  of  the  fleet,  opportunity  for 
which  he  anticipated  in  the  necessarily  slow  and 
graduated  progress  of  so  large  an  assemblage. 

The  occasion  was  indeed  one  that  called  for 
deliberation  as  well  as  for  calculated  audacity, 
both  controlled  by  a  composure  and  ability  rarely 
conjoined  to  the  same  great  extent  as  in  Howe. 
Circumstances  were  more  imminent  than  in  the 
two  previous  reliefs  by  Rodney  and  Darby ;  for 
the  greatly  superior  numbers  of  the  allies  were 
now  not  in  Cadiz,  as  before,  but  lying  only  four 
miles  from  the  anchorage  which  the  supply  ves- 
sels must  gain.  True,  certainly,  that  for  these  a 
certain  portion  of  their  path  would  be  shielded  by 
the  guns  of  the  fortress,  but  a  much  greater  part 
would  be  wholly  out  of  their  range ;  and  the 
mere  question  of  reaching  his  berth,  a  navi- 
gational problem  complicated  by  uncertain  winds, 
and  by  a  very  certain  current  sweeping  in  from 
the  Atlantic,  was  extremely  difficult  for  the  mer- 
chant skipper  of  the  day,  a  seaman  rough  and 
ready,  but  not  always  either  skilful  or  heedful. 
The  problem  before  Howe  demanded  therefore 


Howe  291 

the  utmost  of  his  seamanlike  qualities  and  of  his 
tactical  capacity. 

The  length  of  the  passage  speaks  for  the  delib- 
erate caution  of  Howe's  management,  as  his  con- 
duct at  the  critical  moment  of  approach,  and 
during  the  yet  more  critical  interval  of  accom- 
plishing the  entrance  of  the  supply  ships,  evinces 
the  cool  and  masterful  self-control  which  always 
assured  the  complete  and  sustained  exertion 
of  his  great  professional  powers  at  a  required 
instant.  Thirty  days  were  consumed  in  the  voy- 
age from  Spithead  to  Gibraltar,  but  no  transport 
was  dropped.  Of  the  huge  convoy  even,  it  is 
narrated  that  after  a  heavy  gale,  just  before  reach- 
ing Cape  Finisterre,  the  full  tally  of  183  was 
counted.  After  passing  that  cape,  the  traders 
probably  parted  for  their  several  destinations, 
each  body  under  a  suitable  escort  The  stoppages 
for  the  rounding-up  of  straying  or  laggard  vessels, 
or  for  re-establishing  the  observance  of  order 
which  ever  contributes  to  regulated  movement, 
and  through  it  to  success,  were  not  in  this  case 
time  lost  The  admiral  made  of  them  opportu- 
nities for  exercising  his  ships-of-the-line  in  the 
new  system  of  signals,  and  in  the  simple  evolu- 
tions depending  upon  them,  which  underlie  flexi- 
bility of  action,  and  in  the  day  of  battle  enable 
the  fleet  to  respond  to  the  purposes  of  its  com- 
mander with  reasonable  precision,  and  in  mutual 
support 

Such  drill  was  doubly  necessary,  for  it  not  only 


292  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

familiarized  the  intelligence  of  the  captains  with 
ideas  too  generally  neglected  by  seamen  until 
called  upon  to  put  them  into  practice,  and 
revealed  to  them  difficulties  not  realized  until 
encountered,  but  also  enforced  recognition  of 
the  particular  qualities  of  each  vessel,  upon  the 
due  observance  of  which  substantial  accuracy  of 
manoeuvre  depends.  The  experience  gained  dur- 
ing this  cruise,  going  and  returning,  probably 
opened  the  eyes  of  many  officers  to  unsuspected 
deficiencies  in  themselves,  in  handling  a  ship 
under  the  exigencies  of  fleet  tactics.  Howe  cer- 
tainly was  in  this  respect  disappointed  in  his  fol- 
lowers, but  probably  not  greatly  surprised.  At 
the  same  time  it  is  but  fair  to  note  that  the 
service  was  performed  throughout  without  any 
marked  hitch  traceable  to  want  of  general  pro- 
fessional ability.  A  French  writer  has  com- 
mented upon  this.  "  There  occurred  none  of 
those  events,  so  frequent  in  the  experiences  of 
a  squadron,  which  often  oblige  admirals  to  take 
a  course  wholly  contrary  to  the  end  they  have 
in  view.  It  is  impossible  not  to  recall  the 
unhappy  incidents  which,  from  the  Qth  to  the 
1 2th  of  April,  of  this  same  year,  befell  the 
squadron  of  the  Count  De  Grasse.  If  it  is  just 
to  admit  that  Lord  Howe  displayed  the  highest 
talent,  it  should  be  added  that  he  had  in  his 
hands  excellent  instruments." 

On  the  loth  of  October  the  fleet  and  store- 
ships  drew  nigh  the  Straits  of   Gibraltar.     On 


Howe  293 

that  day  it  was  rejoined  by  a  frigate,  which 
forty-eight  hours  before  had  been  sent  ahead  to 
communicate  the  approach  of  the  relief,  and  to 
concert  action.  She  brought  the  cheering  news 
of  the  victorious  repulse  by  the  British  of  the 
grand  attack  by  sea  and  land  upon  September 
1 3th,  with  the  entire  destruction  of  the  trusted 
floating  batteries.  Under  this  flush  of  national 
triumph,  and  with  a  fair  westerly  wind,  the  great 
expedition  entered  the  straits  on  October  nth, 
in  ranged  order  for  action.  The  convoy  went 
first,  because,  sailing  before  the  wind,  it  was  thus 
to  leeward  of  the  ships  of  war,  in  position  to  be 
immediately  defended,  if  attacked.  Two  squad- 
rons of  the  fleet  succeeded  them,  in  line-of-battle 
ahead,  formed  thus  for  instant  engagement,  Howe 
leading  in  the  Victory;  while  the  third  of  the 
squadrons  followed  in  reserve,  in  an  order  not 
stated,  but  probably  in  a  line  abreast,  sweeping 
a  broader  belt  of  sea,  and  more  nearly  under  the 
eye  of  the  Commander-in-chief,  who,  for  the  pur- 
poses of  the  present  operation,  had  left  his  tradi- 
tional post  in  the  centre.  Howe's  reasons  for 
this  change  of  position,  if  ever  stated,  have  not 
come  under  the  eyes  of  the  writer;  but  analysis 
shows  that  he  was  there  close  to  the  storeships, 
whose  safe  entrance  to  the  port  was  at  once  the 
main  object  of  the  enterprise  and  the  one  most 
critically  uncertain  of  achievement,  because  of 
the  general  bad  behavior  of  convoys.  There  he 
could  control  them  more  surelv.  and  at  the  same 


294  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

time  by  his  own  conduct  indicate  his  general 
purposes  to  subordinates,  who,  however  deficient 
in  distinctly  tactical  proficiency,  had  the  seaman- 
ship and  the  willingness  adequately  to  support 
him. 

At  6  P.  M.  the  supply  ships  were  off  the  mouth 
of  the  bay,  with  the  wind  fair  for  their  anchor- 
age ;  but,  although  full  and  particular  instruc- 
tions had  been  issued  to  them  concerning  cur- 
rents and  other  local  conditions,  all  save  four 
missed  the  entrance  and  were  swept  to  the  east- 
ward of  the  Rock.  The  fleet  of  course  had  to 
follow  its  charge,  and  by  their  failure  a  new  task 
confronted  Howe's  professional  abilities  and  en- 
durance. Fortunately  he  had  an  able  adviser  in 
the  captain  of  the  fleet,  who  had  had  long  experi- 
ence of  the  locality,  invaluable  during  the  trying 
week  that  ensued.  The  allies  had  not  yet  stirred. 
To  move  near  fifty  sail-of-the-line  in  pursuit  of  an 
enemy,  inferior  indeed,  but  ranged  for  battle,  and 
the  precise  moment  of  whose  appearance  could 
not  have  been  foreseen,  was  no  slight  under- 
taking, as  Nelson  afterwards  said.  It  may  be 
recalled  that  before  Trafalgar  over  twenty-four 
hours  were  needed  for  the  allied  thirty-three  to 
get  out  of  Cadiz  Bay.  On  the  i3th,  however, 
the  combined  French  and  Spaniards  sailed,  intent 
primarily,  it  would  seem,  not  on  the  true  and 
vital  offensive  purpose  of  frustrating  the  relief, 
but  upon  the  very  secondary  defensive  object  of 
preserving  two  of  their  own  numbers,  which  in 


Howe  295 

a  recent  gale  had  been  swept  to  the  eastward. 
Thus  trivially  preoccupied,  they  practically  neg- 
lected Howe,  who  on  his  part  stripped  for  action 
by  sending  the  supply  vessels  to  the  Zaffarine 
Islands,  where  the  vagarious  instincts  of  their 
captains  would  be  controlled  by  an  anchor  on 
the  bottom.  On  the  i4th  the  allies  bore  north 
from  the  British,  close  under  the  Spanish  coast, 
and  visible  only  from  the  mastheads.  On  the 
1 5th  the  wind  came  east,  and  the  convoy  and 
fleet  began  cautiously  to  move  towards  Gibraltar, 
the  enemy  apparently  out  of  sight,  and  certainly 
to  the  eastward.  On  the  evening  of  the  i6th 
eighteen  supply  ships  were  at  the  mole,  and  on 
the  1 8th  all  had  arrived.  Gibraltar  was  equipped 
for  another  year's  endurance. 

We  have  less  than  could  be  wished  of  particu- 
lars touching  this  performance  of  Howe's,  from 
the  day  of  leaving  England  to  that  of  fulfilment, 
five  full  weeks  later.  Inference  and  comment  has 
to  be  built  up  upon  incidents  transmitted  dis- 
connectedly, interpreted  in  connection  with  the 
usual  known  conditions  and  the  relative  strength 
of  the  two  opposing  parties.  To  professional 
understanding,  thus  far  supplemented,  much  is 
clear;  quite  enough,  at  the  least,  to  avouch  the 
deliberation,  the  steadiness,  the  professional  apti- 
tude, the  unremitting  exertion  that  so  well  sup- 
plies the  place  of  celerity,  —  never  resting,  if 
never  hasting,  —  the  calculated  daring  at  fit 
moments,  and  above  all  the  unfailing  self-posses- 


296  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

sion  and  self-reliance  which  at  every  instant  up  to 
.the  last  secured  to  the  British  enterprise  the  full 
value  of  the  other  qualities  possessed  by  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief. A  biographical  notice  of  Howe 
cannot  be  complete  without  quoting  the  tribute 
of  an  accomplished  officer  belonging  to  one  of  the 
navies  then  arrayed  against  him.  "  The  qualities 
displayed  by  Lord  Howe  during  this  short  cam- 
paign," says  Captain  Chevalier  of  the  French 
service,  "  rose  to  the  full  height  of  the  mission 
which  he  had  to  fulfil.  This  operation,  one  of 
the  finest  in  the  War  of  American  Independence, 
merits  a  praise  equal  to  that  of  a  victory.  If  the 
English  fleet  was  favored  by  circumstances,  —  and 
it  is  rare  that  in  such  enterprises  one  can  succeed 
without  the  aid  of  fortune,  —  it  was  above  all  the 
Commander-in-chief's  quickness  of  perception,  the 
accuracy  of  his  judgment,  and  the  rapidity  of  his 
decisions  that  assured  success." 

Having  accomplished  his  main  object  and 
landed  besides  fifteen  hundred  barrels  of  powder 
from  his  own  ships,  Howe  tarried  no  longer. 
Like  Nelson,  at  Gibraltar  on  his  way  to  St.  Vin- 
cent, he  would  not  trifle  with  an  easterly  wind, 
without  which  he  could  not  leave  the  Straits 
against  the  constant  inset ;  neither  would  he  ad- 
venture action,  against  a  force  superior  by  a  third, 
amid  the  currents  that  had  caused  him  so  trying 
an  experience.  There  was,  moreover,  the  im- 
portant strategic  consideration  that  if  the  allied 
fleets,  which  were  again  in  sight,  followed  him 


Howe  297 

out,  they  would  thereby  be  drawn  from  any  pos- 
sible molestation  of  the  unloading  of  the  supply 
ships,  which  had  been  attempted,  though  with 
no  great  success,  on  the  occasion  of  the  relief 
by  Darby,  in  1781.  Howe  therefore  at  once 
headed  for  the  Atlantic.  The  allies  pursued, 
and  engaged  partially  on  the  afternoon  and  even- 
ing of  October  2Oth ;  but  the  attack  was  not 
pushed  home,  although  they  had  the  advantage  of 
the  wind  and  of  numbers.  On  the  i4th  of  Novem- 
ber the  British  fleet  regained  Spithead.  It  may 
be  remarked  that  Admirals  Barrington  and  Mill- 
bank  both  praised  their  captains  very  highly,  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  order  in  their  respective 
divisions  during  this  action ;  the  former  saying 
it  "  was  the  finest  close  connected  line  I  ever 
saw  during  my  service  at  sea."  Howe,  who  held 
higher  ideals,  conceived  through  earnest  and  pro- 
longed study  and  reflection,  was  less  well  satis- 
fied. It  seems,  however,  reasonable  to  infer  that 
the  assiduity  of  his  efforts  to  promote  tactical 
precision  had  realized  at  least  a  partial  measure 
of  success. 

Another  long  term  of  shore  life  now  intervened, 
carrying  the  gallant  admiral  over  the  change- 
fraught  years  of  failing  powers  from  fifty-six  to 
sixty-seven,  at  which  age  he  was  again  called  into 
service,  in  the  course  of  which  he  was  to  perform 
the  most  celebrated,  but,  it  may  confidently  be 
affirmed,  not  the  most  substantial,  nor  even  the 
most  brilliant,  action  of  his  career.  During 


298  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

much  of  this  intermediate  period,  between  1783 
and  1788,  Howe  occupied  the  Cabinet  position 
of  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  the  civil  head 
and  administrator  of  the  Navy.  Into  the  dis- 
charge of  this  office  he  carried  the  same  quali- 
ties of  assiduous  attention  to  duty,  and  of  close 
devotion  to  details  of  professional  progress,  which 
characterized  him  when  afloat ;  but,  while  far 
from  devoid  of  importance,  there  is  but  little  in 
this  part  of  his  story  that  needs  mention  as 
distinctive.  Perhaps  the  most  interesting  in- 
cidents, seen  in  the  light  of  afterwards,  are  that 
one  of  his  earliest  appointments  to  a  ship  was 
given  to  Nelson ;  and  that  the  cordiality  of  his 
reception  at  the  end  of  the  cruise  is  said  to 
have  removed  from  the  hero  an  incipient  but 
very  strong  disgust  for  the  service.  "You  ask 
me,"  wrote  the  future  admiral  to  his  brother, 
"  by  what  interest  did  I  get  a  ship  ?  I  answer, 
having  served  with  credit  was  my  recommenda- 
tion to  Lord  Howe.  Anything  in  reason  that  I 
can  ask,  I  am  sure  of  obtaining  from  his  justice." 
At  the  outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution, 
Howe  stood  conspicuously  at  the  head  of  the 
navy,  distinguished  at  once  for  well-known  pro- 
fessional accomplishments  and  for  tried  capacity 
in  chief  command.  His  rivals  in  renown  among 
his  contemporaries  —  Keppel,  Harrington,  and 
Rodney  —  had  gone  to  their  rest.  Jervis,  Dun- 
can, Nelson,  Collingwood,  and  their  compeers, 
had  yet  to  show  what  was  in  them  as  general 


Howe  299 

officers.  Lord  Hood  alone  remained ;  and  he, 
although  he  had  done  deeds  of  great  promise, 
had  come  to  the  front  too  late  in  the  previous 
war  for  his  reputation  to  rest  upon  sustained 
achievement  as  well  as  upon  hopeful  indication. 
The  great  commands  were  given  to  these  two : 
Hood,  the  junior,  going  to  the  Mediterranean  with 
twenty  ships-of-the-line,  Howe  taking  the  Channel 
Fleet  of  somewhat  superior  numbers. 

The  solid,  deliberate,  methodical  qualities  of 
the  veteran  admiral  were  better  adapted  to  the 
more  purely  defensive  role,  forced  upon  Great 
Britain  by  the  allied  superiority  in  1782,  than  to 
the  continuous,  vigilant,  aggressive  action  de- 
manded by  the  new  conditions  with  which  he 
now  had  to  deal,  when  the  great  conflagration  of 
the  Revolution  was  to  be  hemmed  in  and  stamped 
out  by  the  unyielding  pressure  and  massive  blows 
of  the  British  sea  power.  The  days  of  regulated, 
routine  hostilities  between  rulers  had  passed 
away  with  the  uprising  of  a  people ;  the  time 
foretold,  when  nation  should  rise  against  nation, 
was  suddenly  come  with  the  crash  of  an  ancient 
kingdom  and  of  its  social  order.  An  admirable 
organizer  and  indefatigable  driller  of  ships,  though 
apparently  a  poor  disciplinarian,  Howe  lacked 
the  breadth  of  view,  the  clear  intuitions,  the 
alacrity  of  mind,  brought  to  bear  upon  the  problem 
by  Jervis  and  Nelson,  who,  thus  inspired,  framed 
the  sagacious  plan  to  which,  more  than  to  any 
other  one  cause,  was  due  the  exhaustion  alike 


300  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

of  the  Revolutionary  fury  and  of  Napoleon's  im- 
perial power.  Keenly  interested  in  the  material 
efficiency  of  his  ships,  as  well  as  in  the  precision 
with  which  they  could  perform  necessary  evolu- 
tions and  maintain  prescribed  formations,  he 
sought  to  attain  these  ends  by  long  stays  in  port, 
varied  by  formal  cruises  devoted  to  secondary 
objects  and  to  fleet  tactics.  For  these  reasons  also 
he  steadfastly  refused  to  countenance  the  system  of 
close-watching  the  enemy's  ports,  by  the  presence 
before  each  of  a  British  force  adequate  to  check 
each  movement  at  its  beginning. 

Thus  nursing  ships  and  men,  Howe  flattered 
himself  he  should  insure  the  perfection  of  the  in- 
strument which  should  be  his  stay  in  the  hour  of 
battle.  Herein  he  ignored  the  fundamental  truth, 
plainly  perceived  by  his  successor,  St.  Vincent,  that 
the  effectiveness  of  a  military  instrument  consists 
more  in  the  method  of  its  use,  and  in  the  practised 
skill  of  the  human  element  that  wields  it,  than  in 
the  material  perfection  of  the  weapon  itself.  It 
may  justly  be  urged  on  his  behalf  that  the  prepara- 
tion he  sought  should  have  been  made,  but  was  not, 
by  the  Government  in  the  long  years  of  peace. 
This  is  true;  but  yet  the  fact  remains  that  he 
pursued  his  system  by  choice  and  conviction 
repeatedly  affirmed  ;  that  continuous  instead  of 
occasional  cruising  in  the  proper  positions  would 
better  have  reached  the  ends  of  drill  ;  and  that  to 
the  material  well  being  of  his  ships  he  sacrificed 
those  correct  military  dispositions  before  the 


Howe  301 

enemy's  ports,  instituted  and  maintained  by 
Hawke,  and  further  developed  and  extended  by 
Jervis,  who  at  the  same  time  preserved  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  vessels  by  increased  energy  and 
careful  prevision  of  their  wants.  The  brilliant 
victory  of  the  ist  of  June  has  obscured  the 
accompanying  fact,  that  lamentable  failure  char- 
acterized the  general  strategic  use  of  the  Channel 
Fleet  under  Howe  and  his  immediate  successor. 

Once  in  sight  of  the  enemy,  however,  the  old 
man  regained  the  fire  of  youth,  and  showed  the 
attainments  which  long  study  and  careful  thought 
had  added  to  his  natural  talent  for  war,  enabling 
him  to  introduce  distinct  advances  upon  the  tac- 
tical conceptions  of  his  predecessors.  The  battle 
of  June  i,  1794,  was  brought  about  in  the  follow- 
ing manner.  Political  anarchy  and  a  bad  season 
had  combined  to  ruin  the  French  harvests  in 
1793,  and  actual  famine  threatened  the  land. 
To  obviate  this,  at  least  partially,  the  Government 
had  bought  in  the  United  States  a  large  quantity 
of  breadstuff s,  which  were  expected  to  arrive  in 
May  or  June,  borne  by  one  hundred  and  eighty 
merchant  vessels.  To  insure  the  safety  of  this 
valuable  convoy,  the  Brest  Fleet  was  sent  to  meet 
it  at  a  designated  point ;  five  ships  going  first, 
and  twenty-five  following  a  few  days  later.  Robes- 
pierre's orders  to  the  admiral,  Villaret-Joyeuse, 
were  to  avoid  battle,  if  possible,  but  at  all  hazards 
to  secure  the  merchant  fleet,  or  his  head  would 
answer  for  it. 


JO2  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

About  the  same  time,  Howe,  who  had  kept  his 
vessels  in  port  during  the  winter,  sailed  from  the 
Channel  with  thirty-two  ships-of-the-line.  These 
he  soon  divided  into  two  squadrons  ;  one  of  which, 
numbering  six,  after  performing  a  specific  service, 
was  not  ordered  to  rejoin  the  main  body,  but  to 
cruise  in  a  different  spot.  These  ships  were  sadly 
missed  on  the  day  of  battle,  when  they  could  have 
changed  a  brilliant  into  a  crushing  victory.  Howe 
himself  went  to  seek  the  French,  instead  of  tak- 
ing a  position  where  they  must  pass  ;  and  after 
some  running  to  and  fro,  in  which  the  British 
actually  got  to  the  westward  of  their  foes,  and 
might  well  have  missed  them  altogether,  he  was 
lucky  enough,  on  the  28th  of  May,  some  four 
hundred  miles  west  of  the  island  of  Ushant,  to 
find  the  larger  of  their  two  detachments.  This 
having  been  meanwhile  joined  by  one  ship 
from  the  smaller,  both  opponents  now  numbered 
twenty-six  heavy  vessels. 

The  French  were  to  windward,  a  position 
which  gives  the  power  of  refusing  or  delaying 
decisive  action.  The  average  speed  of  any  fleet, 
however,  must  fall  below  the  best  of  some  of  the 
force  opposed  to  it ;  and  Howe,  wishing  to  com- 
pel battle,  sent  out  six  of  his  fastest  and  handiest 
ships.  These  were  directed  to  concentrate  their 
fire  upon  the  enemy's  rear,  which,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  naval  tactics,  was  the  weakest  part 
of  a  line-of-battle  of  sailing  ships ;  because,  to 
aid  it,  vessels  ahead  must  turn  round  and 


Howe  303 

change  their  formation,  performing  a  regular 
evolution,  whereas,  if  the  van  be  assailed,  the 
rear  naturally  advances  to  its  help.  If  this  partial 
attack  crippled  one  or  more  of  the  French,  the 
disabled  ships  would  drift  towards  the  British, 
where  either  they  would  be  captured,  or  their  com- 
rades would  be  obliged  to  come  to  their  rescue, 
hazarding  the  general  engagement  that  Howe 
wanted.  As  it  happened,  the  French  had  in  the 
rear  an  immense  ship  of  one  hundred  and  ten 
guns,  which  beat  off  in  detail  the  successive 
attacks  of  her  smaller  antagonists ;  but  in  so 
doing  she  received  so  much  injury  that  she  left 
the  fleet  after  nightfall,  passing  the  British  un- 
molested, and  wrent  back  to  Brest.  One  of  her 
assailants,  also,  had  to  return  to  England;  but, 
as  the  relative  force  of  the  units  thus  clipped 
from  the  respective  opponents  was  as  three  to  two, 
the  general  result  was  a  distinct  material  gain  for 
Howe.  It  is  to  be  scored  to  his  credit  as  a  tacti- 
cian that  he  let  this  single  enemy  go,  rather  than 
scatter  his  fleet  and  lose  ground  in  trying  to  take 
her.  He  had  a  more  important  object. 

The  next  morning,  May  29th,  the  French  by 
poor  seamanship  had  lost  to  leeward,  and  were 
consequently  so'mewhat  nearer.  Both  fleets  were 
heading  southeasterly,  with  the  wind  at  south- 
southwest  ;  both,  consequently,  on  the  starboard 
tack.  Howe  saw  that,  by  tacking  in  succession, 
his  column  would  so  head  that  several  of  his  ves- 
sels in  passing  could  bring  the  hostile  rear  under 


304  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

their  guns,  and  that  it  was  even  possible  that 
three  or  four  might  be  cut  off,  unless  reinforced ; 
to  attempt  which  by  the  enemy  would  involve 
also  tactical  possibilities  favorable  to  the  Brit- 
ish. The  necessary  movement  was  ordered;  and 
the  French  admiral,  seeing  things  in  the  same 
light,  was  justly  so  alarmed  for  the  result  that  he 
turned  his  head  ships,  and  after  them  his  whole 
column  in  succession,  to  run  down  to  help  the 
rear.  Judicious,  and  indeed  necessary,  as  this 
was,  it  played  right  into  Howe's  hands,  and  was 
a  tribute  to  his  tactical  skill,  by  which  it  was 
compelled ;  for  in  doing  this  the  French  neces- 
sarily gave  up  much  of  their  distance  to  wind- 
ward, and  so  hastened  the  collision  they  wished 
to  avoid.  Although  the  attack  upon  their  rear 
was  limited  to  a  few  desultory  broadsides,  the 
two  fleets  were  at  last  nearly  within  cannon  shot, 
whereas  the  day  before  they  had  been  eight  or 
ten  miles  apart.  Both  were  now  on  the  port  tack, 
running  west  in  parallel  lines. 

Towards  noon,  Howe  saw  that  the  morning's 
opportunity  of  directing  his  whole  column  upon 
the  enemy's  rear  again  offered,  but  with  a  far 
better  chance ;  that  if  his  ships  manoeuvred  well 
half  a  dozen  of  the  French  must  be  cut  off,  unless 
their  admiral,  to  save  them,  repeated  his  previous 
manoeuvre  of  running  down  to  their  assistance, 
which  would  infallibly  entail  the  general  engage- 
ment sought  by  the  British.  The  signal  to  tack 
in  succession  was  again  made,  and  to  pass  through 


Howe  305 

the  enemy's  line ;  but  here  Howe's  purpose  was 
foiled,  as  Rodney's  on  April  iyth,  by  the  failure  of 
his  leading  vessel.  Her  captain,  like  Carkett, 
was  of  considerable  seniority,  having  commanded 
a  ship-of-the-line  under  Howe  at  New  York,  in 
1778.  His  conduct  during  this  brief  campaign 
was  so  unfavorably  noticed  by  his  admiral  that 
he  asked  a  Court-Martial,  which  dismissed  him 
from  his  ship,  though  clearing  him  of  cowardice. 
Upon  the  present  occasion  he  for  some  time 
delayed  obedience ;  and,  when  he  did  go  about, 
wore  instead  of  tacking,  which  lost  ground  and 
caused  confusion  by  going  to  leeward.  The 
second  ship  acted  well,  and  struck  the  French 
column  some  distance  from  its  rear,  proving 
Howe  right  in  judging  that  the  enemy's  order 
could  there  be  pierced.  As  this  vessel  was  not 
closely  supported,  she  received  such  injuries 
from  successive  fires,  that,  when  she  at  last 
found  an  opening  through  which  to  pass,  she  was 
unable  to  manoeuvre. 

Seeing  that  the  van  was  failing  him,  Howe, 
whose  flag-ship,  the  Queen  Charlotte,  was  tenth 
from  the  head  of  his  column,  now  took  the  lead 
himself,  tacked  his  own  vessel,  though  her  turn 
was  not  yet  come,  and,  accompanied  by  his  next 
ahead  and  astern,  —  another  striking  instance  of 
the  inspiring  influence  of  a  high  example,  — 
stood  straight  for  the  hostile  order.  The  three 
broke  through  astern  of  the  sixth  ship  from  the 
French  rear,  and  cut  off  two  of  the  enemy, 


306  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

which  were  speedily  surrounded  by  others  of 
the  British.  Villaret-Joyeuse  then  repeated  his 
former  evolution,  and  nothing  could  have  saved  a 
general  engagement  except  the  disorder  into  which 
the  British  had  fallen,  and  Howe's  methodical 
abhorrence  of  attacks  made  in  such  confusion  as 
prevailed.  Moreover,  the  decisive  result  of  this 
last  brush  was  that  the  French  entirely  lost  the 
windward  position,  and  the  British  admiral  knew 
that  he  now  had  them  where  they  could  not 
escape ;  he  could  afford  to  postpone  the  issue. 
Accordingly,  righting  ceased  for  the  day ;  but 
the  French  had  been  so  mauled  that  three  more 
ships  had  to  go  into  port,  leaving  them  but 
twenty-two  to  the  enemy's  twenty-five. 

To  appreciate  Howe's  personal  merit  as  a 
tactician,  reflection  should  be  bestowed  upon  the 
particulars  of  his  conduct  on  these  two  days, 
with  which  the  First  of  June  is  not  to  be  com- 
pared ;  for  in  them  culminated,  so  to  speak,  a 
long  course  of  preparation  in  the  study  of  tactical 
possibilities,  and  of  the  system  of  signals  needed 
to  insure  necessary  evolutions.  His  officers,  as 
a  body,  do  not  appear  to  have  deserved  by  their 
manoeuvring  the  encomium  passed  by  Rodney 
upon  his,  during  the  long  chase  to  windward  in 
May,  1780;  and,  as  Howe  had  now  held  com- 
mand for  a  year,  this  failure  may  probably  be 
assigned  to  lack  of  that  punctilious  severity  to 
which  Rodney  attributed  his  own  success.  But 
in  the  matter  of  personal  acquirement  Howe 


Howe 


307 


shows  a  distinct  advance  upon  Rodney's  ideas 
and  methods.  There  is  not  to  be  noted  in 
Rodney's  actions  any  foreshadowing  vof  the  judi- 
cious attack  upon  the  enemy's  rear,  on  May  28th, 
by  a  smart  flying  squadron.  This  doubtless  pre- 
sents some  analogy  to  a  general  chase,  but  there 
is  in  it  more  of  system  and  of  regulated  action ; 
in  short,  there  is  development.  Again,  although 
Rodney  doubtless  tacked  in  succession  repeatedly, 
between  May  gth  and  May  2oth,  in  his  efforts  to 
reach  the  enemy  to  windward,  there  does  not 
then  appear,  nor  did  there  appear  on  either  of 
the  two  occasions  when  he  succeeded  in  striking 
their  column  from  to  leeward,  any  intention,  such 
as  Howe  on  the  2Qth  communicated  by  signal 
and  enforced  by  action,  of  breaking  through  the 
enemy's  line  even  at  the  cost  of  breaking  his 
own.  Not  even  on  April  i2th  had  Rodney,  as  far 
as  appears,  any  such  formulated  plan.  There  is 
here,  therefore,  distinct  progress,  in  the  nature  of 
reflective  and  reasoned  development ;  for  it  is 
scarcely  to  be  supposed  that  Howe's  assiduity 
and  close  contact  with  the  navy  had  failed  to 
note,  for  future  application,  the  incidents  of 
Rodney's  battles,  which  had  been  the  subject 
of  animated  discussion  and  censure  by  eye- 
witnesses. 

It  will  be  recognized  that  the  conception  in 
Howe's  mind,  maintained  unchangeably  and 
carried  consistently  into  effect  during  these  two 
days,  was  to  attack  continually,  as  opportunity 


308  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

offered,  the  rear  end  of  the  enemy's  column,  which 
corresponds  precisely  with  the  attack  upon  the 
flank  of  a  line  of  battle  on  shore.  Merit  does 
not  depend  upon  result,  but  fortunate  result 
should  be  noted  for  the  encouragement  and 
guidance  of  the  future.  In  consequence  of  these 
sustained  and  judiciously  directed  movements, 
and  of  the  steps  found  necessary  by  the  French 
admiral  because  of  injuries  received,  the  enemy 
had  lost  from  their  line  four  ships,  of  which  one 
was  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  guns,  another  of 
eighty  ;  while  of  those  retained  one  had  lost  all  her 
spars  save  the  lower  masts,  and  had  thenceforth 
to  be  towed  in  action.  Against  this  was  to  be 
set  only  one  British  seventy-four,  disabled  on  the 
28th  and  returned  to  port ;  their  other  damaged 
vessels  refitted  at  sea  and  stayed  with  the  fleet. 
On  the  other  hand,  Howe's  separated  division  of 
six  remained  separated,  whereas  four  fresh  French 
ships  joined  their  main  fleet  on  the  3Oth.  Admir- 
able tactics  were  thus  neutralized  by  defective 
strategy;  and  therefore  it  may  with  substantial 
accuracy  be  said  that  Howe's  professional  qualities 
and  defects  were  both  signally  illustrated  in  this, 
his  last  conspicuous  service. 

The  French  admiral  on  the  evening  of  the 
29th  saw  that  he  now  must  fight,  and  at  a  dis- 
advantage ;  consequently,  he  could  not  hope  to 
protect  the  convoy.  As  to  save  this  was  his 
prime  object,  the  next  best  thing  was  to  entice 
the  British  out  of  its  path.  With  this  view  he 


Howe  309 

stood  away  to  the  northwest ;  while  a  dense  fog 
coming  on  both  favored  his  design  and  prevented 
further  encounter  during  the  two  ensuing  days, 
throughout  which  Howe  continued  to  pursue. 
In  the  evening  of  May  3ist  the  weather  cleared, 
and  at  daybreak  the  next  morning  the  enemies 
were  in  position,  ready  for  battle,  two  long 
columns  of  ships,  heading  west,  the  British  twenty- 
five,  the  French  again  twenty-six  through  the 
junction  of  the  four  vessels  mentioned.  Howe 
now  had  cause  to  regret  his  absent  six,  and  to 
ponder  Nelson's  wise  saying,  "Only  numbers 
can  annihilate." 

The  time  for  manoeuvring  was  past.  Able 
tactician  as  he  personally  was,  and  admirable  as 
had  been  the  direction  of  his  efforts  in  the  two 
days'  fighting,  Howe  had  been  forced  in  them  to 
realize  two  things,  namely,  that  his  captains  were, 
singly,  superior  in  seamanship,  and  their  crews 
in  gunnery,  to  the  French ;  and  again,  that  in 
the  ability  to  work  together  as  a  fleet  the  British 
were  so  deficient  as  to  promise  very  imperfect  re- 
sults, if  he  attempted  any  but  the  simplest  forma- 
tion. To  such,  therefore,  he  resorted;  falling  back 
upon  the  old,  unskilful,  sledge-hammer  fashion 
of  the  British  navy.  Arranging  his  ships  in  one 
long  line,  three  miles  from  the  enemy,  he  made 
them  all  go  down  together,  each  to  attack  a  speci- 
fied opponent,  coming  into  action  as  nearly  as 
might  be  at  the  same  instant.  Thus  the  French, 
from  the  individual  inferiority  of  the  units  of 


jio  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

their  fleet,  would  be  at  all  points  overpowered. 
The  issue  justified  the  forecast ;  but  the  manner 
of  performance  was  curiously  and  happily  marked 
by  Howe's  own  peculiar  phlegm.  There  was 
a  long  summer  day  ahead  for  fighting,  and  no 
need  for  hurry.  The  order  was  first  accurately 
formed,  and  canvas  reduced  to  proper  propor- 
tions. Then  the  crews  went  to  breakfast.  After 
breakfast,  the  ships  all  headed  for  the  hostile  line, 
under  short  sail,  the  admiral  keeping  them  in 
hand  during  the  approach,  as  an  infantry  officer 
dresses  his  company.  Hence  the  shock  from  end 
to  end  was  so  nearly  simultaneous  as  to  induce 
success  unequalled  in  any  engagement  conducted 
on  the  same  primitive  plan. 

Picturesque  as  well  as  sublime,  animating  as 
well  as  solemn,  on  that  bright  Sunday  morning, 
was  this  prelude  to  the  stern  game  of  war  about 
to  be  played :  the  quiet  summer  sea  stirred  only 
by  a  breeze  sufficient  to  cap  with  white  the  little 
waves  that  rufBed  its  surface ;  the  dark  hulls 
gently  rippling  the  water  aside  in  their  slow  ad- 
vance, a  ridge  of  foam  curling  on  either  side  of 
the  furrow  ploughed  by  them  in  their  onward  way ; 
their  massive  sides  broken  by  two,  or  at  times 
three,  rows  of  ports,  whence,  the  tompions  drawn, 
yawned  the  sullen  lines  of  guns,  behind  which,  un- 
seen, but  easily  realized  by  the  instructed  eye, 
clustered  the  groups  of  ready  seamen  who  served 
each  piece.  Aloft  swung  leisurely  to  and  fro  the 
tall  spars,  which  ordinarily,  in  so  light  a  wind, 


Howe  311 

would  be  clad  in  canvas  from  deck  to  truck, 
but  whose  naked  trimness  now  proclaimed  the 
deadly  purpose  of  that  still  approach.  Upon  the 
high  poops,  where  floated  the  standard  of  either 
nation,  gathered  round  each  chief  the  little  knot 
of  officers  through  whom  commands  were  issued 
and  reports  received,  the  nerves  along  which 
thrilled  the  impulses  of  the  great  organism,  from 
its  head,  the  admiral,  through  every  member  to 
the  dark  lowest  decks,  nearly  awash,  where,  as 
farthest  from  the  captain's  own  oversight,  the 
senior  lieutenants  controlled  the  action  of  the 
ships'  heaviest  batteries. 

On  board  the  Queen  Charlotte,  Lord  Howe, 
whose  burden  of  sixty-eight  years  had  for  four 
days  found  no  rest  save  what  he  could  snatch  in 
an  arm-chair,  now,  at  the  prospect  of  battle,  "dis- 
played an  animation,"  writes  an  eye-witness,  "  of 
which,  at  his  age,  and  after  such  fatigue  of  body 
and  mind,  I  had  not  thought  him  capable.  He 
seemed  to  contemplate  the  result  as  one  of  un- 
bounded satisfaction."  By  his  side  stood  his 
fleet-captain,  Curtis,  of  whose  service  among  the 
floating  batteries,  and  during  the  siege  of  Gib- 
raltar, the  governor  of  the  fortress  had  said,  "  He 
is  the  man  to  whom  the  king  is  chiefly  indebted 
for  its  security;"  and  Codrington,  then  a  lieuten- 
ant, who  afterwards  commanded  the  allied  fleets  at 
Navarino.  Five  ships  to  the  left,  Collingwood, 
in  the  Barfleur,  was  making  to  the  admiral  whose 
flag  she  bore  the  remark  that  stirred  Thackeray: 


Types  of  Naval  Officers 


"  Our  wives  are  now  about  going  to  church, 
but  we  will  ring  about  these  Frenchmen's  ears  a 
peal  which  will  drown  their  bells."  The  French 
officers,  both  admirals  and  captains,  were  mainly 
unknown  men,  alike  then  and  thereafter.  The 
fierce  flames  of  the  Revolution  had  swept  away 
the  men  of  the  old  school,  mostly  aristocrats, 
and  time  had  not  yet  brought  forward  the  very 
few  who  during  the  Napoleonic  period  showed 
marked  capacity.  The  commander-in-chief,  Vil- 
laret-Joyeuse,  had  three  years  before  been  a  lieu- 
tenant. He  had  a  high  record  for  gallantry,  but 
was  without  antecedents  as  a  general  officer. 
With  him,  on  the  poop  of  the  Montagne,  which 
took  her  name  from  Robespierre's  political  sup- 
porters, stood  that  anomalous  companion  of  the 
generals  and  admirals  of  the  day,  the  Revolution- 
ary commissioner,  Jean  Bon  Saint-Andre,  about 
to  learn  by  experience  the  practical  working  of 
the  system  he  had  advocated,  to  disregard  all  tests 
of  ability  save  patriotism  and  courage,  deprecia- 
ting practice  and  skill  as  unnecessary  to  the  valor 
of  the  true  Frenchman. 

As  the  British  line  drew  near  the  French, 
Howe  said  to  Curtis,  "  Prepare  the  signal  for 
close  action."  "  There  is  no  such  signal,"  replied 
Curtis.  "  No,"  said  the  admiral,  "  but  there  is 
one  for  closer  action,  and  I  only  want  that  to  be 
made  in  case  of  captains  not  doing  their  duty." 
Then  closing  a  little  signal  book  he  always  car- 
ried, he  continued  to  those  around  him,  "  Now, 


Howe  313 

gentlemen,  no  more  book,  no  more  signals.  I 
look  to  you  to  do  the  duty  of  the  Queen  Char- 
lotte in  engaging  the  flag-ship.  I  don't  want  the 
ships  to  be  bilge  to  bilge,  but  if  you  can  lock  the 
yardarms,  so  much  the  better;  the  battle  will  be 
the  quicker  decided."  His  purpose  was  to  go 
through  the  French  line,  and  fight  the  Montagne 
on  the  far  side.  Some  doubted  their  succeed- 
ing, but  Howe  overbore  them.  "That's  right, 
my  lord !  "  cried  Bowen,  the  sailing-master,  who 
looked  to  the  ship's  steering.  "  The  Charlotte 
will  make  room  for  herself."  She  pushed  close 
under  the  French  ship's  stern,  grazing  her  ensign, 
and  raking  her  from  stern  to  stem  with  a  wither- 
ing fire,  beneath  which  fell  three  hundred  men. 
A  length  or  two  beyond  lay  the  French  Jacobin. 
-Howe  ordered  the  Charlotte  to  luff,  and  place 
herself  between  the  two.  "  If  we  do,"  said  Bowen, 
"  we  shall  be  on  board  one  of  them."  "  What  is 
that  to  you,  sir?  "  asked  Howe  quickly.  "  Oh  !  " 
muttered  the  master,  not  inaudibly.  "  D — n  my 
eyes  if  I  care,  if  you  don't.  I  '11  go  near  enough 
to  singe  some  of  our  whiskers."  And  then,  see- 
ing by  the  Jacobins  rudder  that  she  was  going 
off,  he  brought  the  Charlotte  sharp  round,  her  jib 
boom  grazing  the  second  Frenchman  as  her  side 
had  grazed  the  flag  of  the  first. 

From  this  moment  the  battle  raged  furiously 
from  end  to  end  of  the  field  for  nearly  an  hour, 
—  a  wild  scene  of  smoke  and  confusion,  under 
cover  of  which  many  a  fierce  ship  duel  was 


314  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

fought,  while  here  and  there  men  wandered,  lost, 
in  a  maze  of  bewilderment  that  neutralized  their 
better  judgment.  An  English  naval  captain  tells 
a  service  tradition  of  one  who  was  so  busy  watch- 
ing the  compass,  to  keep  his  position  in  the  ranks, 
that  he  lost  sight  of  his  antagonist,  and  never 
again  found  him.  Many  a  quaint  incident  passed, 
recorded  or  unrecorded,  under  that  sulphurous 
canopy.  A  British  ship,  wholly  dismasted,  lay 
between  two  enemies,  her  captain  desperately 
wounded.  A  murmur  of  surrender  was  some- 
where heard ;  but  as  the  first  lieutenant  checked 
it  with  firm  authority,  a  cock  flew  upon  the  stump 
of  a  mast  and  crowed  lustily.  The  exultant  note 
found  quick  response  in  hearts  not  given  to 
despair,  and  a  burst  of  merriment,  accompanied 
with  three  cheers,  replied  to  the  bird's  triumphant 
scream.  On  board  the  Brunswick,  in  her  struggle 
with  the  Vengeur,  one  of  the  longest  and  fiercest 
fights  the  sea  has  ever  seen,  the  cocked  hat  was 
shot  off  the  effigy  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick, 
which  she  bore  as  a  figure-head.  A  deputation 
from  the  crew  gravely  requested  the  captain  to 
allow  the  use  of  his  spare  chapeau,  which  was 
securely  nailed  on,  and  protected  his  grace's  wig 
during  the  rest  of  the  action.  After  this  battle 
with  the  ships  of  the  new  republic,  the  partisans 
of  monarchy  noted  with  satisfaction  that,  among 
the  many  royal  figures  that  surmounted  the  stems 
of  the  British  fleet,  not  one  lost  his  crown.  Of  a 
harum-scarum  Irish  captain  are  told  two  droll 


Howe  315 

stories.  After  being  hotly  engaged  for  some  time 
with  a  French  ship,  the  fire  of  the  latter  slackened, 
and  then  ceased.  He  called  to  know  if  she  had 
surrendered.  The  reply  was,  "  No."  "  Then," 
shouted  he,  "d — n  you,  why  don't  you  fire?" 
Having  disposed  of  his  special  antagonist  without 
losing  his  own  spars,  the  same  man  kept  along  in 
search  of  new  adventures,  until  he  came  to  a 
British  ship  totally  dismasted  and  otherwise 
badly  damaged.  She  was  commanded  by  a  cap- 
tain of  rigidly  devout  piety.  "  Well,  Jemmy," 
hailed  the  Irishman,  "  you  are  pretty  well  mauled ; 
but  never  mind,  Jemmy,  whom  the  Lord  loveth 
he  chasteneth." 

The  French  have  transmitted  to  us  less  of 
anecdote,  nor  is  it  easy  to  connect  the  thought  of 
humor  with  those  grimly  earnest  republicans 
and  the  days  of  the  Terror.  There  is,  indeed, 
something  unintentionally  funny  in  the  remark 
of  the  commander  of  one  of  the  captured  ships  to 
his  captors.  They  had,  it  was  true,  dismasted 
half  the  French  fleet,  and  had  taken  over  a  fourth  ; 
yet  he  assured  them  it  could  not  be  considered  a 
victory,  "  but  merely  a  butchery,  in  which  the 
British  had  shown  neither  science  nor  tactics." 
The  one  story,  noble  and  enduring,  that  will  ever 
be  associated  with  the  French  on  the  ist  of  June 
is  in  full  keeping  with  the  temper  of  the  times 
and  the  enthusiasm  of  the  nation.  The  seventy- 
four-gun  ship  Vengeur,  after  a  three  hours'  fight, 
yardarm  to  yardarm,  with  the  British  Brunswick, 


316  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

was  left  in  a  sinking  state  by  her  antagonist,  who 
was  herself  in  no  condition  to  help.  In  the  con- 
•  fusion,  the  Vengeur  s  peril  was  for  some  time  not 
observed ;  and  when  it  was,  the  British  ships  that 
came  to  her  aid  had  time  only  to  remove  part  of 
her  survivors.  In  their  report  of  the  event  the 
latter  said  :  "  Scarcely  had  the  boats  pulled  clear 
of  the  sides,  when  the  most  frightful  spectacle 
was  offered  to  our  gaze.  Those  of  our  comrades 
who  remained  on  board  the  Vengeur  du  Peuple, 
with  hands  raised  to  heaven,  implored,  with 
lamentable  cries,  the  help  for  which  they  could  no 
longer  hope.  Soon  disappeared  the  ship  and  the 
unhappy  victims  it  contained.  In  the  midst  of 
the  horror  with  which  this  scene  inspired  us  all, 
we  could  not  avoid  a  feeling  of  admiration  mingled 
with  our  grief.  As  we  drew  away,  we  heard  some 
of  our  comrades  still  offering  prayers  for  the 
welfare  of  their  country.  The  last  cries  of  these 
unfortunates  were,  *  Vive  la  Republique ! '  They 
died  uttering  them."  Over  a  hundred  Frenchmen 
thus  went  down. 

Seven  French  ships  were  captured,  including 
the  sunk  Vengeur.  Five  more  were  wholly  dis- 
masted, but  escaped,  —  a  good  fortune  mainly  to 
be  attributed  to  Howe's  utter  physical  prostration, 
due  to  his  advanced  years  and  the  continuous 
strain  of  the  past  five  days.  He  now  went  to 
bed,  completely  worn  out.  "We  all  got  round 
him,"  wrote  an  officer,  Lieutenant  Codrington, 
who  was  present ;  "  indeed,  I  saved  him  from  a 


Howe  317 

tumble,  he  was  so  weak  that  from  a  roll  of  the  ship 
he  was  nearly  falling  into  the  waist.  '  Why,  you 
hold  me  up  as  if  I  were  a  child,'  he  said  good- 
humoredly."  Had  he  been  younger,  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  the  fruits  of  victory  would  have 
been  gathered  with  an  ardor  which  his  assistant, 
Curtis,  failed  to  show.  The  fullest  proof  of  this 
is  the  anecdote,  already  quoted  in  the  sketch  of 
Rodney,1  which  has  been  transmitted  by  Admiral 
Sir  Byam  Martin  direct  from  the  sailing-master 
of  the  Queen  Charlotte,  afterwards  Admiral 
Bowen  ;  but  his  account  is  abundantly  confirmed 
by  other  officers,  eye  and  ear  witnesses.  Taken 
in  connection  with  these,  Codrington's  story  of  his 
physical  weakness  bears  the  note,  not  of  pathos 
only,  but  of  encouragement ;  for  the  whole  testifies 
assuredly  to  the  persistence,  through  great  bodily 
debility,  of  a  strong  quality  diligently  cultivated 
in  the  days  of  health  and  vigor.  In  truth,  it 
was  impossible  for  Howe  to  purpose  otherwise. 
Having  been  continuously  what  he  was  in  his 
prime,  it  could  not  be  that  he  would  not  intend, 
with  all  the  force  of  his  will,  to  persevere  to  the 
utmost  in  the  duty  before  him.  The  faithfulness 
of  a  life-time  does  not  so  forsake  a  man  in  his 
end.  What  he  lacked  in  that  critical  hour  was 
not  the  willing  mind,  but  the  instrument  by  which 
to  communicate  to  the  fleet  the  impulse  which 
his  own  failing  powers  were  no  longer  able  directly 
to  impart. 

1  Ante,  p,  250. 


318  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

Lord  Howe's  career  practically  ended  with  this 
battle  and  the  honors  that  followed  it.  Infirm- 
ities then  gained  rapidly  upon  him,  and  it  would 
have  been  well  had  his  own  wish  to  retire  been 
granted  by  the  Government.  He  remained  in 
nominal  command  of  the  Channel  Fleet,  though 
not  going  to  sea,  until  the  occurrence  of  the  great 
mutinies  of  1797.  The  suppression  —  or,  more 
properly,  the  composing  —  of  this  ominous  out- 
break was  devolved  upon  him  by  the  ministry. 
He  very  wisely  observed  that  "  preventive  meas- 
ures rather  than  corrective  are  to  be  preferred 
for  preserving  discipline  in  fleets  and  armies;" 
but  it  was  in  truth  his  own  failure  to  use  such 
timely  remedies,  owing  to  the  lethargy  of  increas- 
ing years,  acting  upon  a  temperament  naturally 
indulgent  and  unapprehensive,  that  was  largely 
responsible  for  disorders  of  whose  imminence  he 
had  warning.  From  the  military  standpoint,  the 
process  of  settlement  had  much  the  air  of  opera 
bouffe,  —  a  consummation  probably  inevitable 
when  just  grievances  and  undeniable  hardships 
get  no  attention  until  the  sufferers  break  through 
all  rules,  and  seek  redress  by  force.  The  mutinous 
seamen  protested  to  Howe  the  bitterness  of  their 
sorrow  at  the  sense  of  wrong  doing,  but  in  the 
same  breath  insisted  that  their  demands  must  be 
conceded,  and  that  certain  obnoxious  officers  must 
be  removed  from  their  ships.  The  demands  were 
yielded,  Howe  gently  explaining  to  the  men  how 
naughty  they  had  been ;  and  that,  as  to  the 


Howe 


319 


unpopular  officers,  they  themselves  asked  relief 
from  so  unpleasant  a  situation.  In  his  curiously 
involved  style,  he  wrote  :  "  This  request  has  been 
complied  with,  under  the  pretext  of  an  equal 
desire  on  the  part  of  the  officers  not  to  be 
employed  in  ships  where  exception,  without 
specification  of  facts,  has  been  taken  to  their 
conduct.  However  ineligible  the  concession,  it 
was  become  indispensably  necessary."  Under 
this  thin  veil,  men  persuaded  themselves  that 
appearances  were  saved,  as  a  woman  hides  a  smile 
behind  her  fan.  Admiral  Codrington,  a  firm 
admirer  of  Howe,  justly  said :  "  It  was  want  of 
discipline  which  led  to  the  discontent  and  mutiny 
in  the  Channel  Fleet.  Lord  Howe  got  rid  of  the 
mutiny  by  granting  the  men  all  they  asked ;  but 
discipline  was  not  restored  until  the  ships  most 
remarkable  for  misconduct  had  been,  one  after 
the  other,  placed  under  the  command  of  Lord  St. 
Vincent." 

With  the  settlement  of  this  mutiny  Lord 
Howe's  long  career  of  active  service  closed. 
Immediately  afterwards  he  retired  formally,  as 
he  sometime  before  had  actually,  from  the  com- 
mand of  the  Channel  Fleet,  and  on  the  5th  of 
August,  1 799,  he  died  full  of  years  and  honors ; 
having  lived  just  long  enough  to  welcome  the  ris- 
ing star  of  Nelson's  glory  as  it  burst  upon  men's 
sight  at  Cape  St.  Vincent  and  the  Nile. 


J  E  R  V  I  S 

1735-1823 

THE  renown  of  Nelson  is  part  of  the  her- 
itage of  the  world.  His  deeds,  although 
their  full  scope  and  real  significance  have  been 
but  little  understood,  stand  out  conspicuous 
among  a  host  of  lesser  achievements,  and  are 
become  to  mankind  the  symbol  of  Great  Britain's 
maritime  power  in  that  tremendous  era  when  it 
drove  the  French  Revolution  back  upon  itself, 
stifling  its  excesses,  and  so  insuring  the  survival 
of  the  beneficent  tendencies  which  for  a  time 
seemed  well  nigh  lost  in  the  madness  of  the 
nation. 

The  appearance  of  a  prodigy  like  Nelson,  how- 
ever, is  not  an  isolated  event,  independent  of 
antecedents.  It  is  the  result  of  a  happy  meeting 
of  genius  and  opportunity.  The  hour  has  come, 
and  the  man.  Other  men  have  labored,  and  the 
hero  enters  into  their  labors;  not  unjustly,  for 
thereto  he  also  has  been  appointed  by  those 
special  gifts  which  fit  him  to  reap  as  theirs  fitted 
them  to  sow.  In  relation  to  Nelson  and  his 
career,  the  illustrious  officer  whose  most  distin- 


Jervis  321 

guishing  characteristics  we  have  now  to  trace 
stood  pre-eminent  among  many  forerunners.  It 
was  he,  above  all  others,  who  made  the  prepara- 
tion indispensable  to  the  approaching  triumphal 
progress  of  the  first  of  British  naval  heroes,  so 
that  his  own  work,  underlies  that  of  his  successor, 
as  foundation  supports  superstructure.  There  is 
not  between  them  the  vital  connection  of  root  to 
branch,  of  plant  to  fruit.  In  the  matter  of  pro- 
fessional kinship  Nelson  has  far  more  in  common 
with  Hood.  Between  these  there  is  an  identity 
of  kind,  an  orderly  sequence  of  development,  an 
organic  bond,  such  as  knits  together  the  series 
of  a  progressive  evolution.  It  is  not  so  with 
Jervis.  Closely  conjoined  as  the  two  men  long 
were  in  a  common  service,  and  in  mutual  admira- 
tion and  sympathy,  it  would  be  an  error  to  think 
of  the  elder  as  in  any  sense  the  professional  pro- 
genitor of  the  younger  ;  yet  he  was,  as  it  were,  an 
adoptive  father,  who  from  the  first  fostered,  and 
to  the  last  gloried  in,  the  genius  which  he  con- 
fessed unparalleled.  "  It  does  not  become  me  to 
make  comparisons,"  he  wrote  after  Copenhagen  ; 
"all  agree  that  there  is  but  one  Nelson."  And 
when  the  great  admiral  had  been  ten  years  in  his 
grave,  he  said  of  an  officer's  gallant  conduct  at 
the  Battle  of  Algiers,  "  He  seems  to  have  felt 
Lord  Nelson's  eye  upon  him ;"  as  though  no 
stronger  motive  could  be  felt  nor  higher  praise 
given. 

John  Jervis  was  born  on  the  2oth  of  January, 


322  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

1 735,  at  Meaford,  in  Staffordshire.  He  was  in- 
tended for  his  father's  profession,  the  law  ;  but, 
by  his  own  account,  a  disinclination  which  was 
probably  natural  became  invincible  through  the 
advice  of  the  family  coachman.  "  Don't  be  a 
lawyer,  Master  Jacky,"  said  the  old  man ;  "  all 
lawyers  are  rogues."  Some  time  later,  his  father 
receiving  the  appointment  of  auditor  to  Green- 
wich Hospital,  the  family  removed  to  the  neigh- 
borhood of  London ;  and  there  young  Jervis, 
being  thrown  in  contact  with  ships  and  seamen, 
and  particularly  with  a  midshipman  of  his  own 
age,  became  confirmed  in  his  wish  to  go  to  sea. 
Failing  to  get  his  parents'  consent,  he  ran  away 
towards  the  close  of  the  year  1747.  From  this 
escapade  he  was  brought  back;  but  his  father, 
seeing  the  uselessness  of  forcing  the  lad's  incli- 
nations, finally  acquiesced,  though  it  seems  likely, 
from  his  after  conduct,  that  it  was  long  before 
he  became  thoroughly  reconciled  to  the  dis- 
appointment. 

In  January,  1748,  the  future  admiral  and  peer 
first  went  afloat  in  a  ship  bound  to  the  West 
Indies.  The  time  was  inauspicious  for  one  mak- 
ing the  navy  his  profession.  The  war  of  the 
Austrian  succession  had  just  been  brought  to  an 
end  by  the  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  and  the 
monotonous  discomfort  of  hard  cruising,  unre- 
lieved by  the  excitements  of  battle  or  the  flush  of 
prize-taking,  was  the  sole  prospect  of  one  whose 
narrow  means  debarred  him  from  such  pleas- 


Jervis  323 

ures  as  the  station  afforded  and  youth  naturally 
prompted  him  to  seek.  His  pay  was  little  over 
twenty  pounds  a  year,  and  his  father  had  not 
felt  able  to  give  more  than  that  sum  towards 
his  original  outfit.  After  being  three  years  on 
board,  practising  a  rigid  economy  scarcely  to  be 
expected  in  one  of  his  years,  the  lad  of  sixteen 
drew  a  bill  upon  home  for  twenty  pounds  more. 
It  came  back  dishonored.  The  latent  force  of  his 
character  was  at  once  aroused.  To  discharge 
the  debt,  he  disposed  of  his  pay  tickets  at  a  heavy 
discount ;  sold  his  bed,  and  for  three  years  slept 
on  the  deck  ;  left  the  mess  to  which  he  belonged, 
living  forward  on  the  allowance  of  a  seaman,  and 
making,  mending,  and  washing  his  own  clothes, 
to  save  expense.  Doubt  has  been  expressed  as 
to  the  reality  of  these  early  privations,  on  the 
ground  that  his  father's  office  at  Greenwich,  and 
the  subsequent  promotions  of  the  young  officer, 
show  the  existence  of  a  family  influence,  which 
would  have  counteracted  such  extreme  restriction 
in  money  matters.  The  particulars,  however, 
have  been  so  transmitted  as  to  entitle  them  to 
acceptance,  unless  contradicted  by  something 
more  positive  than  circumstantial  inference  from 
other  conditions,  not  necessarily  contradictory. 

This  sharp  experience  was  singularly  adapted 
to  develop  and  exaggerate  his  natural  character- 
istics, self-reliance,  self-control,  stern  determina- 
tion, and,  it  must  be  added,  the  exacting  harshness 
which  demanded  of  others  all  that  he  had  himself 


324  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

accepted.  His  experience  of  suffering  and  depri- 
vation served,  not  to  enlarge  his  indulgence,  but 
to  intensify  his  severity.  Yet  it  may  be  remarked 
that  Jervis  was  at  all  periods  in  thorough  touch 
with  distinctively  naval  feeling,  sympathizing 
with  and  respecting  its  sensibilities,  sharing  its 
prejudices,  as  well  as  comprehending  its  weak- 
nesses. Herein  he  differed  from  Rodney,  who  in 
the  matter  of  community  of  sentiment  stood 
habitually  external  to  his  profession  ;  in  it,  but  in 
heart  not  of  it ;  belonging  consciously  and  wil- 
lingly to  a  social  class  which  cherished  other 
ideals  of  life  and  action.  His  familiarity  with  the 
service  quickened  him  to  criticise  more  keenly 
and  accurately  than  a  stranger,  to  recognize  fail- 
ings with  harsher  condemnation ;  but  there  ap- 
pears no  disposition  to  identify  himself  with  it 
further  than  as  an  instrument  of  personal  advance- 
ment and  distinction. 

Upon  Jervis's  naval  future,  the  results  of  his 
early  ordeal  were  wholly  good.  Unable  to  pur- 
sue pleasure  ashore,  he  stuck  to  sea-going  ships ; 
and  the  energies  of  a  singularly  resolute  mind 
were  devoted  to  mastering  all  the  details  of  his 
profession.  After  six  years  in  the  Caribbean, 
he  returned  to  England  in  the  autumn  of  1754. 
The  troubles  between  France  and  Great  Britain 
which  issued  in  the  Seven  Years  War  had  al- 
ready begun,  and  Jervis,  whose  merit  commanded 
immediate  recognition  from  those  under  whom 
he  served,  found  family  influence  to  insure  his 


Jervis  325 

speedy  promotion  and  employment.  Being  made 
lieutenant  early  in  1755,  he  was  with  Boscawen 
off  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  when  that  admiral, 
although  peace  yet  reigned,  was  ordered  to  seize 
the  French  fleet  bearing  reinforcements  to  Que- 
bec. At  the  same  time,  Braddock's  unfortunate 
expedition  was  miscarrying  in  the  forests  of 
Pittsburg.  A  year  later,  in  1756,  Jervis  went  to 
the  Mediterranean  with  Admiral  Hawke,  sent  to 
relieve  Byng  after  the  fiasco  at  Minorca  which 
brought  that  unhappy  commander  to  trial  and  to 
death. 

Before  and  during  this  Mediterranean  cruise 
Jervis  had  been  closely  associated  with  Sir 
Charles  Saunders,  one  of  the  most  distinguished 
admirals  of  that  generation,  upon  whom  he  made 
so  favorable  an  impression  that  he  was  chosen 
for  first  lieutenant  of  the  flag-ship,  when  Saun- 
ders, in  1758,  was  named  to  command  the  fleet  to 
act  against  Quebec.  The  gallant  and  romantic 
General  Wolfe,  whose  death  in  the  hour  of  vic- 
tory saddened  the  triumph  of  the  conquerors, 
embarked  in  the  same  ship ;  and  the  long  pas- 
sage favored  the  growth  of  a  close  personal  inti- 
macy between  the  two  young  men,  who  had  been 
at  school  together  as  boys,  although  the  soldier 
was  several  years  older  than  the  sailor.  The 
relations  thus  formed  and  the  confidences  ex- 
changed are  shown  by  a  touching  incident  re- 
corded by  Jervis's  biographer.  On  the  night 
before  the  battle  on  the  Heights  of  Abraham, 


326  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

Wolfe  went  on  board  the  Porcupine,  a  small  sloop 
of  war  to  whose  command  Jervis  had  meanwhile 
been  promoted,  and  asked  to  see  him  in  private. 
He  then  said  that  he  was  strongly  impressed  with 
the  feeling  that  he  should  fall  on  the  morrow,  and 
therefore  wished  to  entrust  to  his  friend  the  mini- 
ature of  the  lady,  Miss  Lowther,  to  whom  he  was 
engaged,  and  to  have  from  him  the  promise  that, 
if  the  foreboding  proved  true,  he  would  in  person 
deliver  to  her  both  the  portrait  and  Wolfe's  own 
last  messages.  From  the  interview  the  young 
general  departed  to  achieve  his  enterprise,  to 
which  daring  action,  brilliant  success,  and  heroic 
death  have  given  a  lustre  that  time  itself  has  not 
been  able  to  dim,  whose  laurels  remain  green  to 
our  own  day ;  while  Jervis,  to  whose  old  age  was 
reserved  the  glory  that  his  comrade  reaped  in 
youth,  remained  behind  to  discharge  his  last 
request,  —  a  painful  duty  which,  upon  returning 
to  England,  was  scrupulously  fulfilled. 

Although  the  operations  against  Quebec  de- 
pended wholly  upon  the  control  of  the  water  by 
the  navy,  its  influence,  as  often  happens,  was  so 
quietly  exerted  as  to  draw  no  attention  from  the 
general  eye,  dazzled  by  the  conspicuous  splendor 
of  Wolfe's  conduct.  To  Jervis  had  been  assigned 
the  distinguished  honor  of  leading  the  fleet  with 
his  little  ship,  in  the  advance  up  river  against  the 
fortifications  of  the  place ;  and  it  is  interesting  to 
note  that  in  this  duty  he  was  joined  with  the 
afterwards  celebrated  explorer,  James  Cook,  who, 


Jervis  327 

as  master  of  the  fleet,  had  special  charge  of  the 
pilotage  in  those  untried  waters.  Wolfe,  Cook, 
and  Jervis  form  a  striking  trio  of  names,  then 
unknown,  yet  closely  associated,  afterwards  to  be 
widely  though  diversely  renowned. 

When  the  city  fell,  Commander  Jervis  was  sent 
to  England,  probably  with  despatches.  There  he 
was  at  once  given  a  ship,  and  ordered  to  return 
with  her  to  North  America.  Upon  her  proving 
leaky,  he  put  in  to  Plymouth,  where,  as  his  mission 
was  urgent,  he  was  directed  to  take  charge  of  a 
sloop  named  the  Albany,  then  lying  at  anchor 
near  by,  and  to  proceed  in  her.  To  this  moment 
has  been  attributed  an  incident  which,  as  regards 
time  and  place,  has  been  more  successfully  im- 
peached than  the  story  of  his  early  privations,  in 
that  no  mention  of  it  is  found  in  the  ship's  log ; 
and  there  are  other  discrepancies  which  need 
reconcilement.  Nevertheless  it  is,  as  told,  so 
entirely  characteristic,  that  the  present  writer 
has  no  doubt  it  occurred,  at  some  time,  substan- 
tially as  given  by  his  biographer,  who  was  son  to 
a  secretary  long  in  close  relations  with  him  when 
admiral.  It  would  be  entirely  in  keeping  with  all 
experience  of  testimony  that  the  old  man's  recol- 
lections, or  those  of  his  secretary,  may  have  gone 
astray  on  minor  circumstances,  while  preserving 
accurately  the  fundamental  and  only  really  im- 
portant facts,  which  are  perfectly  consistent  with, 
and  illustrative  of,  the  stern  decision  afterwards 
shown  in  meeting  and  suppressing  mutiny  of  the 


328  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

most  threatening  description.  The  crew  of  the 
Albany,  it  is  said,  from  some  motives  of  discontent 
refused  to  sail.  Jervis  had  brought  with  him  a  few 
seamen  from  his  late  command.  These  he  ordered 
to  cut  the  cables  which  held  the  ship  to  her 
anchors,  and  to  loose  the  foresail.  Daunted 
more,  perhaps,  by  the  bearing  of  the  man  than 
by  the  mere  acts,  the  mutineers  submitted,  and 
in  twenty-four  days,  an  extraordinarily  short  pas- 
sage for  that  time,  the  Albany  was  at  New  York. 
Here  Jervis  was  unfortunately  delayed,  and 
thus,  being  prevented  from  rejoining  Sir  Charles 
Saunders,  lost  the  promotion  which  a  British 
commander-in-chief  could  then  give  to  an  officer 
in  his  own  command  who  had  merited  his  pro- 
fessional approval.  It  was  not  until  October, 
1761,  when  he  was  twenty-six,  that  Jervis  obtained 
"  post "  rank,  —  the  rank,  that  is,  of  full,  or  post, 
captain.  By  the  rule  of  the  British  navy,  an 
officer  up  to  that  rank  could  be  advanced  by 
selection ;  thenceforth  he  waited,  through  the 
long  succession  of  seniority,  for  his  admiral's 
commission.  This  Jervis  did  not  receive  until 
1787,  when  he  was  fifty-two. 

It  was  as  a  general  officer,  as  an  admiral  com- 
manding great  fleets  and  bearing  responsibilities 
unusually  grave  through  a  most  critical  period  of 
his  country's  history,  that  Jervis  made  his  high 
and  deserved  reputation.  For  this  reason,  the 
intervening  years,  though  pregnant  with  the  fin- 
ished character  and  distinguished  capacity  which 


Jervis  329 

fitted  him  for  his  onerous  work,  and  though  by 
no  means  devoid  of  incident,  must  be  hastily 
sketched.  The  Treaty  of  Paris,  which  in  1 763 
closed  the  Seven  Years  War,  was  followed  by 
twelve  years  of  peace.  Then  came  the  American 
Revolution,  bringing  in  its  train  hostilities  with 
France  and  Spain.  During  the  peace,  Jervis  for 
nearly  four  years  commanded  a  frigate  in  the 
Mediterranean.  It  is  told  that  while  his  ship 
was  at  Genoa  two  Turkish  slaves  escaped  from  a 
Genoese  galley,  and  took  refuge  in  a  British  boat 
lying  at  the  mole,  wrapping  its  flag  round  their 
persons.  Genoese  officers  took  them  forcibly 
from  the  boat  and  restored  them  to  their  chains. 
Jervis  resented  this,  as  being  not  only  an  insult 
to  the  British  flag,  but  also  an  enforcement  of 
slavery  against  men  under  its  protection  ;  and  so 
peremptory  was  his  tone  that  an  apology  was  made, 
the  two  captives  were  given  up  on  the  frigate's 
quarter-deck,  and  the  offending  officers  punished. 
The  captain's  action,  however,  was  not  sustained 
by  his  own  government.  It  is  curious  to  note 
that,  notwithstanding  his  course  in  this  case, 
and  although  he  was  not  merely  nominally,  but 
strenuously,  a  Whig,  or  Liberal,  in  political  faith, 
connected  by  party  ties  with  Fox  and  his  coterie  of 
friends,  Jervis  was  always  opposed  to  the  abolition 
of  the  slave  trade  and  to  the  education  of  the  lower 
orders.  Liberty  was  to  him  an  inherited  worship, 
associated  with  certain  stock  beliefs  and  phrases, 
but  subordination  was  the  true  idol  of  his  soul. 


330  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

In  1775  Captain  Jervis  commissioned  the 
Foudroyant,  of  eighty-four  guns,  a  ship  captured 
in  1758  from  the  French,  and  thereafter  thought 
to  be  the  finest  vessel  in  the  British  fleet.  To 
this,  her  natural  superiority,  Jervis  added  a  degree 
of  order,  discipline,  and  drill  which  made  her  the 
pride  and  admiration  of  the  navy.  He  was  forty 
when  his  pennant  first  flew  from  her  masthead, 
and  he  held  the  command  for  eight  years,  a  period 
covering  the  full  prime  of  his  own  maturity,  as 
well  as  the  entire  course  of  the  American  Revo- 
lution. It  was  also  a  period  marked  for  him, 
professionally,  less  by  distinguished  service  than 
by  that  perfection  of  military  organization,  that 
combination  of  dignified  yet  not  empty  pomp 
with  thorough  and  constant  readiness,  which  was 
so  eminently  characteristic  of  all  the  phases  of 
Jervis's  career,  and  which,  when  the  rare  moments 
came,  was  promptly  transformed  into  unhesitating, 
decisive,  and  efficient  action.  The  Foudroyant,  in 
her  state  and  discipline,  was  the  type  in  miniature 
of  Jervis's  Mediterranean  fleet,  declared  by  Nelson 
to  be  the  finest  body  of  ships  he  had  ever  known ; 
nay,  she  was  the  precursor  of  that  regenerate 
British  navy  in  which  Nelson  found  the  instru- 
ments of  his  triumphs.  Sixty  years  later,  old 
officers  recalled  the  feelings  of  mingled  curiosity 
and  awe  with  which,  when  sent  to  her  on  duty 
from  their  own  ships,  they  climbed  on  board  the 
Foudroyant,  and  from  the  larboard  side  of  her 
quarter-deck  gazed  upon  the  stern  captain,  whose 


Jervis  33 1 

qualities  were  embodied  in  his  vessel  and  consti- 
tuted her  chief  excellences. 

During  Jervis's  command,  the  Foudroyant  was 
continuously  attached  to  the  Channel  Fleet, 
whose  duty,  as  the  name  implies,  was  to  protect 
the  English  Channel  and  its  approaches  ;•  a  func- 
tion which  often  carried  the  ships  far  into  the 
Bay  of  Biscay.  Thus  he  took  a  prominent  part 
in  Keppel's  battle  off  Ushant  in  1778,  in  the 
movements  occasioned  by  the  entrance  into  the 
Channel  of  an  overpowering  Franco-Spanish  fleet 
in  1779  and  1781,  and  in  the  brilliant  relief  of 
Gibraltar  by  Admiral  Howe  towards  the  end  of 
1782.  His  most  distinguished  service,  however, 
was  taking,  single-handed,  the  French  seventy- 
four  Pegase,  in  the  spring  of  the  latter  year.  The 
capture  was  effected  after  an  action  of  fifty  min- 
utes, preceded  by  a  chase  of  twelve  hours,  run- 
ning before  a  half-gale  of  wind.  The  Foudroyant 
was  unquestionably  superior  in  battery  to  her 
enemy,  who,  moreover,  had  but  recently  been 
commissioned ;  but,  as  has  justly  been  remarked 
of  some  of  the  victories  of  our  own  ships  over 
those  of  the  British  in  the  War  of  1812,  although 
there  was  disparity  of  forces,  the  precision  and 
rapidity  with  which  the  work  was  done  bore  in- 
controvertible testimony  to  the  skill  and  training 
of  the  captain  and  crew.  Single  combats,  such 
as  this,  were  rare  between  vessels  of  the  size  of 
the  Foudroyant  and  Pegase,  built  to  sail  and  fight 
in  fleets.  That  one  occurred  here  was  due  to 


33  2  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

the  fact  that  the  speed  of  the  two  opponents  left 
the  British  squadron  far  astern.  The  exploit 
obtained  for  Jervis  a  baronetcy  and  the  ribbon  of 
the  Order  of  the  Bath. 

Sir  John  Jervis  did  not  serve  afloat  during  the 
ten  years  of  peace  following  1783,  although, 
from  his  high  repute,  he  was  one  of  those  sum- 
moned upon  each  of  the  alarms  of  war  that  from 
time  to  time  arose.  Throughout  this  period  he 
sat  in  Parliament,  voting  steadily  with  his  party, 
the  Whigs,  and  supporting  Fox  in  his  opposition 
to  measures  which  seemed  to  tend  towards  hos- 
tilities with  France.  When  war  came,  however, 
he  left  his  seat,  ready  to  aid  his  country  with  his 
sword  in  the  quarrel  from  which  he  had  sought 
to  keep  her. 

Having  in  the  mean  time  risen  from  the  rank 
of  captain  to  that  of  rear-  and  of  vice-admiral, 
Jervis's  first  service,  in  1794,  was  in  the  Carib- 
bean Sea,  as  commander  of  the  naval  part  of  a 
joint  expedition  of  army  and  navy  to  subdue  the 
French  West  India  islands.  The  operation,  al- 
though most  important  and  full  of  exciting  and 
picturesque  incident,  bears  but  a  small  share  in  his 
career,  and  therefore  may  not  be  dwelt  upon  in 
so  short  a  sketch  as  the  present  aims  to  be.  At- 
tended at  first  by  marked  and  general  success,  it 
ended  with  some  severe  reverses,  occasioned  by 
the  force  given  him  being  less  than  he  demanded, 
and  than  the  extent  of  the  work  to  be  done  re- 
quired. A  quaintly  characteristic  story  is  told  of 


Jervis  333 

the  admiral's  treatment  of  a  lieutenant  who  at 
this  period  sought  employment  on  board  his  ship. 
Knowing  that  he  stood  high  in  the  old  seaman's 
favor,  the  applicant  confidently  expected  his 
appointment,  but,  upon  opening  the  "  letter  on 
service,"  was  stunned  to  read  :  — 

SIR,  —  You,  having  thought  fit  to  take  to  yourself  a 
wife,  are  to  look  for  no  further  attentions  from 

Your  humble  servant, 

J.  JERVIS. 

The  supposed  culprit,  guiltless  even  in  thought 
of  this  novel  misdemeanor,  hastened  on  board, 
and  explained  that  he  abhorred  such  an  offence 
as  much  as  could  the  admiral.  It  then  appeared 
that  the  letter  had  been  sent  to  the  wrong  person. 
Jervis  was  himself  married  at  this  time  ;  but  his 
well-regulated  affections  had  run  steadily  in  har- 
ness until  the  mature  age  of  forty-eight,  and  he 
saw  no  reason  why  other  men  should  depart 
from  so  sound  a  precedent.  "  When  an  officer 

marries,"  he  tersely  said,  "he  is  d d  for  the 

service." 

Returning  to  England  in  February,  1795,  Jervis 
was  in  August  nominated  to  command  the  Med- 
iterranean station,  and  in  November  sailed  to  take 
up  his  new  duties.  At  the  end  of  the  month,  in 
San  Fiorenzo  Bay,  an  anchorage  in  the  north 
of  Corsica,  he  joined  the  fleet,  which  continued 
under  his  flag  until  June,  1799.  He  had  now 
reached  the  highest  rank  in  his  profession,  though 


334  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

not  the  highest  grade  of  that  rank  as  it  was  then 
subdivided ;  being  a  full  Admiral  of  the  Blue. 
The  crowning  period  of  his  career  here  began. 
Admirable  and  striking  as  had  been  his  previous 
services,  dignified  and  weighty  as  were  the  re- 
sponsibilities borne  by  him  in  the  later  part  of  a 
life  prolonged  far  beyond  the  span  of  man,  the 
four  years  of  Jervis's  Mediterranean  command 
stand  conspicuous  as  the  time  when  preparation 
flowered  into  achievement,  solid,  durable,  and 
brilliant.  It  may  be  interesting  to  Americans  to 
recall  that  his  age  was  nearly  the  same  as  that 
of  Farragut  when  the  latter  assumed  the  charge 
in  which,  after  long  years  of  obscure  preparation, 
he  also  reaped  his  harvest  of  glory.  It  is  like- 
wise worthy  of  note  that  this  happy  selection 
was  made  wholly  independent  of  the  political 
bias,  which  till  then  had  so  often  and  un- 
worthily controlled  naval  appointments.  Jervis 
belonged  to  the  small  remnant  of  Whigs  who 
still  followed  Fox  and  inveighed  against  the  cur- 
rent war,  as  unnecessary  and  impolitic.  It.  was 
a  pure  service  choice,  as  such  creditable  alike  to 
the  Government  and  the  officer. 

Though  distinguished  success  now  awaited 
him,  a  period  of  patient  effort,  endurance,  and 
disappointment  had  first  to  be  passed,  repro- 
ducing in  miniature  the  longer  years  of  faith- 
ful service  preceding  his  professional  triumphs. 
Jervis  came  to  the  Mediterranean  too  late  for 
the  best  interests  of  England.  The  year  1 795,  just 


Jervis  335 

ending,  was  one  in  which  the  energies  of  France, 
after  the  fierce  rush  of  the  Terror,  had  flagged 
almost  to  collapse.  Not  only  so,  but  in  its 
course  the  republic,  discouraged  by  frequent 
failure,  had  decided  to  abandon  the  control  of 
the  sea  to  its  enemy,  to  keep  its  great  fleets  in 
port,  and  to  confine  its  efforts  to  the  harassment 
of  British  commerce.  To  this  change  of  policy  in 
France  is  chiefly  to  be  ascribed  the  failure  of 
naval  achievement  with  which  Macaulay  has  re- 
proached Pitt's  earlier  ministry.  Battles  cannot 
be  fought  if  the  foe  keeps  behind  his  walls. 
Prior  to  this  decision,  two  fleet  battles  had  been 
fought  in  the  Mediterranean  in  the  spring  and 
summer  of  1795,  in  which  the  British  had  missed 
great  successes  only  through  the  sluggishness  of 
their  admiral.  "  To  say  how  much  we  wanted 
Lord  Hood  "  (the  last  commander-in-chief),  wrote 
Nelson,  "  is  to  ask, '  Will  you  have  all  the  French 
fleet  or  no  battle  ? ' :  Could  he  have  foreseen  all 
that  Jervis  was  to  be  to  the  Mediterranean,  his 
distress  must  have  been  doubled  to  know  that 
the  fortunes  of  the  nation  thus  fell  between  two 
stools. 

His  predecessor's  slackness  in  pushing  mil- 
itary opportunities,  due  partly  to  ill  health, 
was  mainly  constitutional,  and  therefore  could 
not  but  show  itself  by  tangible  evidences  in 
the  more  purely  administrative  and  discipli- 
nary work.  Jervis  found  himself  at  once  under 
the  necessity  of  bringing  his  fleet  —  in  equip- 


336  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

ment,  in  discipline,  and  in  drill  —  sharply  up 
to  that  level  of  efficiency  which  is  essential  to  the 
full  development  of  power  when  occasion  offers. 
This  his  perfect  achievement,  of  organization  and 
administration,  in  its  many  intricate  details,  needs 
at  least  to  be  clearly  noted,  even  though  space  do 
not  admit  many  particulars ;  because  his  capacity 
as  administrator  at  the  head  of  the  Admiralty  a 
few  years  later  has  been  seriously  impugned, 
by  a  criticism  both  partial  and  excessive,  if  not 
wholly  unjust.  Nelson,  a  witness  of  his  Mediter- 
ranean service  from  beginning  to  end,  lauded  to 
the  utmost  the  excellence  there  reached,  and 
attributed  most  of  the  short-coming  noted  in 
the  later  office  to  the  yielding  of  a  man  then 
advanced  in  years,  to  advisers,  in  trusting 
whom  fully  he  might  well  believe  himself  war- 
ranted by  experience. 

Although,  when  taking  command,  his  fleet 
reached  the  seemingly  large  proportions  of  twen- 
ty-five ships-of-the-line  and  some  fifty  cruisers, 
heavy  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  variety 
of  services  extending  over  the  two  thousand 
miles  of  the  Mediterranean,  from  east  to  west. 
Seven  of-the-line  had  to  be  kept  before  Cadiz, 
though  still  a  neutral  port,  to  check  a  French 
division  within.  One  of  the  same  class  was  on 
the  Riviera  with  Nelson;  and  other  demands, 
with  the  necessities  of  occasional  absences  for 
refit,  prevented  the  admiral  from  ever  assembling 
before  Toulon,  his  great  strategic  care,  much 


Jervis  337 

more  than  a  round  dozen  to  watch  equal  French 
numbers  there.  The  protection  of  Corsica,  then 
in  British  hands ;  the  convoy  of  commerce,  dis- 
persed throughout  the  station ;  the  assurance  of 
communications  to  the  fortress  and  Straits  of 
Gibraltar,  by  which  all  transit  to  and  from  the 
Mediterranean  passes ;  diplomatic  exigencies 
with  the  various  littoral  states  of  the  inland  sea ; 
these  divergent  calls,  with  the  coincident  neces- 
sity of  maintaining  every  ship  in  fit  condition  for 
action,  show  the  extent  of  the  administrative 
work  and  of  the  attendant  correspondence.  The 
evidence  of  many  eye-witnesses  attests  the  suc- 
cessful results. 

Similar  attention,  broad  yet  minute,  was 
demanded  for  the  more  onerous  and  invidious 
task  of  enforcing  relaxed  discipline  and  drill. 
Concerning  these,  the  most  pregnant  testimony, 
alike  to  the  stringency  and  the  persistence  of  his 
measures,  may  be  found  in  the  imbittered  expres- 
sions of  enemies.  Five  years  later,  when  the 
rumor  spread  that  he  was  to  have  the  Channel 
Fleet,  the  toast  was  drunk  at  the  table  of  the 
man  then  in  command,  "  May  the  discipline  of 
the  Mediterranean  never  be  introduced  into  the 
Channel."  "  May  his  next  glass  of  wine  choke 
the  wretch,"  is  a  speech  attributed  to  a  captain's 
wife,  wrathful  that  her  husband  was  kept  from 
her  side  by  the  admiral's  regulations.  For 
Jervis's  discipline  began  at  the  top,  with  the 
division  and  ship  commanders.  One  of  the 


33  8  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

senior  admirals  under  him  persisting  in  a  remon- 
strance, beyond  the  point  which  he  considered 
consistent  with  discipline,  was  sent  home.  "  The 
very  disorderly  state  of  His  Majesty's  ship  under 
your  command,"  he  writes  to  a  captain,  "  obliges 
me  to  require  that  neither  yourself  nor  any  of  your 
officers  are  to  go  on  shore  on  what  is  called  plea- 
sure." "  The  commander-in-chief  finds  himself 
under  the  painful  necessity  of  publicly  reprimand- 
ing Captains and for  neglect  of  duty,  in 

not  maintaining  the  stations  assigned  to  their  ships 
during  the  last  night."  In  a  letter  to  a  lieutenant 
he  says,  "  If  you  do  not  immediately  make  a 
suitable  apology  to  Commissioner  Inglefield  for 
the  abominable  neglect  and  disrespect  you  have 
treated  him  with,  I  will  represent  your  behaviour 
to  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty, 
and  recommend  your  name  to  be  struck  off  the 
list  of  lieutenants."  Captains  of  vessels  were  not 
only  subject  to  strict  regulation  as  to  their  personal 
proceedings,  compelled  to  sleep  on  board,  for 
instance,  even  in  home  ports;  but  duties  cus- 
tomarily left  to  subordinates,  with  results  to  dis- 
cipline that  might  not  now  obtain  but  which 
were  in  those  days  deplorable,  were  also  assigned 
to  them. 

"  The  commander-in-chief  has  too  exalted  an 
opinion  of  the  respective  captains  of  the  squadron 
to  doubt  their  being  upon  deck  when  the  signal 
is  made  to  tack  or  wear  in  the  night,  and  he  re- 
quires all  lieutenants  then  to  be  at  their  stations, 


Jervis  339 

except  those  who  had  the  watch  immediately  pre- 
ceding." Nor  did  he  leave  this  delicately  worded, 
but  pointed,  admonition,  issued  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean, to  take  care  of  itself.  In  after  years,  when 
he  was  nigh  seventy,  his  secretary  tells  that  on  a 
cold  and  rainy  November  night  off  Brest,  the  sig- 
nal to  tack  being  made,  he  hurried  to  the  cabin  to 
persuade  the  old  man  not  to  go  on  deck,  as  was  his 
custom.  He  was  not,  however,  in  his  cot,  nor 
could  he  for  a  long  time  be  found  ;  but  at  last  a 
look  into  the  stern  gallery  discovered  him,  in 
flannel  dressing-gown  and  cocked  hat,  watching 
the  movements  of  the  fleet.  To  remonstrance  he 
replied,  "  Hush,  I  want  to  see  how  the  evolution 
is  performed  on  such  a  night,  and  to  know 
whether  Jemmy  Vashon  (commanding  the  ship 
next  astern)  is  on  deck ; "  but  soon  hearing  the 
captain's  well-known  shrill  voice,  crying,  "  Are  you 
all  ready  forward  ? "  he  consented  then  to  retire. 
Post-captains  and  commanders  were  required 
to  attend  at  points  on  shore  where  the  boats  and 
crews  of  ships  congregated  on  service ;  at  landing 
places  and  watering  places,  —  scenes  fruitful  in 
demoralization,  —  to  maintain  order  and  suppress 
disturbance.  "  The  Masters  and  Commanders 
are  to  take  it  in  turn,  according  to  rank,  to  attend 
the  duty  on  shore  at  the  ragged  staff  [at  Gibraltar], 
from  gun-fire  in  the  morning  to  sunset,  to  keep 
order  and  prevent  disputes,  and  to  see  that  boats 
take  their  regular  turns.  They  are  never  to 
be  absent  from  the  spot  except  at  regular  meal 


34°  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

times."  "  When  the  squadron  is  at  anchor  in 
Torbay  [in  the  English  Channel],  a  captain  of  a 
ship-of-the-line  is  to  command  at  the  watering 
place  at  Brixham,  taking  to  his  assistance  his 
commanding  officer  of  marines  with  a  party  of 
his  men.  He  also  may  take  with  him  a  lieutenant 
of  the  ship  and  as  many  midshipmen  as  he  thinks 
fit;  but  he  himself  is  not  to  quit  his  command 
until  regularly  relieved."  A  greater  stringency 
is  observable  at  this  later  date,  in  the  Channel 
Fleet,  than  in  the  Mediterranean ;  for  at  the 
earlier  period  the  spirit  of  mutiny  had  not  openly 
broken  out,  and  he  had  besides  on  the  distant 
station  better  captains  than  those  who  had  clung 
to  the  home  fleet  under  its  lax  discipline.  "  Old 
women  in  the  guise  of  young  men,"  he  affirmed 
many  of  them  to  be. 

There  was  in  fact  an  imminent  necessity  that 
naval  rank  should  be  made  to  feel  its  responsibil- 
ities, and  to  exert  its  predominance ;  to  be  restored 
to  prestige,  not  by  holding  aloof  in  its  privileges, 
but  by  asserting  itself  in  act.  The  preponderance 
of  political  and  family  influence  in  determining 
promotion  of  officers,  unbalanced  by  valid  tests  of 
fitness  such  as  later  days  imposed,  had  not  only 
lowered  the  competency  of  the  official  body  as  a 
whole,  but  impaired  the  respect  which  personal 
merit  alone  can  in  the  long  run  maintain.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  scarcity  of  seamen  in  proportion 
to  the  heavy  demands  of  the  war,  and  the  irregular 
methods  of  impressment  and  recruiting  then  pre- 


Jervis  341 

vailing,  swept  into  the  service  a  vast  number  of 
men  not  merely  unfit,  but  of  extremely  bad  char- 
acter, —  "  miscreants,"  to  use  Collingwood's  word, 
—  to  be  ruled  only  by  fear  of  the  law  and  of  their 
officers,  supported  by  the  better  element  among 
the  crews.  But  these  better  men  also  were  be- 
coming alienated  by  the  harsh  restrictions  of  the 
times,  and  by  the  procrastination  of  superiors  — 
Howe,  the  Sailor's  Friend,  among  others  —  to 
heed  their  just  complaints.  The  stern  Jervis, 
whom  none  suspected  of  fatherly  tenderness,  if 
less  indulgent  to  culprits,  was  far  more  attentive 
to  meet  the  reasonable  demands  of  those  under 
him.  While  quelling  insubordination  mercilessly, 
he  ever  sought  to  anticipate  grievance  ;  exhibiting 
thus  the  two  sides  of  the  same  spirit  of  careful, 
even-handed  justice. 

Jervis's  work  during  the  first  eighteen  months 
of  his  command  was  therefore  not  only  necessary, 
but  most  timely.  By  improving  that  period  of 
comparative  internal  quiet,  he  educated  his  officers 
and  men  to  pass  steadfastly,  though  not  unmoved, 
through  the  awful  crisis  of  the  mutinies  in  1797- 
98.  Professional  self-respect,  a  most  powerful 
moral  force,  was  more  than  restored;  it  was  in- 
tensified by  the  added  dignity  and  power  manifest 
in  the  surroundings  of  daily  life,  as  well  as  in  the 
military  results  obtained.  Seamen,  like  others, 
deal  more  conservatively  with  that  of  which  they 
are  proud  because  it  reflects  honor  upon  them- 
selves ;  and  they  obey  more  certainly  men  who 


342  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

share  their  labors  and  lead  them  capably  in 
danger,  as  did  Jervis's  Mediterranean  captains. 
With  himself,  severity  was  far  from  being  the 
only  instrument.  Thoroughly  capable  profession- 
ally, and  thereby  commandful  of  respect,  he 
appealed  also  to- men's  regard  by  intelligent  and 
constant  thought  for  the  wants  and  comfort  of 
those  under  him ;  by  evidence  of  strong  service 
feeling  on  his  own  part ;  by  clear  and  clearly 
expressed  recognition  of  merit,  wherever  found ; 
by  avoidance  of  misunderstandings  through  ex- 
planation volunteered  when  possible,  —  not  apolo- 
getically, but  as  it  were  casually,  yet  appealing 
to  men's  reason.  Watchfulness  and  sympathetic 
foresight  were  with  him  as  constant  as  sternness, 
though  less  in  evidence. 

Of  this  prevalence  of  kindly  naval  feeling  amid 
the  harshness  which  seemed  superficially  the 
chief  characteristic  of  his  rule,  many  instances 
could  be  cited.  Passing  by  the  frequent  inci- 
dental praise  of  distinguished  captains,  Nelson, 
Troubridge,  and  others,  he  thus  advocates  the 
claims  of  one  of  the  humble,  hopeless  class  of 
sailing-masters,  out  of  the  line  of  promotion. 
After  an  act  of  brilliant  merit  in  the  West  Indies, 
"  Mr.  White  was  ambitious  to  become  a  lieuten- 
ant ;  but  not  having  served  six  years  in  the  navy, 
and  being  a  master,  I  could  not  then  comply  with 
his  wishes.  He  is  now  Master  of  the  Defence,  and 
his  captain  speaks  in  the  highest  terms  of  him  ; 
and  it  is  a  tribute  due  to  tlie  memory  of  Captain 


Jervis  343 

Faulknor,  —  whose  certificate  of  that  matchless 
service  is  enclosed,  —  and  to  the  gallantry  of  his 
officers  and  crew,  to  state  the  claims  of  Mr.  White 
to  your  Lordship,  who  is  the  protector  of  us  all." 
The  present  and  the  past,  the  merits  of  the  living, 
the  memory  of  the  glorious  dead,  the  claims  of 
the  navy  to  see  well-doers  rewarded,  are  all  pressed 
into  service  to  support  a  just  request,  and  with 
a  manifest  heartiness  which  in  virtue  of  its  reality 
approaches  eloquence.  "  I  have  given  an  order 
to  Mr.  Ellis  to  command  as  a  lieutenant,  he  being 
the  son  of  a  very  old  officer  whom  I  knew  many 
years  ;  and  coming  very  strongly  recommended 
from  his  last  ship,  I  place  him  under  your  Lord- 
ship's protection  as  a  child  of  the  service" 
When  a  man  thus  bears  others'  deserts  and 
the  profession  on  his  heart,  he  can  retain  the 
affections  of  his  subordinates  even  though  he 
show  all  the  unbending  severity  of  Jervis,  and 
despite  the  numerous  hangings,  which,  for  that 
matter,  rarely  fell  except  on  the  hopelessly  bad. 
A  most  significant  feature  of  his  rule  as  a  dis- 
ciplinarian was  his  peculiar  care  of  health,  by 
instructed  sanitary  measures,  by  provision  of 
suitable  diet,  and  by  well-ordered  hospital  service. 
This  was  not  merely  a  prudential  consideration 
for  the  efficiency  of  the  fleet ;  he  regarded  also 
the  welfare  of  the  sufferers.  He  made  it  a  rule 
to  inspect  the  hospitals  himself,  and  he  directed 
a  daily  visit  by  a  captain  and  by  the  surgeons  of 
the  ships  from  which  patients  were  sent,  thus 


344  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

keeping  the  sick  in  touch  with  those  they  knew, 
and  who  had  in  them  a  personal  interest.  An 
odd  provision,  amusingly  illustrative  of  the  ob- 
verse side  of  the  admiral's  character,  was  that 
the  visiting  captain  should  be  accompanied  by 
a  boatswain's  mate,  the  functionary  charged  with 
administering  floggings,  and,  "  if  they  find  the 
patients  do  not  conduct  themselves  properly  and 
orderly,  they  are  to  punish  them  agreeably  to  the 
rules  of  the  Navy."  It  was,  however,  on  his  care 
of  health,  in  its  various  exposures,  that  the  ad- 
miral  specially  valued  himself ;  it  was,  he  said, 
his  proudest  boast  among  the  services  to  which 
he  laid  claim. 

But  while  he  labored  thus  for  the  welfare  of 
the  seamen,  it  was  naturally  upon  the  professional 
tone  of  his  officers  that  his  chief  reliance  must  be 
placed ;  and  the  leaders  among  them  he  grappled 
to  his  soul  with  hooks  of  steel,  as  they  recognized 
the  wisdom  and  force  of  his  measures,  and  the 
appreciation  given  to  them  and  others.  What- 
ever beneficent  influence  might  issue  from  him 
as  a  fountain-head  must  through  them  be  dis- 
tributed, and  by  them  reinforced  and  sustained. 
"  The  discipline  of  the  fleet,"  he  said,  "  is  in  the 
ward-room;"  and  greatly  did  he  lament  the  loose 
insubordinate  talk,  the  spirit  of  irresponsible  criti- 
cism that  found  voice  at  mess-tables,  within  the 
hearing  of  servants,  by  whom  it  was  disseminated 
throughout  the  body  of  the  ship.  Not  only  he, 
but  many,  attributed  to  this  hot-bed  the  fomenting 


Jervis  345 

of  discontent  into  organized  mutiny.  This  could 
not  be  stopped  by  direct  measures,  but  only  by 
imposing  a  feeling  of  fear,  and  nurturing  that  of 
officer-like  propriety,  by  stringent  prescription  of 
forms  of  respect  and  rigid  exaction  of  their  obser- 
vance. To  stand  uncovered  before  a  superior, 
instead  of  lightly  touching  the  hat,  to  pay  out- 
ward reverence  to  the  national  flag,  to  salute  the 
quarter-deck  as  the  seat  of  authority,  were  no 
vain  show  under  him.  "  Discipline,"  he  was  fond 
of  quoting,  "is  summed  up  in  the  one  word, 
'  Obedience  ; ' "  and  these  customs  were  charged 
with  the  observance  which  is  obedience  in  spirit. 
They  conduced  to  discipline  as  conventional 
good  manners,  by  rendering  the  due  of  each  to 
each,  knit  together  the  social  fabric  and  maintain 
the  regularity  and  efficiency  of  common  life ;  re- 
moving friction,  suppressing  jars,  and  minister- 
ing constantly  to  the  smooth  and  even  working 
of  the  social  machinery. 

By  measures  such  as  these,  extending  to  all 
ranks  and  every  detail,  exemplifying,  in  spirit 
and  in  form,  the  extremes  of  cordial  reward,  iron 
restraint,  and  weighty  punishment,  Jervis  patiently 
fashioned  the  fleet  which  was  to  be  both  a  pat- 
tern for  coming  days,  and  the  highly  tempered 
instrument  to  achieve  his  own  victory  of  Cape 
St.  Vincent  and  the  earlier  triumphs  of  Nelson ; 
as  well  as  to  sustain  and  to  crush  the  onset  of 
mutiny  which  soon  afterwards  shook  the  Navy  to 
its  centre.  For  purely  military  action  of  an 


346  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

aggressive  character  no  opportunity  was  afforded 
him.  His  coming  to  the  Mediterranean  coincided 
with  that  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte  to  the  Army 
of  Italy.  During  1795,  wrote  Nelson,  if  the 
British  fleet  had  done  its  duty,  the  French  army 
could  not  have  moved  along  the  Riviera  of  Genoa. 
It  failed,  and  the  Austrian  general,  its  ally,  also 
failed  to  act  with  vigor.  So  the  year  had  ended, 
for  the  Austrians,  with  a  disastrous  defeat  and  a 
retreat  behind  the  Apennines.  To  the  Riviera 
they  never  returned  to  receive  the  cooperation 
which  Jervis  stood  eager  to  give.  At  their  first 
move  to  cross  the  mountains,  Bonaparte  struck, 
and  followed  up  his  blows  with  such  lightning- 
like  rapidity  that  in  thirty  days  they  were 
driven  back  over  a  hundred  miles,  behind 
the  Adige ;  their  chief  fortress,  Mantua,  was 
blockaded  ;  all  northwest  Italy  with  its  seaboard, 
including  Leghorn,  was  in  the  power  of  France  ; 
and  Naples  also  had  submitted.  Jervis,  power- 
less to  strike  a  blow  when  no  enemy  was  within 
reach,  found  his  fleet  without  a  friendly  port 
nearer  than  Gibraltar,  while  Corsica,  where  alone 
he  could  expect  anchorage  and  water,  was 
seething  with  revolt  against  the  British  crown, 
to  which,  by  its  own  vote,  it  had  been  annexed 
but  two  years  before. 

Amid  these  adverse  circumstances,  the  only 
large  operation  possible  to  him  was  the  close 
watching  of  the  port  of  Toulon,  conducted  on 
the  same  general  plan  that  was  afterwards  more 


Jervis  347 

illustriously  exhibited  before  Brest,  between  1800 
and  1805,  under  conditions  of  surpassing  diffi- 
culty. All  contemplated  movements  of  the 
French  fleet  were  thus  dammed  at  the  source, 
for  it  must  first  fight  the  British,  after  which 
there  was  little  hope  of  being  in  a  state  to  fulfil 
any  further  mission.  For  six  months,  from  April 
to  October,  Jervis  held  his  fleet  close  up  to  the 
port,  the  advanced  body  two  miles  from  the 
entrance.  The  effort  was  admirable  as  a  pattern, 
and  for  disciplinary  purposes.  The  ships,  forced 
to  self-dependence,  became  organically  self-reliant. 
Their  routine  life  of  seamanship  and  military 
exercise  perfected  habit  and  efficiency,  and  diffi- 
culties to  others  insuperable  were  as  the  light 
burdens  which  a  giant  carries  unwittingly. 

Further  than  this,  achievement  could  not  then 
go.  During  the  summer  Bonaparte  held  Man- 
tua by  the  throat,  and  overthrew  one  after  an- 
other the  Austrian  forces  approaching  to  its 
relief.  Two  French  armies,  under  Jourdan  and 
Moreau,  penetrated  to  the  heart  of  Germany; 
while  Spain,  lately  the  confederate  of  Great 
Britain,  made  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance 
with  France,  and  sent  a  fleet  of  over  twenty 
ships-of-the-line  into  the  Mediterranean.  Stag- 
gered by  these  reverses,  the  British  ministry 
ordered  Corsica  evacuated  and  the  Mediterranean 
abandoned.  Jervis  was  cruelly  embarrassed.  A 
trusted  subordinate  of  high  reputation  had  been 
before  Cadiz  with  seven  ships-of-the-line,  watch- 


348  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

ing  a  French  division  in  that  port.  Summoned, 
in  view  of  the  threatening  attitude  of  Spain,  to 
reinforce  the  main  fleet  in  San  Fiorenzo  Bay,  he 
lost  his  head  altogether,  hurried  past  Gibraltar 
without  getting  supplies,  and  brought  his  ships 
destitute  to  the  admiral,  already  pressed  to  main- 
tain the  vessels  then  with  him.  Although  there 
were  thirty-five  hostile  ships  in  Toulon  and  the 
British  had  only  twenty-two,  counting  this  divis- 
ion, there  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  send  it  back  to 
Gibraltar,  under  urgent  orders  to  return  with  all 
speed.  With  true  military  insight  and  a  correct 
appreciation  of  the  forces  opposed  to  him,  Jervis 
saw  the  need  of  fighting  the  combined  enemies 
then  and  there. 

Unfortunately,  the  division  commander,  Admi- 
ral Mann,  on  reaching  Gibraltar,  became  infected 
with  the  spirit  of  discouragement  then  prevailing 
in  the  garrison,  called  a  council  of  naval  captains, 
and  upon  their  advice,  which  could  in  no  wise 
lessen  his  own  responsibility,  decided  to  return 
to  England.  This  culpably  unwarrantable  act 
aptly  illustrates  the  distinction,  rarely  appreciated, 
between  an  error  of  judgment  and  an  error  of 
conduct.  Upon  arrival,  he  was  at  once  deprived 
of  his  command,  a  step  of  unquestionable  justice, 
but  which  could  not  help  Jervis.  "  We  were  all 
eyes,  looking  westward  from  the  mountain  tops," 
wrote  Collingwood,  then  a  captain  in  the  fleet, 
"  but  we  looked  in  vain.  The  Spanish  fleet, 
nearly  double  our  number,  was  cruising  almost 


Jervis  349 

.  in  view,  and  our  reconnoitring,  frigates  sometimes 
got  among  them,  while  we  expected  them  hourly 
to  be  joined  by  the  French  fleet."  "  I  cannot 
describe  to  your  lordship,"  wrote  Jervis  himself, 
"  the  disappointment  my  ambition  and  zeal  to 
serve  my  country  have  suffered  by  this  diminu- 
tion of  my  force ;  for  had  Admiral  Mann  sailed 
from  Gibraltar  on  the  loth  of  October,  the  day 
he  received  my  orders,  and  fulfilled  them,  I  have 
every  reason  to  believe  the  Spanish  fleet  would 
have  been  cut  to  pieces.  The  extreme  disorder 
and  confusion  they  were  observed  to  be  in,  by 
the  judicious  officers  who  fell  in  with  them,  leave 
no  doubt  upon  my  mind  that  a  fleet  so  trained 
and  generally  well  commanded  as  this  is  would 
have  made  its  way  through  them  in  every  direc- 
tion." 

Nelson  shared  this  opinion,  the  accuracy  of 
which  was  soon  to  be  tested  and  proved.  "  They 
at  home,"  wrote  he  to  his  wife,  "  do  not  know 
what  this  fleet  is  capable  of  performing ;  any- 
thing and  everything.  The  fleets  of  England 
are  equal  to  meet  the  world  in  arms ;  and  of  all 
the  fleets  I  ever  saw,  I  never  beheld  one,  in  point 
of  officers  and  men,  equal  to  Sir  John  Jervis's, 
who  is  a  commander-in-chief  able  to  lead  them 
to  glory."  To  a  friend  he  wrote :  "  Mann  is 
ordered  to  come  up  ;  we  shall  then  be  twenty-two 
sail-of-the-line  such  as  England  hardly  ever  pro- 
duced, commanded  by  an  admiral  who  will  not 
fail  to  look  the  enemy  in  the  face,  be  their  force 


350  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

what  it  may.  I  suppose  it  will  not  be  more  than 
thirty-four  of-the-line."  "  The  admiral  is  firm  as 
a  rock,"  wrote  at  the  same  moment  the  British 
viceroy  of  Corsica.  Through  all  doubts  and  un- 
certainties he  held  on  steadily,  refusing  to  leave 
the  rendezvous  till  dire  necessity  forced  him,  lest 
Mann,  arriving,  should  be  exposed  alone  and 
lost.  At  last,  with  starvation  staring  him  in  the 
face  if  delaying  longer,  he  sailed  for  Gibraltar, 
three  men  living  on  the  rations  of  one  during 
the  passage  down. 

Mann's  defection  had  reduced  the  fleet  from 
twenty-two  vessels  to  fifteen.  A  series  of  single 
accidents  still  further  diminished  it.  In  a  violent 
gale  at  Gibraltar  three  ships-of-the-line  drove 
from  their  anchors.  One,  the  Courageux,  stretch- 
ing over  toward  the  Barbary  coast,  ran  ashore 
there  and  was  totally  wrecked,  nearly  all  her  crew 
perishing.  Her  captain,  a  singularly  capable  sea- 
man named  Hallowell,  was  out  of  her  upon  a 
court-martial,  and  it  was  thought  she  would  not 
have  been  lost  had  he  been  on  board.  Another, 
the  Gibraltar,  struck  so  heavily  on  a  reef  that 
she  had  to  be  sent  to  England.  Upon  being 
docked,  a  large  piece  of  rock  was  found  to  have 
penetrated  the  bottom  and  stuck  fast  in  the  hole. 
Had  it  worked  out,  the  ship  would  have  foun- 
dered. The  third  vessel,  the  Zealous,  was  less 
badly  hurt,  but  she  had  to  be  left  behind  in 
Gibraltar  when  Jervis,  by  orders  from  home,  took 
his  fleet  to  Lisbon.  There,  in  entering  the 


Jervis  351 

Tagus,  a  fourth  ship  was  lost  on  a  shoal,  so  that 
but  eleven  remained  out  of  twenty-two.  Despite 
these  trials  of  his  constancy,  the  old  man's  temper 
still  continued  u  steady  as  a  rock."  "  Whether 
you  send  me  a  reinforcement  or  not,"  he  wrote 
to  the  Admiralty,  "  I  shall  sleep  perfectly  sound, 
—  not  in  the  Tagus,  but  at  sea ;  for  as  soon  as 
the  St.  George  has  shifted  her  topmast,  the 
Captain  her  bowsprit,  and  the  Blenheim  repaired 
her  mainmast,  I  will  go  out."  "  Inactivity  in  the 
Tagus,"  he  wrote  again,  "  will  make  cowards  of 
us  all."  This  last  expression  summed  up  much 
of  his  naval  philosophy.  Keep  men  at  sea,  he 
used  to  say,  and  they  cannot  help  being  seamen, 
though  attention  will  be  needed  to  assure  ex- 
ercise at  the  guns.  And  it  may  be  believed  he 
would  thus  contemn  the  arguments  which  sup- 
ported Howe's  idea  of  preserving  the  ships  by 
retaining  them  in  port.  Keep  them  at  sea,  he 
would  doubtless  have  replied,  and  they  will  learn 
to  take  care  of  themselves. 

In  quitting  the  river  another  vessel  took  the 
ground,  and  had  to  be  left  behind.  This,  how- 
ever,  was  the  last  of  the  admiral's  trials  for  that 
time.  A  few  days  later,  on  the  6th  of  February, 
1797,  there  joined  him  a  body  of  five  ships-of-the- 
line,  detached  from  England  as  soon  as  the 
government  had  been  freed  from  the  fear  of  the 
invasion  of  Ireland,  which  the  French  had  at- 
tempted on  a  large  scale  in  December.  On  the 
1 3th,  Nelson,  a  host  in  himself,  returned  from  an 


352  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

adventurous  mission  up  the  Mediterranean.  The 
next  day,  February  i4th,  Jervis  with  his  fifteen 
ships  met  a  Spanish  fleet  of  twenty-seven  some 
thirty  miles  from  Cape  St.  Vincent,  which  has 
given  its  name  to  the  battle. 

The  Spaniards  were  running  for  Cadiz,  to  the 
east-southeast,  —  say,  across  the  page  from  left  to 
right,  inclining  a  little  downward, — while  Jer- 
vis's  fleet  was  approaching  nearly  at  right  angles 
from  the  north,  or  top  of  the  page.  It  was  in 
two  close,  compact  columns,  of  seven  and  eight 
ships  respectively.  The  Spaniards,  on  the  con- 
trary, were  in  disorder  and  dispersed.  Six  of  their 
ships  were  far  ahead  of  the  others,  an  interval  of 
nearly  eight  miles  separating  the  two  groups. 
The  weather,  which  was  foggy,  cleared  gradually. 
Jervis  was  walking  back  and  forth  on  the  poop 
with  Hallowell,  lately  captain  of  the  wrecked 
Courageux,  and  he  was  heard  to  say,  "  A  victory 
is  very  essential  to  England  at  this  moment." 
As  ship  after  ship  of  the  enemy  loomed  up 
through  the  haze,  successive  reports  were  made 
to  him.  "  There  are  eight  sail-of-the-line,  Sir 
John."  "  There  are  twenty  sail-of-the-line, 
Sir  John."  "  There  are  twenty-five  of-the-line, 
Sir  John."  Finally,  when  the  full  tale  of  twenty- 
seven  was  made  out,  the  captain  of  the  fleet  re- 
marked on  the  greatness  of  the  odds.  "  Enough 
of  that,  sir,"  retorted  the  admiral,  intent  on  that 
victory  which  was  so  essential  to  England ;  "  if 
there  are  fifty  sail,  I  will  go  through  them." 


Jervis  353 

This  reply  so  delighted  Hallowell,  an  eccentric 
man,  who  a  year  later  gave  Nelson  the  coffin 
made  from  the  mainmast  of  the  Orient,  that  he 
patted  his  august  superior  on  the  back.  "  That 's 
right,  Sir  John,"  said  he,  "and,  by  G — ,  we'll 

give  them  a  d d  good  licking!" 

When  the  weather  finally  cleared,  to  ward  IOA.M., 
the  British  were  near  to  the  enemy  and  head- 
ing direct  for  the  gap,  which  the  Spaniards, 
too  late,  were  trying  to  close.  Almost  at  the 
moment  of  meeting,  Jervis  formed  his  two  col- 
umns into  one  —  the  order  of  battle  —  "  with  the 
utmost  celerity ; "  thus  doubling  the  length  of 
the  line  interposed  between  the  two  divisions  of 
the  enemy.  Soon  opened  the  guns  of  the  lead- 
ing ship,  the  Culloden,  Captain  Troubridge  ;  the 
reports  following  one  another  in  regular  succes- 
sion, as  though  firing  a  salute  by  watch.  The 
Culloderis  course  led  so  direct  upon  a  Spanish 
three-decker,  that  the  first  lieutenant  reported  a 
collision  imminent.  "  Can't  help  it,  Griffiths," 
replied  Troubridge ;  "  hardest  fend  off."  But 
the  Spaniard,  in  confusion,  put  his  helm  up  and 
went  clear.  By  this  time  the  Spanish  division 
on  the  right,  or  west,  of  the  British  had  changed 
its  course  and  was  steering  north,  parallel  but  op- 
posite to  its  foes.  As  the  Culloden  went  through, 
the  admiral  signalled  her  to  put  about  and  follow 
it.  Troubridge,  fully  expecting  this  order,  obeyed 
at  once  ;  and  Jervis's  signal  was  scarce  unfurled 
when,  by  the  flapping  of  the  Culloden  s  sails,  he 

23 


354  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

saw  it  was  receiving  execution.  "  Look  at  Trou- 
bridge !  "  he  shouted.  "  Does  n't  he  handle  his 
ship  as  though  the  eyes  of  all  England  were  on 
him  ?  I  would  to  God  they  were,  that  she  might 
know  him  as  I  know  him !  "  But  here  a  graver 
matter  drew  the  admiral's  care.  The  Spanish 
division  from  the  left,  steering  across  his  path  of 
"advance,  approached,  purposing  in  appearance  to 
break  through  the  line.  The  Victory  stopped, 
or,  as  seamen  say,  hove-to ;  and  as  the  Spanish 
admiral  came  near  within  a  hundred  yards,  her 
broadside  rang  out,  sweeping  through  the  crowded 
decks  and  lofty  spars  a  storm  of  shot,  to  which, 
in  the  relative  positions,  the  foe  could  not  reply. 
Staggered  and  crippled  he  went  about,  and  the 
Victory  stood  on. 

Meanwhile,  the  ships  which  Troubridge  and  his 
followers  were  pursuing  drew  toward  the  tail  of 
the  British  column,  and  as  they  did  so  made  a 
movement  to  pass  round  it,  and  so  join  their 
friends  who  had  just  been  so  severely  handled  in 
making  the  attempt  to  pass  through.  But  Nelson 
was  in  this  part  of  the  order,  there  being  but  two 
ships  behind  him.  Now,  as  far  as  signals  went, 
he  should  continue  on,  and,  like  the  others,  follow 
in  due  succession  behind  the  Culloden.  He  saw 
that  if  this  were  done  the  Spaniards  would  effect 
their  junction,  so  he  instantly  turned  his  ship 
toward  the  rear,  out  of  her  place,  and  threw  her 
alone  across  the  enemy's  advance.  It  is  said  that 
the  Captain  of  the  Fleet  drew  Jervis's  attention  to 


Jervis  355 

this  breach  of  discipline.  "  Ay,"  replied  the  old 
seaman,  "  and  if  ever  you  offend  in  the  same  way, 
I  promise  you  my  forgiveness  beforehand."  For 
a  while  Nelson  took  the  brunt  of  the  hostile  fire 
from  half  a  dozen  ships,  but  not  for  long.  Soon 
Troubridge,  his  dearest  friend,  came  up  with  a 
couple  of  others ;  and  Collingwood,  the  close  as- 
sociate of  early  days,  who  had  the  rear  ship,  was 
signalled  to  imitate  Nelson's  act.  In  doing  this, 
he  silenced  the  fire  of  two  enemies;  but,  wrote 
Nelson,  "  disdaining  the  parade  of  taking  posses- 
sion of  beaten  ships,  Captain  Collingwood  most 
gallantly  pushed  on  to  save  his  old  friend  and 
messmate,  who  appeared  to  be  in  a  critical  state, 
being  then  fired  upon  by  three  first-rates,  and  the 
San  Nicolas,  eighty."  To  get  between  Nelson's 
ship  and  the  San  Nicolas,  Collingwood  had  to 
steer  close,  passing  within  ten  feet  of  the  latter ; 
so  that,  to  use  his  own  expression,  "though  we 
did  not  touch  sides,  you  could  not  put  a  bodkin 
between  us."  His  fire  drove  the  San  Nicolas 
upon  one  of  the  first-rates,  the  San  Josef ;  and 
when,  continuing  on  to  seek  other  unbeaten  foes, 
he  left  the  field  again  clear  for  Nelson,  the  latter, 
by  a  movement  of  the  helm,  grappled  the  San 
Nicolas.  Incredible  as  it  may  appear,  the  crew 
of  this  one  British  seventy-four  carried,  sword  in 
hand,  both  the  enemy's  ships,  though  of  far  su- 
perior force.  "  Extravagant  as  the  story  may 
seem,"  wrote  Nelson,  "  on  the  quarter-deck  of  a 
Spanish  first-rate  I  received  the  swords  .of  the 


356  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

vanquished  Spaniards,  which,  as  I  received,  I  gave 
to  William  Fearney,  one  of  my  bargemen,  who 
placed  them  with  the  greatest  sangfroid  under 
his  arm." 

Four  Spanish  ships,  two  of  them  of  the  largest 
size,  were  the  trophies  of  this  victory;  but  its 
moral  effect  in  demonstrating  the  relative  values 
of  the  two  navies,  and  the  confidence  England 
could  put  in  men  like  Jervis,  Nelson,  and  the 
leading  captains,  was  far  greater.  The  spirit  of 
the  nation,  depressed  by  a  long  series  of  re- 
verses, revived  like  a  giant  refreshed  with  wine. 
Jervis  had  spoken  truth  when  he  said  a  victory 
was  essential  to  England  at  that  time.  The 
gratitude  of  the  state  was  shown  in  the  profusion 
of  rewards  showered  upon  the  victors.  Promo- 
tions and  honors  were  liberally  distributed.  The 
Government  had  already  purposed  to  recognize 
Jervis's  previous  services  by  raising  him  to  the 
lower  ranks  of  the  peerage ;  but  this  timely  tri- 
umph procured  him  at  one  step  a  higher  eleva- 
tion. He  was  created  Earl  of  St.  Vincent,  with 
a  pension  of  three  thousand  pounds  per  annum. 

The  tactical  decisions  made  by  Jervis  on  this 
momentous  occasion  were  correct  as  far  as  they 
went ;  but,  except  the  initial  determination  to 
attack  the  larger  body  of  the  enemy,  because  to 
windward,  there  is  no  evidence  of  tactical  ori- 
ginality in  him,  no  innovation  comparable  to 
Howe's  manoeuvres  on  May  28  and  29,  —  and 
there  was  undoubted  oversight  in  not  providing 


Jervis  357 

by  signal  against  that  move  of  the  weather  Span- 
ish division  which  it  became  Nelson's  opportunity 
and  glory  to  counteract.  It  is  also  possible  that 
the  signal  to  tack  in  succession,  a  wholly  routine 
proceeding,  might  have  been  made  earlier  to 
advantage ;  but  the  writer  does  not  think  that 
the  body  of  the  fleet  should  then  have  tacked 
together,  as  some  criticism  would  have  it.  Until 
the  British  van  approached  on  the  new  tack,  the 
broadsides  of  the  centre  were  better  ranged  on 
the  original  line  to  counteract  the  efforts,  actu- 
ally made,  by  the  lee  Spanish  division  to  break 
through.  As  regards  the  decision  not  to  follow 
the  victory  further,  which  has  been  censured  in 
the  instances  of  Rodney  and  Howe,  the  condi- 
tions here  differed  in  much.  The  disparity  of 
numbers  was  very  great ;  if  many  of  the  enemy 
had  suffered  greatly,  many  also  had  not  suffered 
at  all ;  they  were  now  reunited  ;  above  all  Jervis's 
strategic  and  political  insight — far  superior  to 
his  tactical  equipment  —  had  rightly  read  the 
situation  when  he  said  that  what  England  needed 
was  a  victory,  —  moral  effect.  The  victory  was 
there,  undeniable  and  brilliant,  it  was  better  not 
risked. 

The  rest  of  the  Spaniards,  many  of  them  badly 
crippled,  took  refuge  in  Cadiz,  and  there  Jervis, 
after  repairing  damages,  held  them  blockaded  for 
two  years,  from  April,  1797,  to  May,  1799.  For 
the  greater  part  of  this  time  the  operation  was 
conducted  by  anchoring  the  British  fleet,  a 


358  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

resource  which  the  character  of  the  ground 
permitted,  and  which,  though  not  everywhere 
possible,  St.  Vincent  declared  the  only  way  of 
assuring  the  desired  end  of  holding  a  position 
in  all  weathers.  During  this  period  was  ren- 
dered the  other  most  signal  service  done  by 
him  to  the  state,  in  suppressing  the  mutinous  ac- 
tion of  the  seamen,  which  there,  as  everywhere 
else  in  the  British  navy  at  that  time,  sought  to 
overthrow  the  authority  of  the  officers. 

The  cause  of  the  mutinies  of  1797  is  not  here 
in  question.  Suffice  it  to  say  that,  in  their  origin, 
they  alleged  certain  tangible  material  grievances 
which  were  clearly  stated,  and,  being  undeniable, 
were  redressed.  The  men  returned  to  their  duty ; 
but,  like  a  horse  that  has  once  taken  the  bit 
between  his  teeth,  the  restive  feeling  remained, 
fermenting  in  a  lot  of  vicious  material  which  the 
exigencies  of  the  day  had  forced  the  navy  to 
accept.  Coinciding  in  time  with  the  risings  in 
Ireland,  1796-1798,  there  arose  between  the  two 
movements  a  certain  sympathy,  which  was  fos- 
tered by  the  many  Irish  in  the  fleets,  where  agents 
were  in  communication  with  the  leaders  of  the 
United  Irishmen  on  shore. 

In  the  Channel  and  the  North  Sea,  the  sea- 
men took  the  ships,  with  few  exceptions,  out  of 
the  hands  of  their  officers.  In  the  former,  they 
dictated  their  terms  ;  in  the  latter,  after  a  month 
of  awful  national  suspense,  they  failed  :  the  dif- 
ference being  that  in  the  one  case  the  demands, 


Jervis  359 

being  reasonable,  carried  conviction,  while  in  the 
other,  becoming  extravagant,  the  Government's 
resistance  was  supported  by  public  opinion.  It 
remained  to  be  seen  how  the  crisis  would  be  met 
in  a  fleet  so  far  from  home  that  the  issue  must 
depend  upon  the  firmness  and  judgment  of  a 
man  of  adamant.  It  was  no  more  than  prudent 
to  expect  that  the  attempt  would  be  made  there 
also ;  and  the  watchfulness  of  the  superior 
officers  of  the  fleet  soon  obtained  certain  infor- 
mation of  its  approach,  though  as  yet  without 
proof  adequate  to  the  arrest  of  individuals.  The 
policy  of  the  admiral,  broadly  stated,  was  that  of 
isolating  ship  from  ship  —  divide  et  impera  —  to 
prevent  concerted  action  ;  a  measure  effected  to 
all  practical  purpose  by  his  unremitting  vigilance, 
and  by  the  general  devotion  to  his  policy  among 
his  leading  officers.  On  the  other  hand,  evidence 
was  not  wanting  that  in  the  ships  long  under  his 
orders  his  own  character  was  now  fairly  under- 
stood, and  obtained  for  him  a  backing  among  the 
seamen  themselves,  without  which  his  severity 
alone  might  have  failed. 

The  first  overt  sign  of  trouble  was  the  appear- 
ance of  letters  addressed  to  the  leading  petty 
officers  of  the  different  ships  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean fleet.  These  were  detected  by  a  captain, 
who  held  on  to  them,  and  sent  to  St.  Vincent  to 
ask  if  they  should  be  delivered.  Careful  to  be- 
tray no  sign  of  anxiety,  the  admiral's  reply  was  a 
general  signal  for  a  lieutenant  from  each  ship  to 


360  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

come  to  him  ;  and  by  them  word  was  sent  that 
all  letters  should  be  delivered  as  addressed,  un- 
opened. "  Should  any  disturbance  arise,"  he 
added,  "the  commander-in-chief  will  know  how 
to  repress  it." 

Disturbance  soon  did  arise,  and  it  is  significant 
to  note  that  it  appeared  in  a  ship  which,  by  tak- 
ing the  ground  when  leaving  Lisbon,  had  not 
shared  in  the  Battle  of  St.  Vincent.  In  July, 
1797,  two  seamen  of  the  St.  George  had  been 
condemned  to  death  for  an  infamous  crime. 
Their  shipmates  presented  a  petition,  framed  in 
somewhat  peremptory  terms,  for  their  liberation, 
on  the  ground  that  execution  for  such  an  offence 
would  bring  disgrace  upon  all.  The  admiral 
refusing  to  pardon,  the  occasion  was  seized  to 
bring  mutiny  to  a  head.  A  plot  to  take  posses- 
sion of  the  ship  was  formed,  but  was  betrayed  to 
the  captain.  The  outburst  began  with  a  tumul- 
tuous assembling  of  the  crew,  evidently,  however, 
mistrustful  of  their  cause.  After  vainly  trying  to 
restore  order,  the  captain  and  first  lieutenant 
rushed  among  them,  each  collaring  a  ringleader. 
The  rest  fell  back,  weakened,  as  men  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  traditions  are  apt  to  be,  by  the  sense  of 
law-breaking.  The  culprits  were  secured,  and  at 
once  taken  to  the  flag-ship.  A  court-martial  was 
ordered  for  the  next  day,  Saturday ;  and  as  the 
prisoners  were  being  taken  to  the  court,  St.  Vin- 
cent, with  a  hard  bluntness  of  speech  which  char- 
acterized him,  —  a  survival  of  the  frank  brutality 


Jervis  361 

of  the  past  century,  —  said,  "  My  friends,  I  hope 
you  are  innocent,  but  if  you  are  guilty  make 
your  peace  with  God  ;  for,  if  you  are  condemned, 
and  there  is  daylight  to  hang  you,  you  will  die 
this  day." 

They  were  condemned ;  but  the  trial  ended 
late,  and  the  president  of  the  court  told  them 
they  should  have  Sunday  to  prepare.  "  Sir,"  said 
the  earl,  "  when  you  passed  sentence,  your  duty 
was  done;  you  had  no  right  to  say  that  execution 
should  be  delayed ;  "  and  he  fixed  it  for  eight  the 
next  morning.  One  of  the  junior  admirals  saw 
fit  to  address  him  a  remonstrance  upon  what  he 
termed  a  desecration  of  the  Sabbath.  Nelson,  on 
the  contrary,  approved.  "  Had  it  been  Christmas 
instead  of  Sunday,"  wrote  he,  "  I  would  have 
hanged  them.  Who  can  tell  what  mischief  would 
have  been  brewed  over  a  Sunday's  grog  ?  "  Con- 
trary to  previous  custom,  their  own  shipmates, 
the  partners  and  followers  in  their  crime,  were 
compelled  to  hang  them,  manning  the  rope  by 
which  the  condemned  were  swayed  to  the  yard- 
arm.  The  admiral,  careful  to  produce  impression, 
ordered  that  all  the  ships  should  hold  divine 
service  immediately  upon  the  execution.  Accord- 
ingly, when  the  bell  struck  eight,  the  fatal  gun 
was  fired,  the  bodies  swung  with  a  jerk  aloft,  the 
church  flags  were  hoisted  throughout  the  fleet, 
and  all  went  to  prayers.  Ere  yet  the  ceremony 
was  over,  the  Spanish  gunboats  came  out  from 
Cadiz  and  opened  fire ;  but  St.  Vincent  would 


362  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

not  mar  the  solemnity  of  the  occasion  by  shorten- 
ing the  service.  Gravely  it  was  carried  to  its 
end ;  but  when  the  flags  came  down,  all  boats 
were  ordered  manned.  The  seamen,  with  nerves 
tense  from  the  morning's  excitement,  gladly 
hurried  into  action,  and  the  enemy  were  forced 
back  into  port. 

One  such  incident  was  far  from  ending  the 
ordeal  through  which  the  admiral  had  to  pass, 
and  which  was  prolonged  throughout  the  period 
of  the  Cadiz  blockade.  In  May,  1798,  when 
Nelson  was  sent  into  the  Mediterranean  to  win 
the  Battle  of  the  Nile,  the  detachment  committed 
to  him  was  replaced  by  a  dozen  ships-of-the-line 
from  the  Channel,  seething  with  the  mutinous 
temper  which  at  home  had  been  humored  rather 
than  scotched.  Immediately  on  their  joining, 
request  was  made  for  a  Court  Martial  on  some 
men  of  the  Marlborough,  on  board  which  two 
violent  mutinies  had  occurred,  —  one  on  the 
passage  out.  St.  Vincent,  having  known  before- 
hand that  this  ship  had  been  pre-eminent  for  in- 
subordination, had  ordered  her  anchored  in  the 
centre  of  the  fleet,  between  the  two  lines  in  which 
it  was  ranged ;  and  the  Court  met  without  delay. 
The  remainder  of  the  incident  is  quoted  substan- 
tially from  one  of  St.  Vincent's  biographers,  for  it 
illustrates  most  forcibly  the  sternness  of  his  action, 
as  well  when  dealing  with  weakness  in  officers 
as  with  mutiny  in  crews.  The  written  order  to 
the  commander  of  the  division  of  launches  appears 


Jervis  363 

among  the  earl's  papers,  as  does  also  a  similar 
one  in  the  case  of  a  mutiny  on  board  the  Defence 
some  months  earlier.  The  ulterior  object  of 
parading  these  boats  was  kept  profoundly  secret. 
They  appeared  to  be  only  part  of  the  pageantry, 
of  the  solemn  ceremonial,  with  which  the  wisdom 
of  the  great  commander-in-chief  providently 
sought  to  invest  all  exhibitions  of  authority,  in 
order  to  deepen  impression. 

The  object  of  the  last  mutiny  on  board  the 
Marlborough  had  been  to  protect  the  life  of  a 
seaman  forfeited  by  a  capital  crime.  No  sooner 
was  one  sentenced  to  die  than  the  commander- 
in-chief  ordered  him  to  be  executed  on  the  fol- 
lowing morning,  "  and  by  the  crew  of  the  Marl- 
borough  alone,  no  part  of  the  boats'  crews  from 
the  other  ships,  as  had  been  used  on  similar 
occasions,  to  assist  in  the  punishment,  —  his 
lordship's  invariable  order  on  the  execution  of 
mutineers.  On  the  receipt  of  the  necessary  com- 
mands for  this  execution,  Captain  Ellison  of  the 
Marlborough  waited  upon  the  commander-in-chief, 
and  reminding  his  lordship  that  a  determination 
that  their  shipmates  should  not  suffer  capital 
punishment  had  been  the  very  cause  of  the  ship's 
company's  mutiny,  expressed  his  conviction  that 
the  Marlborough 's  crew  would  never  permit  the 
man  to  be  hanged  on  board  that  ship. 

"  Receiving  the  captain  on  the  Ville  de  Paris  s 
quarter-deck,  before  the  officers  and  ship's  com- 
pany hearkening  in  breathless  silence  to  what 


364  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

passed,  and  standing  with  his  hat  in  his  hand  over 
his  head,  as  was  his  lordship's  invariable  custom 
during  the  whole  time  that  any  person,  whatever 
were  his  rank,  even  a  common  seaman,  addressed 
him  on  service,  Lord  St.  Vincent  listened  very 
attentively  till  the  captain  ceased  to  speak;  and 
then  after  a  pause  replied,  — 

" '  Do  you  mean  to  tell  me,  Captain  Ellison,  that 
you  cannot  command  his  Majesty's  ship,  the 
Marlborough?  for  if  that  is  the  case,  sir,  I  will 
immediately  send  on  board  an  officer  who  can.' 

"  The  captain  then  requested  that,  at  all  events, 
the  boats'  crews  from  the  rest  of  the  fleet  might, 
as  always  had  been  customary  in  the  service,  on 
executions,  attend  at  this  also,  to  haul  the  man 
up  ;  for  he  really  did  not  expect  the  Marlborough "s 
would  do  it. 

"  Lord  St.  Vincent  sternly  answered:  '  Captain 
Ellison,  you  are  an  old  officer,  sir,  have  served 
long,  suffered  severely  in  the  service,  and  have 
lost  an  arm  in  action,  and  I  should  be  very  sorry 
that  any  advantage  should  be  now  taken  of  your 
advanced  years.  That  man  shall  be  hanged,  at 
eight  o'clock  to-morrow  morning,  and  by  his  own 
ship's  company :  for  not  a  hand  from  any  other 
ship  in  the  fleet  shall  touch  the  rope.  You  will 
now  return  on  board,  sir ;  and,  lest  you  should 
not  prove  able  to  command  your  ship,  an  officer 
will  be  at  hand  who  can.' 

"  Without  another  word  Captain  Ellison  in- 
stantly retired.  After  he  had  reached  his  ship, 


Jervis  365 

he  received  orders  to  cause  her  guns  to  be  housed 
and  secured,  and  that  at  daybreak  in  the  morning 
her  ports  should  be  lowered.  A  general  order 
was  then  issued  to  the  fleet  for  all  launches  to 
rendezvous  under  the  Prince  at  seven  o'clock  on 
the  following  morning,  armed  with  carronades 
and  twelve  rounds  of  ammunition  for  service ; 
each  launch  to  be  commanded  by  a  lieutenant, 
having  an  expert  and  trusty  gunner's-mate  and 
four  quarter  gunners,  exclusive  of  the  launch's 
crew.  The  whole  were  to  be  under  the  com- 
mand of  Captain  Campbell,  of  the  Blenheim,  to 
whom,  on  presenting  to  him  the  written  orders 
under  which  he  was  to  act,  Lord  St.  Vincent 
further  said,  '  he  was  to  attend  the  execution,  and 
if  any  symptoms  of  mutiny  appeared  in  the  Marl- 
borough,  any  attempt  to  open  her  ports,  or  any 
resistance  to  the  hanging  of  the  prisoner,  he  was 
to  proceed  close  touching  the  ship,  and  to  fire 
into  her,  and  to  continue  to  fire  until  all  mutiny 
or  resistance  should  cease ;  and  that,  should  it 
become  absolutely  necessary,  he  should  even  sink 
the  ship  in  face  of  the  fleet.' 

"  Accordingly,  at  seven  the  next  morning,  all 
the  launches,  thus  armed,  proceeded  from  the 
Prince  to  the  Blenheim,  and  thence,  Captain 
Campbell  having  assumed  the  command,  to  the 
Marlborough. 

"  Having  lain  on  his  oars  a  short  time  along- 
side, the  captain  then  formed  his  force  in  a  line 
athwart  her  bows,  at  rather  less  than  pistol  shot 


366  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

distance  off,  and  then  he  ordered  the  tompions 
to  be  taken  out  of  the  carronades,  and  to  load. 

"  At  half-past  seven,  the  hands  throughout  the 
fleet  having  been  turned  up  to  witness  punish- 
ment, the  eyes  of  all  bent  upon  a  powerfully 
armed  boat  as  it  quitted  the  flagship ;  every  one 
knowing  that  there  went  the  provost-marshal 
conducting  his  prisoner  to  the  Marlborougk  for 
execution.  The  crisis  was  come  ;  now  was  to  be 
seen  whether  the  Marlborougti s  crew  would  hang 
one  of  their  own  men. 

"  The  ship  being  in  the  centre  between  the 
two  lines  of  the  fleet,  the  boat  was  soon  along- 
side, and  the  man  was  speedily  placed  on  the  cat- 
head and.  haltered.  A  few  awful  minutes  of  uni- 
versal silence  followed,  which  was  at  last  broken 
by  the  watch  bells  of  the  fleet  striking  eight 
o'clock.  Instantly  the  flagship's  gun  fired,  and 
at  the  sound  the  man  was  lifted  well  off ; 
but  then,  and  visibly  to  all,  he  dropped  back 
again ;  and  the  sensation  throughout  the  fleet 
was  intense.  For,  at  this  dreadful  moment,  when 
the  eyes  of  every  man  in  every  ship  was  straining 
upon  this  execution,  as  the  decisive  struggle 
between  authority  and  mutiny,  as  if  it  were 
destined  that  the  whole  fleet  should  see  the 
hesitating  unwillingness  of  the  Marlborougtis 
crew  to  hang  their  rebel,  and  the  efficacy  of 
the  means  taken  to  enforce  obedience,  by  an 
accident  on  board  the  ship  the  men  at  the  yard- 
rope  unintentionally  let  it  slip,  and  the  turn  of 


Jervis  367 

the  balance  seemed  calamitously  lost;  but  then 
they  hauled  him  up  to  the  yard  arm  with  a  run. 
The  law  was  satisfied,  and,  said  Lord  St.  Vin- 
cent at  the  moment,  perhaps  one  of  the  greatest 
of  his  life,  '  Discipline  is  preserved,  sir ! ' 

Again  a  year  later,  in  May,  1 799,  when  twenty- 
five  French  ships-of-the-line  broke  through  the 
wretchedly  inefficient  guard  at  that  time  kept 
before  Brest,  and  entered  the  Mediterranean,  a 
reinforcement  of  over  a  dozen  was  sent  from  the 
Channel  to  Lord  St.  Vincent,  who  was  found  then 
in  Port  Mahon,  Minorca.  Sir  Edward  Pellew, 
captain  of  one  of  the  new-comers,  asked  a  Court- 
Martial  upon  a  mutiny  that  had  occurred  just 
before  leaving  the  home  port.  St.  Vincent  at 
first  demurred,  startled,  according  to  Pellew's 
biographer,  by  the  extent  of  the  plot  then  re- 
vealed, and  thinking  it  politic  to  suppress  the 
facts ;  but  it  is  alleged  with  equal  probability 
that  he  was  indignant  at  being  continually  called 
upon  to  remedy  evils  due  to  the  general  indis- 
cipline of  the  Channel  Fleet.  "What  do  they 
mean  by  invariably  sending  the  mutinous  ships 
to  me  ?  Do  they  think  that  I  will  be  hangman  to 
the  fleet  ?  "  Both  versions  are  likely  enough  to  be 
correct.  There  is  a  limit  to  all  human  endur- 
ance, and  the  earl  was  now  broken  in  health  ; 
he  was  sixty-four,  had  borne  his  load  for  three 
years,  and  was  on  the  point  of  resigning  his 
command  to  Lord  Keith.  The  Court,  however, 
was  ordered,  and  three  men  were  sentenced  to  be 


368  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

hanged.  Pellew  then  interceded  for  one,  on 
the  ground  of  previous  good  character.  "  No," 
replied  St.  Vincent.  "  Those  who  have  suffered 
hitherto  have  been  so  worthless  before  that  their 
fate  was  of  little  use  as  an  example.  I  shall 
now  convince  the  seamen  that  no  character, 
however  good,  shall  save  a  man  who  is  guilty  of 
mutiny." 

But  St.  Vincent  was  not  content  with  mere 
repression.  Outwardly,  and  indeed  inwardly, 
unshaken,  he  yet  unwearyingly  so  ordered  the 
fleet  as  to  avoid  occasions  of  outbreak.  With 
the  imposing  moral  control  exerted  by  his  un- 
flinching steadiness,  little  trouble  was  to  be 
apprehended  from  single  ships  ;  ignorant  of  what 
might  be  hoped  from  sympathizers  elsewhere, 
but  sure  of  the  extreme  penalty  in  case  of  failure, 
the  movements  lacked  cohesion  and  were  easily 
nipped.  Concerted  action  only  was  to  be  feared, 
and  careful  measures  were  taken  to  remove 
opportunities.  Captains  were  forbidden  to  enter- 
tain one  another  at  dinner,  —  the  reason,  neces- 
sarily unavowed,  being  that  the  boats  from 
various  ships  thus  assembling  gave  facilities  for 
transmitting  messages  and  forming  plans ;  and 
when  ships  arrived  from  England  they  underwent 
a  moral  quarantine,  no  intercourse  with  them 
being  permitted  until  sanctioned  by  the  admiral. 
When  the  captain  reported  to  him,  his  boat, 
while  waiting,  was  shoved  off  out  of  earshot.  It 
is  said  that  on  one  occasion  a  seaman  in  such 


Jervis  369 

a  boat  managed  to  call  to  one  looking  out  of  a 
port  of  the  flag-ship,  "  I  say,  there,  what  have  you 
fellows  been  doing  out  here,  while  we  have  been 
fighting  for  your  beef  and  pork  ?  "  To  which  the 
other  replied,  "  You  'd  best  say  nothing  at  all 
about  that  out  here,  for  if  old  Jarvie  hears  ye 
he  '11  have  ye  dingle-dangle  at  the  yard-arm  at 
eight  o'clock  to-morrow  morning." 

The  severe  strain  of  this  prolonged  watchful- 
ness told  on  even  his  iron  hardihood,  and  it  would 
almost  appear  that  some  of  the  rough  practical 
jokes  told  of  this  period  must  represent  reaction 
from  the  tension  under  which  he  necessarily  was 
through  the  grave  anxieties  pressing  upon  him. 
Humor  he  certainly  had,  but  at  this  time  it  often 
showed  itself  in  horse-play,  so  fantastic  as  to  sug- 
gest some  unusual  exciting  cause.  Thus,  for  one 
such  prank  he  seemed  to  draw  his  inspiration  from 
the  Sunday  celebration  of  Divine  Service.  Upon 
its  conclusion,  he  framed  and  published  a  new 
signal,  for  "  all  chaplains,"  the  employment  of 
which,  however,  was  postponed  to  an  occasion 
suited  to  his  lordship's  fun.  "  A  few  days  after  it 
blew  great  guns  from  west-southwest,  which  is 
directly  into  the  Bay  of  Cadiz.  The  inshore 
squadron  lay  six  miles  from  the  flag-ship,  directly 
to  leeward,  and  up  went  the  signal  for  all  chap- 
lains. It  was  a  hard  pull  for  the  rowers,  and  no 
luxury  for  the  sitters.  When  they  reached  the 
quarter-deck  of  the  Ville  de  Paris,  literally 
drenched  with  salt-water,  the  admiral  presented 

24 


370  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

them  to  '  Bishop  Morgan,'  as  he  called  the  chap- 
lain of  the  flag-ship,  and  desired  that  they  would 
go  down  into  the  ward-room  and  hold  a  conclave." 
One  who  has  had  a  pull  of  that  kind,  as  most  offi- 
cers have  in  their  day,  can  understand  that  the 
humor  was  less  appreciable  to  the  victims  than 
to  the  author. 

"  He  sometimes  amused  himself  by  paying  a 
visit  to  the  quarter-deck  at  what  most  people 
would  deem  very  unseasonable  hours.  Coming 
up  one  morning  at  half-past  two,  in  the  middle 
watch,  he  sent  for  Colonel  Flight,  the  command- 
ing officer  of  marines.  Up  came  the  colonel, 
armed  at  all  points,  supposing  that  some  enter- 
prise was  in  hand.  '  I  have  sent  for  you/  said 
the  Chief,  in  the  quiet  and  gentlemanly  style 
which  he  could  always  command,  '  I  have  sent 
for  you,  Colonel,  that  you  might  smell,  for  the 
first  time  in  your  life,  the  delicious  odors  brought 
off  by  the  land  wind  from  the  shores  of  Andalusia. 
Take  a  good  sniff,  and  then  you  may  go  and  turn 
in  again.' " 

"A  lieutenant  one  day  came  on  board  to 
answer  a  signal.  Lord  St.  Vincent  thought 
there  was  about  him  too  much  embonpoint  for 
an  officer  of  that  rank.  '  Calder,'  said  he  to  the 
captain  of  the  fleet,  '  all  the  lieutenants  are  run- 
ning to  belly;  they. have  been  too  long  at  anchor 
(for  the  fleet  was  still  off  Cadiz) ;  block  up  the 
entering  port,  except  for  admirals  and  captains, 
and  make  them  climb  over  the  hammocks.'  The 


Jervis  371 

entering  port  in  a  three-decked  ship  being  on 
the  middle  deck,  the  difference  between  going 
into  that  and  climbing  over  the  hammocks  may 
be  compared  to  entering  the  drawing-room  by 
the  balcony  window,  or  mounting  to  the  parapet 
and  taking  the  attics  by  storm.  There  was  also 
great  inconvenience,  and  even  expense,  attending 
this  painful  operation,  since  in  those  days  all 
officers  wore  white  knee-breeches,  or  shorts,  as 
they  were  called,  and  many  useful  garments 
which  could  not  readily  be  replaced,  were  torn 
and  spoiled  in  this  attempt  at  juvenile  activity, 
and  many  oaths  probably  sworn,  which  but  for 
this  needless  exertion  would  not  have  been 
elicited." 

A  more  pleasing,  and  it  may  well  be  believed 
much  more  characteristic,  instance  of  his  playful- 
ness has  also  been  transmitted ;  one  illustrative 
too  of  his  deep  fund  of  kindliness  which  was 
shown  in  many  acts,  often  of  large  pecuniary 
liberality,  and  tinged  especially  with  a  certain 
distinct  service  coloring,  with  sympathy  for  the 
naval  officer  and  the  naval  seaman,  which  must 
have  gone  far  to  obtain  for  him  the  obedience 
of  the  will  as  well  as  submission  of  conduct. 
He  wisely  believed  in  the  value  of  forms,  and 
was  careful  to  employ  them,  in  this  crisis  of  the 
mutinies,  to  enforce  the  habit  of  reverence  for 
the  insignia  of  the  state  and  the  emblems  of 
military  authority.  Young  lieutenants  —  for  there 
were  young  lieutenants  in  those  days  —  were 


372  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

directed  to  stand  cap  in  hand  before  their  supe- 
riors, and  not  merely  to  touch  their  hats  in  a 
careless  manner.  "  The  discipline  of  the  cabin 
and  ward-room  officers  is  the  discipline  of  the 
fleet,"  said  the  admiral ;  and  savage,  almost,  were 
the  punishments  that  fell  upon  officers  who  dis- 
graced their  cloth.  The  hoisting  of  the  colors, 
the  symbol  of  the  power  of  the  nation,  from 
which  depended  his  own  and  that  of  all  the 
naval  hierarchy,  was  made  an  august  and  impos- 
ing ceremony.  The  marine  guard,  of  near  a 
hundred  men,  was  paraded  on  board  every  ship- 
of-the-line.  The  national  anthem  was  played, 
the  scarlet-clad  guard  presented,  and  all  officers 
and  crews  stood  bareheaded,  as  the  flag  with 
measured  dignity  rose  slowly  to  the  staff-head. 
Lord  St.  Vincent  himself  made  a  point  of  attend- 
ing always,  and  in  full  uniform ;  a  detail  he  did 
not  require  of  other  officers.  Thus  the  divinity 
that  hedges  kings  was,  by  due  observance,  asso- 
ciated with  those  to  whom  their  authority  was 
delegated,  and  the  very  atmosphere  the  seaman 
breathed  was  saturated  with  reverence. 

The  presence  of  Lord  St.  Vincent  on  these 
occasions,  and  in  full  uniform,  gave  rise  to  an 
amusing  skit  by  one  of  the  lieutenants  of  the 
fleet,  attributing  the  homage  exacted,  not  to  the 
flag,  but  to  the  great  man  himself;  and  this, 
becoming  known  to  the  admiral,  elicited  from 
him  in  turn  the  exhibition  of  practical  humor  to 
which  allusion  has  just  been  made.  Parodying 


Jervis  373 

the  Scriptural  story  of  Nebuchadnezzar's  golden 
image,  the  squib  began :  — 

"  I.  The  Earl  of  St.  Vincent,  the  commander- 
in-chief,  made  an  Image  of  blue  and  gold,  whose 
height  was  about  five  feet  seven  inches,  and  the 
breadth  thereof  was  about  twenty  inches  "  (which 
we  may  infer  were  the  proportions  of  his  lord- 
ship). "  He  set  it  up  every  ten  o'clock  A.  M.  on 
the  quarter-deck  of  the  Ville  de  Paris,  before 
Cadiz." 

Passing  from  hand  to  hand,  it  can  be  under- 
stood that  this  effusion,  which  was  characterized 
throughout  by  a  certain  sprightliness,  gave  more 
amusement  to  men  familiar  with  the  local  sur- 
roundings, and  welcoming  any  trifle  of  fun  in  the 
dulness  of  a  blockade,  than  it  does  to  us.  At 
last  it  reached  the  admiral,  who  knew  the  author 
well.  Sending  for  him  on  some  pretext,  an  hour 
before  the  time  fixed  for  a  formal  dinner  to  the 
captains  of  the  fleet,  he  detained  him  until  the 
meal  was  served,  and  then  asked  him  to  share  it. 
All  passed  off  quietly  until  the  cloth  was  removed, 
and  then  the  host  asked  aloud,  "  What  shall  be 
done  to  the  man  whom  the  commander-in-chief 
delights  to  honour?  "  "Promote  him,"  said  one 
of  the  company.  "  Not  so,"  replied  St.  Vincent, 
"  but  set  him  on  high  among  the  people.  So, 
Cumby,"  addressing  the  lieutenant,  "  do  you  .sit 
there,"  —  on  a  chair  previously  arranged  at  some 
height  above  the  deck,  —  "  and  read  this  paper  to 
the  captains  assembled."  Mystified,  but  not  yet 


374  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

guessing  what  was  before  him,  Cumby  took  his 
seat,  and,  opening  the  paper,  saw  his  own  parody. 
His  imploring  looks  were  lost  upon  the  admiral, 
who  sat  with  his  stern  quarter-deck  gravity  un- 
shaken, while  the  abashed  lieutenant,  amid  the 
suppressed  mirth  of  his  audience,  stumbled 
through  his  task,  until  the  words  were  reached, 
"  Then  the  Earl  of  St.  Vincent  was  full  of  fury, 
and  the  form  of  his  visage  was  changed  against 
the  poor  Captain  of  the  Main-Top,"  who  had  not 
taken  off  his  hat  before  the  Image  of  blue  and 
gold.  Here  a  roar  of  laughter  from  the  head  of 
the  table  unloosed  all  tongues,  and  Cumby 's  pen- 
ance ended  in  a  burst  of  general  merriment. 
"  Lieutenant  Cumby,"  said  the  admiral,  when 
quiet  was  restored,  "  you  have  been  found  guilty 
of  parodying  Holy  Writ  to  bring  your  commander- 
in-chief  into  disrespect ;  and  the  sentence  is  that 
you  proceed  to  England  at  once  on  three  months' 
leave  of  absence,  and  upon  your  return  report  to 
me  to  take  dinner  here  again." 

Compelled  by  general  break-down  of  health  to 
seek  rest  at  home,  St.  Vincent  returned  to  Eng- 
land in  August,  1799.  He  was  not  left  long  in 
repose.  The  condition  of  the  Channel  Fleet  as 
regards  discipline  has  already  appeared,  and  the 
very  recent  incident  of  the  escape  of  the  great 
French  fleet  from  Brest,  coupled  with  the  equally 
humiliating  and  even  more  threatening  experience 
of  the  same  character  in  1 796,  when  the  invasion 
of  Ireland  was  attempted,  —  both  which  occurred 


Jervis  375 

under  the  same  British  commander-in-chief,  — 
showed  the  urgent  necessity  of  placing  in  control 
the  only  man  of  suitable  rank,  whose  complete 
adequacy  to  such  a  post  had  been  demonstrated. 
St.  Vincent  accordingly  hoisted  his  flag  in  April, 
1800. 

In  the  effort  to  restore  discipline,  he  here  en- 
countered not  only  opposition,  intensified  by  the 
greater  desire  for  shore  privileges  that  always 
attends  a  home  station  and  the  proximity  of  wives 
and  children,  but  something  very  like  an  attempt 
at  combination  against  his  orders  —  a  very  grave 
military  offence  —  on  the  part  of  the  captains. 
All  this  he  trampled  down  with  severity  amount- 
ing to  ruthlessness.  The  insubordinate  toast  — 
"  May  the  discipline  of  the  Mediterranean  never 
be  introduced  into  the  Channel  Fleet "  —  was 
met  face  to  face  by  republishing  every  order  and 
restriction  upon  which  the  discipline  of  the  Med- 
iterranean had  rested.  In  the  more  distinctly 
military  part  of  his  task,  the  closing  of  the  port 
of  Brest  to  evasions  by  the  enemy,  such  as  those 
just  mentioned,  he  achieved  a  noteworthy  success. 
Modelling  his  scheme  upon  that  of  Hawke,  forty 
years  before,  he  gave  to  it  a  development,  a 
solidity,  and  an  extension  which  his  distinguished 
forerunner  had  not  been  able  to  impart.  Hawke 
had  not  the  advantage,  which  St.  Vincent  had,  of 
following  a  period  of  inefficiency,  the  remembrance 
of  which  compelled  the  Admiralty  vigorously  to 
support  all  measures  of  the  commander-in-chief, 


376  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

if  they  desired  to  replace  the  interminable  uncer- 
tainties and  anxieties  of  the  last  administration  of 
the  fleet  by  a  sense  of  security,  and  consequent 
popular  content. 

St.  Vincent's  institution  and  maintenance  of 
the  Brest  blockade  must  be  regarded  under  two 
principal  heads.  There  is,  first,  the  usefulness  of 
the  blockade  as  an  instrument  to  the  general 
ends  of  the  current  war,  which  is  the  strategic 
point  of  view,  involving  a  conception  permanent 
in  character;  and  there  are  again  the  local  dis- 
positions, arising  from  the  local  conditions,  that 
may  rightly  be  styled  tactical,  and  vary  from  port 
to  port  thus  watched.  The  former,  the  strategic, 
was  more  directly  in  line  with  his  natural  gifts ; 
and  in  the  possession  which  the  idea  took  of  him 
is  to  be  found  the  germ  of  the  system  that  thence- 
forward began  to  throttle  the  power  of  the  French 
Revolution,  whether  under  the  Republic  or  the 
Empire.  The  essence  of  the  scheme  was  to  cut 
loose  from  the  beach,  and  keep  to  the  sea ;  ever 
watchful,  with  the  same  watchfulness  that  had  not 
only  crushed  mutiny,  but  by  diligent  care  fore- 
stalled occasions  of  revolt.  "  Our  great  reliance," 
he  said,  —  not  directly  in  reference  to  the  blockade, 
but  to  the  general  thought  of  which  the  blockade, 
as  instituted  by  him,  was  the  most  illustrious  ex- 
emplification,—  "  is  on  the  vigilance  and  activity 
of  our  cruisers  at  sea,  any  reduction  in  the  number 
of  which,  by  applying  them  to  guard  our  ports,  in- 
lets, and  beaches,  would  in  my  judgment  tend  to 


Jervis  377 

our  destruction."  Amplified  as  the  idea  was  by 
him,  when  head  of  the  Admiralty,  to  cover  not  only 
Brest  but  all  ports  where  hostile  divisions  lay,  it 
became  a  strategic  plan  of  wide  sweep,  which 
crushed  the  vitality  of  the  hostile  navies,  isolated 
France  from  all  support  by  commerce,  and  fatally 
sapped  her  strength.  To  St.  Vincent,  more  than 
to  any  one  man,  is  due  the  effective  enforcement 
and  maintenance  of  this  system ;  and  in  this 
sense,  as  practically  the  originator  of  a  decisive 
method,  he  is  fairly  and  fully  entitled  to  be  con- 
sidered the  organizer  of  ultimate  victory. 

The  local  dispositions  before  Brest  will  not 
here  be  analyzed.1  Suffice  it  to  say  that,  as 
revealed  in  Jervis's  correspondence,  they  show  that 
equipment  of  general  professional  knowledge, 
that  careful  study  of  conditions,  —  of  what  cor- 
responds to  "  the  ground "  of  a  shore  battle- 
field,—  and  the  thoughtful  prevision  of  pos- 
sibilities, which  constitute  so  far  the  skilful 
tactician.  The  defence  and  the  attack  of  sea- 
ports, embracing  as  they  do  both  occupation  of 
permanent  positions  and  the  action  of  mobile 
bodies,  are  tactical  questions;  differing  much, 
yet  not  radically,  from  field  operations,  where 
positions  are  taken  incidentally,  but  where  move- 
ment of  armed  men  is  the  principal  factor.  In 
the  one  sense  St.  Vincent  displayed  a  high  degree 
of  aptitude  for  ordered  permanent  dispositions, 

1  This  has  been  done  by  the  author  elsewhere  (Influence  of  Sea 
Power  upon  the  French  Revolution  and  Empire,  Vol.  I.  pp.  371-377). 


378  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

which  is  the  side  of  tactics  most  akin  to  strategy. 
On  the  more  distinctively  tactical  side,  in  the 
movements  of  a  fleet  in  action,  he  had  little 
opportunity.  As  far  as  shown  by  his  one  battle, 
Cape  St.  Vincent,  it  would  not  appear  that  either 
by  nature  or  cultivation  he  possessed  to  any  great 
extent  the  keen  insight  and  quick  appreciation 
that  constitute  high  tactical  ability. 

Earl  St.  Vincent  rendered  three  great  servi- 
ces to  England.  The  first  was  the  forming  and 
disciplining  the  Mediterranean  fleet  into  the  per- 
fection that  has  been  mentioned.  Into  it,  thus 
organized,  he  breathed  a  spirit  which,  taking  its 
rise  from  the  stern  commander  himself,  rested 
upon  a  conviction  of  power,  amply  justified  in 
the  sequel  by  Cape  St.  Vincent  and  the  Nile, 
its  two  greatest  achievements.  The  second  was 
the  winning  of  the  Battle  of  St.  Vincent  at  a  most 
critical  political  moment.  The  third  was  the  sup- 
pression of  mutiny  in  1797  and  1798.  But,  in  esti- 
mating the  man,  these  great  works  are  not  to  be 
considered  as  isolated  from  his  past  and  his  future. 
They  were  the  outcome  and  fruitage  of  a  char- 
acter naturally  strong,  developed  through  long 
years  of  patient  sustained  devotion  to  the  ideals 
of  discipline  and  professional  tone,  which  in  them 
received  realization.  Faithful  in  the  least,  Jervis, 
when  the  time  came,  was  found  faithful  also  in 
the  greatest.  Nor  was  the  future  confined  to 
his  own  personal  career.  Though  he  must  yield 
to  Nelson  the  rare  palm  of  genius,  which  he 


Jervis  379 

himself  cannot  claim,  yet  was  the  glory  of  Nel- 
son, from  the  Nile  to  Trafalgar,  the  fair  flower 
that  could  only  have  bloomed  upon  the  rugged 
stalk  of  Jervis's  navy.  Upon  him,  therefore,  Nel- 
son showered  expressions  of  esteem  and  rever- 
ence, amounting  at  times  almost  to  tenderness, 
in  his  early  and  better  days.  In  later  years  their 
mutual  regard  suffered  an  estrangement  which, 
whatever  its  origin,  appears  as  a  matter  of  feeling 
to  have  been  chiefly  on  the  part  of  the  younger 
man,  whose  temper,  under  the  malign  influence 
of  an  unworthy  passion,  became  increasingly  im- 
bittered,  at  strife  within  itself  and  at  variance  with 
others.  The  affectionate  admiration  of  St.  Vin- 
cent for  his  brilliant  successor  seems  to  have  re- 
mained proof  against  external  differences. 

It  was  poetic  justice,  then,  that  allotted  to  St. 
Vincent  the  arrangement  of  the  responsible  expe- 
dition which,  in  1798,  led  to  the  celebrated  Bat- 
tle of  the  Nile ;  in  its  lustre  and  thorough  work- 
manship the  gem  of  all  naval  exploits.  To  him 
it  fell  to  choose  for  its  command  his  brilliant 
younger  brother,  and  to  winnow  for  him  the 
flower  of  his  fleet,  to  form  what  Nelson  after  the 
victory  called  "  his  band  of  brothers."  "  The 
Battle  of  the  Nile,"  said  the  veteran  admiral, 
Lord  Howe,  "stands  singular  in  this,  that  every 
captain  distinguished  himself."  The  achievement 
of  the  battle  was  Nelson's  own,  and  Nelson's  only ; 
but  it  was  fought  on  St.  Vincent's  station,  by  a 
detachment  from  St.  Vincent's  fleet.  He  it  was 


380  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

who  composed  the  force,  and  chose  for  its  leader 
the  youngest  flag-officer  in  his  command.  Bit- 
ter reclamations  were  made  by  the  admirals  senior 
to  Nelson,  but  St.  Vincent  had  one  simple  suffi- 
cient reply,  —  "  Those  who  are  responsible  for 
measures  must  have  the  choice  of  the  men  to 
execute  them." 

When  St.  Vincent,  in  1799,  quitted  the  Medi- 
terranean, he  had  yet  nearly  a  quarter  of  a 
century  to  live.  His  later  years  were  distin- 
guished by  important  services,  but  they  embody 
the  same  spirit  and  exemplify  the  same  methods 
that  marked  his  Mediterranean  command,  which 
was  the  culminating  period  of  his  career.  In 
1 80 1,  when  Pitt's  long  term  of  office  came  to  an 
end,  he  became  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty, — 
the  head  of  naval  affairs  for  the  United  King- 
dom, —  and  so  continued  during  the  Addington 
administration,  till  1804.  In  1806,  at  the  age  of 
seventy-two,  he  was  again  for  a  short  time  called 
to  command  the  Channel  fleet;  but  in  1807  he 
retired  from  active  service,  and  the  square  flag 
that  had  so  long  flown  with  honor  was  hauled 
down  forever. 

The  rest  of  his  life  was  spent  chiefly  at  his 
country-seat,  Rochetts,  in  Essex,  sixteen  miles 
from  London.  Having  a  handsome  income, 
though  not  wealthy,  he  entertained  freely ;  and 
his  retreat  was  cheered  by  frequent  visits  from 
his  old  naval  subordinates  and  political  friends. 
Generous  in  the  use  of  money,  and  without  chil- 


Jervis  381 

dren  for  whom  to  save,  the  neighborhood  learned 
to  love  him  as  a  benefactor.  In  cases  of  ne- 
cessity, his  liberality  rose  to  profusion,  and  he 
carried  into  the  management  of  his  estate  a 
carelessness  he  never  showed  in  administering 
a  fleet.  It  is  told  that  he  once  undertook  to 
raise  a  sum  by  mortgage,  in  entire  forgetful- 
ness  of  a  much  larger  amount  in  bank.  Far 
into  old  age  he  retained  the  active  habits  of 
his  prime.  To  say  that  he  rose  at  four,  asserts 
a  biographer,  would  be  to  understate  the  case ; 
he  was  frequently  in  the  fields  at  half-past  two 
in  the  early  summer  dawn  of  England,  —  always 
before  his  laborers,  —  and  he  was  not  pleased  if 
his  male  guests  did  not  appear  by  six.  To  ladies 
he  was  more  tolerant.  With  mind  unclouded 
and  unweakened  to  the  last,  he  retained  his  inter- 
est in  public  affairs  and  in  the  navy,  contributing 
to  the  conversation  which  animated  his  home  the 
judgment  of  an  acute  intellect,  though  one  deeply 
tinged  by  prejudices  inseparable  from  so  strong  a 
character.  Thus  honored  and  solaced  by  the 
companionship  of  his  friends,  he  awaited  in  calm 
dignity  the  summons,  which  came  on  the  I3th  of 
March,  1823.  He  was  two  months  over  eighty- 
eight  when  he  passed  away,  the  senior  admiral  of 
Great  Britain. 


SAUMAREZ 


"  'T^HESE  were  honourable  among  the  thirty," 
A  says  the  ancient  Hebrew  chronicler,  "  yet 
they  attained  not  unto  the  first  three."  Since 
that  far-away  day,  when  the  three  mighty  men 
broke  through  the  host  of  the  Philistines  that 
they  might  bring  their  chieftain  water  from  the 
well  of  Bethlehem,  to  how  many  fighters,  land 
and  sea,  have  these  words  been  applicable  !  — 
men  valiant  in  deed,  wise  in  council,  patient  in 
endurance,  yet  lacking  that  divine  somewhat 
which,  for  want  of  a  better  name,  we  call  genius. 
Of  such  an  one  now,  and,  in  contrasted  sequence, 
of  another  of  his  oeers,  we  are  about  to  give  an 
account  ;  men  who  in  their  respective  careers 
illustrated  more  conspicuously,  the  one  the 
distinctively  military,  the  other  the  more  purely 
nautical,  aspects,  in  the  due  blending  of  which 
the  excellence  of  the  profession  is  realized  ;  fore- 
most, both,  among  the  ocean  warriors  whose 
pennants  flew  through  the  wild  scenes  where 
England's  flag  was  called  to  brave  the  battle  and 
the  breeze, 


Saumarez  383 

"  Till  danger's  troubled  night  depart, 
And  the  star  of  peace  return." 

James  Saumarez  was  born  on  the  nth  of 
March,  1757,  in  Guernsey,  one  of  the  Channel 
group  of  islands  that  still  remain  attached  to  the 
English  crown,  —  the  sole  remaining  fragment  of 
the  Norman  duchy  to  which  the  kingdom  itself 
was  for  a  while  but  an  appendage.  In  Saumarez's 
childhood,  French  was  still  so  generally  spoken 
there  that,  despite  the  very  early  age  at  which 
he  went  to  sea,  he  always  retained  a  perfect  mas- 
tery of  that  language ;  and  it  is  recorded  that 
one  of  his  uncles,  being  intended  for  the  sea  ser- 
vice, was  sent  to  school  in  England  when  ten 
years  old,  in  order  to  acquire  the  use  of  English. 
From  such  a  stock,  whose  lineage  among  the 
gentry  of  the  island  can  be  traced  to  the  four- 
teenth century,  sprang  three  distinguished  officers 
of  this  name,  destined  to  illustrate  the  British 
flag  by  their  deeds  in  several  wars,  in  which  their 
chief  opponent  was  the  French  navy.  Among 
these,  the  subject  of  this  article  attained  the  most 
brilliant  renown.  Eighteen  months  older  than 
Nelson,  not  even  Nelson  saw  more  or  harder 
fighting  than  did  James  Saumarez,  nor  bore 
himself  more  nobly  throughout  their  day  and 
generation. 

Having  early  shown  a  taste  for  the  navy,  his 
father,  who  had  six  sons  and  a  restricted  income, 
obtained  of  a  naval  captain  to  have  his  name 
borne  on  the  books  of  a  ship  of  war  at  the  early 


384  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

age  of  ten  ;  a  curious  custom  of  that  day  allowing 
such  constructive  service  to  be  counted  in  the 
time  prescribed  for  attaining  a  lieutenant's  com- 
mission. The  boy  did  not  actually  go  afloat 
until  1770,  when  a  little  over  thirteen.  This  first 
employment  kept  him  from  home  continuously 
for  five  years,  a  period  spent  wholly  in  the  Medi- 
terranean, and  for  the  most  part  in  the  Levant ; 
the  active  naval  war  then  existing  between  Tur- 
key and  Russia,  in  the  waters  of  Asia  Minor, 
necessitating  a  special  protection  to  British  in- 
terests. It  is  a  singular  circumstance  that  this 
sea,  esteemed  so  important  to  Great  Britain,  was 
never  again  visited  by  him,  with  the  exception  of 
the  few  brief  months  from  May  to  October,  1 798, 
when,  as  second  in  command,  he  followed  Nel- 
son's flag  during  the  pursuit  of  Bonaparte's  fleet 
which  ended  in  its  destruction  at  the  Battle  of  the 
Nile. 

Returning  to  England  in  1775,  his  actual  and 
constructive  service  permitted  Saumarez  to  ap- 
pear for  examination  for  a  lieutenancy.  This  he 
passed,  but  was  not  at  once  promoted.  The 
troubles  with  the  American  colonies  had  now  be- 
come open  hostilities,  and  he  was  appointed,  as 
master's  mate  or  passed  midshipman,  to  the 
Bristol  of  fifty  guns,  selected  as  flag-ship  for 
the  expedition  against  Charleston.  This  duty, 
which,  by  bringing  him  immediately  under  the 
eyes  of  the  naval  commander-in-chief,  placed  him 
also  on  the  highway  to  advancement,  he  owed  to 


Saumarez  385 

Admiral  Keppel,  then  one  of  the  leading  flag 
officers  of  the  British  navy.  His  uncle,  Philip 
Saumarez,  and  Keppel  had  shared  the  perils  and 
sufferings  of  Anson  s  well-known  expedition  to 
the  South  Seas  in  1740.  Together  they  had  buf- 
feted the  wild  weather  off  Cape  Horn,  with  ships' 
companies  more  than  decimated  by  scurvy;  to- 
gether they  had  spread  terror  among  the  Spanish 
colonies  of  the  Pacific ;  together  they  had  cap- 
tured the  great  galleon  off  Manila ;  and  Keppel 
still  retained  an  affectionate  interest  in  the  kins- 
man of  his  old  shipmate,  who  had  long  since 
fallen  gloriously  on  the  deck  of  his  ship,  in  close 
action  with  a  French  vessel  of  far  superior  force. 
The  squadron,  which  was  commanded  by  Com- 
modore Sir  Peter  Parker,  assembled  at  Cork, 
whence  it  sailed  in  January,  1776.  Embarked  on 
board  the  Bristol  was  Lord  Cornwallis,  afterwards 
so  closely,  and  for  himself  disastrously,  associated 
with  the  course  of  the  American  Revolution. 
Struck  by  Saumarez's  activity  and  efficiency,  he 
offered  him  a  commission  in  his  own  regiment, 
with  the  position  of  aide-de-camp  to  himself.  The 
young  seaman,  having  a  naturally  strong  mili- 
tary bent,  which  at  that  moment  seemed  more 
likely  to  receive  satisfaction  on  shore  than  at  sea, 
and  swayed  doubtless  also  by  the  prospect  of  a 
powerful  patron,  in  the  days  when  patronage  had 
so  much  to  do  with  men's  careers,  was  on  the 
point  of  accepting ;  but  his  messmates  chaffed 
him  so  mercilessly  upon  adopting  a  profession 

25 


3 86  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

which  habitually  supplied  them  with  derisive  illus- 
trations and  comparisons,  that  he  finally  declined. 
Many  years  later,  when  Saumarez  was  among  the 
senior  captains  of  the  navy,  the  two  gentlemen 
met  as  guests  at  the  table  of  the  head  of  the  Ad- 
miralty, who  upon  hearing  the  incident  from  Corn- 
wallis  remarked  that  he  would  have  deprived  the 
navy  of  one  of  its  best  officers. 

Owing  partly  to  delays  inseparable  from  sailing 
vessels,  and  partly  to  the  dilatoriness  with  wfiich 
war  was  most  often  waged  before  the  days  of  the 
French  Revolution,  the  British  expedition  did 
not  appear  off  Charleston  until  the  beginning  of 
June,  1776.  To  Americans  who  know  their  own 
history,  the  stirring  story  of  Fort  Moultrie  and 
its  repulse  of  the  British  fleet  has  been  familiar 
from  childhood.  Few  are  the  American  boys  to 
whom  the  names  of  Jasper,  of  Marion,  and  of 
their  brave  commander,  Moultrie  himself,  are  un- 
known. But  while  all  honor  is  due  to  the  band 
of  raw  provincials  who  at  this  critical  moment  — 
one  week  before  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
was  signed  —  withstood  the  enemy,  and  for  the 
moment  saved  the  province,  the  steady,  obstinate 
valor  shown  by  the  seamen  of  kindred  race,  who 
contended  with  them,  was  no  less  brilliant,  and 
was  even  more  severely  tested.  The  loss  of  the 
fort  was  thirty-seven  killed  and  wounded ;  that 
of  the  Bristol  alone  was  one  hundred  and  eleven 
out  of  a  crew  of  three  hundred  and  fifty ;  and 
during  much  of  the  action,  which  lasted  thirteen 


Saumarez  387 

hours,  she  was  powerless  to  return  the  raking 
fire  of  the  enemy,  in  consequence  of  shot  severing 
the  ropes  that  kept  her  broadside  in  position. 
Saumarez  was  here  for  the  first  time  engaged, 
and  had  two  narrow  escapes.  Once,  when  point- 
ing a  gun,  a  cannon-ball  entering  the  port  swept 
away  seven  of  the  eight  men  who  served  the 
piece;  and  somewhat  later  another  ball  struck 
off  the  head  of  a  messmate  by  whom  he  was 
standing,  covering  him  with  blood. 

In  this,  his  maiden  action,  Saumarez  gave  full 
proof  of  the  steady  courage  which  ever  dis- 
tinguished him ;  and  it  is  worthy  of  passing 
remark  that,  in  the  doggedness  of  the  fighting 
and  the  severity  of  the  slaughter,  the  battle  was 
typical  of  a  great  part  of  his  after  experience. 
Several  death  vacancies  resulting  among  the 
officers,  he  was  promoted  to  be  lieutenant  a 
fortnight  later ;  and  when  the  Bristol  went  north 
he  was  again  actively  engaged  in  the  operations 
on  Long  Island,  and  along  the  East  and  Hudson 
rivers,  up  to  the  evacuation  of  New  York  by  the 
Americans.  His  conspicuous  activity  at  length 
obtained  for  him  the  command  of  a  galley,  with 
which  he  was  sent  to  Rhode  Island  in  February, 
1778.  The  judgment  of  the  illustrious  Rodney, 
as  well  as  the  repeated  efforts  of  the  Americans 
to  regain  control  of  Narragansett  Bay,  may  be 
cited  against  the  opinion  expressed  by  Bancroft, 
that  the  seizure  of  this  important  naval  centre  by 
the  British  was  a  mistake.  The  tenure  of  the 


388  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

island,  however,  depended  upon  the  control  of 
the  surrounding  waters,  and  upon  the  active 
destruction  of  the  American  means  of  transport. 
Saumarez's  galley  was  one  of  the  force  stationed 
in  the  eastern,  or  Seakonnet,  passage ;  and  in  the 
five  months  thus  employed  it  is  recorded  that  he 
was  forty-seven  times  under  fire. 

Sullivan  was  at  this  time  preparing  for  his 
attack  upon  the  British  lines,  expecting  co-opera- 
tion by  the  French  fleet.  This  arrived  on  the 
2Qth  of  July,  and  six  days  later  Seakonnet  Chan- 
nel was  entered  by  a  detachment  superior  in  force 
to  the  British  there.  The  latter  burned  their 
ships  and  retreated  to  Rhode  Island,  where  the 
officers  and  seamen,  Saumarez  among  them,  con- 
tinued actively  engaged  in  the  defence  of  the 
works.  On  August  8th,  the  main  French  fleet, 
under  the  Count  d'Estaing,  ran  the  batteries  of  the 
principal  channel,  and  anchored  off  the  north  end 
of  the  island,  seriously  increasing  the  perils  of  the 
defenders ;  but  next  day  the  appearance  of  Lord 
Howe  with  an  inferior  squadron  lured  the  French 
admiral  out  of  the  bay,  his  vessels  were  crippled 
by  a  storm,  and  he  abandoned  the  coast.  Sul- 
livan, deprived  of  an  essential  factor  in  his 
scheme,  had  then  to  fall  back ;  and  the  British 
captains,  with  their  crews,  being  no  longer  needed, 
returned  to  England  to  seek  other  ships. 

Both  by  fortune  and  by  choice,  Saumarez's  lot 
throughout  life  was  thrown  with  the  line-of-battle 
force  of  the  navy,  that  body  of  heavy  fighting 


Saumarez  389 

ships  which  constitute  the  true  backbone  of  a 
sea  service,  because  their  essential  function  is  to 
fight,  not  singly,  but  in  masses,  co-operating  with 
others  like  themselves.  In  that  respect  they  cor- 
respond to  the  solid  masses  of  infantry,  which, 
however  disposed  tactically,  form  the  strength  of 
armies.  The  aptitudes  of  brilliant  officers  differ. 
Some  are  born  frigate-captains,  partisan  warriors, 
ever  actively  on  the  wing,  and  rejoicing  in  the 
comparative  freedom  and  independence  of  their 
movements,  like  the  cavalry  raider  and  outpost 
officer.  Of  this  type  was  Pellew,  Lord  Exmouth, 
a  seaman  inbred,  if  ever  there  was  one,  who  in 
this  sphere  won  the  renown  most  distinctively 
associated  with  his  name,  while  giving  proof 
throughout  a  long  career  of  high  professional  ca- 
pacity in  many  directions.  But  while  Saumarez, 
in  his  turn,  was  occasionally  employed  in  frigate 
and  light  cruiser  service,  and  always  with  great 
credit,  his  heart  was  with  the  ship-of-the-line, 
whose  high  organization,  steady  discipline,  and 
decisive  influence  upon  the  issues  of  war  appealed 
to  a  temperament  naturally  calm,  methodical,  and 
enduring.  "  He  always  preferred  the  command 
of  a  ship-of-the-line  to  a  frigate,"  says  his  biogra- 
pher, who  knew  him  well,  —  "  notwithstanding  the 
chances  of  prize-money  are  in  favor  of  the  latter ;  " 
and  he  himself  confirmed  the  statement,  not  only 
by  casual  utterance,  —  "  My  station  as  repeating 
frigate  is  certainly  more  desirable  than  a  less  con- 
spicuous one,  at  the  same  time  I  would  rather 


390  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

command  a  seventy-four,"  —  but  by  repeated  for- 
mal applications.  In  variety  and  interest  of 
operations,  as  well  as  in  prize-money,  did  a  cruis- 
ing frigate  have  advantages  ;  for  much  of  the 
time  of  shipsof-the-line  passed  necessarily  in 
methodical  routine  and  combined  movements, 
unfavorable  to  individual  initiative.  Neverthe- 
less, their  functions  are  more  important  and  more 
military  in  character.  In  accordance  with  this 
preference  Saumarez  is  found,  whether  by  his 
own  asking  or  not,  serving  the  remaining  three 
years  of  his  lieutenant's  time  upon  vessels  of  that 
class;  and  in  one  of  them  he  passed  through  his 
next  general  action,  a  scene  of  carnage  little  infe- 
rior to  the  Charleston  fight,  illustrated  by  the 
most  dogged  courage  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
batants, but  also,  it  must  be  said,  unrelieved  by 
any  display  of  that  skill  which  distinguishes 
scientific  warfare  from  aimless  butchery.  This, 
however,  was  not  Saumarez's  fault. 

Towards  the  end  of  1780,  Great  Britain,  hav- 
ing already  France,  Spain,  and  America  upon  her 
hands,  found  herself  also  confronted  by  a  league 
between  the  Baltic  states  to  enforce  by  arms 
certain  neutral  claims  which  she  contested.  To 
this  league,  called  the  Armed  Neutrality,  Holland 
acceded,  whereupon  England  at  once  declared  war. 
Both  nations  had  extensive  commercial  interests 
in  the  Baltic,  and  it  was  in  protecting  vessels 
engaged  in  this  trade,  by  a  large  body  of  ships  of 
war,  that  the  only  general  action  between  the  two 


Saumarez  391 

navies  occurred.  This  was  on  the  5th  of  August, 
1781,  in  the  North  Sea,  off  the  Dogger- Bank, 
from  which  it  has  taken  its  name. 

At  the  time  of  meeting,  the  British,  number- 
ing six  ships-of-the-line,  were  returning  from  the 
Baltic ;  the  Dutch,  with  seven  ships,  were  bound 
thither.  Despite  the  numerical  difference,  no 
great  error  is  made  in  saying  that  the  two  squad- 
rons were  substantially  of  equal  force.  Each  at 
once  ordered  the  merchant  vessels  under  its  pro- 
tection to  make  the  best  of  their  way  towards 
port,  while  the  ships  of  war  on  either  side  began 
to  form  in  order  of  battle  between  the  enemy  and 
their  own  convoy.  The  lists  being  thus  cleared 
and  the  lines  ranged,  the  British  vessels,  which 
were  to  windward,  stood  down  together,  after 
what  was  then  the  time-honored  and  unintelligent 
practice  of  their  service,  each  to  attack  one  of 
the  Dutch ;  disdaining  to  attempt  doubling  upon 
any  part  of  the  hostile  line.  Their  ideal  appears 
to  have  been  that  of  the  tournament,  where  every 
advantage  of  numbers  and  combination  was  re- 
jected in  order  to  insure  that  the  test  should  be  that 
of  individual  courage  and  skill.  So  strong  was  this 
tradition  in  the  British  navy  that  its  ablest  con- 
temporary chronicler,  James,  has  sought  to  explain 
away,  half  apologetically,  the  advantage  gained  by 
Nelson  in  doubling  on  the  French  van  at  the 
Nile. 

The  Dutch,  equally  quixotic,  refrained  from 
taking  advantage  of  the  enemy's  inability  to  use 


Types  of  Naval  Officers 


his  broadsides  while  thus  approaching  nearly 
head-on.  Arrayed  in  a  close  column,  the  ships 
about  six  hundred  feet  apart,  the  crews  at  the 
guns,  and  the  marines  drawn  up  on  the  poops, 
they  waited  in  silence  until  the  English,  at 
8  A.  M.,  were  in  position  at  half  musket  shot. 
Then  the  battle-flag  was  hoisted  by  each  admiral, 
and  all  opened  together,  the  conflict  raging  with 
fury  for  nearly  four  hours.  It  was  the  first  time 
since  the  days  of  the  great  De  Ruyter,  more  than 
a  century  before,  that  these  kindred  people  had 
thus  met  in  fair  fight  upon  the  sea.  Equal  in 
courage  and  in  seamanship,  and  each  neglecting 
to  seek  a  tactical  advantage,  the  usual  result  fol- 
lowed. Many  men  were  killed  and  wounded,  no 
ship  was  taken,  and  the  combatants  separated 
after  a  drawn  battle  ;  but  as  one  Dutch  ship  sank 
the  next  day,  and  their  convoy  could  not  proceed, 
the  British  claimed  a  victory.  Their  own  mer- 
chant vessels,  being  on  the  return  voyage,  were 
able  to  complete  it. 

Saumarez  had  shown  his  usual  gallantry,  and 
was  again  promoted.  On  the  23d  of  August, 
eighteen  days  after  the  action,  he  was  made  com- 
mander into  the  Tisiphone,  a  small  but  fast 
cruiser,  technically  called  a  fireship,  and  attached 
to  the  Channel  fleet.  In  December,  the  British 
government  learned  that  a  large  number  of  trans- 
ports and  supply  ships  were  about  to  sail  from 
Brest  for  the  West  Indies.  These  were  to  carry 
troops  and  stores  to  the  fleet  of  Count  De  Grasse, 


Saumarez  393 

who  had  returned  to  Martinique  after  the  sur- 
render at  Yorktown,  and  was  now  about  to 
undertake  the  conquest  of  Jamaica.  It  was  im- 
perative to  intercept  an  expedition  so  essential 
to  the  success  of  the  French  plan,  and  Admiral 
Kempenfelt  —  the  same  who  afterwards,  in  the 
Royal  George,  "  went  down  with  twice  four  hun- 
dred men "  —  was  sent  in  pursuit  with  twelve 
ships-of-the-line.  The  Tisiphone  accompanied 
them  as  lookout  vessel,  and  on  the  I2th  of 
December,  1781,  being  then  well  ahead  of  the 
fleet,  she  was  able  to  signal  the  admiral  that  the 
enemy  was  in  sight  to  leeward  with  seventeen  of- 
the-line ;  but  that  the  latter,  instead  of  being 
between  the  British  and  the  transports,  were  on 
the  far  side.  Kempenfelt,  an  able  tactician  as 
well  as  seaman,  seized  his  advantage,  pushed 
between  the  men-of-war  and  the  convoy,  and  car- 
ried off  fifteen  sail  laden  with  military  and  naval 
stores,  of  great  money  value  and  greater  military 
importance.  More  could  not  be  done  without 
risking  a  battle  with  a  too  superior  force.  It 
was  essential,  therefore,  to  apprise  the  British 
commander  in  the  West  Indies  of  the  approach 
of  the  French  reinforcements  as  well  as  of  Kem- 
penfelt's  successes,  and  the  Tisiphone  was  the 
same  day  despatched  on  this  errand. 

Although  he  knew  it  not,  Saumarez  was  now 
being  borne  by  the  tide  which  leads  on  to  fortune. 
The  next  step  in  promotion  then  fixed,  and  still 
fixes,  the  seniority  of  a  British  officer,  and  the 


394  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

Tisiphones  mission  led  him  straight  to  it. 
Easily  outsailing  the  unwieldy  mass  of  enemies, 
he  reached  Barbados,  and  there  learned  that  the 
British  fleet,  under  Sir  Samuel  Hood,  was  an- 
chored off  the  island  of  St.  Christopher,  then 
invaded  by  a  French  army  supported  by  De 
Grasse's  fleet.  The  tenure  of  the  island  depended 
upon  a  fort  on  Brimstone  Hill,  still  held  by  the 
British  ;  and  Hood,  though  much  inferior  in  force, 
had  by  a  brilliant  tactical  move  succeeded  in 
dislodging  De  Grasse  from  his  anchorage  ground, 
taking  it  himself,  and  establishing  there  his  fleet 
in  such  order  that  its  position  remained  impreg- 
nable. The  French,  however,  continued  cruising 
to  the  southward,  off  the  adjoining  island  of 
Nevis,  where  they  interposed  between  Hood  and 
Saumarez;  and  the  latter  could  reach  his  com- 
mander only  by  threading  the  reefs  lining  the 
passage  between  the  two  islands,  —  a  feat  con- 
sidered hazardous,  if  not  impracticable.  Never- 
theless, the  Tisiphone  effected  it  by  diligent  care 
and  seamanship,  joining  the  fleet  on  January  3ist, 
1782. 

Saumarez  now  found  himself  in  the  midst  of  the 
most  active  operations,  at  the  opening  of  a  cam- 
paign which  promised  to  be  of  singular  and 
critical  importance.  But  in  the  midst  of  his  re- 
joicing at  the  good  fortune  which  had  transferred 
him  from  the  comparative  inactivity  of  the  Channel 
fleet,  a  momentary  reverse  befell.  Called  by 
signal  on  board  the  flag-ship,  he  received  a  bag  of 


Saumarez  395 

despatches,  with  orders  to  sail  that  night  for 
England.  As  he  went  dejectedly  down  the  ship's 
side  to  his  boat  and  was  shoving  off,  the  gig  of 
a  post-captain  pulled  alongside.  "  Hallo,  Sau- 
marez," said  its  occupant,  "  where  are  you  going  ?  " 
"  To  England,  I  grieve  to  say."  "  Grieve !  "  re- 
joined the  other.  "  I  wish  I  were  in  your  place. 
I  have  been  wanting  this  long  time  to  go  home 
for  my  health.  Hold  on  a  moment ;  perhaps  it  can 
be  arranged."  The  new-comer,  named  Stanhope, 
went  at  once  to  the  admiral,  who  a  few  minutes 
later  sent  for  Saumarez.  Hood  had  learned  to 
value  the  active  young  officer  who  had  taken  a 
forward  part  in  the  guerilla  enterprises  of  the 
fleet.  "Captain  Saumarez,"  he  said,  "you  know 
not  how  much  I  wish  to  serve  you.  Captain 
Stanhope  shall  go  home,  as  he  desires,  and  you 
shall  have  command  of  the  Russell."  The  same 
night  the  Tisiphone  sailed ;  Saumarez  remaining 
as  an  acting  post-captain,  with  a  ship  of  seventy- 
four  guns  under  him. 

Thus  it  happened  that  two  months  later,  at 
the  age  of  twenty-five,  Saumarez  commanded  a 
ship-of-the-line  in  Rodney's  renowned  battle  of 
the  1 2th  of  April;  with  one  exception  the  most 
brilliant  and  decisive  action  fought  by  the  British 
navy  in  a  century.  This  circumstance  alone 
would  have  insured  the  confirmation  of  his  rank 
by  the  Admiralty,  even  had  he  not  also  eminently 
distinguished  himself ;  but  it  was  for  him  one  of 
those  periods  when  inconstant  fortune  seems  bent 


396  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

upon  lavishing  her  favors.  He  was  near  the 
head  of  the  British  column,  as  the  hostile 
fleets  passed  in  opposite  directions,  exchanging 
broadsides.  As  his  ship  cleared  the  French  rear, 
a  neighboring  British  vessel,  commanded  by  one 
of  the  senior  captains,  turned  to  pursue  the 
enemy.  Saumarez  gladly  imitated  him ;  but 
when  the  other  resumed  his  former  course, 
because  the  admiral  of  the  van,  his  immediate 
superior,  had  not  turned,  the  Russell  kept  on  after 
the  French.  At  this  moment,  Rodney  in  the 
centre,  and  Hood  in  the  rear,  favored  by  a  change 
of  wind,  were  breaking  through  the  French  line. 
The  Russell's  course  carried  her  toward  them, 
and  consequently,  in  the  melee  which  followed, 
she  had  the  distinguished  honor  of  engaging  De 
Grasse's  flag-ship,  and  of  being  in  action  with  her 
when  she  surrendered.  Indeed,  although  Sau- 
marez with  characteristic  modesty  refrained  from 
pressing  his  claim,  he  always,  when  questioned 
on  the  subject,  maintained  that  although  the 
enemy's  vessel  certainly  struck  to  Hood's  flag- 
ship, she  did  so  immediately  upon  the  latter 
joining  the  Russell. 

However  regarded,  this  was  a  brilliant  achieve- 
ment for  so  young  a  captain,  less  than  a  twelve- 
month having  elapsed  since  he  was  but  a 
lieutenant.  Rodney,  who  had  meanwhile  sig- 
nalled his  van  to  go  about,  was  somewhat  per- 
plexed at  finding  a  single  ship  thus  opportunely 
in  the  direction  whence  the  Russell  appeared; 


Saumarez 


397 


and,  upon  being  informed  that  she  belonged  to 
the  van  squadron,  declared  that  her  commander 
had  distinguished  himself  above  all  others  in  the 
fleet.  It  proved,  in  fact,  the  keen  military  sense 
of  the  demands  of  an  occasion  which  constitutes 
the  born  corps  or  division  commander.  This  was 
Saumarez's  third  general  action,  at  a  time  when 
Nelson,  although  three  years  a  post-captain,  had 
commanded  only  frigates,  and  had  never  seen  a 
battle  between  fleets.  But,  if  Saumarez  used  well 
the  singular  opportunities  with  which  fortune 
favored  him,  it  was  characteristic  of  Nelson 
that  his  value  transpired  through  the  simplest 
intercourse  and  amid  the  most  commonplace  in- 
cidents of  service.  Men  felt,  rather  than  realized, 
that  under  the  slight,  quaint,  boyish  exterior  there 
lay  the  elements  of  a  great  man,  who  would  one 
day  fulfil  his  own  boast  of  climbing  to  the  top  of 
the  tree ;  and  he  had  been  made  a  full  captain  in 
1779,  when  not  quite  twenty-one.  According  to 
the  rule  of  the  British  service,  already  mentioned, 
this  assured  for  life  his  precedence  over  Sau- 
marez, promoted  in  1782. 

The  latter,  however,  if  outstripped  by  a  younger 
competitor,  who  was  to  become  the  greatest  of 
British  admirals,  had  secured  a  position  of  van- 
tage for  that  great  war  which  then  lay  in  the  womb 
of  the  future.  Returning  to  England  in  1782, 
he  passed  in  retirement  the  ten  years  that  pre- 
ceded the  outbreak  of  hostilities  with  the  French 
republic.  During  this  period  he  was  twice  called 


398  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

out  for  service  upon  occasions  of  war  threatening, 
-in  1 787  with  France,  and  in  1790  with  Spain; 
but  though  in  each  case  appointed  to  a  ship,  the 
employment  went  no  farther,  as  hostilities  were 
timely  averted.  This  protracted  withdrawal  from 
active  pursuit  of  his  profession,  viewed  in  connec- 
tion with  his  prolonged  and  efficient  service  of 
the  twenty  following  years,  may  be  taken  as  indi- 
cating two  things :  first,  that  to  professional  ex- 
cellence once  attained  such  a  break  is  not  as 
fatal  as  is  commonly  argued ;  and  second,  con- 
sidered with  his  favorable  entertainment  of  Corn- 
wallis's  proposal  to  exchange  into  the  army,  this 
contentment  with  shore  life  during  the  peace 
confirms  the  remark  already  made,  that,  although 
a  thorough  seaman,  Saumarez  was  so  incidentally. 
His  quickening  interest  was  in  the  military  rather 
than  the  nautical  side  of  his  calling.  Pellew,  on  the 
contrary,  now  eagerly  sought  duty  at  sea,  impelled 
thereto  by  clear  restless  predilection  as  well  as, 
possibly,  by  need  of  increased  income.  It  was 
during  this  interval  of  repose,  in  1788,  that  Sau- 
marez married ;  a  step  which  did  not  in  his  case 
entail  the  professional  deterioration  charged 
against  it  by  the  cynical  criticisms  of  St.  Vincent. 
At  this  time,  also,  he  made  a  trip  to  France,  upon 
the  occasion  of  sinking  the  first  cone  of  the  great 
Cherbourg  breakwater,  designed  to  give  the 
French  navy  a  first-class  arsenal  upon  the  Chan- 
nel,—  a  purpose  which  it  now  fulfils.  Louis 
XVI.  was  present  at  this  ceremony,  and  treated 


Saumarez  399 

Saumarez  with  much  attention.  This  was  the 
only  time  that  he  ever  set  foot  upon  French  soil, 
although  his  home  was  in  sight  of  the  coast  and 
he  spoke  the  language  fluently. 

When  war  with  France  again  began,  in  1 793, 
Saumarez  was  appointed  to  the  frigate  Crescent, 
of  thirty-six  guns,  with  which  he  served  actively 
in  the  Channel.  In  her,  on  the  2oth  of  October, 
1793,  he  succeeded  in  intercepting  the  French 
frigate  Reunion^  of  substantially  equal  force, 
which  he  had  learned  was  in  the  habit  of  quit- 
ting Cherbourg  in  pursuit  of  British  merchant 
vessels  every  night,  returning  in  the  morning. 
The  ensuing  action  called  for  an  exhibition  of 
seamanship  which  showed  he  had  not  lost  aptitude 
during  his  retirement.  In  the  beginning  he 
placed  the  Crescent  on  the  weather  quarter  of  the 
French  ship,  —  that  is,  on  the  windward  side,  but 
a  little  to  the  rear.  This  was  well  judged,  because 

(1)  the  all-important  rudder  is  thus  less  exposed, 

(2)  in  case  of  an  unfavorable  accident  the  adversary 
tends  to  leave  rather  than  to  approach,  and  (3) 
the  vessel,  moving  ahead,  is  at  once  under  com- 
mand to  stop  short  of  the  opponent.     After  being 
placed,  speed  was  regulated  by  backing  or  filling 
the  mizzen-topsail,  thus  maintaining  the  relative 
positions,    and    directing  fire   upon    the  enemy's 
rudder.     In    this   situation   the  fore-topsail  yard 
and  foretopmast  of   the  Crescent  were  shot  away 
in  quick  succession,  and  the  ship  flew  up  head 
to    wind,    bringing   all  her  sails    aback.     For   a 


400  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

moment  she  was  in  an  awkward  plight,  but  the 
Reunion,  drawing  away,  could  not  rake  ;  and  Sau- 
marez,  by  adroit  management  of  the  rudder  and 
sails,  backed\\\s  ship  round,  —  always  a  nice  opera- 
tion and  especially  when  near  an  enemy,  —  till  the 
wind  came  again  abaft,  restoring  the  normal  con- 
ditions of  moving  ahead  under  control  of  the  helm. 
The  contest  was  then  renewed,  and  ended  in  the 
surrender  of  the  French  vessel.  The  disparity  of 
loss — i  British  to  118  French  —  proved  the  dis- 
cipline of  the  Crescent  and  the  consummate  sea- 
manship of  her  commander.  For  this  exploit 
Saumarez  was  knighted.  Faithful  to  his  constant 
preference,  he  as  soon  as  possible  exchanged  into 
a  ship-of-the-line,  the  Orion,  of  seventy-four  guns. 
In  her  he  again  bore  a  foremost  part,  in  1795,  in 
a  fleet-battle  off  the  Biscay  coast  of  France, 
where  three  enemy's  ships  were  taken ;  and  two 
years  later  he  was  in  the  action  with  the  Span- 
iards off  Cape  St.  Vincent,  of  which  an  account 
has  been  given  in  the  sketch  of  Earl  St.  Vincent. 
After  this  Saumarez  remained  on  the  same  station, 
blockading  Cadiz. 

In  the  following  year,  1798,  it  became  necessary 
to  send  a  small  detachment  into  the  Mediter- 
ranean, and  off  the  chief  arsenal  of  the  enemy, 
Toulon,  to  ascertain  the  facts  concerning  a  great 
armament,  since  known  as  Bonaparte's  Egyptian 
expedition,  which  rumor  said  was  there  in  prep- 
aration. The  hazardous  nature  of  the  duty, 
which  advanced  three  ships  of  medium  size,  un- 


Saumarez  401 

supported,  in  the  very  teeth  of  over  a  dozen 
enemies,  many  of  superior  strength,  demanded 
the  utmost  efficiency  in  each  member  of  the  little 
body  so  exposed ;  a  consideration  which  doubtless 
led  Lord  St.  Vincent  to  choose  Saumarez,  though 
one  of  the  senior  captains,  for  this  service,  of 
which  Nelson,  the  junior  flag  officer  of  the  fleet, 
was  given  charge. 

It  seems  scarcely  credible  that,  when  it  was 
afterwards  decided  to  raise  this  detachment  to 
fourteen  ships-of-the-line,  sufficient  to  cope  with 
the  enemy,  both  St.  Vincent  and  Nelson  wished 
to  remove  Saumarez,  with  his  antecedents  of 
brilliant  service,  so  as  to  allow  Troubridge,  his 
junior,  to  be  second  in  command.  The  fact,  how- 
ever, is  certain.  Nelson  had  orders  which  would 
have  allowed  him  to  send  the  Orion  back,  when 
thus  proceeding  on  a  service  pregnant  with  danger 
and  distinction,  to  the  immeasurable  humiliation 
of  her  brave  commander.  After  making  every 
deduction  for  the  known  partiality  for  Troubridge 
of  both  St.  Vincent  and  Nelson,  it  is  difficult  to 
avoid  the  conclusion  that  Saumarez,  with  all  his 
undoubted  merit,  was  in  their  eyes  inferior  to 
Troubridge  in  the  qualities  necessary  to  chief 
command,  in  case  of  Nelson's  death,  at  a  junc- 
ture which  called  for  the  highest  abilities  of  a  gen- 
eral officer.  The  moment  was  too  critical  to 
permit  mere  favoritism  to  sway  two  such  men 
against  their  judgment.  As  it  was,  however, 

Nelson  felt  he  could  not  part  with  so  efficient  a 

26 


402  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

ship;  and  he  therefore  contented  himself  with 
giving  Troubridge  and  Saumarez  each  a  sub- 
division of  four  vessels,  keeping  six  under  his 
own  immediate  direction. 

As  all  know,  the  French,  when  found,  were  at 
anchor.  Thus  surprised,  the  British  fleet  was 
hurled  at  them  in  a  single  mass ;  nor  was  there 
any  subordinate  command  exercised,  by  Saumarez 
or  any  other,  except  that  of  each  captain  over  his 
particular  ship.  Nelson's  first  expectation  was  to 
overtake  the  unwieldy  numbers  of  the  enemy, 
amounting  to  over  four  hundred  sail,  at  sea,  and 
there  to  destroy  both  convoy  and  escort.  In  such 
an  encounter  there  would  be  inestimable  tactical 
advantage  in  those  compact  subdivisions,  which 
could  be  thrown  as  units,  under  a  single  head,  in 
a  required  direction.  For  such  a  charge  Sau- 
marez possessed  most  eminent  capacity. 

The  warm  family  affection  that  was  among  the 
many  winning  traits  of  Saumarez's  symmetrical 
and  attractive  character  impelled  him  to  copious 
letter-writing.  Hence  we  have  a  record  of  this 
pursuit  of  the  French  fleet,  with  almost  daily 
entries ;  an  inside  picture,  reflecting  the  hopes, 
fears,  and  perplexities  of  the  squadron.  Bona- 
parte's enterprise  has  been  freely  condemned 
in  later  days  as  chimerical ;  but  it  did  not  so 
appear  at  the  time  to  the  gallant  seamen  who 
frustrated  it.  The  preparations  had  been  so 
shrouded  in  mystery  that  neither  Nelson  nor  his 
government  had  any  certainty  as  to  its  des- 


Saumarez  403 

tination,  —  an  ignorance  shared  by  most  of  the 
prominent  French  officials.  When,  after  many 
surmises,  the  truth  gradually  transpired,  the  Brit- 
ish officers  realized  that  much  time  must  yet 
elapse  before  the  English  ministry  could  know 
it.  Two  months,  for  instance,  passed  before 
news  of  the  Battle  of  the  Nile  reached  London. 
Then,  if  India  were  the  ultimate  object,  to  which 
Egypt  was  but  the  stepping-stone,  four  months 
more,  at  least,  would  be  needed  to  get  a  naval 
reinforcement  to  the  threatened  point.  What  if, 
meanwhile,  the  ally  of  France  in  the  peninsula, 
Tippoo  Saib,  had  been  assembling  transports 
with  the  secrecy  observed  at  Toulon  and  the 
other  ports  whence  the  divisions  had  sailed  ?  "  I 
dined  with  Sir  Horatio  to-day,"  writes  Saumarez 
on  June  i5th,  nearly  four  weeks  after  Bonaparte's 
starting,  "  and  find  that  his  intelligence  extends 
only  to  the  enemy's  fleet  having  been  seen  off 
Sicily ;  but  we  have  reason  to  suppose  them 
gone  for  Alexandria,  the  distance  from  which  to 
the  Red  Sea  is  only  three  days'  journey.  They 
may  soon  be  transported  thence  by  water  to  the 
East  Indies,  with  the  assistance  of  Tippoo  Saib; 
and  with  their  numerous  army  they  expect  to 
drive  us  out  of  our  possessions  in  India.  This 
profound  scheme,  which  is  thought  very  feasible, 
we  hope  to  frustrate  by  coming  up  with  them 
before  they  reach  the  place  of  their  destination." 
A  week  later,  Nelson  received  off  Sicily  news 
of  the  surrender  of  Malta  to  the  French.  In 


404  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

accordance  with  the  views  above  expressed,  Sir 
James  now — June  22d  —  gave  Nelson  his  written 
opinion,  favoring  the  course  adopted  of  seeking 
the  enemy  off  the  coast  of  Egypt;  one  of  the 
most  responsible  decisions  ever  taken  by  an  ad- 
miral in  chief  command,  especially  at  the  begin- 
ning of  a  career,  as  Nelson  then  was.  "  We  are 
now  crowding  sail  for  Alexandria ;  but  it  is  very 
doubtful  if  we  fall  in  with  them  at  all,  as  we  are 
proceeding  on  the  merest  conjecture,  and  not  on 
any  positive  information.  If,  at  the  end  of  our 
journey,  we  find  we  are  upon  the  wrong  scent, 
our  embarrassment  will  be  great  indeed.  Fortu- 
nately, I  only  act  here  en  second ;  but  did  the 
chief  responsibility  rest  with  me,  I  fear  it  would 
be  more  than  my  too  irritable  nerves  would  bear." 
Nelson,  in  truth,  was  passing  these  hours  in  a 
fever  of  anxiety,  scarce  able  to  eat  or  drink.  Yet 
at  that  very  moment  the  British  were  crossing 
the  enemy's  wake,  unseeing  and  unseen,  and 
barely  fifty  miles  separated  the  two  fleets. 

The  perplexity  foreshadowed  by  Saumarez  actu- 
ally fell  upon  the  English  admiral,  through  his 
reaching  Alexandria  three  days  before  the  French. 
Harassed  out  of  his  better  judgment,  he  hurried 
back  to  the  westward,  touched  at  Sicily,  and 
thence  once  more  to  Egypt.  Meantime,  the 
French  had  landed  successfully.  On  the  ist  of 
August  the  British  fleet  again  sighted  Alexan- 
dria ;  saw  the  French  flag  on  the  walls,  but  no 
ships  of  war.  "  When  the  reconnoitring  squad- 


Saumarez  405 

ron  made  the  signal  that  the  enemy  was  not 
there,"  wrote  Saumarez,  "  despondency  nearly 
took  possession  of  my  mind,  and  I  do  not  re- 
member ever  to  have  felt  so  utterly  hopeless  or 
out  of  spirits  as  when  we  sat  down  to  dinner. 
Judge,  then,  what  a  change  took  place  when,  as 
the  cloth  was  being  removed,  the  officer  of  the 
watch  hastily  came  in,  saying,  '  Sir,  a  signal  is 
just  now  made  that  the  enemy  is  in  Aboukir  Bay, 
and  moored  in  a  line  of  battle.'  All  sprang  from 
their  seats,  and,  only  staying  to  drink  a  bumper 
to  our  success,  we  were  in  a  moment  on  deck." 
As  the  captain  appeared,  the  crew  hailed  him 
with  three  hearty  cheers,  a  significant  token  of 
the  gloom  which  had  wrapped  the  entire  squadron 
through  the  recent  ordeal  of  suspense  and  disap- 
pointment. 

It  is  only  with  Saumarez's  share  in  this  re- 
nowned battle  that  we  are  here  concerned.  As 
is  generally  known,  Nelson's  tactics  consisted  in 
doubling  upon  the  van  and  centre  of  the  enemy, 
who  lay  at  anchor  in  a  column  head  to  wind, 
or  nearly  so.  Their  rear,  being  to  leeward,  was 
thus  thrown  out  of  action.  The  French  had 
thirteen  ships-of-the-line,  of  which  one  was  of 
one  hundred  and  twenty  guns,  and  two  eighties. 
The  British  also  had  thirteen,  all  seventy-fours, 
and  one  of  fifty  guns ;  but  one  of  the  former 
going  aground  left  them  equal  in  numbers  and 
inferior  in  force.  There  were  two  successive 
acts  in  the  drama.  In  the  first,  ten  British 


406  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

ships  engaged  the  eight  leading  French ;  in 
the  second,  the  fifty  and  two  of  the  seventy- 
fours,  which  had  been  belated,  came  upon  the  field 
and  strengthened  the  attack  upon  the  enemy's 
centre.  The  Orion,  being  third  in  the  order, 
was  one  of  the  five  vessels  which  passed  within 
the  French,  and  fought  on  that  side.  In  so  doing, 
she  described  a  wide  sweep  around  her  two  pre- 
decessors. While  thus  standing  down  to  her 
station,  an  enemy's  frigate,  the  Serieuse,  opened 
fire  upon  her,  wounding  two  men.  It  was  then 
part  of  the  chivalrous  comity  of  fleet-actions  that 
frigates  should  not  be  molested  by  the  ships-of- 
the-line,  so  long  as  they  minded  their  own  busi- 
ness,—  an  immunity  which  of  course  ceased  if 
they  became  aggressive.  Saumarez  was  urged  to 
return  her  fire.  "  No,"  he  replied,  "  let  her  alone ; 
she  will  get  bolder  and  come  nearer.  Shorten 
sail."  She  did  draw  nearer,  and  then  the  Orion, 
swinging  sharply  towards  her,  let  drive  her  broad- 
side of  double-shotted  guns.  All  the  masts  of 
the  unlucky  frigate  went  overboard,  and  she 
shortly  sank,  nothing  but  her  poop  being  visible 
the  next  day.  The  helm  of  the  British  vessel  was 
then  shifted,  but  so  much  ground  had  been  lost 
that  she  could  anchor  only  abreast  the  fifth 
French  ship;  the  interval  left  being  filled  by 
those  who  followed.  In  this  position  the  Orion 
silenced  her  immediate  opponent,  the  Peuple 
Souverain,  which,  being  in  an  hour  and  a  half  to- 
tally dismasted,  cut  her  cables  and  dropped  out  of 


Saumarez  407 

the  line ;  the  contest  being  then  continued  with 
the  sixth  in  the  French  order,  the  Franklin, 
next  ahead  of  the  flag-ship,  Orient.  The  Orion 
was  thus  near  by  the  latter  when  she  blew  up, 
but  the  few  burning  fragments  which  fell  on 
board  were  quickly  extinguished. 

Twenty-four  hours  after  the  battle,  Saumarez, 
who  had  been  delayed  till  then  by  a  severe 
wound  from  a  splinter,  went  on  board  the  flag- 
ship to  call  on  the  admiral;  and  to  this  visit  we 
owe  the  knowledge  of  two  closely  related  inci- 
dents, recorded  by  his  biographer  and  friend, 
which  are  significant  at  once  of  his  individual 
ideas  on  tactical  combination,  and  of  the  lack  of 
personal  sympathy  apparent  between  him  and 
Nelson.  He  "  found  several  of  his  brother  offi- 
cers on  the  quarter-deck,  discussing  the  merits  of 
the  action.  Some  regret  having  been  expressed 
at  the  escape  of  the  two  sternmost  ships  of  the 
French  line,  Sir  James  said  to  the  admiral,  '  It 
was  unfortunate  we  did  not  — '  and  was  proceed- 
ing to  say  'all  anchor  on  the  same  side.'  But, 
before  he  could  finish  the  sentence,  Nelson 
hastily  interrupted  him,  exclaiming,  '  Thank  God 
there  was  no  order ! '  Then  turning  the  conver- 
sation, he  entered  his  cabin  and  sent  for  Captain 
Ball.  .  .  .We  may  relate  the  circumstances  which 
induced  Saumarez,  without  the  least  intention  to 
offend,  to  make  the  observation  at  which  offence 
was  taken.  It  was  Nelson's  custom,  when  in  com- 
munication or  company  with  the  captains  under 


408  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

his  command,  to  converse  with  them  on  the  vari- 
ous modes  of  attacking  the  enemy  under  different 
circumstances;  and,  on  one  of  these  occasions, 
Sir  James  Saumarez,  who  had  seen  the  evil  con- 
sequences of  doubling  on  the  enemy,  especially  in 
a  night  action,  had  differed  with  the  admiral  in 
that  plan  of  attack,  saying  that  *  it  never  required 
two  English  ships  to  capture  one  French,  and 
that  the  damage  which  they  must  necessarily  do 
each  other  might  render  them  both  unable  to  fight 
an  enemy's  ship  that  had  not  been  engaged ; 
and,  as  in  this  case  two  ships  could  be  spared 
to  the  three-decker,  everyone  might  have  his 
opponent.' " 

Inasmuch  as  Nelson,  in  pursuance  of  his  previ- 
ously announced  idea,  had  himself  in  the  flag-ship 
—  the  sixth  to  enter  action  —  set  the  example  of 
doubling,  by  anchoring  on  the  side  of  the  enemy's 
line  opposite  to  that  of  his  first  five  ships,  and  in 
doing  so  had  deliberately  taken  position  on  one 
side  of  a  French  vessel  already  engaged  on  the 
other,  Saumarez's  remark  was  substantially  a 
censure,  inopportune  to  a  degree  singular  in  a 
man  of  his  kindly  and  generous  temper;  and  its 
reception  by  Nelson  is  not  a  cause  for  surprise. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  a  matter  of  tactical  criti- 
cism, based  upon  tactical  conceptions  previously 
adopted,  if  we  assume  it  to  be  true  that  two 
British  ships  were  not  needed  to  capture  one 
French,  it  may  yet  be  confidently  affirmed  that 
to  attack  with  decisively  superior  force  a  part 


Saumarez  409 

of  the  enemy's  order  —  to  combine  in  short  —  is 
shown  by  experience  to  attain  the  same  degree  of 
success  more  certainly  and  at  less  cost  than  the 
simple  distribution  of  effort  advocated  by  Sauma- 
rez. To  double,  and  to  beat  in  detail,  remained  the 
ideal  of  Nelson,  as  it  had  been  of  Howe.  It  was 
by  him  applied  then  and  afterwards  to  all  cases, 
small  or  great,  actual  or  supposed.  To  it  he 
chiefly  owed  his  dazzling  successes,  and  this 
divergence  of  ideals  marks  the  difference  in 
professional  insight  which  mainly  determines 
the  relative  positions  of  Nelson  and  Saumarez 
in  naval  biography.  It  indicates  the  distinction 
between  the  great  general  officer  and  the  accom- 
plished and  resolute  division  or  corps  commander. 
At  the  Battle  of  the  Nile  Saumarez  received 
the  only  wound  that  ever  fell  to  him  throughout 
his  numerous  meetings  with  the  enemy,  being 
struck  on  the  thigh  and  side  by  a  heavy  splinter, 
which  had  killed  two  officers  before  reaching  him. 
The  total  loss  of  his  ship  was  forty-two  killed  and 
wounded,  out  of  a  crew  of  six  hundred.  Ten 
days  after  the  action  he  was  ordered  to  take 
charge  of  six  of  the  prizes,  which  had  been  partly 
repaired,  and  with  seven  of  the  fleet  to  convoy 
them  to  Gibraltar.  At  the  same  time  he  was 
notified  that  the  Orion  was  to  go  home  as  soon 
as  this  duty  was  performed.  A  more  charming 
prospect  can  scarcely  be  imagined  than  this  re- 
turning to  his  family  after  a  long  absence,  fresh 
from  the  completest  achievement  ever  wrought 


410  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

by  the  British  navy;  but  even  his  tranquil  tem- 
per, whose  expressions  never  lapse  into  the 
complaints  of  Nelson  or  the  querulousness  of 
Collingwood,  was  tried  by  the  slow  progress  of 
his  battered  and  crippled  squadron.  "  The  prizes 
get  on  very  slowly,"  he  writes ;  "  but  I  am  en- 
dowed with  unparalleled  patience,  having  scarcely 
uttered  a  murmur  at  their  tardiness,  so  perfectly 
satisfied  am  I  with  the  prospect  before  me." 
Some  time  later  he  notes :  "  We  have  been  three 
weeks  effecting  what  might  be  accomplished  in 
two  days.  This  extraordinary  delay  makes  me 
more  fractious  than  can  be  imagined,  and  I  begin 
to  lose  the  character  for  patience  which  I  had  given 
myself,  by  so  tiresome  a  situation."  It  was  still 
the  season  of  westerly  winds,  and  the  voyage  from 
Alexandria  to  Gibraltar  occupied  sixty-nine  days. 
The  Orion  was  now  completely  worn  out,  hav- 
ing been  continuously  in  commission  since  the 
war  began  in  1793-  Besides  the  three  general 
actions  in  which  Saumarez  commanded  her,  she 
had  borne  a  valiant  part  in  Howe's  great  battle  of 
the  ist  of  June.  "  This  last  business  has  so 
shattered  the  poor  Orion,"  wrote  Saumarez,  "  that 
she  will  not,  without  considerable  repairs,  be  in  a 
state  for  more  service."  On  reaching  England 
she  was  paid  off ;  and  in  February,  1 799,  he 
was  appointed  to  the  C&sar,  of  eighty-four  guns, 
one  of  the  finest  ships  in  the  navy,  which  was  to 
bear  his  flag  in  the  last  and  most  brilliant  episode 
of  his  hard-fighting  career. 


Saumarez  41 1 

A  year  later,  Lord  St.  Vincent,  having  re- 
turned from  the  Mediterranean,  took  command 
of  the  Channel  Fleet,  and  at  once  instituted  in 
its  methods,  and  particularly  in  the  blockade  of 
Brest,  changes  which  gradually  revolutionized  the 
character  of  the  general  naval  war ;  baffling  be- 
yond any  other  single  cause  the  aims  of  Napo- 
leon, and  insuring  the  fall  of  his  empire.  One 
of  the  new  requirements  was  the  maintenance  of 
a  powerful  advanced  division  of  six  or  eight  ships- 
of-the-line,  within  ten  miles  of  the  harbor's  mouth. 
It  was  a  duty  singularly  arduous,  demanding 
neither  dash  nor  genius,  but  calmness,  steadiness, 
method,  and  seamanship  of  a  high  order,  for  all 
which  Saumarez  was  conspicuous.  From  either 
side  of  the  Bay  of  Brest  a  long  line  of  reefs  pro- 
jects for  fifteen  miles  to  the  westward.  Far  in- 
side their  outer  limits,  and  therefore  embayed  by 
the  westerly  winds  which  blow  at  times  with 
hurricane  violence,  was  the  station  of  the  ad- 
vanced squadron,  off  some  well-marked  rocks  of 
the  northern  reef,  known  as  the  Black  Rocks. 
On  this  spot,  called  Siberia  by  the  seamen,  dur- 
ing fifteen  weeks,  from  August  to  December,  Sir 
James  Saumarez  kept  so  close  a  watch  that  not  a 
vessel  of  any  force  entered  or  left  Brest.  "  With 
you  there,"  wrote  Earl  St.  Vincent,  "  I  sleep  as 
sound  as  if  I  had  the  key  of  Brest  in  my  pocket." 
No  work  ever  done  by  him  was  more  meritorious 
or  more  useful.  Near  its  expiration  St.  Vincent 
wrote  to  him,  "  The  employment  you  have  con- 


412  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

ducted  is  the  most  important  of  this  war."  He  there 
demonstrated  that  what  before  had  apparently  been 
thought  impossible  could  be  done,  though  involv- 
ing a  degree  of  anxiety  and  peril  far  exceeding 
that  of  battle,  while  accompanied  by  none  of  the 
distinction,  nor  even  recognition,  which  battle 
bestows.  "  None  but  professional  men  who  have 
been  on  that  service,"  says  his  biographer  with 
simple  truth,  "can  have  any  idea  of  its  diffi- 
culties, —  surrounded  by  dangers  of  every  kind, 
exposed  to  the  violence  of  storms,  sailing  amidst 
a  multitude  of  rocks  and  variable  currents  in  the 
longest  and  darkest  nights,  and  often  on  a  lee  shore 
on  the  enemy's  coast,  while  the  whole  of  their  fleet 
is  near,  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  disaster." 
Collingwood,  who  in  the  next  war  succeeded 
to  the  same  unenviable  duty,  wrote  home  that, 
even  in  the  summer  month  of  August,  "  I  bid 
adieu  to  comfortable  naps  at  night,  never  lying 
down  but  in  my  clothes.  An  anxious  time  I 
have  of  it,  what  with  tides  and  rocks,  which 
have  more  of  danger  in  them  than  a  battle  once 
a  week."  In  this  laborious  task  Saumarez  was 
the  patient,  unobserved  pioneer. 

There  was  one  man,  however,  who  could  and 
did  recognize  to  the  full  the  quality  of  the  work 
done  by  Saumarez,  and  its  value  to  those  saga- 
cious plans  which  he  himself  had  framed,  and 
which  in  the  future  were  to  sap  the  foundations 
of  the  French  power.  That  man  was  St.  Vin- 
cent. "  The  merit  of  Sir  James  Saumarez,"  he 


Saumarez  413 

said,  "  cannot  be  surpassed ;  "  and  again,  to  Sau- 
marez himself,  "  The  manner  in  which  you  have 
conducted  the  advanced  squadron  calls  upon  me 
to  repeat  my  admiration  of  it."  Succeeding  soon 
after  to  the  post  of  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty, 
he  gave  him  an  opportunity  for  distinction,  which 
resulted  in  an  action  of  singular  lustre  and  strik- 


ing success. 


Bonaparte,  long  before  returned  from  Egypt, 
and  now,  as  First  Consul,  practically  the  abso- 
lute ruler  of  France,  had  overthrown  all  ene- 
mies on  the  Continent.  Peace  with  Austria,  after 
her  disasters  of  Marengo  and  Hohenlinden,  had 
been  signed  in  February,  1801.  The  great  ob- 
jects of  the  French  ruler  now  were  to  compass 
a  maritime  peace  and  withal  to  retain  Egypt, 
associated  from  far  back  with  the  traditional 
policies  of  France,  and  moreover  a  conquest  in 
which  his  own  reputation  was  peculiarly  inter- 
ested. To  compel  Great  Britain  to  peace,  he 
sought,  by  diplomacy  or  force,  to  exclude  her 
commerce  from  the  Continent,  as  well  as  to 
raiser  up  maritime  enemies  against  her.  Thus 
he  had  fostered,  if  not  actually  engendered,  the 
Baltic  league  of  1801,  shattered  by  Nelson  at 
Copenhagen  ;  and  for  this  purpose  he  intended 
to  occupy  both  Portugal  and  the  kingdom  of 
Naples.  A  powerful  British  expedition  against 
Egypt  had  entered  the  Mediterranean.  It  was 
essential  either  to  attack  this  directly,  or  to  crip- 
ple its  communications.  Unable  to  do  the  for- 


414  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

mer,  and  persistently  thwarted  in  his  attempts 
to  reinforce  his  own  troops  in  that  distant  de- 
pendency by  the  close  watch  of  the  British  navy, 
of  which  Saumarez  gave  so  conspicuous  an  illus- 
tration before  Brest,  Napoleon  resorted  to  the 
common  and  sound  military  expedient  of  col- 
lecting a  threatening  force  upon  the  flank  of 
his  enemy's  line  of  communications.  He  directed 
a  concentration  of  the  Spanish  and  French  na- 
vies at  Cadiz,  which,  by  its  nearness  to  the  straits, 
met  the  desired  requirement.  Among  others, 
three  French  ships  were  ordered  thither  from 
Toulon. 

The  British  ministry  was  informed  that  at  Ca- 
diz were  collecting  Spanish  vessels,  said  by  report 
to  be  intended  against  Portugal.  This  is  unlikely, 
as  Bonaparte  could  have  subdued  that  country 
from  the  land  side  by  the  assistance  of  Spain  ; 
moreover,  the  object  of  the  concentration  is  stated 
in  his  letters.  A  squadron  of  five  ships-of-the 
line  was  accordingly  formed,  and  placed  under 
the  command  of  Saumarez,  who  on  the  ist  of 
January,  1801,  had  been  made  a  rear  admiral.  His 
orders  were  to  go  off  Cadiz,  where  he  would  find 
two  more  vessels,  and  to  prevent  the  enemies 
within  the  port  from  sailing,  or  from  being  joined 
by  any  from  outside.  Whatever  Bonaparte's 
object,  it  would  be  thwarted  by  a  force  thus  inter- 
posed, in  a  position  to  meet  either  one  or  the 
other  of  the  converging  detachments  before  they 
could  unite. 


Saumarez 


415 


Saumarez  sailed  on  his  mission  June  16,  1801, 
and  on  the  28th  arrived  off  Cadiz.  On  the  5th 
of  July  he  was  informed  that  three  French  ships 
had  anchored  off  Algeciras,  the  Spanish  port  on 
the  west  side  of  Gibraltar  Bay,  confronting  the 
British  fortress  on  the  east  side.  This  was  the 
division  from  Toulon,  which  upon  reaching 
the  straits  first  learned  of  the  British  squadron 
that  effectually  prevented  its  entrance  to  Cadiz. 

Saumarez  at  once  started  for  Algeciras  with 
six  of  his  ships-of-the-line,  the  seventh  being 
out  of  recall  to  the  northward.  The  following 
day,  July  6th,  he  entered  the  bay,  and  found  the 
French  moored  in  a  strong  position,  under  cover 
of  Spanish  land  batteries,  and  supported  by  a 
number  of  gunboats.  Still,  though  difficult  and 
doubtful,  the  enterprise  was  not  hopeless ;  and, 
as  the  breeze  allowed  his  vessels  to  head  for 
the  enemy,  he  steered  to  engage  at  once.  Un- 
fortunately, the  wind  fell  as  the  squadron  drew 
nigh,  and  only  four  ships  were  able  to  take 
their  intended  places ;  the  other  two  had  to  an- 
chor outside  their  consorts,  and  fire  as  they 
could  through  the  intervals.  This  mishap  les- 
sened by  one-third  the  fighting  power  of  the 
British,  and,  coupled  with  the  acknowledged  su- 
periority of  guns  on  solid  ground  over  those 
afloat,  reduced  them  to  inferiority.  Their  dis- 
advantage was  increased  by  the  arrangements  of 
the  French  admiral,  carefully  elaborated  during 
the  two  preceding  days.  Had  the  preparations 


4i 6  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

of  Brueys  at  the  Nile  equalled  those  of  Linois  at 
Algeciras,  Nelson's  task  must  have  been  harder 
and  his  victory  less  complete.  Nevertheless,  after 
an  engagement  of  an  hour  and  a  half,  the  British 
fire  so  far  prevailed  that  the  enemy  resorted  to  a 
measure  for  which  precautions  had  been  taken 
beforehand.  Lines  had  been  run  from  each  French 
ship  to  the  shoal  water  lying  close  inside  them ; 
and  by  means  of  these  they  were  warped  away 
from  their  opponents  until  they  took  the  ground. 
This  increase  of  distance  was  in  every  way  a  gain 
to  the  party  standing  on  the  defensive,  and  a  corre- 
sponding loss  to  the  assailants.  Saumarez  ordered 
the  cables  cut  and  sail  made  to  close  once  more ; 
but  the  light  and  fickle  airs  both  baffled  this  ef- 
fort and  further  embarrassed  the  British,  through 
the  difficulty  of  keeping  their  broadsides  in  posi- 
tion. Here  happened  the  great  disaster  of  the  day. 
One  of  the  outer  ships,  the  Hannibal,  tried  to  pass 
inside  the  headmost  of  the  French,  not  realizing 
that  the  latter  had  moved.  In  so  doing  she 
ran  aground  close  under  a  battery,  to  whose 
fire  she  could  make  no  reply.  After  a  brave  and 
prolonged  resistance,  in  which  she  lost  seventy- 
five  killed  and  seventy  wounded  out  of  a  crew 
of  six  hundred,  and  had  many  of  her  guns  dis- 
mounted, she  hauled  down  her  flag.  By  this 
time  another  ship,  the  Pompee,  was  dismasted, 
and  success  was  plainly  hopeless.  The  British 
admiral,  therefore,  ordered  the  action  discon- 
tinued, and  withdrew  to  the  Gibraltar  side ; 


Saumarez  417 

the  Pomp'ee  having  to  be  towed  away  by  the 
boats  of  the  squadron. 

Saumarez  had  failed,  and  failure,  however  ex- 
plained, can  hardly  be  carried  to  a  man's  credit ; 
but  his  after  course,  by  wresting  success  out  of 
seemingly  irretrievable  disaster,  has  merited  the 
highest  eulogium.  Maintaining  both  courage 
and  energy  unimpaired,  every  effort  was  instantly 
made  to  get  the  ships  once  more  into  fighting 
condition,  that  the  attack  might  be  renewed. 
"  Tell  the  Admiralty,"  said  he  to  the  bearer  of 
his  despatches,  "  that  I  feel  confident  I  shall  soon 
have  an  opportunity  of  attacking  the  enemy  again, 
and  that  they  may  depend  upon  my  availing 
myself  of  it." 

The  opportunity  did  come.  On  the  morning 
of  July  gth,  the  Superb,  the  seventh  ship,  which 
had  not  been  in  the  action,  was  seen  rounding 
the  west  point  of  the  bay  under  all  sail,  with 
a  signal  flying  that  the  enemy  was  in  pursuit. 
A  few  moments  later  appeared  five  Spanish 
vessels,  two  of  which,  the  Real  Carlos  and  the 
Hermenegildo,  carrying  each  one  hundred  and 
twelve  guns,  were  among  the  largest  then  afloat. 
On  board  them  had  embarked  a  number  of  the 
jeunesse  dor'ee  of  Cadiz,  eager  to  join  the  trium- 
phal procession  which  it  was  thought  would  soon 
enter  the  port,  flushed  with  a  victory  considered 
by  them  to  be  rather  Spanish  than  French,  and 
escorting  the  rare  trophy  of  a  British  ship-of- 

the-line   that   had   struck   to    Spanish    batteries. 

27 


4i  8  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

Besides  the  two  giants,  there  were  a  ninety-gun 
ship  and  two  seventy-fours  ;  and  the  next  day  a 
French  vessel  of  the  latter  class  joined,  making  a 
total  reinforcement  of  six  heavy  ships. 

To  these  Saumarez  could  oppose  but  five. 
The  Hannibal  he  had  lost.  The  Pomp'ec  could 
not  be  repaired  in  time ;  her  people  were  there- 
fore distributed  among  the  other  vessels  of  the 
squadron.  Even  his  own  flag-ship,  the  Casar, 
was  so  injured  that  he  thought  it  impossible  to 
refit  her ;  but  when  her  crew  heard  his  decision, 
one  cry  arose, — to  work  all  day  and  night  till 
she  was  ready  for  battle.  This  was  zeal  not  ac- 
cording to  knowledge  ;  but,  upon  the  pleading  of 
her  captain  in  their  name,  it  was  agreed  that  they 
should  work  all  day,  and  by  watches  at  night. 
So  it  happened,  by  systematic  distribution  of 
effort  and  enthusiastic  labor,  that  the  Casar, 
whose  mainmast  on  the  Qth  was  out  and  her  rig- 
ging cut  to  pieces,  was  on  the  i2th  able  to  sail  in 
pursuit  of  the  foe. 

During  the  forenoon  of  the  latter  day  the 
combined  squadron  was  seen  getting  under  way. 
The  wind,  being  easterly,  was  fair  for  the  British, 
and,  besides,  compelled  the  enemy  to  make  some 
tacks  to  clear  the  land.  This  delay  was  inval- 
uable to  Saumarez,  whose  preparations,  rapid  as 
they  had  been,  were  still  far  from  complete.  Not 
till  one  in  the  afternoon  did  the  headmost  Span- 
iards reach  the  straits,  and  there  they  had  to 
await  their  companions.  The  Hannibal  was  un- 


Saumarez  419 

able  to  join  them,  and  reanchored  at  Algeciras. 
At  half-past  two  the  C&sar  hauled  out  from  Gib- 
raltar mole,  her  band  playing,  "  Cheer  up,  my 
lads,  't  is  to  glory  we  steer  ! "  which  was  answered 
from  the  mole-head  with  "  Britons,  strike  home ! " 
At  the  same  moment  Saumarez's  flag,  provision- 
ally shifted  to  another  vessel,  was  rehoisted  at  her 
masthead.  The  rugged  flanks  of  the  rock  and 
the  shores  of  Algeciras  were  crowded  with  eager 
and  cheering  sight-seers,  whose  shouts  echoed 
back  the  hurrahs  of  the  seamen.  Rarely,  indeed, 
is  so  much  of  the  pride  and  circumstance,  if  not 
of  the  pomp,  of  war  rehearsed  before  an  audience 
which,  breathless  with  expectation,  has  in  it  no 
part  save  to  admire  and  applaud. 

Off  Europa  Point,  on  the  Gibraltar  side,  there 
clustered  round  the  Ccesar  her  four  consorts, 
all  but  one  bearing,  like  herself,  the  still  fresh 
wounds  of  the  recent  conflict.  Four  miles  away, 
off  Cabrita  Point,  assembled  the  three  French  of 
Linois's  division,  having  like  honorable  marks, 
together  with  the  six  new  unscarred  arrivals.  At 
8  P.M.  of  the  summer  evening  the  allies  kept 
away  for  Cadiz ;  Linois's  division  leading,  the 
other  six  interposing  between  them  and  the  five 
ships  of  Saumarez,  which  followed  at  once.  It 
was  a  singular  sight,  this  pursuit  of  nine  ships 
by  five,  suggestive  of  much  of  the  fatal  differ- 
ence, in  ideals  and  efficiency,  between  the  navies 
concerned.  Towards  nine  o'clock  Saumarez  or- 
dered the  Superb,  whose  condition  alone  was 


4-2O  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

unimpaired  by  battle,  to  press  ahead  and  bring 
the  rear  of  the  enemy  to  action.  The  wind  was 
blowing  strong  from  the  east,  with  a  heavy  sea. 
At  half-past  eleven  the  Superb  overtook  the  Real 
Carlos,  and  opened  fire.  Abreast  the  Spanish 
vessel,  on  her  other  side,  was  the  Hermenegildo. 
The  latter,  probably  through  receiving  some  of 
the  Superb 's  shot,  fancied  the  ship  nearest  her  to 
be  an  enemy,  and  replied.  In  the  confusion,  one 
of  them  caught  fire,  the  other  ran  on  board  her, 
and  in  a  few  moments  there  was  presented  to  the 
oncoming  British  the  tremendous  sight  of  these 
two  huge  ships,  with  their  twenty  hundred  men, 
locked  in  a  fast  embrace  and  blazing  together. 
At  half-past  two  in  the  morning,  having  by 
that  time  drifted  apart,  they  blew  up  in  quick 
succession. 

Leaving  them  to  their  fate,  the  hostile  squad- 
ron passed  on.  The  Superb  next  encountered 
the  St.  Antoine,  and  forced  her  to  strike.  Soon 
afterwards  the  wind  died  away,  and  both  fleets 
were  much  scattered.  A  British  ship  brought 
to  action  one  of  the  French  which  had  been 
in  the  first  battle ;  indeed,  the  French  accounts 
say  that  the  latter  had  fought  three  enemies. 
However  that  may  be,  she  was  again  severely 
mauled ;  but  the  English  vessel  opposed  to  her 
ran  on  a  shoal,  and  lost  all  her  masts.  With  this 
ended  the  events  of  that  awful  night. 

The  net  results  of  this  stirring  week  completely 
relieved  the  fears  of  the  British  ministers.  What- 


Saumarez  42 1 

ever  the  objects  of  the  concentration  at  Cadiz, 
they  were  necessarily  frustrated.  Though  the 
first  attack  was  repulsed,  the  three  French  ships 
had  been  very  roughly  handled ;  and,  of  the  re- 
lieving force,  three  out  of  six  were  now  lost  to  the 
enemy.  "  Sir  James  Saumarez's  action  has  put 
us  upon  velvet,"  wrote  St.  Vincent,  then  head  of 
the  Admiralty;  and  in  the  House  of  Peers  he 
highly  eulogized  the  admiral's  conduct,  as  also 
did  Nelson.  The  former  declared  that  "  this  gal- 
lant achievement  surpassed  everything  he  had 
ever  met  with  in  his  reading  or  service,"  a  state- 
ment sufficiently  sweeping ;  while  the  praise  of  the 
hero  of  the  Nile  was  the  more  to  be  prized  be- 
cause there  never  was  cordial  sympathy  between 
him  and  Saumarez.  Closely  as  they  had  been 
associated,  Nelson's  letters  to  his  brother  officer 
began  always  "  My  dear  Sir  James,"  not  "  My 
dear  Saumarez." 

In  this  blaze  of  triumph  the  story  of  Saumarez 
fitly  terminates.  He  was  never  again  engaged  in 
serious  encounter  with  the  enemy.  The  first  war 
with  the  French  republic  ended  three  months 
after  the  battle  of  Algeciras.  After  the  second 
began,  in  1803,  he  was,  until  1807,  commander- 
in-chief  at  the  Channel  Islands,  watching  the 
preparations  for  the  invasion  of  England,  and 
counteracting  the  efforts  of  cruisers  against  Brit- 
ish commerce.  In  1808,  in  consequence  of  the 
agreements  of  Tilsit  between  the  Czar  and  Napo- 
leon, affairs  in  the  Baltic  became  such  as  to  de- 


422  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

mand  the  presence  of  a  large  British  fleet,  —  first 
to  support  Sweden,  then  at  war  with  Russia,  and 
later  to  protect  the  immense  British  trade,  which, 
under  neutral  flags  and  by  contraband  methods, 
maintained  by  way  of  the  northern  sea  the  inter- 
course of  Great  Britain  with  the  Continent.  Of 
this  trade  Sweden  was  an  important  intermediary, 
and  her  practical  neutrality  was  essential  to  its 
continuance.  This  was  insured  by  the  firm  yet 
moderate  attitude  of  Sir  James  Saumarez,  even 
when  she  had  been  forced  by  France  to  declare 
war  against  Great  Britain. 

It  may  be  said  without  exaggeration  that  from 
this  time,  and  until  the  breach  between  Napoleon 
and  Russia  in  1812,  the  maritime  interest  of  the  war 
between  Great  Britain  and  France  centred  in  the 
Baltic.  Elsewhere  the  effective  but  monotonous 
blockade  of  the  continental  ports  controlled  by 
the  French  Emperor  absorbed  the  attention  of 
the  British  fleets.  Of  great  battles  there  were 
none  after  Trafalgar.  To  Saumarez,  therefore, 
fell  the  most  distinctive,  and  probably  also  the 
most  decisive,  field  of  work  open  to  the  British 
navy.  The  importance  of  the  Baltic  was  two- 
fold. It  was  then  the  greatest  source  of  materials 
essential  to  ship-building  —  commonly  called 
naval  stores ;  and  further,  the  Russian  part  of  its 
coast  line,  being  independent  of  Napoleon's  direct 
regulation,  was  the  chief  means  of  approach  by 
which  Great  Britain  maintained  commercial  in- 
tercourse with  the  Continent,  to  exclude  her 


Saumarez  423 

from  which  had  become  the  leading  object  with 
the  Emperor.  The  contravention  of  his  policy  in 
this  way,  in  disregard,  as  he  claimed,  of  the  agree- 
ments existing  between  him  and  the  Czar,  led 
eventually  to  the  Russian  war,  and  so  finally  to 
his  own  overthrow  and  the  deliverance  of  the 
Continent  from  his  domination. 

The  historical  significance  of  the  position  now 
occupied  by  Saumarez,  and  its  importance  to  the 
great  issues  of  the  future,  are  thus  manifest.  It 
was  a  post  that  he  was  eminently  qualified  to  fill. 
Firm,  yet  calm,  sagacious,  and  moderate,  he  met 
with  rare  efficiency  the  varied  and  varying  de- 
mands of  those  changeful  times.  The  unremit- 
ting and  well  directed  efforts  of  his  cruisers  broke 
up  reciprocal  commerce  between  the  countries 
surrounding  the  narrow  inland  sea,  so  essential 
to  their  welfare  while  submitting  to  Napoleon; 
while  the  main  fleet  sustained  the  foreign  trade 
with  Russia  and  Sweden,  carried  on  through 
neutral  ships  for  the  advantage  of  Great  Britain. 
Two  instances  will  illustrate  his  activities  better 
than  many  words.  In  the  year  1809  four  hundred 
and  thirty  local  vessels  were  captured,  averaging 
the  small  size  of  sixty  tons  each,  three  hundred 
and  forty  of  which  belonged  to  Denmark,  then 
under  Napoleon's  absolute  sway.  At  the  close  of 
the  open  season  of  1810,  the  merchant  ships  for 
England,  which  ordinarily  were  despatched  under 
convoy  in  bodies  of  five  hundred,  numbered, 
according  to  Saumarez's  flag-lieutenant  and  biog- 


424  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

rapher,  no  less  than  one  thousand  vessels,  gath- 
ered in  one  mass. 

As  long  as  Sweden  remained  friendly,  the 
admiral's  duties,  though  weighty,  did  not  differ 
materially  from  those  usual  to  his  profession ;  but 
when  she  was  unwillingly  forced  into  a  declara- 
tion of  war  by  Napoleon,  his  task  became  more 
complicated  and  more  delicate.  The  British 
minister  having  to  leave,  Saumarez  succeeded  to 
a  diplomatic  situation,  in  which  the  problem  was 
to  support  the  interests  and  dignity  of  his  own 
nation,  without  transforming  the  formal  war  into 
actual  hostilities,  and  substituting  imbitterment 
for  the  secret  good  will  of  the  Swedish  govern- 
ment and  people,  who,  in  common  with  the 
Russian  nobles  and  subjects,  were  alienated  by 
the  imperious  and  merciless  exactions  of  the 
French  demands.  The  secret  aim  of  Great  Britain 
was  so  to  nourish  this  ill-will  towards  France,  and 
so  to  avoid  causes  of  offence  by  herself,  as  to 
convert  covert  hostility  into  open  antagonism, 
and  thus  to  reverse  the  political  and  military  com- 
binations of  Europe.  In  the  absence  of  regular 
accredited  diplomatic  representatives,  Saumarez 
became  at  once  the  exponent  and  the  minister  of 
this  vital  policy.  He  had  to  avoid  quarrels,  and 
yet  at  the  same  time  to  restrain  Sweden  from  acts 
of  injury  to  which  she  was  constantly  impelled 
by  the  Emperor,  whose  purpose  naturally  was 
exactly  the  opposite  of  his ;  and  who  sought  fur- 
ther to  estrange  all  people  from  Great  Britain. 


Saumarez  425 

In  the  performance  of  this  task  Saumarez's 
success  was  not  only  complete,  but  peculiarly  his 
own.  His  temper  was  at  times  severely  tried, 
but  it  never  got  beyond  his  control.  He  repressed 
injury,  and  demanded  satisfaction  for  it,  when 
committed ;  but,  relying  with  good  reason  on  the 
motives  of  the  Swedish  government,  he  contrived 
to  secure  redress  without  resorting  to  force,  which, 
however  understood  by  statesmen,  would  enrage 
the  peoples  he  had  to  conciliate.  After  the  ordeal 
was  over,  and  Russia  was  at  war  with  France,  a 
leading  Swedish  statesman  wrote  to  him:  "You 
have  been  the  guardian  angel  of  my  country  ;  by 
your  wise,  temperate,  and  loyal  conduct,  you  have 
been  the  first  cause  of  the  plans  which  have  been 
formed  against  the  demon  of  the  continent.  .  .  . 
Once  more  I  must  tell  you,  that  you  were  the 
first  cause  that  Russia  had  dared  to  make  war 
against  France ;  had  you  fired  one  shot  when  we 
declared  war  against  England,  all  had  been  ended 
and  Europe  would  have  been  enslaved."  Sau- 
marez, an  extremely  religious  man,  may  have 
reflected  that  "  he  who  ruleth  his  spirit  is  greater 
than  he  that  taketh  a  city." 

Though  in  the  strictest  sense  professional,  the 
Baltic  service  of  Saumarez  involved  little  of  purely 
military  interest.  Shortly  after  his  assuming  the 
command,  in  1808,  a  Russian  fleet  which  had 
been  keeping  the  sea  took  refuge,  on  the 
approach  of-  the  allied  British  and  Swedes,  in  a 
harbor  on  the  Gulf  of  Finland.  Saumarez  fol- 


426  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

lowed  close  upon  their  heels,  and  after  a  consul- 
tation and  reconnoissance  of  the  position,  which 
consumed  two  days,  secured  the  co-operation  of 
the  Swedish  admiral  for  an  attack  on  the  day 
following;  an  essential  condition,  for  the  Russian 
force  was  superior  to  his  own  in  the  proportion  of 
eight  to  six.  Unhappily,  the  wind  shifted,  and 
blew  an  adverse  gale  for  eight  days ;  at  the  end 
of  which  time  the  enemy  had  so  far  fortified  the 
surroundings  that  Saumarez  thought  it  inexpedi- 
ent to  attack.  In  this  decision  he  was  supported 
by  the  opinion  of  captains  of  such  established 
reputation  as,  joined  to  his  own  brilliant  record, 
must  be  taken  to  justify  his  action,  which  seems 
to  have  caused  some  dissatisfaction  in  England. 
On  the  face,  it  could  not  but  be  a  disappointment 
to  people  accustomed  to  the  brilliant  victories  of 
Nelson,  and  his  apparent  invincibility  by  obstacles; 
but  in  the  end  it  was  all  for  the  best,  for  doubt- 
less the  mortifying  destruction  of  a  Russian  fleet 
would  not  have  furthered  the  reconciliation,  which 
soon  became  a  leading  object  with  the  British 
government  and  the  great  bulk  of  the  Russian 
nation.  It  is,  however,  probable  that  to  this 
frustration  of  public  expectation,  which  had  been 
vividly  aroused  by  preceding  accounts  of  the  con- 
ditions, is  to  be  attributed  the  delay  in  granting 
the  peerage,  eagerly  desired  by  Saumarez  in  his 
later  days, —  not  for  itself  merely,  but  as  a  recog- 
nition which  he  not  unnaturally  thought  earned 
by  his  long  and  distinguished  service. 


Saumarez  427 

Saumarez  held  the  Baltic  command  through 
five  eventful  years,  —  from  1808  to  1812.  After 
Napoleon's  disastrous  Russian  expedition,  affairs 
in  that  sea  no  longer  required  a  force  adequate  to 
his  rank,  and  he  then  finally  retired  from  service 
afloat,  still  in  the  full  maturity  of  a  healthy  prime, 
at  the  age  of  fifty-five.  The  remainder  of  his  life, 
with  brief  exception,  was  passed  in  his  native 
island  of  Guernsey,  amid  those  charms  of  family 
affection  and  general  esteem  which  he  had  de- 
served by  his  fidelity  to  all  the  duties  of  the  man 
and  the  citizen.  Though  so  far  removed  from 
the  active  centres  of  life,  he  kept  touch  with  it  by 
the  variety  of  his  interests  in  all  useful  and  be- 
nevolent undertakings,  to  which  an  ample  fortune 
allowed  him  freely  to  contribute.  "  The  hopes 
entertained  of  his  assistance  and  sympathy,"  ob- 
serves his  biographer,  "  were  never  disappointed." 
Among  naval  biographies,  there  is  none  that  pre- 
sents a  more  pleasing  picture  of  genial  and  digni- 
fied enjoyment  of  well-earned  repose.  In  1831, 
upon  the  accession  of  William  IV.,  the  Sailor 
King,  the  long-coveted  peerage  was  at  last  be- 
stowed. Lord  de  Saumarez  died  on  the  gth  of 
October,  1836,  in  his  eightieth  year. 


P  E  L  L  E  W 

1757-1833 

LIKE  the  English  tongue  itself,  the  names 
of  British  seamen  show  the  composite 
origin  of  their  nation.  As  the  Danes  after 
the  day  of  Copenhagen,  to  them  both  glorious 
and  disastrous,  claimed  that  in  Nelson  they 
had  been  vanquished  by  a  man  of  their  own 
blood,  descended  from  their  Viking  forefathers ; 
as  Collingwood  and  Troubridge  indicate  the 
English  descent  of  the  two  closest  associates  of 
the  victor  of  Trafalgar;  so  Saumarez  and  the 
hero  of  this  sketch,  whose  family  name  was 
Pellew,  represent  that  conquering  Norman  race 
which  from  the  shores  of  the  Northern  ocean 
carried  terror  along  the  coasts  of  Europe  and 
the  Mediterranean,  and  as  far  inland  as  their 
light  keels  could  enter.  After  the  great  wars 
of  the  French  Revolution  and  the  Battle  of 
Algiers,  when  Lord  Exmouth  had  won  his  renown 
and  his  position  had  been  attained,  kinship  with 
him  was  claimed  by  a  family  still  residing  in  Nor- 
mandy, where  the  name  was  spelled  "  Pelleu." 
Proof  of  common  origin  was  offered,  not  only  in 
the  name,  but  also  in  the  coat  of  arms. 


Pellew  429 

In  England,  the  Pellew  family  was  settled  in 
the  extreme  southwest,  in  Cornwall  and  Devon- 
shire, counties  whose  nearness  to  the  great 
Atlantic  made  them  the  source  of  so  much  of 
the  maritime  enterprise  that  marked  the  reign  of 
Elizabeth.  Lord  Exmouth's  grandfather  was  a 
man  of  wealth  ;  but,  as  he  left  many  children, 
the  juniors  had  to  shift  for  themselves,  and  the 
youngest  son,  Samuel  Pellew,  the  father  of  the 
admiral,  at  the  time  of  the  latter's  birth  com- 
manded a  post-office  packet  on  the  Dover  sta- 
tion. He  accordingly  made  the  town  of  that 
name  the  home  of  his  wife  and  children;  and 
there  Edward,  the  second  of  his  four  sons,  was 
born,  April  19,  1757.  Their  mother  was  the 
daughter  of  a  Jacobite  gentleman,  who  had  been 
out  for  the  Pretender  in  1715, — a  fact  which 
probably  emphasized  the  strong  Hanoverian  sym- 
pathies of  Samuel  Pellew,  whose  habit  was  to 
make  his  children,  every  Sunday,  drink  King 
George's  health  upon  their  knees. 

In  1765,  when  the  future  admiral  was  only 
eight  years  old,  his  father  died,  and  the  mother 
making  an  imprudent  marriage  three  years  later, 
the  children  were  thrown  upon  the  world  with 
small  provision  and  scanty  care.  The  resolute, 
active,  and  courageous  character  of  the  lads, 
however,  brought  them  well  forward  among 
their  equals  in  age.  At  school  Edward  was 
especially  distinguished  for  fearlessness.  Of  this 
he  gave  a  marked  instance,  when  not  yet  twelve, 


430  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

by  entering  a  burning  house  where  gunpowder 
was  stored,  which  no  other  of  the  bystanders 
would  approach.  Alone  and  with  his  own  hands 
the  lad  brought  out  the  powder.  A  less  com- 
mendable but  very  natural  result  of  the  same 
energetic  spirit  was  shown  in  the  numerous 
fighting  matches  in  which  he  was  engaged. 
Being  threatened  with  a  flogging  for  one  of 
these,  the  circumstance  became  the  immediate 
occasion  of  his  going  to  sea.  If  flogged,  he 
declared,  he  would  run  away ;  and  as  a  decided 
taste  for  seafaring  life  had  already  manifested  it- 
self, his  guardian  thought  better  to  embrace  at 
once  the  more  favorable  alternative  and  enter 
him  regularly  in  the  navy.  He  thus  went  afloat 
towards  the  end  of  1770,  the  date  at  which  Nel- 
son, also,  though  one  year  younger,  began  his 
career. 

His  first  cruise  was  in  the  Mediterranean. 
It  came  to  a  premature  end  through  a  quarrel 
between  the  commander  of  the  ship  and  one  of 
the  midshipmen.  In  this  the  captain  was  clearly 
and  grossly  in  the  wrong ;  yet  nevertheless  carried 
his  resentment,  and  the  power  of  oppression  in 
his  hands,  then  little  restrained  by  law,  so  far  as 
to  expel  the  youngster  from  the  ship  and  set  him 
on  shore  in  Marseilles.  Pellew  insisted  upon 
accompanying  his  messmate,  and  the  two  lads  of 
fourteen,  aided  by  some  of  the  lieutenants,  secured 
a  passage  home.  It  shows  a  pleasing  trait  in  our 
hero's  character  that,  some  years  afterwards,  he 


Pellew  43 1 

advanced  materially  the  professional  fortunes  of 
the  son  of  the  officer  who  had  thus  abused-  his 
authority. 

He  next  passed  under  the  command  of  a 
Captain  Pownoll,  between  whom  and  himself 
were  established  such  warm  relations,  of  affec- 
tionate interest  on  the  one  side  and  reverential 
regard  on  the  other,  that  Pownoll  became  a 
family  name  among  the  descendants  of  the 
admiral.  He  himself  gave  it  to  his  first-born, 
and  it  still  appears  in  the  present  generation. 
Under  him,  also,  Pellew  was  brought  into  direct 
contact  with  the  American  Revolution  ;  for  on 
board  the  frigate  Blonde,  Pownoll's  ship,  General 
Burgoyne  embarked  in  1775  for  Canada,  there 
beginning  the  undertaking  which  ended  so  dis- 
astrously for  him.  It  is  told  that  when  the  dis- 
tinguished passenger  came  on  board,  the  yards 
being  manned  to  receive  him  with  the  honors  due 
to  his  rank,  he  was  startled  to  see  on  one  yard- 
arm  a  midshipman  standing  on  his  head.  Upon 
expressing  alarm,  he  was  laughingly  reassured  by 
the  captain,  who  said  that  Pellew  —  for  he  it  was 
who  put  this  extra  touch  upon  the  general's  recep- 
tion —  was  quite  capable  of  dropping  from  the 
yard,  passing  under  the  ship's  bottom,  and  coming 
up  on  the  other  side.  A  few  days  later  the  young 
officer  actually  did  leap  from  the  yard-arm,  the 
ship  going  fast  through  the  water  —  not,  however, 
as  bravado,  but  to  aid  a  seaman  who  had  fallen 
overboard,  and  whom  he  succeeded  in  saving. 


Types  of  Naval  Officers 


Throughout  his  youth  the  exuberant  vitality 
of  the  man  delighted  in  these  feats  of  wanton 
power.  To  overturn  a  boat  by  press  of  canvas, 
as  a  frolic,  is  not  unexampled  among  lads  of  dar- 
ing ;  but  it  is  at  least  unusual,  when  a  hat  goes 
overboard,  to  follow  it  into  the  water,  if  alone  in 
a  boat  under  sail.  This  Pellew  did,  on  one  occa- 
sion, when  he  was  old  enough  to  know  better  ; 
being  at  the  moment  in  the  open  Channel,  in  a 
small  punt,  going  from  Falmouth  to  Plymouth. 
The  freak  nearly  cost  him  his  life  ;  for,  though 
he  had  lashed  the  helm  down  and  hove-to  the 
boat,  she  fell  off  and  gathered  way  whenever  he 
approached.  When  at  last  he  laid  hold  of  her 
rail,  after  an  hour  of  this  fooling,  barely  strength 
remained  to  drag  himself  on  board,  where  he  fell 
helpless,  and  waited  long  before  his  powers  were 
restored.  It  is  trite  to  note  in  such  exhibitions 
of  recklessness  many  of  the  qualities  of  the  ideal 
seaman,  though  not  so  certainly  those  of  the  fore- 
ordained commander-in-chief.  Pellew  was  a  born 
frigate  captain. 

At  the  end  of  1775  the  Americans  were  still 
engaged  in  the  enterprise  against  Quebec,  the 
disastrous  termination  of  which  is  familiarly 
known.  After  the  fall  of  General  Montgomery 
in  the  unsuccessful  night  assault  of  December 
31'  J775>  the  American  operations  were  reduced 
to  a  land  blockade  of  the  town,  which  was  cut  off 
from  the  sea  by  ice  in  the  river.  A  close  invest- 
ment was  thus  maintained  for  five  months,  until 


Pellew  433 

the  early  part  of  May,  1776,  when  the  place  was 
relieved  by  the  arrival  of  a  small  naval  force, 
commanded  by  Captain  Charles  Douglas.  Im- 
mediately upon  its  appearance  the  commanding 
British  general  Carleton,  attacked  the  besiegers, 
who,  already  prostrated  by  disease  and  privation, 
abandoned  their  positions  and  fell  back  upon 
Sorel,  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  Richelieu,  the 
outlet  from  Lake  Champlain  to  the  St.  Lawrence. 
Here  they  remained  until  June,  when  the  enemy, 
who  had  received  heavy  reinforcements,  advanced 
in  overpowering  numbers.  The  Americans  again 
retired  above  the  rapids  of  the  Richelieu  to  St. 
Johns.  Thence  there  is  a  clear  channel  south- 
ward ;  and  embarking  there,  the  retreating  force 
without  further  molestation  reached  Crown  Point, 
a  fortified  post  a  hundred  miles  distant,  at  the 
head  of  the  lake,  commanding  the  narrow  stream 
to  which  it  is  reduced  in  its  upper  part.  Twelve 
miles  above  Crown  Point  is  Ticonderoga,  the 
well-known  border  fortress  of  the  Colonial  and 
Revolutionary  wars  ;  and  for  fifteen  or  twenty 
miles  farther  the  stream  is  navigable  for  boats  of 
some  size,  thus  affording  an  easy  means  of  com- 
munication in  those  early  days  of  impassable 
forests  and  scanty  transport. 

Though  greatly  superior  on  land,  the  British 
had  now  for  a  time  to  stay  their  pursuit ;  for  the 
water  highway  essential  to  its  continuance  was 
controlled  by  the  flotilla  under  the  command  of 

Benedict  Arnold,  forbidding  further  advance  until 

28 


434  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

it  was  subdued.  The  presence  of  these  vessels, 
which,  though  few,  were  as  yet  unopposed,  gained 
for  the  Americans,  in  this  hour  of  extremity,  the 
important  respite  from  June  to  October,  1776; 
and  then  the  lateness  of  the  season  compelled 
the  postponement  of  the  invasion  to  the  follow- 
ing year.  The  toil  with  which  this  little  force 
had  been  created,  a  few  months  before,  was  thus 
amply  justified  ;  for  delay  is  ever  to  the  advantage 
of  the  defence.  In  this  case  it  also  gave  time 
for  a  change  of  commanders  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy,  from  Carleton  to  Burgoyne,  which  not 
improbably  had  a  decisive  effect  upon  the  for- 
tunes of  the  next  campaign. 

As  soon  as  established  at  St.  Johns,  the  Brit- 
ish took  steps  to  place  a  naval  force  upon  the 
lake,  an  undertaking  involving  trouble  and  delay, 
notwithstanding  their  greatly  superior  resources 
in  men  and  material.  Some  thirty  fighting  ves- 
sels, suitable  to  the  waters  upon  which  they  were 
to  act,  were  required,  and  also  four  hundred  bat- 
eaux for  the  transport  of  the  troops.  These  had 
either  to  be  built  upon  the  spot,  despite  the  lack 
of  all  dockyard  facilities,  or  else  to  be  brought 
bodily  from  the  St.  Lawrence,  by  road,  or  through 
the  rapids  of  the  Richelieu,  until  the  deep  water 
at  St.  Johns  was  reached.  In  this  hardy,  stren- 
uous work,  Pellew  naturally  was  conspicuously 
active  ;  and  in  its  course  he  gained  a  particular 
professional  accomplishment  which  afterwards 
stood  him  in  good  stead.  Several  vessels  were 


Pellew  435 

built  upon  the  shores  of  the  stream ;  among  others, 
one  of  one  hundred  and  eighty  tons,  the  Inflex- 
ible, whose  heavier  timbers  were  brought  overland 
to  St.  Johns.  The  construction  of  these  craft 
was  superintended  by  a  lieutenant  —  afterwards 
Admiral  Schank  —  of  scientific  knowledge  as  a 
ship  architect ;  and  through  close  association 
with  him  Pellew's  instinctive  appreciation  of  all 
things  nautical  received  an  intelligent  guidance, 
which  gave  him  a  quick  insight  into  the  probable 
behavior  of  a  ship  from  an  examination  of  her 
build,  and  enabled  him  often  to  suggest  a  suitable 
remedy  for  dangerous  faults.  During  this  period 
of  equipment  occurred  a  characteristic  incident 
which  has  only  recently  become  public  through 
a  descendant.1  "  On  the  day  the  Inflexible  was 
launched,  Pellew  on  the  top  of  the  sheers  was 
trying  to  get  in  the  mainmast.  The  machinery 
not  being  of  the  best  gave  way,  and  down  came 
mainmast,  Pellew,  and  all,  into  the  lake.  '  Poor 
Pellew,'  exclaimed  Schank,  '  he  is  gone  at  last ! ' 
However,  he  speedily  emerged  and  was  the  first 
man  to  mount  the  sheers  again.  '  Sir,'  Admiral 
Schank  used  to  conclude,  'he  was  like  a  squirrel.' " 
Thirty  days  after  the  keel  of  the  Injlexible  was 
laid  at  St.  Johns,  the  vessel  herself  not  only  was 
launched,  but  had  set  sail  for  the  southward. 
She  carried  eighteen  twelve-pounders,  nine  on  a 
side,  and  was  thus  superior  in  power,  not  only  to 
any  one  vessel  of  the  Americans,  but  to  their 

1  Fleetwood  Hugo  Pellew,  in  "  Our  Naval  Heroes." 


436  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

whole  assembled  flotilla  on  Lake  Champlain. 
Except  the  principal  pieces  of  her  hull,  the  timber 
of  which  she  was  built  was  hewed  in  the  neigh- 
boring forest ;  and  indeed,  the  whole  story  of  the 
rapid  equipment  of  this  squadron  recalls  vividly 
the  vigorous  preparation  of  Commander  Perry,  of 
the  United  States  navy,  in  1813,  for  his  success- 
ful attempt  to  control  Lake  Erie.  The  entire 
British  force,  land  and  naval,  now  moved  toward 
Crown  Point.  On  the  nth  of  October  the 
American  flotilla  was  discovered,  a  short  distance 
above  Plattsburg  and  about  twenty  miles  from 
the  foot  of  the  lake,  drawn  up  between  Valcour 
Island  and  the  western  shore,  which  are  from  one- 
half  to  three-fourths  of  a  mile  apart.  It  lay  there 
so  snugly  that  the  British,  wafted  by  a  northwest 
wind,  had  actually  passed  to  the  southward  with- 
out seeing  it,  and  the  discovery  was  purely  acci- 
dental, —  a  fact  which  suggests  that  Arnold,  who 
must  have  felt  the  impossibility  of  a  force  so 
inferior  as  his  own  contesting,  or  even  long 
delaying,  the  enemy's  advance  by  direct  oppo- 
sition, may  have  entertained  some  purpose  of 
operating  in  their  rear,  and  thus  causing  a  diver- 
sion which  at  this  late  season  might  effectually 
arrest  their  progress.  It  is  true  that  such  a 
stroke  would  frightfully  imperil  his  little  squad- 
ron ;  but,  in  circumstances  of  absolute  inferiority, 
audacity,  usually  the  best  policy  in  war,  offers  the 
only  chance  of  success.  Mere  retreat,  however 
methodical,  must  end  in  final  destruction.  To 


Pellew  437 

act  towards  St.  Johns,  trusting  to  dexterity  and 
to  local  knowledge  of  the  network  of  islands  at 
the  foot  of  the  lake  to  escape  disaster,  or  at  least  to 
protract  the  issue,  offered  the  best  chance ;  and 
that  the  situation  thus  accepted  would  not  be 
hopeless  was  proved  by  the  subsequent  temporary 
evasion  of  pursuit  by  the  Americans,  even  in  the 
open  and  narrow  water  of  the  middle  lake. 

The  British  moved  to  attack  as  soon  as  the 
hostile  shipping  was  discovered.  Pellew  was  sec- 
ond officer  of  the  schooner  Carleton,  of  twelve 
guns,  the  third  vessel  of  the  flotilla  in  point  of 
force.  The  wind  being  contrary,  and  apparently 
light,  the  Carleton  alone  of  the  sailing  vessels  got 
into  action  ;  and  although  she  was  supported  by 
a  number  of  rowing  gunboats,  whose  artillery 
was  heavy,  the  match  was  unequal.  According 
to  Arnold's  own  account,  he  had  disposed  his 
gunboats  and  gondolas  "  on  the  west  side  of 
Valcour  Island,  as  near  together  as  possible, 
and  in  such  a  form  that  few  vessels  can  attack 
us  at  the  same  time,  and  those  will  be  exposed 
to  the  fire  of  the  whole  fleet."  To  this  Cap- 
tain Douglas,  in  his  report  of  the  occurrences, 
adds  the  suggestive  particular  that  the  Carleton, 
by  a  lucky  slant  of  wind,  fetched  "  nearly  into 
the  middle  of  the  rebel  half-moon,  where  she 
anchored  with  a  spring  on  her  cable."  The 
position  was  one  of  honorable  distinction,  but 
likewise  of  great  exposure.  Her  first  officer  lost 
an  arm ;  her  captain,  Lieutenant  Dacres,  was  so 


43  8  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

severely  wounded  that  he  was  about  to  be  thrown 
overboard  as  dead ;  and  Pellew,  thus  left  with- 
out a  superior,  fought  the  vessel  through  the 
engagement.  When  signal  was  at  last  made  to 
withdraw,  the  Carleton  was  able  to  do  so  only 
by  help  of  the  gunboats,  which  towed  her  out 
of  fire.  On  the  other  hand,  Arnold's  flag-ship, 
the  schooner  Royal  Savage,  which  had  fought 
in  advance  of  her  consorts  and  under  canvas, 
fell  to  leeward,  and  came  there  under  the  dis- 
tant fire  of  the  Inflexible,  by  which  she  was 
badly  crippled.  She  then  was  run  ashore  on  the 
southern  point  of  the  island,  where  she  fell  mo- 
mentarily into  the  hands  of  the  British,  who 
turned  her  guns  on  her  former  friends.  Later 
in  the  day,  it  seeming  probable  that  she  might 
be  retaken,  she  was  set  on  fire  and  burned  to 
the  water's  edge.  Thus  abandoned,  she  sank 
to  the  bottom,  where  her  hull  rests  to  this  day. 
During  the  recent  summer  of  1901  some  gun- 
carriages  have  been  recovered  from  her,  after 
lying  for  a  century  and  a  quarter  beneath  the 
surface  of  the  lake. 

Pellew's  personal  activity  and  strength  en- 
abled his  gallantry  to  show  to  particular  ad- 
vantage in  this  sanguinary  contest.  When  the 
Carleton,  in  her  attempt  to  withdraw,  hung  in 
stays  under  the  island,  her  decks  swept  by  the 
bullets  of  the  riflemen  on  shore,  it  was  he  who 
sprang  out  on  the  bowsprit  to  bear  the  jib  over 
to  windward.  When  the  tow-rope  was  cut  by 


Pellew  439 

a  shot,  it  was  Pellew  again  who  exposed  his 
person  for  the  safety  of  the  vessel.  His  two 
seniors  being  forced  by  their  wounds  to  leave 
the  schooner,  he  succeeded  to  the  command, 
in  which  he  was  afterwards  confirmed.  In  this 
sharp  affair  the  Carleton  lost  eight  killed  and 
six  wounded,  —  about  half  her  crew,  —  and  had 
two  feet  of  water  in  her  hold  when  she  anchored 
out  of  range. 

Towards  evening  the  Inflexible  succeeded  in 
getting  within  point-blank  range  of  the  American 
flotilla,  "  when  five  broadsides,"  wrote  Douglas, 
"  silenced  their  whole  line ;  "  a  sufficient  testi- 
mony to  the  superiority  of  her  concentrated 
battery  over  the  dispersed  force  of  all  her  nu- 
merous petty  antagonists.  The  British  then  an- 
chored to  the  southward  of  Arnold's  little  force ; 
but  that  active  and  enterprising  officer  succeeded 
in  stealing  during  the  night  between  the  enemy 
and  the  western  shore,  and  retired  towards  Crown 
Point.  The  chase  to  windward  continued  during 
the  next  day,  but  a  favorable  shift  of  wind,  to 
the  north,  reached  the  British  first,  and  enabled 
them  to  close.  Arnold  again  behaved  with  the  ex- 
traordinary bravery  and  admirable  conduct  which 
distinguished  him  in  battle.  Sending  on  the  bulk 
of  the  squadron,  he  took  the  rear  with  two  galleys, 
covering  the  retreat.  Fighting  like  a  lion,  he  op- 
posed the  enemy's  advance  long  enough  to  secure 
the  escape  of  six  of  his  vessels  ;  and  then,  seeing 
his  one  consort  forced  to  strike,  he  ran  his  own 


440  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

galley  ashore  and  set  her  on  fire.  "  Arnold,"  says 
the  naval  historian  Cooper,  "  covered  himself  with 
glory,  and  his  example  seems  to  have  been  nobly 
followed  by  most  of  his  officers  and  men.  The 
manner  in  which  the  Congress  was  fought  until 
she  had  covered  the  retreat  of  the  galleys,  and  the 
stubborn  resolution  with  which  she  was  defended 
until  destroyed,  converted  the  disasters  of  this 
part  of  the  day  into  a  species  of  triumph."  "  The 
Americans,"  says  a  contemporary  British  writer, 
"chiefly  gloried  in  the  dangerous  attention  paid 
by  Arnold  to  a  nice  point  of  honor,  in  keeping 
his  flag  flying,  and  not  quitting  his  galley  till 
she  was  in  flames,  lest  the  enemy  should  have 
boarded  and  struck  it." 

Pellew  received  like  recognition,  not,  perhaps, 
from  the  popular  voice,  but  from  his  official  su- 
periors. Douglas,  the  senior  naval  officer  at 
Quebec,  who  was  made  a  baronet  in  reward  of 
these  operations,  Lord  Howe  at  New  York,  and 
the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  in  England,  all 
sent  him  personal  letters  of  commendation;  and 
the  two  latter  promised  him  promotion  as  soon 
as  he  came  within  their  respective  jurisdictions. 
His  continuance  at  the  front  of  operations  during 
this  and  the  following  year  therefore  postponed 
his  deserved  advancement  to  a  lieutenancy,  by 
retaining  him  from  the  "jurisdiction"  of  those 
able  to  bestow  it. 

The  two  gallant  enemies  were  soon  again 
brought  together  in  an  incident  which  came  near 


Pellew  441 

to  change  the  career  of  one  of  them,  and,  in  so 
doing,  to  modify  seriously  the  fortunes  of  many 
others.  Arnold  having  one  day  pulled  out  on 
the  open  lake,  in  his  venturesome  manner,  Pel- 
lew  gave  chase  in  another  boat.  The  Americans 
being  hard  pressed  and  capture  probable,  Arnold 
unbuckled  his  stock  and  himself  took  an  oar. 
So  nearly  caught  was  he,  that  he  had  to  escape 
into  the  bushes,  leaving  behind  him  stock  and 
buckle ;  and  these,  as  late  as  sixty  years  after, 
remained  in  the  possession  of  Pellew's  brother. 
Had  he  thus  been  deprived  of  the  opportunity 
that  Saratoga  gave  him  the  next  year,  Arnold's 
name  might  now  be  known  to  us  only  as  that 
of  the  brave  officer  who  kept  his  country's  flag 
flying  till  his  vessel  was  in  flames. 

On  the  i4th  of  October  Carleton  landed  at 
Crown  Point,  which  the  Americans  had  aban- 
doned ;  but  the  lateness  of  the  season  deterred 
him  from  advancing  against  Ticonderoga,  and 
he  soon  afterwards  returned  to  Canada.  The 
full  import  of  this  halt  is  too  easily  overlooked, 
with  consequent  failure  to  appreciate  the  mo- 
mentous influence  exerted  upon  the  course  of  the 
Revolutionary  War  by  this  naval  campaign,  in 
which  Pellew  bore  so  conspicuous  a  part.  It 
has  never  been  understood  in  America,  where  the 
smallness  of  the  immediate  scale  has  withdrawn 
attention  from  the  greatness  of  the  ultimate  issue, 
in  gaining  time  for  the  preparations  which  re- 
sulted in  the  admittedly  decisive  victories  about 


442  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

Saratoga.  "  If  we  could  have  begun  our  expe- 
dition four  weeks  earlier,"  wrote  a  German  gen- 
eral there  present,  "  I  am  satisfied  everything 
would  have  been  ended  this  year  [1776];  were 
our  whole  army  here,  it  would  be  an  easy  matter 
to  drive  the  enemy  from  their  entrenchments 
at  Ticonderoga."  The  delay,  not  of  four  weeks 
only,  but  of  the  whole  summer,  was  obtained 
by  the  naval  force  organized  upon  Champlain 
by  Arnold  and  his  superior,  General  Schuyler. 
The  following  year  the  invasion  was  resumed, 
under  General  Burgoyne.  Pellew  accompanied 
him  with  a  body  of  seamen,  taking  part  in  all 
the  operations  down  to  the  final  surrender. 
Burgoyne,  indeed,  afterwards  chaffed  him  with 
being  the  cause  of  the  disaster,  by  rebuilding 
the  bridge  which  enabled  the  army  to  cross  from 
the  east  bank  of  the  Hudson  to  the  west. 

Returning  to  England  in  the  early  part  of  1778, 
Pellew  was  made  lieutenant,  and  in  1 780  we  find 
him  again  serving  under  Captain  Pownoll,  as  first 
lieutenant  of  the  Apollo  frigate.  On  the  i5th  of 
June,  in  the  same  year,  the  Apollo  met  the 
French  frigate  Stanislas.  A  severe  action  fol- 
lowed, and  at  the  end  of  an  hour  Pownoll  was 
shot  through  the  body.  As  his  young  friend 
raised  him  from  the  deck,  he  had  barely  time  to 
say,  "  Pellew,  I  know  you  won't  give  his  Majesty's 
ship  away,"  and  immediately  expired.  The  en- 
gagement lasted  an  hour  longer,  when  the  enemy, 
which  had  all  the  time  been  standing  in  for  the 


Pellew  443 

Belgian  coast,  took  the  ground,  the  most  of  her 
spars,  already  wounded,  going  overboard  with  the 
shock.  The  Apollo  had  hauled  off  a  few  mo- 
ments before,  finding  that  she  had  less  than  five 
feet  of  water  under  her  keel. 

Though  unable  again  to  attack  the  Stanislas, 
which  claimed  the  protection  of  the  neutral  flag, 
the  result  was  substantially  a  victory;  but  to 
Pellew's  grief  for  the  death  of  a  tried  friend  was 
added  the  material  loss  of  a  powerful  patron. 
Happily,  however,  his  reputation  was  known  to 
the  head  of  the  Admiralty,  who  not  only  pro- 
moted him  for  this  action,  but  also  gave  him  a 
ship,  though  a  poor  one.  After  a  succession  of 
small  commands,  he  was  fortunate  enough  again 
to  distinguish  himself,  —  driving  ashore  and  de- 
stroying several  French  privateers,  under  circum- 
stances of  such  danger  and  difficulty  as  to  win 
him  his  next  grade,  post-captain.  This  step, 
which,  so  far  as  selection  went,  fixed  his  position 
in  the  navy,  he  received  on  the  25th  of  May,  1782. 

The  ten  years  of  peace  that  shortly  followed 
were  passed  by  many  officers  in  retirement,  which 
we  have  seen  was  contentedly  accepted  by  his 
distinguished  contemporary,  Saumarez;  but  Pel- 
lew  was  a  seaman  to  the  marrow,  and  constantly 
sought  employment  afloat.  When  out  of  occupa- 
tion, he  for  a  while  tried  farming,  the  Utopian 
employment  that  most  often  beguiles  the  imagi- 
nation of  the  inbred  seaman  in  occasional  weariness 
of  salt  water;  but,  as  his  biographer  justly  re- 


444  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

marks,  his  mind,  which  allowed  him  to  be  happy 
only  when  active,  could  ill  accommodate  itself 
to  pursuits  that  almost  forbade  exertion.  "  To 
have  an  object  in  view,  yet  to  be  unable  to  ad- 
vance it  by  any  exertions  of  his  own,  was  to  him 
a  source  of  constant  irritation.  He  was  wearied 
with  the  imperceptible  growth  of  his  crops,  and 
complained  that  he  made  his  eyes  ache  by  watch- 
ing their  daily  progress." 

His  assiduous  applications,  however,  were  not 
wholly  unavailing  to  obtain  him  the  professional 
employments  usually  so  hard  to  get  in  times  of 
peace.  For  five  of  the  ten  years,  1783-1793,  he 
commanded  frigates,  chiefly  on  the  Newfoundland 
station  ;  and  in  them,  though  now  turning  thirty, 
he  displayed  the  superabundant  vitality  and  rest- 
less activity  that  had  characterized  his  early  youth. 
"  Whenever  there  was  exertion  required  aloft," 
wrote  a  midshipman  who  served  with  him  at  this 
period,  "  to  preserve  a  sail  or  a  mast,  the  captain 
was  foremost  in  the  work,  apparently  as  a  mere 
matter  of  amusement,  and  there  was  not  a  man 
in  the  ship  that  could  equal  him  in  personal  activ- 
ity. He  appeared  to  play  among  the  elements  in 
the  hardest  storms.  I  remember  once,  in  close- 
reefing  the  main  topsail,  the  captain  had  given 
his  orders  from  the  quarter-deck  and  sent  us  aloft. 
On  gaining  the  topsail  yard,  the  most  active  and 
daring  of  our  party  hesitated  to  go  upon  it,  as  the 
sail  was  flapping  violently,  making  it  a  service  of 
great  danger;  but  a  voice  was  heard  from  the  ex- 


Pellew  445 

treme  end  of  the  yard,  calling  upon  us  to  exert 
ourselves  to  save  the  sail,  which  would  otherwise 
beat  to  pieces.  A  man  said,  '  Why,  that 's  the 

captain  !     How  the did  he  get  there  ? '     He 

had  followed  us  up,  and,  clambering  over  the 
backs  of  the  sailors,  had  reached  the  topmast 
head,  above  the  yard,  and  thence  descended  by 
the  lift,"  —  a  feat  unfortunately  not  easy  to 
be  explained  to  landsmen,  but  which  will  be 
allowed  by  seamen  to  demand  great  hardihood 
and  address. 

All  this  was  the  simple  overflow  of  an  animal 
energy  not  to  be  repressed,  the  exulting  prowess  of 
a  giant  delighting  to  run  his  course.  It  found 
expression  also  in  joyous  practical  jests,  like  those 
of  a  big  boy,  which  at  times  had  ludicrous  conse- 
quences. On  one  occasion  of  state  ceremony, 
the  king's  birthday,  Pellew  had  dressed  in  full 
uniform  to  attend  a  dinner  on  shore.  The  weather 
was  hot,  and  the  crew  had  been  permitted  an 
hour's  swimming  around  the  ship.  While  his 
boat  was  being  manned,  the  captain  stood  by  the 
frigate's  rail  watching  the  bathers,  and  near  by 
him  was  one  of  the  ship's  boys.  "  I  too  shall 
have  a  good  swim  soon,"  called  the  latter  to  a 
comrade  in  the  water.  "  The  sooner,  the  better," 
said  Pellew,  coming  behind  him  and  tipping  him 
overboard.  No  sooner  had  the  lad  risen  to  the 
surface  from  his  plunge  than  it  was  plain  that  he 
could  not  swim ;  so  in  after  him  went  the  practi- 
cal joker,  with  all  his  toggery.  "  If  ever  the  cap- 


446  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

tain  was  frightened,"  writes  the  officer  just  quoted, 
"  it  was  then." 

But  along  with  all  this  physical  exuberance  and 
needless  assumption  of  many  of  the  duties  of  a 
foremast  hand,  Pellew  possessed  to  a  very  remark- 
able extent  that  delicate  art  of  seamanship  which 
consists  in  so  handling  a  ship  as  to  make  her  do 
just  what  you  want,  and  to  put  her  just  where  she 
should  be ;  making  her,  to  use  a  common  sea 
expression,  do  everything  but  talk.  This  is  a 
faculty  probably  inborn,  like  most  others  that 
reach  any  great  degree  of  perfection,  and,  while  a 
very  desirable  gift,  it  is  by  no  means  indispensable 
to  the  highest  order  of  naval  excellence.  Nelson 
did  not  at  all  equal  Pellew  in  this  respect,  as  is 
indicated  by  an  amusing  story  transmitted  by  a 
Colonel  Stewart,  who  served  on  board  the  great 
admiral's  flag-ship  during  the  expedition  against 
Copenhagen :  "  His  lordship  was  rather  too  apt 
to  interfere  in  the  working  of  the  ship,  and  not 
always  with  the  best  judgment  or  success.  The 
wind,  when  off  Dungeness,  was  scanty,  and  the 
ship  was  to  be  put  about.  Lord  Nelson  would 
give  the  orders,  and  caused  her  to  miss  stays. 
Upon  this  he  said,  rather  peevishly,  to  the  officer 
of  the  watch,  '  Well,  now  see  what  we  have  done. 
Well,  sir,  what  mean  you  to  do  now  ? '  The 
officer  saying,  with  hesitation,  '  I  don't  exactly 
know,  my  lord.  I  fear  she  won't  do,'  Lord  Nelson 
turned  sharply  to  the  cabin,  and  replied,  '  Well,  I 
am  sure  if  you  do  not  know  what  to  do  with  her, 


Pellew  447 

no  more  do  I,  either.'  He  went  in,  leaving  the 
officer  to  work  the  ship  as  he  liked."  Yet  Nelson 
understood  perfectly  what  ships  could  do,  and 
what  they  could  not ;  no  one  could  better  handle 
or  take  care  of  a  fleet,  or  estimate  the  possibility 
of  performing  a  given  manoeuvre ;  and  long  be- 
fore he  was  called  to  high  command  he  was  dis- 
tinguished for  a  knowledge  of  naval  tactics  to 
which  few,  if  any  other,  of  his  time  attained.  He 
was  a  great  general  officer ;  and  whether  he  had 
the  knack  of  himself  making  a  ship  go  through 
all  her  paces  without  a  fault  mattered  as  little  as 
whether  he  was  a  crack  shot  with  a  gun. 

A  ship  is  certainly  the  most  beautiful  and 
most  graceful  of  machines ;  a  machine,  too,  so 
varied  in  its  movements  and  so  instinct  with  life 
that  the  seaman  affectionately  transfers  to  her 
credit  his  own  virtues  in  handling  her.  Pellew's 
capacity  in  this  part  of  his  profession  was  so 
remarkable  that  it  is  somewhat  singular  to  find 
him,  in  his  first  frigate  action,  compelled  to  dis- 
card manoeuvring,  and  to  rely  for  victory  upon 
sheer  pluck  and  luck.  When  war  with  the 
French  republic  began  in  1793,  his  high  reputa- 
tion immediately  insured  him  command  of  a 
frigate,  the  Nymphe.  The  strength  of  England 
as  a  naval  power  lay  largely  in  the  great  reserve 
of  able  seamen  manning  her  merchant  ships  ;  but 
as  these  were  scattered  in  all  quarters  of  the 
world,  great  embarrassment  was  commonly  felt  at 
the  outbreak  of  a  war,  and  especially  when  it 


44 8  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

came  with  the  unexpected  rapidity  of  the  revolu- 
tionary fury.  As  the  object  of  first  importance 
was  to  get  the  fleets  of  ships-of-the-line  to  sea, 
Pellew  had  to  depend  chiefly  upon  his  own  inde- 
fatigable exertions  to  procure  a  crew  for  his  ves- 
sel. Seamen  being  hard  to  find,  he  had  on  board 
a  disproportionate  number  of  landsmen  when  the 
Nymphe,  on  the  igth  of  June,  1793,  encountered 
the  French  vessel  Cleopatre,  of  force  slightly  in- 
ferior, except  in  men,  but  not  sufficiently  so  to 
deny  the  victor  the  claim  of  an  even  fight. 

A  peculiar  incident  preceding  the  action  has 
interest,  as  showing  the  strong  preoccupation  of 
men's  minds  at  the  opening  of  war,  before  meet- 
ings with  the  enemy  have  lost  novelty.  Pellew's 
younger  brother,  Israel,  a  commander  in  the 
navy,  being  otherwise  unemployed,  had  come  out 
with  him  for  the  cruise.  The  Cleopatre  having 
been  first  seen  in  the  early  morning,  Edward 
would  not  have  him  called  till  just  as  the  Nymphe 
was  closing.  As  he  came  on  deck,  the  brother 
said  affectionately,  "  Israel,  you  have  no  business 
here.  We  are  too  many  eggs  from  one  nest.  I 
am  sorry  I  brought  you  from  your  wife."  But 
the  other  was  unheeding,  his  eyes  fixed  upon  the 
stranger.  "  That 's  the  very  frigate,"  he  cried, 
"  that  I  've  been  dreaming  of  all  night !  I 
dreamt  that  we  shot  away  her  wheel."  And, 
hastening  to  the  after-gun,  he  made  the  French 
ship's  wheel  the  object  of  an  unremitting  fire. 

By  the  way  the  enemy  was  handled  it  was  evi- 


Pellew  449 

dent  that  she  was  well  manned  and  ably  com- 
manded. She  had,  in  fact,  been  in  commission 
for  over  a  year.  Great  as  was  his  own  skill,  Pellew 
could  not  venture  upon  manoeuvres  with  a  green 
crew,  untrained  save  at  the  guns,  and  only  filled 
the  night  before  by  pressing  from  a  merchant 
vessel.  He  therefore  determined  upon  a  simple 
artillery  duel.  The  Frenchman  waited  under 
short  canvas,  while  the  Nymphe,  with  greater 
way,  drew  slowly  up  on  his  starboard,  or  right- 
hand  side ;  both  ships  running  nearly  before  the 
wind,  but  having  it  a  little  on  the  left  side.  Each 
captain  stood  uncovered,  and  as  the  bows  of  the 
Nymphe  doubled  upon  the  stern  of  the  Cleopatre, 
within  three  hundred  feet,  a  French  sailor  was 
seen  to  run  aloft  and  fasten  a  red  cap  of  liberty  to 
the  mainmast  head.  The  eyes  of  the  British  sea- 
men were  fastened  upon  their  commander,  await- 
ing the  gesture  which  he  had  set,  instead  of  word 
of  mouth,  for  opening  fire.  At  quarter-past  six 
he  gave  it,  raising  his  cap  to  his  head.  A  furious 
cannonade  at  once  began,  and,  the  Nymphe  short- 
ening sail  as  soon  as  fairly  abreast  her  antago- 
nist, the  two  frigates  continued  on  parallel  lines, 
maintaining  their  relative  positions  as  though  at 
anchor,  and  rolling  easily  in  the  soft  summer 
sea  under  the  recoil  of  their  guns.  So  nearly 
matched  were  the  gunners  that  the  conflict,  un- 
usually deadly  though  it  was,  might  have  lasted 
long,  but  at  a  little  before  seven  Israel  Pellew's 

dream   was   fulfilled.      The    Frenchman's   wheel 

29 


450  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

was  shot  away,  and,  the  mizzenmast  going  over- 
board at  the  same  time,  the  Cleopatre'  yielded  to 
the  impulse  of  her  forward  sails,  turned  sharp 
round  to  the  right,  and  ran  perpendicularly  into 
the  Nymphe.  The  British  boarded  her,  fixed  in 
this  disadvantageous  position,  fought  their  way 
aft,  and,  although  the  French  crew  was  numeri- 
cally superior,  in  ten  minutes  hauled  down  the 
colors.  In  this  brief  hour  they  had  lost  twenty- 
three  killed'and  twenty-seven  wounded,  the  enemy 
sixty-three  killed  and  wounded,  out  of  ships'  com- 
panies numbering  respectively  two  hundred  and 
forty  and  three  hundred  and  twenty. 

This  was  the  first  decisive  frigate  action  of  the 
War  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  in  conse- 
quence great  was  the  enthusiasm  aroused.  Lord 
Howe  wrote  to  Pellew,  "  The  manner  in  which 
you  have  taken  the  enemy's  ship  will  set  an  ex- 
ample for  the  war."  In  truth,  however,  while 
admitting  the  soundness  of  Pellew's  judgment  in 
adopting  the  course  he  did,  the  actual  demand 
upon  his  personal  skill  was  less,  and  in  so  far  the 
credit  due  therefore  less,  than  in  the  second  suc- 
cessful frigate  action,  in  the  following  October,  in 
which  Sir  James  Saumarez  commanded.  Not 
only  was  the  French  vessel's  superiority  in  force 
more  marked  in  the  latter  instance,  but  Saumarez's 
ship  there  met  with  an  accident  similar  in  char- 
acter to  that  which  befell  the  Cleopatre,  from  the 
consequences  of  which  she  was  extricated  by  his 
masterly  seamanship.  Still,  it  may  with  fairness 


Pellew 


451 


be  argued  that,  as  the  one  action  from  its  attend- 
ant circumstances  evidenced  the  individual  skill 
of  the  commander,  so  the  other  testified  to  the 
antecedent  preparation  and  efficiency  of  the  crew, 
which  are  always  to  be  attributed  to  the  care  of 
the  captain,  especially  under  the  conditions  of 
Pellew's  enlistments.  Both  captains  fully  de- 
served the  reward  of  knighthood  bestowed  upon 
their  success.  Israel  Pellew  was  promoted  to 
post-captain. 

During  the  first  three  years  of  this  war  British 
commerce  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Channel 
suffered  most  severely  from  French  cruisers. 
The  latter  resumed  the  methods  of  Jean  Bart 
and  other  celebrated  privateers  of  -the  days  of 
Louis  XIV.;  the  essence  of  which  was  to  prey 
upon  the  enemy's  commerce,  not  by  single  ves- 
sels, but  by  small  squadrons  of  from  five  to 
seven.  Cruisers  so  combined,  acting  in  mutual 
support,  were  far  more  efficient  than  the  same 
number  acting  separately.  Spreading  like  a  fan, 
they  commanded  a  wider  expanse  than  a  ship 
alone ;  if  danger  arose,  they  concentrated  for 
mutual  support;  did  opportunity  offer,  the  work 
was  cut  out  and  distributed,  thus  insuring  by 
co-operation  more  thorough  results.  At  the  sug- 
gestion of  Sir  Edward  Pellew,  the  British  Ad- 
miralty determined  to  oppose  to  these  organized 
depredators  a  similar  system.  Groups  of  crack 
frigates  were  constituted,  and  sent  to  cruise 
within  the  limits  of  the  Channel  Fleet,  but  inde- 


45 2  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

pendent  of  its  admiral.  In  these  Pellevv  served 
for  the  next  five  years,  much  of  the  time  as  squad- 
ron commander;  to  him  a  period  of  incessant, 
untiring  activity,  and  illustrated  by  many  brilliant 
and  exciting  incidents,  for  which  the  limits  of 
this  sketch  afford  no  space. 

There  are,  however,  two  episodes  in  which  he 
was  so  distinctly  the  central  figure  that  they 
demand  at  least  a  brief  narration.  In  January, 
1796,  while  his  ship  was  repairing,  a  large  East 
Indiaman,  the  Dutton,  carrying  some  six  hundred 
troops  and  passengers,  was  by  a  series  of  mishaps 
driven  ashore  on  the  beach  of  Plymouth,  then  an 
unprotected  sound.  As  she  struck,  all  her  masts 
went  overboard,  and  she  lay  broadside  to  the 
waves,  pounding  heavily  as  they  broke  over  her. 
Pellew  was  at  this  moment  driving  to  a  dinner 
with  his  wife.  Seeing  crowds  running  from 
various  directions  towards  the  same  quarter,  he 
asked  the  reason.  Upon  learning  it,  he  left  his 
carriage  and  hurried  to  the  scene.  When  he 
arrived,  he  recognized,  by  the  confusion  on  board, 
by  the  way  the  ship  was  laboring,  by  the  poverty 
of  the  means  that  had  been  contrived  for  landing 
the  imperilled  souls,  —  only  a  single  hawser  hav- 
ing been  run  to  the  shore,  —  that  the  loss  of 
nearly  all  on  board  was  imminent.  Night,  too, 
was  falling,  as  well  as  the  destruction  of  the  ves- 
sel impending.  After  vainly  offering  rewards  to 
the  hardy  boatmen  standing  by,  if  they  would 
board  the  wreck  with  a  message  from  him,  he 


Pellew  453 

said,  "  Then  I  must  go  myself."  Though  then 
close  to  forty  years  of  age,  his  immense  personal 
strength  and  activity  enabled  him,  though  sorely 
bruised  thereby,  to  be  hauled  on  board  through 
the  breakers  by  the  hawser,  which  alternately 
slacked  and  then  tightened  with  a  jerk  as  the 
doomed  ship  rolled  to  and  fro  in  the  seas.  Once 
on  board,  he  assumed  command,  the  want  of 
which,  through  the  absence  of  the  proper  captain, 
had  until  then  hampered  and  well-nigh  paralyzed 
all  effectual  effort.  When  his  well-known  name 
was  spoken,  three  hearty  cheers  arose  from  the 
troops  on  board,  echoed  by  the  thousands  of  spec- 
tators on  shore ;  and  the  hope  that  revived  with 
the  presence  of  a  born  leader  of  men  showed  it- 
self at  once  in  the  renewed  activity  and  intelli- 
gent direction  of  effort,  on  the  decks  and  on 
the  beach.  The  degree  of  the  danger  can  be 
estimated  from  the  fact  that  boats  from  the  ships 
of  war  in  port,  his  own  included,  tried  in  vain  to 
approach  and  had  to  run  for  safety  to  the  inner 
harbor.  With  sword  drawn,  —  for  many  of  the 
soldiers  were  drunk  and  riotous,  —  Pellew  main- 
tained order,  guided  with  a  seaman's  readiness 
the  preparations  for  landing,  and  saw  the  women, 
the  children,  —  one  child  but  three  weeks  old, 
*  —  the  sick,  landed  first,  then  the  soldiers,  lastly 
the  seamen.  When  he  himself  was  transferred 
to  the  beach  by  the  same  means  that  his  skill 
had  contrived  for  others,  but  three  persons  re- 
mained on  board,  officers  of  the  ship,  who  eased 


454  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

him  on  shore.  The  injuries  he  had  received  in 
his  perilous  passage  out,  and  which  confined  him 
to  his  bed  for  a  week,  forbade  his  being  last.  To 
the  end  of  his  life,  this  saving  of  the  crew  of  the 
Dutton  was  the  action  in  which  he  took  most 
pride. 

The  year  that  opened  with  this  magnificent 
act  of  self-devotion  saw  Pellew,  at  its  close,  bear- 
ing a  seaman's  part  in  the  most  serious  crisis  that 
befell  his  country  during  the  wars  of  the  French 
Revolution.  The  end  of  1796  and  the  earlier 
months  of  1797  marked  the  nadir  of  Great 
Britain's  military  fortunes.  The  successes  of 
Bonaparte's  Italian  campaign  were  then  culmi- 
nating ;  Austria  was  on  the  point  of  making 
peace  with  France ;  England  was  about  to  find 
herself  alone,  and  the  discontent  of  the  seamen 
of  the  navy,  long  smouldering,  was  soon  to  break 
out  into  the  famous  and  threatening  mutinies  of 
the  Channel  Fleet  and  of  the  Nore.  At  the  same 
time  France,  relieved  on  her  eastern  frontiers,  felt 
able  to  devote  seventeen  ships-of-the-line  and 
eighteen  thousand  troops  to  the  invasion  of 
Ireland. 

Pellew,  with  two  frigates  besides  his  own,  was 
stationed  off  the  mouth  of  Brest  harbor  to  watch 
the  enemy's  movements;  the  main  British  fleet 
being  some  fifty  miles  to  seaward.  To  this 
emergency  he  brought  not  only  the  intrepidity 
of  a  great  seaman  and  the  ardor  of  an  anxious 
patriot,  but  likewise  the  intense  though  narrow 


Pellew  455 

Protestant  feeling  transmitted  from  a  past,  then 
not  so  remote,  when  Romanism  and  enmity  to 
England  were  almost  synonymous.  "  How  would 
you  like,"  said  he  to  an  officer  who  shared  Pitt's 
liberal  tendencies,  "  to  see  Roman  Catholic  chap- 
lains on  board  our  ships?  "  and  to  the  end  of  his 
life  he  opposed  the  political  enfranchisement  of 
persons  of  that  creed. 

The  French  expedition  against  Ireland  sailed 
from  Brest  on  the  i6th  of  December,  1796.  Hav- 
ing sent  off  successively  each  of  his  consorts  with 
information  for  the  fleet,  Pellew  remained  with 
his  own  ship  alone,  the  Indefatigable,  at  the 
moment  of  the  final  start.  There  are  two  prin- 
cipal channels  by  which  Brest  can  be  left,  one 
leading  to  the  south,  the  other  due  west.  The 
Frencn  admiral  had  at  first  intended  to  use  the 
former ;  but,  the  wind  showing  signs  of  an  un- 
favorable shift,  he  endeavored  to  change  the 
orders  just  as  night  was  falling.  The  weather 
being  hazy,  his  signals  were  understood  by  but 
few  of  the  forty-odd  vessels  composing  the  force. 
Eight  or  ten  joined  him;  the  remainder  followed 
the  original  instructions  and  went  out  by  the 
south.  Pellew  attached  himself  to  the  admiral's 
division,  kept  along  with  it  just  out  of  gunshot, 
and  by  making  false  signals,  burning  blue  lights 
and  sending  up  rockets,  introduced  into  the  at- 
tempts to  convey  the  wishes  of  the  commander- 
in-chief  such  confusion  as  rendered  them  utterly 
futile.  Havins:  satisfied  himself  as  to  the  general 

O  O 


456  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

direction  taken  by  the  enemy,  he  left  them,  and 
made  all  sail  for  Falmouth,  where  he  arrived  on 
the  2oth. 

The  general  fortunes  of  the  expedition  do  not 
belong  to  the  present  story.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that  the  greater  part  reached  Ireland  safely,  but 
through  stress  of  weather  was  unable  to  land  the 
troops,  and  went  back  to  France  by  detachments, 
in  January,  1797.  It  is  during  this  process  of 
return  that  Sir  Edward  Pellew  again  appears,  in 
perhaps  the  most  dramatic  incident  of  his  stir- 
ring career. 

On  the  afternoon  of  January  i3th,  being  then  in 
company  with  the  frigate  Amazon,  and  about  one 
hundred  and  twenty  miles  west  of  Brest,  a  French 
ship-of-the-line  was  discovered.  The  stranger, 
named  the  Droits  de  rHomme,  was  returning 
from  Ireland,  and  heading  east.  The  frigates 
steered  courses  converging  towards  hers,  seeking 
to  cut  her  off  from  the  land.  The  weather  was 
thick  and  gloomy,  with  a  strong  west  wind  fast 
rising  to  a  gale.  At  half-past  four,  as  night  was 
falling,  the  French  ship  carried  away  her  fore 
and  main  topmasts  in  a  heavy  squall ;  and  an 
hour  later  the  Indefatigable,  now  under  close 
reefs,  passed  across  her  stern,  pouring  in  a  broad- 
side from  so  near  that  the  French  flag  floated 
across  her  poop,  where  it  was  seized  and  torn 
away  by  some  of  the  British  seamen.  The 
enemy,  having  on  board  nearly  a  thousand 
soldiers  besides  her  crew,  replied  with  rapid 


Pellew  457 

volleys  of  musketry,  and,  as  the  frigate  passed 
ahead,  sheered  impetuously  towards  her,  attempt- 
ing to  board,  and  in  her  turn  grazing  the 
stern  of  the  Indefatigable.  In  another  hour  the 
Amazon  drew  up,  and  then  the  British  vessels 
took  their  positions,  one  on  either  bow  of  the 
Droits  de  I '  Homme,  whence,  by  movements  of 
the  helm,  they  alternately  raked  her.  The  labor 
of  the  gunners,  however,  was  arduous,  due  to  the 
deep  rolling  of  the  ships,  on  board  which,  also, 
the  seas  poured  in  volumes  through  the  gun- 
ports.  On  the  main  decks  the  men  fought  up  to 
their  middles  in  water,  the  heavy  cannon  broke 
away  from  the  breechings,  or  ropes  used  to  con- 
trol them,  and  even  iron  bolts  tore  out  from  the 
ships'  sides  under  the  severe  recoil  of  the  guns. 
Thus  through  the  long  winter  night  the  three 
ships  rushed  headlong  before  the  gale  towards 
the  French  coast,  intent  on  mutual  destruction ; 
the  constant  storm  of  shot,  though  flying  wild 
under  the  violent  motions  of  the  vessels,  tearing 
through  spars  and  rigging,  and  crippling  them  in 
much  that  was  essential  to  their  safety. 

At  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  I4th, 
long  before  daybreak,  land  was  sighted  right 
ahead.  The  Indefatigable  hauled  at  once  to 
the  southward,  the  Amazon  to  the  northward ; 
the  enemy  alone,  seemingly  unconscious  of  the 
danger,  kept  on,  and  as  she  passed  Pellew's  ship 
fired  a  broadside  which  severely  wounded  all 
the  masts.  The  situation  of  the  combatants  was 


458  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

well-nigh  desperate.  They  had  reached  the  coast 
of  France  at  a  point  where  it  forms  a  deep  recess, 
called  Audierne  Bay,  from  either  side  of  which 
project  capes  that  must  be  cleared  in  order  to 
gain  once  more  the  open  sea.  One  only  of  the 
three  escaped.  The  Droits  de  fHomme,  un- 
manageable for  want  of  sail  power,  tried  to 
anchor,  but  drove,  and  struck  on  a  shoal  some 
distance  from  the  beach.  Of  sixteen  hundred 
souls  on  board  when  the  battle  began,  over  one 
hundred  had  been  killed ;  and  of  those  who  sur- 
vived the  fight  three  hundred  perished  in  the 
wreck.  The  Amazon,  likewise  crippled,  though 
not  so  badly,  had  gone  ashore  to  the  northward 
only  ten  minutes  after  she  ceased  firing.  Of  her 
people,  but  six  were  drowned.  The  Indefatigable, 
beating  back  and  forth  against  the  gale  before  the 
scene  of  the  French  disaster,  upon  which  her  crew 
gazed  with  the  solemn  feeling  that  such  might 
soon  be  their  own  fate,  succeeded  at  last  in  clear- 
ing the  southern  cape.  At  eleven  o'clock,  nearly 
twenty-four  hours  after  first  meeting  the  foe,  and 
with  six  feet  of  water  in  her  hold,  she  passed 
only  three-quarters  of  a  mile  outside  of  the  Pen- 
marcks,  a  rocky  promontory  thirty  miles  south 
of  Brest. 

This  remarkable  encounter  is  said  to  have  sug- 
gested to  Marryat  the  vivid  sea  picture  with 
which  "  The  King's  Own  "  ends.  Pellew's  un- 
usual personal  endurance  was  signally  illustrated 
on  the  same  day,  very  shortly  after  the  safety  of 


Pellew  459 

the  ship  from  wreck  was  assured.  Her  principal 
sails  had  been  so  torn  by  shot  as  to  require 
immediate  renewing,  and  this  had  scarcely  been 
done  when  two  vessels  were  sighted,  one  of  which 
was  for  the  moment  supposed  to  be  the  Amazon, 
whose  fate  was  yet  unknown.  Pellew  gave  orders 
to  chase,  but  his  officers  represented  to  him  that, 
whatever  he  himself  was  capable  of,  the  ship's 
company  was  too  exhausted  for  present  further 
exertion ;  and  that,  besides,  the  ammunition  was 
very  short,  almost  the  last  filled  cartridge  having 
been  expended.  Under  these  circumstances  he 
was  compelled  to  desist. 

The  interest  of  Pellew's  career  centres  mainly 
in  his  command  of  frigates.  This  independent 
but  yet  restricted  sphere  afforded  the  fullest 
scope  for  a  conspicuous  display  of  those  splendid 
qualities — fearlessness,  enterprise,  sound  judg- 
ment, instant  decision,  and  superb  seamanship 
—  which  he  so  eminently  possessed.  He  was, 
above  all,  the  frigate  captain.  "  Nothing  like 
hesitation  was  ever  seen  in  him.  His  first  order 
was  always  his  last ;  and  he  often  declared  of 
himself  that  he  never  had  a  second  thought 
worth  sixpence."  In  1 799,  by  a  new  Admiralty 
rule,  he  was  transferred  to  the  Imp'etueux,  a  ship- 
of-the-line,  and  thenceforth  served  in  that  class 
of  vessel  until  his  promotion  to  admiral. 

As  a  general  officer,  Pellew  had  no  opportun- 
ity to  show  whether  he  possessed  ability  of  the 
highest  order.  For  five  years  he  held  the  com- 


460  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

mand  in  India;  and  soon  after  Collingvvood's 
death  he  was,  in  1811,  appointed  commander-in- 
chief  in  the  Mediterranean.  On  both  stations 
he  evinced  that  faculty  for  careful  organization, 
systematic  preparation,  and  sagacious  distribution 
of  force  which  carries  success  up  to  the  point 
which  administrative  capacity  can  reach.  His 
ability  in  planning,  while  yet  a  subordinate  in 
command  of  squadrons,  had  been  recognized  by 
St.  Vincent  during  his  management  of  the  Brest 
blockade.  "  The  disposition  made  by  Sir  Edward 
Pellew  for  the  descent  on  a  certain  point  is  the 
most  masterly  I  have  ever  seen.  .  .  .  Although 
the  naval  command  in  Quiberon  may  appear  too 
important  for  a  captain,  I  shall  not  divest  him  of 
it,  unless  I  am  ordered  to  do  so;  feeling  a 
thorough  conviction  that  no  man  in  His  Maj- 
esty's Navy,  be  his  rank  ever  so  high,  will  fill  it 
so  well."  At  the  time  this  was  written,  June, 
1800,  he  had  seven  ships-of-the-line  under  his 
orders.  After  the  Peace  of  Amiens,  when  war 
again  began  in  1803,  he  commanded  a  similar 
division  watching  the  Spanish  port  of  Ferrol,  in 
which,  although  formally  neutral,  a  French  divi- 
sion lay  at  anchor ;  and  in  discharge  of  this  duty, 
both  as  a  seaman  and  an  administrator,  he  again 
justified  the  eulogium  of  the  old  Earl,  now  at  the 
head  of  the  navy  as  First  Lord. 

In  1804  he  was  promoted  Rear- Admiral,  and 
soon  afterwards  assigned  to  the  East  India 
Station,  which  he  held  from  1805  to  1809.  Here 


Pellew  461 

no  naval  actions  on  the  great  scale  were  to  be 
fought,  but  under  his  systematic  organization 
of  convoys  and  cruisers  for  the  protection  of 
commerce  the  insurance  premium  —  the  war  risk 
—  on  the  most  exposed  routes  fell  markedly,  —  for 
the  port  of  Bombay  fifty  per  cent  less  than  at 
any  former  period  of  hostilities ;  while  the  losses 
by  capture,  when  the  merchants  observed  his 
instructions,  amounted  to  but  one  per  cent  on 
the  property  insured,  which  was  less  than  those 
caused  by  the  dangers  of  the  sea,  and  consider- 
ably less,  also,  than  the  average  war  losses  in 
other  parts  of  the  world.  All  this  shows  great 
ability,  carefully  utilized  in  diligent  preparation 
and  efficient  precaution ;  and  the  same  character- 
istics are  to  be  observed  in  his  administration  of 
the  Mediterranean  command,  of  wider  scope  and 
more  purely  military  importance.  Nevertheless, 
it  gives  no  sure  proof  of  the  particular  genius 
of  a  great  captain.  Whether,  having  forged  his 
weapon,  Pellew  could  also  wield  it;  whether, 
having  carefully  sowed,  he  could  also  reap  the 
harvest  by  large  combinations  on  the  battle-field, 
must  remain  uncertain,  at  least  until  probable 
demonstration  of  his  conceptions  is  drawn  from 
his  papers.  Nothing  is  as  yet  adduced  to  warrant 
positive  inference. 

Pellew's  Mediterranean  command  coincided  in 
time  with  the  period  of  Napoleon's  falling  for- 
tunes. After  Trafalgar,  the  Emperor  decided  to 
increase  his  navy  largely,  but  to  keep  it  in  port 


462  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

instead  of  at  sea,  forcing  Great  Britain  also  to 
maintain  huge  fleets,  the  expense  of  which,  con- 
curring with  the  commercial  embarrassments  that 
he  sought  to  bring  upon  her,  might  exhaust  her 
power  to  continue  the  war.  In  consequence  of 
this  policy,  British  military  achievement  on  the 
grand  scale  was  confined  to  the  army  in  the 
Spanish  peninsula;  and  in  the  bestowal  of  re- 
wards, after  Napoleon's  first  abdication,  but  one 
peerage  was  given  to  the  navy.  The  great  claims 
of  Sir  James  Saumarez,  who  was  the  senior  of 
the  two,  were  disregarded  on  the  ground  that  his 
flag  was  not  flying  at  the  moment,  and  Pellew 
was  created  Baron  Exmouth. 

During  the  process  of  settlement  which  suc- 
ceeded the  final  fall  of  Napoleon  at  Waterloo,  Lord 
Exmouth  remained  in  the  Mediterranean.  In  the 
early  part  of  1816  he  was  ordered  to  visit  with  his 
fleet  the  Barbary  ports,  and  to  compel  the  uncon- 
ditional release  of  all  slaves  who  were  natives  of 
the  Ionian  Islands ;  they  having  become  subjects 
of  Great  Britain  by  the  terms  of  the  peace.  For 
many  years,  while  the  powers  of  Europe  were 
engrossed  in  the  tremendous  strife  of  the  French 
Revolution,  these  piratical  states,  under  pretence 
of  regular  hostilities,  had  preyed  upon  the  coasts 
as  well  as  upon  the  commerce  of  the  weak 
Mediterranean  countries,  and  captives  taken  by 
them  were  kept  in  bitter  slavery.  Nelson  in  his 
correspondence,  in  1796,  mentions  a  curious  inci- 
dent which  sufficiently  characterizes  the  general 


Pellew  463 

motives  and  policy  of  these  barbarian  Courts. 
He  asked  an  Algerine  official  visiting  his  ship, 
why  the  Dey  would  not  make  peace  with 
Genoa  and  Naples,  for  they  would  pay  well 
for  immunity,  as  the  United  States  also  at  that 
time  did.  The  reply  was,  "  If  we  make  peace 
with  every  one,  what  is  the  Dey  to  do  with  his 
ships  ?  "  In  his  later  experience  with  the  Medi- 
terranean the  great  admiral  realized  yet  more 
forcibly  the  crying  shame  of  Great  Britain's 
acquiescence.  "  My  blood  boils  that  I  cannot 
chastise  these  pirates.  They  could  not  show 
themselves  in  this  sea  did  not  our  country  per- 
mit. Never  let  us  talk  of  the  cruelty  of  the 
African  slave  trade,  while  we  permit  such  a 
horrid  war."  The  United  States  alone,  although 
then  among  the  least  of  naval  powers,  had  taken 
arms  before  1805  to  repress  outrages  that  were 
the  common  reproach  of  all  civilized  nations,  —  a 
measure  the  success  of  which  went  far  to  establish 
the  character  of  her  navy  and  prepare  it  for  1812. 
Lord  Exmouth  was  also  directed  to  demand  peace 
for  Sardinia,  as  well  as  for  any  other  state  that 
should  authorize  him  to  act  for  it.  Only  Naples 
availed  itself  of  this  opportunity. 

As  far  as  his  instructions  went,  his  mission 
was  successful,  and,  by  a  happy  accident,  he  was 
able  at  Tunis  and  Tripoli  to  extort  further  from 
the  rulers  a  promise  that  thereafter  captives 
should  be  treated  as  in  civilized  countries ;  in 
other  words,  that  they  should  no  longer  be  re- 


464  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

duced  to  slavery.  Algiers  refused  this  conces- 
sion ;  and  the  admiral  could  not  take  steps  to 
enforce  it,  because  beyond  his  commission.  The 
Dey,  however,  undertook  to  consult  the  Porte; 
and  the  fleet,  with  a  few  exceptions,  returned  to 
England,  where  it  arrived  towards  the  end  of 
June. 

Meanwhile  British  public  feeling  had  become 
aroused ;  for  men  were  saying  that  the  outrages 
of  the  past  had  been  rather  welcome  to  the  com- 
mercial selfishness  of  the  country.  The  well- 
protected  traders  of  Great  Britain,  shielded  by 
her  omnipotent  navy,  had  profited  by  crimes 
which  drove  their  weaker  rivals  from  the  sea. 
Just  then  news  came  that  at  the  port  of  Bona, 
on  the  Algiers  coast,  where  there  was  under  the 
British  flag  an  establishment  for  carrying  on 
the  coral  fishery,  a  large  number  of  the  fisher- 
men, mostly  Italians,  had  been  wantonly  slaugh- 
tered by  a  band  of  Turkish  troops.  To  insist, 
arms  in  hand,  upon  reparation  for  such  an  out- 
rage, and  upon  guarantees  for  the  future,  would 
doubtless  be  condemned  by  some  of  our  recent 
lights ;  but  such  was  not  then  the  temper  of 
Great  Britain.  The  government  determined  at 
once  to  send  a  fleet  to  the  spot,  and  Lord  Ex- 
mouth  was  chosen  for  the  command,  with  such  a 
force  as  he  himself  should  designate.  The  gist 
of  his  instructions  was  to  demand  the  release, 
without  ransom,  of  all  Christian  slaves,  and  a 
solemn  declaration  from  the  Dey  that,  in  future 


Pellew  465 

wars,  prisoners  should  receive  the  usage  accorded 
them  by  European  states.  Great  Britain  thus 
made  herself,  as  befitted  the  obligation  imposed 
by  her  supreme  maritime  power,  the  avenger  of 
all  those  oppressed  by  these  scourges  of  the  sea. 
The  times  of  the  barbarians  were  fulfilled. 

During  a  long  career  of  successful  piracy,  the 
port  of  Algiers  had  accumulated  an  extensive 
and  powerful  system  of  defences.  These  had 
doubtless  suffered  in  condition  from  the  nonchalant 
fatalism  of  Turkish  rule,  encouraged  by  a  long 
period  of  impunity ;  but  they  constituted  still, 
and  under  all  the  shortcomings  of  the  defenders, 
a  most  imposing  menace  to  an  attacking  fleet. 
To  convey  a  precise  impression  of  them  by 
detailed  verbal  description  would  be  difficult,  and 
the  attempt  probably  confusing.  It  may  be  said, 
in  brief,  that  the  town  faces  easterly,  rising 
abruptly  up  a  steep  hill ;  that  from  its  front  there 
then  projected  a  pier,  nearly  a  thousand  feet  long, 
at  whose  end  was  a  circular  fort,  carrying  seventy 
guns  in  three  tiers;  from  that  point  a  mole  ex- 
tended at  right  angles  to  the  southward,  —  par- 
allel, that  is,  in  a  general  sense,  to  the  town 
front,  but  curving  inward  through  the  southern 
half  of  its  length,  so  as  better  to  embrace  and 
shelter  the  vessels  inside.  This  mole  was  some- 
what over  a  thousand  feet  in  length,  and  had 
throughout  two  tiers  of  guns,  linked  at  their 
northern  extremity  to  the  circular  fort  at  the  pier 
end.  These  principal  works  were  flanked  and 

30 


466  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

covered,  at  either  end  and  on  the  hillside,  by 
others  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  particularize. 
The  total  number  of  guns  bearing  seaward  num- 
bered near  three  hundred,  of  very  respectable  size 
for  that  day.  The  basin  formed  by  the  pier  and 
the  mole  constituted  the  port  proper,  and  in 
it,  at  the  time  of  the  attack,  was  collected  the 
entire  Algerine  navy,  nine  frigates  and  corvettes 
and  thirty-seven  gunboats,  the  paltry  force  that 
had  so  long  terrorized  the  Mediterranean. 

In  prevision  of  his  present  enterprise,  Lord 
Exmouth  before  leaving  the  Mediterranean  had 
despatched  a  light  cruiser  to  Algiers,  on  a  casual 
visit  similar  to  those  continually  made  by  ships 
of  war  to  foreign  ports.  Her  commander,  Cap- 
tain Charles  Warde,  received  from  him  very 
precise  and  most  secret  instructions  to  examine 
closely  into  the  defences  and  soundings ;  to  do 
which  it  was  necessary  not  only  to  observe  every 
precaution  of  seeming  indifference,  —  even  to 
the  extent  of  appearing  engrossed  with  social 
duties,  —  but  also  to  conduct  under  this  cover 
measurements  and  observations  of  at  least  ap- 
proximate correctness.  This  duty  was  performed 
with  singular  diligence  and  success,  with  the 
double  result  of  revealing  the  hopeless  inaccuracy 
of  existing  charts  and  of  placing  in  Exmouth's 
hands  a  working  plan  of  the  ground,  perfectly 
trustworthy  for  his  tactical  dispositions. 

As  before  remarked,  in  the  sketch  of  Lord 
St  Vincent,  the  defence  and  attack  of  seaports, 


Pellew  467 

involving  as  they  do  both  occupation  of  perma- 
nent positions  and  the  action  of  mobile  bodies, 
are  tactical  questions.  They  differ  much,  though 
not  radically,  from  operations  in  the  open  sea, 
or  in  the  field,  where  positions  may  be  taken 
incidentally,  but  where  the  movements  of  mo- 
bile bodies  are  the  principal  factor.  In  this 
way,  though  without  using  the  word  tactical, 
Exmouth  treated  the  problem  before  him.  Fur- 
nished, thanks  to  his  own  foresight  and  Warde's 
efficiency,  with  reliable  information  concerning 
the  preparations  of  the  enemy,  he  calculated  the 
dispositions  necessary  to  meet  them  and  to  crush 
their  fire.  Having  assigned  to  the  hostile  works, 
severally  and  collectively,  the  force  needed  to 
overbear  them,  and  having  arranged  the  anchor- 
ing positions  for  the  vessels  of  his  command 
with  reference  to  the  especial  task  of  each,  as 
well  as  for  mutual  support,  he  had  substantially 
his  plan  of  battle,  afterwards  communicated  to 
the  fleet  before  going  into  action  ;  and  the  same 
data  afforded  the  foundation  for  his  statement  to 
the  Government  of  the  number  and  character 
of  ships  needed  for  success. 

To  the  surprise  of  the  Admiralty,  Lord  Ex- 
mouth  asked  for  but  five  ships-of-the-line,  five 
frigates,  and  five  smaller  vessels,  to  which  were 
added  four  mortar  boats  to  play  upon  the  town 
and  arsenal.  When  met  with  expressions  of 
doubt,  he  replied,  "  I  am  satisfied,  and  take  the 
responsibility  entirely  upon  myself."  To  satisfy 


468  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

the  hesitancy  of  the  Government,  he  left  with 
the  Secretary  to  the  Admiralty  a  written  state- 
ment that  his  every  requirement  had  been  ful- 
filled, and  that  to  him  alone,  therefore,  would 
failure  from  deficient  power  be  attributable.  On 
the  eve  of  departure  he  said  to  his  brother  Israel, 
"  If  they  open  fire  when  the  ships  are  coming 
up,  and  cripple  them  in  their  masts,  the  diffi- 
culty and  loss  will  be  greater;  but  if  they  allow 
us  to  take  our  stations,  I  am  sure  of  them,  for 
I  know  that  nothing  can  resist  a  line-of-battle 
ship's  fire."  He  trusted  to  the  extreme  care  of 
his  preparations,  which  neglected  no  particular 
of  equipment  or  organization,  elaborating  every 
detail  of  training  and  discipline,  and  providing, 
by  the  most  diligent  foresight  and  minute  in- 
struction, that  each  officer  concerned  should  know 
exactly  what  was  expected  of  him.  In  short, 
it  was  to  perfection  of  quality,  and  not  to  an 
unwieldy  bulk  of  superfluous  quantity,  that  Ex- 
mouth  confided  his  fortunes  in  this  last  hazard. 

The  fleet  sailed  from  England  on  the  28th 
of  July,  1816,  was  joined  at  Gibraltar  by  a  Dutch 
squadron  of  five  frigates,  whose  commander  asked 
to  share  the  coming  contest,  and  on  the  26th  of 
August  was  off  the  north  point  of  Algiers  Bay, 
some  twenty  miles  from  the  town.  At  daybreak 
the  next  morning,  the  weather  being  almost  calm, 
a  flag  of  truce  was  sent  in,  bearing  the  British 
demands.  During  its  absence  a  breeze  from  the 
sea  sprang  up,  and  the  fleet  stood  in  to  a  mile 


Pellew  469 

from  the  works,  where  it  stopped  to  await  the 
reply.  At  two  P.  M.  the  boat  was  seen  returning, 
with  the  signal  that  no  answer  had  been  given. 
The  flag-ship  queried,  "  Are  you  ready  ?  "  Each 
ship  at  once  replied,  "  Yes  ; "  and  all  filling  away 
together  stood  down  to  the  attack,  the  admiral 
leading. 

The  Algerine  batteries  were  fully  manned ; 
the  mole,  moreover,  was  crowded  with  troops. 
With  singular  temerity,  they  fired  no  gun  as  the 
ships  came  on,  thus  relieving  the  most  anxious 
of  Exmouth's  preoccupations  concerning  the  dif- 
ficulties before  him ;  fearing,  seemingly,  that,  if 
otherwise  received,  the  prey  might  turn  and  es- 
cape. The  British,  on  their  side,  observed  the 
utmost  silence ;  not  a  gun,  not  a  cheer,  marred 
the  solemn  impression  of  the  approach.  The 
flag-ship,  Queen  Charlotte^  piloted  by  an  officer 
who  had  served  continuously  with  Exmouth  since 
1793,  anchored  by  the  stern  across  the  mole  head, 
at  a  distance  of  fifty  yards,  her  starboard  batter- 
ies pointing  to  sweep  it  from  end  to  end.  Still 
no  sound  of  battle,  as  she  proceeded  to  lash  her 
bows  to  those  of  an  Algerine  brig  lying  just 
within  the  mole.  This  done,  her  crew  gave  three 
cheers,  as  well  they  might.  Then  the  stolid, 
unaccountable  apathy  of  the  barbarians  ceased, 
and  three  guns  in  quick  succession  were  fired 

1  This  Queen  Charlotte  was  the  successor  of  the  ship  which  carried 
Howe's  flag  on  the  First  of  June,  and  which  had  been  destroyed  by 
fire  off  Leghorn  in  1800. 


470  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

from  the  eastern  battery.  Stirred  by  a  movement 
of  compassion,  Lord  Exmouth,  from  the  flag- 
ship's poop,  seeing  the  Moorish  soldiery  clus- 
tered thick  upon  the  parapets  to  watch  the  ships, 
waved  to  them  with  his  hand  to  get  down.  At 
the  first  hostile  gun  he  gave  the  order  "  Stand 
by  !  "  at  the  second,  "  Fire  ! "  and  simultaneously 
with  the  third  the  Queen  Charlotte's  broadside 
rang  out,  and  the  battle  began. 

The  other  vessels  of  the  squadron  were  not  all 
as  successful  as  the  flag-ship  in  taking  the  exact 
position  assigned,  and  the  admiral's  plan  thereby 
suffered  some  of  that  derangement  to  which  every 
undertaking,  especially  military  and  naval,  is  lia- 
ble. This,  however,  produced  no  effect  upon 
the  general  result,  except  by  increasing  somewhat 
the  lists  of  killed  and  wounded,  through  loss  of 
advantageous  offensive  position,  with  consequent 
defect  in  mutual  support.  But  the  first  broadside 
is  proverbially  half  the  battle.  It  was  a  saying 
of  Collingwood  to  his  crew,  in  a  three-decker  like 
the  Queen.  Charlotte,  that  if  they  could  deliver 
three  effective  fires  in  the  first  five  minutes  no 
vessel  could  resist  them ;  and  this  was  yet  more 
certain  when  opposed  to  the  semi-discipline  of 
adversaries  such  as  the  Algerine  pirates.  Ex- 
mouth's  general  design  was  to  concentrate  his 
heavy  ships  at  the  southern  end  of  the  mole, 
whence  the  curve  in  the  line  of  batteries  would 
enable  them  to  enfilade  or  take  in  reverse  the 
works  at  the  northern  extremity.  Here  were  to 


Pellew  471 

be  the  two  three-deckers,  with  a  seventy-four  be- 
tween them,  all  three  in  close  order,  stem  to  stern. 
The  two-decker,  however,  anchored  some  seven 
hundred  feet  astern  of  the  Queen  Charlotte,  the 
intervening  space  being  left  empty  until  filled 
by  a  thirty-six-gun  frigate,  upon  whose  captain 
St.  Vincent  passed  the  eulogium,  "  He  seems  to 
have  felt  Lord  Nelson's  eye  upon  him."  The 
two  remaining  seventy-fours  placed  themselves 
successively  close  astern  of  the  first,  which  was  in 
accord  with  the  original  purpose,  while  the  other 
three-decker  took  the  right  flank  of  the  line,  and 
somewhat  too  far  out ;  in  which  exposed  and  un- 
intended position,  beyond  the  extreme  north 
point  contemplated  for  the  British  order,  she 
underwent  a  very  heavy  loss. 

In  general  summary,  therefore,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  broadsides  of  the  ships-of-the-line  were 
opposed  from  end  to  end  to  the  heavy  central 
batteries  on  the  mole,  while  the  lighter  vessels  en- 
gaged the  flanking  works  on  the  shore  to  the  south- 
ward, thus  diverting  the  fire  which  would  have 
harassed  the  chief  assailants,  —  a  service  in  which 
the  Dutch  squadron,  composed  entirely  of  frig- 
ates, rendered  important  assistance.  The  bomb 
vessels  from  the  rear  threw  their  shells  over  the 
fighting  ships  into  the  town  and  arsenal,  and  in 
the  admiral's  report  are  credited  with  firing  all  the 
shipping  in  the  harbor,  except  one  frigate,  creat- 
ing a  conflagration  which  spread  over  the  arsenal 
and  storehouses.  Soon  after  the  contest  opened, 


47 2  Types  of  Naval   Officers 

the  thirty-seven  Algerine  gunboats,  crowded  with 
troops,  were  seen  advancing  under  cover  of  the 
smoke  to  board  the  flag-ship.  The  attempt,  rash 
to  insanity,  met  the  fate  it  should  have  expected ; 
thirty-three  were  sent  to  the  bottom  by  the  guns  of 
the  Leander,  stationed  ahead  of  the  Queen  Char- 
lotte, and  commanding  the  entrance  to  the  port. 
An  hour  later,  Lord  Exmouth  determined  to  set 
fire  to  the  remaining  frigate.  The  service  was 
performed  by  an  officer  and  boat's  crew,  with  a 
steadiness  which  elicited  from  him  such  admira- 
tion that,  on  the  return  of  the  party,  he  stopped 
the  working  of  the  ship's  upper  battery  to  give 
them  three  cheers.  As  the  hostile  vessel  burned, 
she  drifted  so  near  the  Queen  Charlotte  as  nearly 
to  involve  her  in  the  same  fate. 

From  three  to  ten  p.  M.  the  battle  lasted,  steady 
disciplined  valor  contending  with  a  courage  in  no 
way  inferior,  absolutely  insensible  to  danger,  but 
devoid  of  that  coherent,  skilful  direction  which  is 
to  courage  what  the  brain  and  eye  are  to  the 
heart.  "  I  never,"  wrote  Exmouth  to  his  brother, 
"  saw  any  set  of  men  more  obstinate  at  their  guns, 
and  it  was  superior  fire  only  that  could  keep  them 
back.  To  be  sure,  nothing  could  stand  before 
the  Queen  Charlottes  broadside.  Everything 
fell  before  it,  and  the  Swedish  consul  assures  me 
we  killed  above  five  hundred  at  the  very  first  fire, 
from  the  crowded  way  in  which  the  troops  were 
drawn  up,  four  deep  above  the  gunboats,  which 
were  also  full  of  men.  It  was  a  glorious  sight," 


Pellew  473 

he  continues,  "  to  see  the  Charlotte  take  her  an- 
chorage, and  to  see  her  flag  towering  on  high, 
when  she  appeared  to  be  in  the  flames  of  the 
mole  itself;  and  never  was  a  ship  nearer  burnt ;  it 
almost  scorched  me  off  the  poop.  We  were 
obliged  to  haul  in  the  ensign,  or  it  would  have 
caught  fire."  He  was  himself  struck  thrice> 
though  not  seriously  injured.  A  cannon-ball 
carried  away  the  skirts  of  his  coat,  and  one  glass 
of  the  spectacles  in  his  pocket  was  broken,  and 
the  frame  bulged,  by  a  shot. 

At  ten  P.  M.,  the  ammunition  of  the  fleet  run- 
ning short,  and  its  work  being  substantially  ac- 
complished, the  ships  began  to  haul  off.  The  sea 
defences  and  a  great  part  of  the  town  were  in 
ruins.  "  To  be  again  effective,"  wrote  Exmouth, 
"  the  defences  must  be  rebuilt  from  the  founda- 
tion." The  flanking  batteries  and  the  hill  forts 
continued  to  annoy  the  vessels  as  they  retired, 
but  the  spirit  of  the  Dey  was  broken.  Towards 
eleven  a  light  air  from  the  land  sprang  up,  which 
freshened  into  a  violent  and  prolonged  thunder- 
storm, lasting  for  three  hours ;  and  the  flashes  of 
heaven's  artillery  combined  with  the  glare  of  the 
burning  town  to  illuminate  the  withdrawal  of  the 
ships. 

The  following  morning  the  Dey  signified  his 
submission,  and  on  the  3Oth  of  August  Lord 
Exmouth  made  known  to  the  fleet  that  all  the 
terms  of  Great  Britain  had  been  yielded ;  that 
Christian  slavery  was  forever  abolished,  and  that 


474  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

by  noon  of  the  following  day  all  slaves  then  in 
Algiers  would  be  delivered  to  his  flag.  This  was 
accordingly  done,  the  whole  number  amounting 
to  1642;  which,  with  those  previously  released 
at  Tunis  and  Tripoli,  raised  to  3003  the  human 
beings  whom  Exmouth  had  been  the  instru- 
ment of  freeing  from  a  fate  worse  than  death. 
Of  this  total,  but  eighteen  were  English  ;  the 
remainder  were  almost  wholly  from  the  Mediter- 
ranean countries.  On  the  3d  of  September,  just 
one  week  after  the  attack,  the  fleet  sailed  for 
England. 

Profuse  acknowledgment  necessarily  awaited 
the  hero  of  a  deed  in  which  national  exulta- 
tion so  happily  blended  with  the  sentiment  of 
pity  for  the  oppressed.  The  admiral  was  raised 
to  the  next  rank  in  the  peerage,  and  honors 
poured  in  upon  him  from  every  side,  —  from 
abroad  as  well  as  from  his  own  countrymen.  His 
personal  sense  of  the  privilege  permitted  him, 
thus  to  crown  a  life  of  strenuous  exertion  by  a 
martial  deed  of  far-reaching  beneficence,  was  a 
reward  passing  all  others.  In  the  opening  words 
of  his  official  report  he  voices  his  thankfulness : 
"  In  all  the  vicissitudes  of  a  long  life  of  public 
service,  no  circumstance  has  ever  produced  on 
my  mind  such  impressions  of  gratitude  and  joy 
as  the  event  of  yesterday.  To  have  been  one  of 
the  humble  instruments  in  the  hands  of  Divine 
Providence  for  bringing  to  reason  a  ferocious 
Government,  and  destroying  for  ever  the  horrid 


Pellew  475 

system  of  Christian  slavery,  can  never  cease  to 
be  a  source  of  delight  and  heartfelt  comfort  to 
every  individual  happy  enough  to  be  employed 
in  it." 

Here  Lord  Exmouth's  career  closes.  Just 
forty  years  had  elapsed  since  as  a  youth  he  had 
fought  the  Carleton  on  Lake  Champlain,  and  he 
was  yet  to  live  sixteen  in  honored  retreat ;  bear- 
ing, however,  the  burden  of  those  whose  occupa- 
tion is  withdrawn  at  an  age  too  advanced  to  form 
new  interests.  Though  in  vigorous  health  and 
with  ample  fortune,  "  he  would  sometimes  con- 
fess," says  his  biographer,  "  that  he  was  happier 
amid  his  early  difficulties."  The  idea  of  retire- 
ment, indeed,  does  not  readily  associate  itself 
with  the  impression  of  prodigious  vitality,  which 
from  first  to  last  is  produced  by  the  record  of 
his  varied  activities.  In  this  respect,  as  in  others, 
the  contrast  is  marked  between  him  and  Sau- 
marez,  the  two  who  more  particularly  illustrate 
the  complementary  sides  of  the  brilliant  group  of 
naval  leaders,  in  the  second  rank  of  distinction, 
which  clustered  around  the  great  names  of  Nelson, 
Howe,  and  Jervis.  In  the  old  age  of  Saumarez, 
the  even,  ordered  tenor  of  his  active  military  life 
is  reflected  in  the  peaceful,  satisfied  enjoyment  of 
repose  and  home  happiness,  of  the  fruits  of  labors 
past,  which  Collingwood,  probably  without  good 
reason,  fancied  to  be  characteristic  of  his  own 
temperament.  Lord  Exmouth,  compelled  to  be 
a  passive  spectator,  saw  with  consequent  increased 


476  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

apprehension  the  internal  political  troubles  of 
Great  Britain  in  his  later  days.  Though  not  a 
party  man,  he  was  strongly  conservative,  so  that 
the  agitations  of  the  Reform  era  concealed  from 
him  the  advantages  towards  which  it  was  tending, 
and  filled  him  with  forebodings  for  the  future  of 
his  country. 

Like  his  distinguished  contemporary,  Admiral 
Saumarez,  and  like  many  others  of  those  lion- 
hearted,  masculine  men  who  had  passed  their  lives 
amid  the  storms  of  the  elements  and  of  battle, 
—  and  like  our  own  Farragut,  —  Lord  Exmouth 
was  a  deeply  religious  man.  Strong  as  was  his 
self-reliance  in  war  and  tempest,  he  rested  upon 
the  Almighty  with  the  dependence  of  a  child 
upon  its  father.  His  noble  brother,  Sir  Israel 
Pellew,  who  had  followed  Nelson  into  the  fire  at 
Trafalgar,  departed  with  the  words,  "  I  know  in 
Whom  I  have  believed ;  "  and  of  the  admiral 
himself,  an  officer  who  was  often  with  him  during 
the  closing  scene  said,  "  I  have  seen  him  great  in 
battle,  but  never  so  great  as  on  his  deathbed." 

Lord  Exmouth  died  on  January  23,  1833.  He 
was  at  the  time  Vice-Admiral  of  England,  that 
distinguished  honorary  rank  having  been  con- 
ferred upon  him  but  a  few  months  before  his 
death. 


Of  the  last  four  admirals  whose  careers  have 
been  here  sketched,  Howe    alone    inherited  for- 


Pellew  477 

tune  and  high  social  rank  ;  but  he  also  fought  his 
way  far  beyond  the  modest  position  bequeathed 
to  him  by  his  brother.  Eminent  all,  though  in 
varying  manner  and  degree,  each  illustrated  a 
distinct  type  in  the  same  noble  profession.  All 
were  admirable  officers,  but  they  differed  greatly 
in  original  endowments  and  consequent  develop- 
ment. It  was  intuitive  with  St.  Vincent  to  take 
wide  and  far-sighted  views,  and  to  embody  them 
in  sustained,  relentless  action.  Endued  by  nature 
with  invincible  energy  and  determination,  he 
moved  spontaneously  and  easily  along  his  difficult 
path.  He  approached,  although  he  did  not  attain 
genius.  In  Howe  is  seen  rather  the  result  of 
conscientious  painstaking  acting  upon  excellent 
abilities,  but  struggling  always  against  a  native 
heaviness  and  a  temper  constitutionally  both 
indolent  and  indulgent;  a  temper  to  which 
indeed  he  does  not  yield,  over  which  he  triumphs, 
but  which  nevertheless  imposes  itself  upon  his 
general  course  with  all  the  force  inseparable  from 
hereditary  disposition.  A  man  of  talent,  he 
educates  himself  to  acquirements  which  in  his 
rival  have  the  character  of  perception ;  and  only 
under  the  spur  of  emergency  does  he  rise  to  the 
height  of  greatness.  Both  were  great  general 
officers,  a  claim  which  can  scarcely  be  advanced 
for  Saumarez  and  Exmouth,  able,  brilliant,  and 
devoted  as  they  were.  Saumarez  was  the  stead- 
fast, skilful,  accomplished  master  of  his  profes- 
sion, but  one  whose  aptitudes  and  tastes  placed 


478  Types  of  Naval  Officers 

him  in  the  great  organization  of  the  fleet,  as  a 
principal  subordinate  rather  than  as  head.  Ex- 
mouth  was  the  typical,  innate  seaman,  intensely 
active,  whose  instincts  are  those  of  the  partisan 
warrior,  and  who  shines  most  in  the  freedom  of 
detached  service.  All  bore  a  conspicuous  part 
in  the  greatest  war  of  modern  times,  with  honor 
such  that  their  names  will  be  remembered  as 
long  as  naval  history  endures. 


Ind 


ex 


Index 


ABOUKIR  BAY,  405. 

Age,  standard  of,  a  factor  in  effi- 
ciency, 70. 

Albany,  sloop,  327,  328. 

Alexandria,  403 ;  404  ;  battle  off, 
405-408;  410. 

Algeciras,  allied  fleet  anchored  at, 
289;  French  ships  anchor  off, 
415;  Saumarez  starts  for,  415; 
Saumarez  finds  French  ships 
moored  at,  415;  Hannibal  re- 
anchors  at,  419;  crowded  with 
eager  sight-seers,  419;  renewed 
battle  off,  420. 

Algiers,  battle  of,  428;  policy  of, 
462, 463 ;  Nelson  denounces,  463 ; 
refuses  demand  of  Lord  Ex- 
mouth  in  regard  to  treatment  of 
captives,  464;  Italian  coral  fish- 
ermen slaughtered  on  coast  of, 
464 ;  Lord  Exmouth  demands  re- 
lease of  Christian  slaves  in,  464  ; 
its  system  of  defences,  465 ;  navy 
of,  in  port,  466;  Capt.  Warde 
examines  defences  in  port  of, 
466;  Lord  Exmouth  sails  against, 
468 ;  battle  at  bay  of,  470-473. 

Algiers,  Dey  of,  463 ;  consults  the 
Porte,  464  ;  makes  submission  to 
Exmouth,  473 ;  delivers  up  Chris- 
tian slaves,  473,  474. 

Alligator,  ship,  266. 

Altavela,  244. 

Amazon,  ship,  456;  fight  of,  with 
Droits  de  I' Homme,  456,  457 ; 
wreck  of,  458,  459. 

Amiens,  Peace  of,  460. 

Anglo-Dutch   war,    marks    period 


of  transition  in  naval  warfare, 
12. 

Anglo-Saxon  predominance,  begin- 
ning of  the  struggle  for,  100;  ap- 
proaching its  crisis,  100. 

ANSON,  Lord,  takes  command  of 
Channel  fleet,  122;  presents 
Rodney  at  court,  153  ;  succeeded 
by  Earl  of  Sandwich,  154;  385. 

Antigua,  163;  228;  245. 

Apollo,  frigate,  442  ;  engages  Stan- 
islas, 442 ;  443. 

ARBUTHNOT,  Admiral,  ordered  to 
send  ships  to  West  Indies,  210; 
his  force  added  to  Rodney's,  211; 
regards  himself  injured,  212. 

Ardent,  ship,  242. 

ARNOLD,  Benedict,  433;  436;  437  ; 
bravery  of,  in  battle,  439 ;  retires 
toward  Crown  Point,  439  ;  Coop- 
er's praise  of,  440;  441 ;  442. 

Articles  of  War,  modified,  95. 

Audierne  Bay,  458. 

Austria.peace  signed  with, 413;  454. 

BALTIC  league,  fostered  by  Napo- 
leon, 413;  shattered  by  Nelson, 
413 ;  Saumarez  disturbs,  422, 423. 

Baltic  Sea,  affairs  in,  421. 

Barbados,  injuries  at,  by  hurricane, 
217  ;  British  fleet  arrives  at,  228 ; 
Rodney  returns  to,  230 ;  Rodney 
unwilling  to  fight  French,  off, 
230 ;  Rodney  reaches,  233  ;  245  ; 
Saumarez  reaches,  394. 

Barfleur,  ship,  240;  242;  311. 

BARRINGTON,  declines  command 
of  Channel  fleet,  182 ;  refuses 


482 


Index 


command  of  a  fleet,  286;  de- 
nounces ministry,  286 ;  287  ;  sec- 
ond to  Howe,  289;  297. 

BART,  Jean,  French  privateer,  451. 

Basque  Roads,  its  character  as  a 
harbor,  112;  141. 

Bedford,  ship,  240. 

Berwick,  ship,  79,  8l. 

BIRON,  Marechal,  makes  money 
advance  to  Rodney,  179. 

Black  Rocks,  reef,  411. 

Blenheim,  ship,  351 ;  365. 

Blonde,  ship,  Burgoyne  embarks 
on,  431. 

Bombay,  461. 

BOMPART,  Commodore,  leaves 
America,  134;  his  arrival,  135. 

BONAPARTE,  see  Napoleon. 

BOSCAWEN,  Admiral,  fleet  under, 
collecting  at  Portsmouth,  103  ; 
sails  to  intercept  French  squad- 
ron, 103,  104 ;  loses  two  ships, 
104 ;  before  Toulon,  126;  at- 
tacks French  frigates  near  Tou- 
lon, 133;  his  failure,  133;  returns 
to  Gibraltar,  133 ;  criticism  of, 
133 ;  surprised  while  repairing, 
134  ;  his  rapid  movements,  134; 
goes  in  pursuit  of  De  la  Clue, 
134;  destroys  five  French  ships, 
134;  succeeds  Hawke  tempo- 
rarily, 143. 

Boston,  loss  of,  284. 

Brest,  Hawke's  efficient  blockade 
of,  122;  movements  of  French 
navy  at,  126;  De  la  Clue  sails 
for,  133  ;  Conflans's  ships  escape 
to,  141 ;  Rodney  operates  against, 
1 58  ;  Jervis  closes  port  of,  375, 
392;  blockade  of,  411;  bay  of, 
411;  Pellew  stationed  off,  454; 
French  expedition  against  Ire- 
land sails  from,  455. 

15rimstone  Hill,  234 ;  394. 

Bristol,  ship,  384 ;  385  :  386 ;  387. 

British  Empire,  non-existent  in 
1748,99. 


British  Ministry,  apprehensive  over 
schooner  Hawke  incident,  172; 
cautions  Rodney,  172;  leams 
that  Spain  is  concentrating  ves- 
sels at  Cadiz,  414. 

BRUEYS,  at  Battle  of  Nile,  416. 

Brunswick,  ship,  314;  315. 

Burford,  ship,  262. 

BURGOYNE,  276;  284;  431;  434; 
leads  renewed  invasion,  442. 

BURRISH,  Capt.  George,  off  Tou- 
lon, 30 ;  his  address  to  his  lieu- 
tenants, 32  ;  decision  of  court  in 
case  of,  35  ;  cashiered,  37. 

BYNG,  Admiral,  his  incompetency 
at  Minorca,  5,  20 ;  finding  of 
courtmartial  of,  17 ;  one  of  the 
judges  of  Mathews,  24 ;  his 
punishment,  25;  his  situation  at 
Minorca  reviewed,  47-63  ;  auth- 
or's criticism  of,  64 ;  discussion 
of  trial  of,  64 ;  article  under 
which  he  was  convicted  and  ex- 
ecuted, 96,  97 ;  his  sailing  for 
Minorca,  104;  arrival  off  Port 
Mahon,  104 ;  engages  French 
fleet,  105 ;  retires  to  Gibraltar, 
105 ;  news  of  retreat  of,  reaches 
England,  105 ;  superseded  by 
Hawke,  105  ;  sent  home,  105 ; 
inquiry  concerning  in  House  of 
Commons,  105;  defended  by 
Pitt,  105  ;  his  execution  a  politi- 
cal exigency,  180. 

BYRON,  given  North  American 
command,  176;  284;  relieves 
Howe  and  goes  to  West  Indies, 
183  ;  284  ;  his  failure  and  return 
to  England,  183. 

CABRITA  POINT,  419. 

Cadiz,  French  ships  escape  to,  134 ; 
336;  347;  Spaniards  running  for, 
352 ;  Spanish  gunboats  leave, 
361  ;  blockade  at,  362 ;  Saumarez 
blockades,  400;  French  and 
Spanish  navies  concentrated  at, 


Index 


4*3 


414 ;  Saumarez  ordered  to  block- 
ade, 414;  Saumarez  arrives  off, 
415;  Saumarez  prevents  en- 
trance of  French  ship  to,  415; 
object  of  concentration  at,  frus- 
trated by  Saumarez,  421. 

Cadiz,  Bay  of,  369. 

Casar,  ship,  Saumarez  appointed 
to  command,  410 ;  injured  at 
Algeciras,  418;  refitted,  418; 
hauls  out  from  Gibraltar  mole, 
419;  sails  for  Algeciras,  419; 
appears  off  Europa  Point,  419. 

CAMPBELL,  Captain,  aids  in  sup- 
pressing mutiny  on  board  ship 
Marlborough,  365. 

Cape  Horn,  260. 

Cape  Passaro,  Battle  of,  69. 

Cape  St.  Vincent,  see  St.  Vincent, 
Cape. 

Cap  Fran9ois,  231 ;  236;  244;  246. 

Captain,  ship,  351. 

Cardinals,  The,  rocks,  137,  139. 

CARKETT,  Captain,  200;  his  dis- 
obedience of  Rodney's  orders, 
200,  20 1. 

CARLETON,  General,  433  ;  434. 

Carleton,  schooner,  437 ;  Pellew 
left  in  command  of,  438 ;  obliged 
to  withdraw,  438 ;  439;  475. 

Cartagena,  harbor  of,  schooner 
Hawke  taken  to,  171;  governor 
of,  Rodney  demands  schooner 
Hawke  from,  171. 

Cesar,  ship,  240. 

Champlain,  Lake,  433;  436;  battle 
on,  436,  437;  442;  475- 

CHANDOS,  Duke  of,  148. 

Channel  Fleet,  Keppel  appointed 
to  command  of,  176;  183;  271; 
281 ;  286;  287  ;  Howe  takes  com- 
mand of,  299 ;  Howe  remains  in 
nominal  command  of,  318 ;  Howe 
formally  retires  from  command 
of,  319;  Jervis  attached  to,  331 ; 
rumor  concerning  command  of, 
337 ;  lack  of  discipline  in,  367  ; 


374J  375;  St-  Vincent  again 
called  to  command  of,  380  ;  Tisi- 
phone  attached  to,  392;  394;  St. 
Vincent  takes  command  of,  411 ; 

45i;  454- 

Channel  Islands,  Saumarez  com- 
mander-in-chief  at,  421. 

Charente,  river,  French  vessels 
flee  up,  117. 

Charleston,  British  fleet  arrives  off, 
386. 

Cherbourg,  Saumarez  present  at  be- 
ginning of  work  on  breakwater  at, 
398  ;  frigate  Reunion  quits,  399. 

CHEVALIER,  Captain,  tribute  of, 
to  Admiral  Howe,  296. 

Cleopdtre,  ship,  fight  of,  with 
Nymphe,  448,  449. 

CLINTON,  Sir  Henry,  his  evacu- 
ation of  New  York,  277  ;  at  Cape 
May,  278;  reaches  Navesink, 
279 ;  280. 

CODRINGTON,  Lieutenant,  311; 
316. 

COLLINGWOOD,  31 1  ;  criticises 
movement  of  Admiral  Mann, 
348;  at  battle  off  Cape  St.  Vin- 
cent, 355;  410;  off  Brest,  412; 
Pellew  succeeds,  460. 

CONFLANS,  opposed  by  Hawke, 
126;  sails,  135;  his  fleet  breaks 
apart  and  flees,  141  ;  his  flagship 
destroyed,  141  ;  273. 

COOK,  James,  master  of  fleet  at 
Quebec,  326,  327. 

COOPER,  naval  historian,  his  opin- 
ion of  Arnold,  440. 

Copenhagen,  413;  446. 

Cornwall,  429. 

Cornwall,  ship,  202. 

CORNWALLIS,  Lord,  his  fate  in 
America,  settled,  232  ;  his  sur- 
render, 233 ;  surrender  of, 
change  of  ministry  consequent 
upon,  251  ;  offers  commission  to 
Saumarez,  385 ;  meeting  of,  with 
Saumarez,  subsequently,  385. 


484 


Index 


Corsica,  333 ;  337  ;  in  revolt  against 
Britain,  346 ;  evacuated  by  Brit- 
ish, 347. 

Courageux,  ship,  wrecked  on  Bar- 
bary  coast,  350;  352. 

Crescent,  frigate,  Saumarez  ap- 
pointed to  command,  399  ;  action 
of,  with  French  frigate  Reunion, 
399,  400. 

Crown  Point,  433 ;  439 ;  Pellew 
Jands  at,  441. 

Culloden,  ship,  353,  354. 

CUMBERLAND,  Richard,  his  re- 
mark concerning  Rodney,  178. 

CUMBY,  Lieutenant,  parody  by, 
upon  Admiral  Jervis,  373  ;  pre- 
tended revenge  of  Admiral  upon, 

374- 

Cura9ao,  246. 

CURTIS,  Fleet  Captain,  311. 
CURTIS,  Sir  Roger,  250. 
Czar  of  Russia,  421. 

DACRES,      Lieutenant,    wounded, 

437,  438- 

Declaration  of  Independence,  275. 

DE  COURT,  Admiral,  his  comments 
on  engagement  off  Toulon,  44; 
81. 

Defence,  ship,  342 ;  363. 

DE  GRASSE,  Count,  fleet  under, 
sails  for  Martinique,  221,  222; 
sights  Hood's  division,  222 ; 
gives  -Hood  battle,  222  ;  moves 
to  support  his  detachment  at 
Tobago,  229 ;  sails  for  Hayti, 
231  ;  protects  convoy  from  Mar- 
tinique to  Cap  Francois,  236; 
is  followed  by  Rodney,  236; 
separates  ships  of  war  from 
convoy,  237 ;  fails  to  use  his 
opportunity,  237 ;  condition  of 
ships  of,  238  ;  flagship  of,  collides 
with  Ztif,  238;  battle  with 
Rodney,  238-242 ;  disaster  to 
squadron  of,  292 ;  transports 
sail  to  carry  stores  to,  392 ;  off 


St.  Christopher,  394;  Saumarez 
engages  flagship  of,  396. 

DE  GUICHEN,  sails  from  Mar- 
tinique, 197  ;  his  battle  with  Rod- 
ney, 200-206 ;  asks  to  be  relieved, 
206;  his  fleet  returns  to  Europe, 
214;  239. 

DE  LA  CLUE,  Admiral,  sails  for 
Brest,  133;  near  Gibraltar,  133;  is 
seen  by  British  frigate,  134  ;  pur- 
sued by  Boscawen,  134;  fireships 
destroyed  by  Boscawen,  1 34. 

DE  RUYTER,  pronounced  great- 
est naval  seaman  in  era  of 
Charles  II.,  12,  13. 

D'ESTAING,  Count,  Howe's  cam- 
paign against,  268,  269;  leaves 
Toulon  for  America,  277 ;  his 
arrival  delayed,  279 ;  strength 
of  squadron  of,  279 ;  arrives,  279 ; 
sails  southward,  280  ;  enters 
harbor  of  Newport,  281 ;  again 
puts  to  sea,  281 ;  fleet  of,  scat- 
tered, 282 ;  appears  again  off 
Rhode  Island,  282 ;  retires  to 
Boston,  282 ;  runs  batteries  at 
Seakonnet  channel,  388;  is  lured 
out  of  bay,  388  ;  abandons  coast, 
388. 

Devonshire,  429. 

Devonshire,  ship,  90,  91. 

Dey,  of  Algiers,  see  Algiers,  Dey  of. 

Dominica,  237. 

Dorsetshire,  frigate,  41,  46,  137. 

DOUGLAS,  Sir  Charles,  his  criti- 
cism of  Rodney's  encounter  with 
De  Grasse,  247  ;  433 ;  437 ;  on 
battle  of  Lake  Champlain,  439; 
commands  Pellew,  440. 

DOUGLAS,  Sir  James,  165. 

DRAKE,  Rear  Admiral,  sent  by 
Rodney  against  De  Grasse,  229 ; 
forced  to  retire  before  superior 
force,  230. 

Droits  de  FHomme,  ship,  fight  of, 
with  Indefatigable  and  Amazon, 
456,  457  ;  wreck  of,  458. 


Index 


485 


Dungeness,  anecdote  of  Nelson 
off,  446,  447. 

DUPLEIX,  recalled  from  India  by 
French  government,  101. 

Dutton,  ship,  driven  ashore  at 
Plymouth,  452 ;  her  troops,  pas- 
sengers, and  crew  saved  through 
action  of  Admiral  Pellew,  452- 
454- 

Eagle,  ship,  90,  153. 

East  Indies,  403. 

East  India,  station,  Pellew  as- 
signed to,  460. 

Egypt,  403;  404;  413. 

ELLIS,  Lieutenant,  343. 

ELLISON,  Captain,  Earl  St.  Vin- 
cent's rebuke  to,  363,  364. 

ELPHINSTONE,  Captain,  165. 

Erie,  Lake,  436. 

Essex,  ship,  112. 

Europa  Point,  419. 

EXMOUTII,  Lord,  see  Pellew. 

FALKLAND  ISLANDS,  incident  at, 
brings  Great  Britain  and  Spain 
on  verge  of  rupture,  172. 

Falmouth,  456. 

FAULKNER,  Captain,  342,  343. 

FEARNEY,  William,  bargeman,  re- 
ceives surrendered  Spanish 
swords  from  Nelson,  356. 

Ferrol,  Spanish  port  of,  Pellew 
watches,  460. 

Fighting  Instructions,  of  1740  and 
1756,  compared  with  those  of 
1665;  Rooke's  tactics  adopted 
in,  16. 

Finisterre,  Cape,  291. 

Finland,  gulf  of,  Russian  fleet  takes 
refuge  in,  425. 

First  Consul,  Napoleon  as,  413. 

Flamborough,  frigate,  78. 

FLIGHT,  Colonel,  Admiral  Jervis 
plays  joke  upon,  370. 

Formidable,  flagship  of  Rodney, 
239- 


Fort  Moultrie,  see  Moultrie  Fort. 

Fort  Royal,  235. 

Foudroyant,  ship,  330  ;  331. 

Four  Days  Battle,  British  meet 
severe  rcheck  in,  n  ;  attributed 
to  strategic  errors,  12  ;  Penn's 
criticism  of,  12. 

Fox,  Captain,  criticised  for  con- 
duct in  battle  off  La  Rochelle, 
93;  court-martialled,  93;  retired 
as  a  rear-admiral,  93. 

Fox,  Charles  J.,  supported  in  Par- 
liament by  Admiral  Jervis,  332. 

France,  abandons  Egypt,  101 ; 
sends  fleet  and  force  against 
Minorca,  104  ;  declares  war 
against  Great  Britain,  105  ; 
captures  British  supply  vessel 
off  Gibraltar,  106  ;  sends  squad- 
ron to  convoy  troops  to  Cape 
Breton,  1758,  116  ;  ships  of,  flee 
up  river  Charente,  117  ;  vessels 
of,  make  their  escape,  117;  de- 
termines to  invade  England,  124 ; 
preparations  of,  for  invasion  of 
England,  124,  125;  war  between 
Great  Britain  and,  imminent, 
176;  declares  war  against  Great 
Britain,  185  ;  expedition  of, 
against  Ireland,  sails  from 
Brest,  455  ;  failure  of  expedi- 
tion of,  against  Ireland,  456. 

Fran9ois,  Cap,  231 ;  236;  244  ;  246. 

FRANKLIN,  Benjamin,  on  French  oc- 
cupation of  Canada,  102 ;  receives 
note  from  Admiral  Howe,  275,' 
bitter  reply  of,  275  ;  Howe's  com- 
ment on,  275. 

Franklin,  ship,  406. 

FREDERICK  the  Great,  260. 

Free  ports,  Great  Britain  insti- 
tutes, in  West  Indies,  169 ; 
effect  of,  169 ;  Rodney's  report 
concerning,  169  ;  170. 

French  Navy,  see  Navy,  French. 

French,  the,  their  part  in  develop- 
ment of  tactical  science,  13;  sea- 


486 


Index 


men   mobbed    in    Boston,   282 ; 
land  in  Egypt,  404. 

GALLEY  fighting,  its  superiority  in 
effectiveness  to  that  in  sailing 
vessels,  7 ;  its  decline,  8 ;  its 
traditions  linger,  8. 

GARDNER,  Lord,  265. 

GEARY,  Francis,  Hawke's  advice 
to,  146. 

GEORGE  I.,  King  of  England, 
stands  sponsor  for  infant  Rod- 
ney, 148. 

GEORGE  II.,  King  of  England, 
takes  knowledge  of  Hawke,  84. 

GEORGE  III.,  King  of  England, 
conversation  of,  with  Earl  S^, 
Vincent,  287. 

Gibraltar,  Rooke's  capture  of,  16; 
Byng  retires  to,  105 ;  Hawke 
reaches,  105 ;  Boscawen  returns 
*°»  *33 !  De  la  Clue  near,  133 ; 
187  ;  joy  at,  over  Rodney's  vic- 
tory off  Cape  St.  Vincent,  193, 
194 ;  269 ;  Howe's  relief  of,  288  - 
295 ;  Jervis  at  relief  of,  331 ;  346 ; 
348  ;  three  ships  wrecked  at, 
350;  Saumarez  convoys  prizes  to, 
409  ;  410  ;  Saumarez  withdraws 
from  Algeciras  to,4i6 ;  Exmouth 
joins  Dutch  fleet  at,  468. 

Gibraltar,  ship,  injured  on  a  reef, 

35°- 

Glorieux,  ship,  239. 

Great  Britain,  declares  war  against 
France,  105;  institutes  free  ports 
in  Jamaica,  169 ;  effect  of  this 
movement,  169;  foreign  policy 
of,  enfeebled,  172  ;  on  verge  of 
rupture  with  Spain  over  Falk- 
land Islands  incident,  172;  war 
between  France  and,  imminent, 
176 ;  pensions  daughters  of 
Marechal  Biron,  180 ;  declares 
war  against  Holland,  217;  Na- 
poleon seeks  to  exclude  com- 
merce of,  413. 


Great  Britain,  Navy  of,  see  Navy  of 
Great  Britain. 

Greenwich  Hospital,  Palliser  ap- 
pointed to  governorship  of,  182. 

Grenada,  captured  by  British,  159. 

Gros  Ilet  Bay,  23$. 

Guadaloupe,  237  ;  238  ;  243  ;  245. 

Guernsey,  Island,  James  Saumarez 
born  on,  383  ;  later  years  of 
Saumarez  at,  427. 

HALLOWELL,  Captain,  352;  eccen- 
tric response  of,  to  Jervis,  353. 

Hannibal,  ship,  loss  of,  at  Alge- 
ciras, 416;  418;  re-anchors  at 
Algeciras,  419 

Havana,  Rodney  at  fall  of,  166; 
loss  of,  embitters  Spain,  171. 

Havre,  Rodney  operates  against, 
158. 

HAWKE,  Admiral,  development  of 
naval  warfare  identified  with 
name  of,  4  ;  uplifted  the  navy,  6  ; 
off  Toulon,  29,  39,  40 ;  his  cap- 
ture of  the  Spanish  vessel,  Poder, 
40 ;  his  birth  and  parentage,  77  ; 
his  promotion  to  post-captain, 
78 ;  appointed  to  the  Berwick, 
79;  sails  for  the  Mediterranean, 
79;  loses  his  political  influence, 
79 ;  war  against  Spain  declared, 
80;  sails  for  West  Indies  in 
Portland,  80;  war  of  Austrian 
succession,  80;  before  Toulon, 
81 ;  his  exceptional  conduct  in 
battle,  8 1  ;  is  complimented  by 
Rear-Admiral  Rowley,  84;  effect 
of  the  battle  on  his  fortunes,  84; 
the  king  takes  knowledge  of  him, 
84  ;  becomes  a  rear-admiral,  85 ; 
hoists  his  flag,  85  ;  cruises  in  the 
Bay  of  Biscay,  under  Sir  Peter 
Warren,  85 ;  joined  to  Warren 
in  command,  86;  goes  to  sea  in 
command,  86 ;  subordinates 
pecuniary  to  military  considera- 
tions, 88 ;  descries  the  enemy  off 


Index 


487 


La  Rochelle,  89 ;  overhauls  fleet 
of  French  merchantmen  con- 
voyed by  Commodore  L'Eten- 
duere,  89;  orders  general  chase, 
90;  overtakes  the  French  rear, 
90  ;  his  brilliant  victory,  91 ;  his 
report  of  the  engagement,  92; 
calls  a  council  of  war,  93 ;  dis- 
pleased with  Capt.  Fox,  93  ;  ac- 
tually commander  in  battle  with 
L'Etenduere,  97 ;  given  Order 
of  the  Bath,  98 ;  now  known  as 
Sir  Edward  Hawke,  98 ;  pro- 
moted to  rank  of  vice-admiral, 
98  ;  in  dock  yard  command,  98  ; 
most  illustrious  naval  officer,  100; 
revolutionizes  naval  ideas,  100  ; 
his  part  in  arbitrament  with 
France,  103;  again  in  command 
of  a  fleet,  103 ;  sails  against 
French,  104;  seizes  300  trading 
vessels,  104;  supersedes  Byng, 
105 ;  reaches  Gibraltar,  105 ; 
sends  Byng  home,  105  ;  institutes 
inquiry  into  conduct  of  Byng's 
captains,  105;  denies  allegations 
of  Pitt  in  House  of  Commons, 
105 ;  disliked  by  Pitt,  106 ;  returns 
to  England,  106 ;  recaptures  Brit- 
ish supply  vessel  in  Spanish  port, 
107 ;  his  characteristic  indepen- 
dence illustrated,  107 ;  his  ser- 
vice henceforth  confined  to  Chan- 
nel fleet,  108;  maintains  blockade 
of  French  ports,  108  ;  his  expedi- 
tion against  Rochefort,  1 1 1  ; 
controversy  concerning  it,  in  ; 
his  maxim  concerning  pilots,  112; 
his  surprise  at  Basque  Roads, 
112;  characterization  of  that 
harbor,  112;  his  coolness,  113; 
his  self-assertion,  113;  his  bold 
disregard  of  pilotage  difficulties 
at  Quiberon,  114;  declines  to 
attend  a  council  of  war,  115; 
reaches  Spithead,  115;  resents 
language  of  Pitt,  1 16 ;  his  service 


against  French  squadron,  1758, 
116;  his  failure  to  destroy  French 
squadron  through  defective 
equipment,  117  ;  practically  sup- 
planted by  Howe,  118;  abandons 
his  command  in  an  indignant 
note,  118,  119;  his  anger  in  some 
respects  justified,  119;  is  sum- 
moned to  the  Admiralty,  121  ; 
defends  his  action,  121 ;  his  posi- 
tion strengthened,  121;  accom- 
panies Anson  as  second  in  com- 
mand, 122;  culminating  epoch 
in  career  of,  122  ;  his  triumph  at 
Quiberon  Bay,  122;  his  capacity 
as  a  seaman  proved,  122;  his 
efficient  blockade  of  Brest,  122: 
is  burned  in  effigy,  124;  opera- 
tions at  Brest,  126;  his  double 
duty  there,  126;  his  difficulties, 
126;  opposes  Conflans,  126  ;  his 
method  at  Quiberon  analyzed, 
127-130;  assures  the  Admiralty, 
131  ;  his  great  tact  in  correspon- 
dence, 132 ;  discharges  a  mutin- 
ous surgical  officer,  132  ;  defends 
his  act,  132 ;  his  liberality  toward 
subordinates,  132  ;  watches 
French  ships  at  Cadiz,  134 ; 
sends  ships  to  reinforce  light 
squadron,  134;  recalls  ships-of- 
the-line,  134,  anchors  in  Torbay, 
135 ;  receives  news  of  French 
fleet,  135;  crowds  all  sail  for 
Quiberon,  136;  sights  the  French 
fleet,  136 ;  gives  pursuit,  136, 
137  ;  opens  fire,  137  ;  his  orders 
to  his  sailing  master,  138;  is 
overtaken  by  night,  139  ;  follows 
French  fleet  round  The  Cardi- 
nals, 139;  sinks  two  French 
ships,  140;  cowes  the  French 
navy,  141 ;  his  losses  at  Quibe- 
ron, 141 ;  his  feat  at  Quiberon 
analyzed,  142 ;  returns  to  Eng- 
land, 143  ;  is  succeeded  by  Bos- 
cawen  temporarily,  143 ;  received 


488 


Index 


with  honors,  143;  denied  a  peer- 
age, 143;  his  indifference  to  self- 
advancement,  143;  his  indepen- 
dence in  professional  conduct, 
toward  superiors,  143,  144;  hauls 
down  his  flag,  144 ;  becomes  first 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  144 ;  made 
vice-admiral  of  Great  Britain, 
145;  the  peerage  conferred,  145; 
his  advice  to  Geary,  146 ;  his 
death,  146;  his  distinctive  glory, 
146;  his  opinion  of  Howe,  262; 

273- 

Hawke,  schooner,  170,  overhauled 
by  Spanish  coast  guard  vessels, 
170;  taken  to  Cartagena,  171. 

Hayti,  231  ;  236. 

Hector,  ship,  240. 

Hermenegildo,  ship,  417;  420;  re- 
markable loss  of,  420. 

Hohenlinden,  413. 

Holland,  Great  Britain  declares 
war  against,  217  ;  390. 

HOOD,  Sir  Samuel,  strength  of  his 
powers,  74;  made  second  in 
command  to  Rodney,  220;  ar- 
rives at  West  India  station,  221  ; 
his  disagreement  with  Rodney, 
221 ;  gives  battle  to  De  Grasse, 
222 ;  urges  Rodney  to  effect  a 
coalition  of  forces,  223 ;  joins 
Rodney  at  St.  Kitts,  228 ;  criti- 
cises Rodney's  movement  against 
De  Grasse  at  Tobago,  229 ;  de- 
fends St.  Kitts,  234 ;  urges  Rod- 
ney to  more  energetic  action, 
243  ;  criticises  Rodney,  244-246 ; 
his  comment  on  Rodney,  252 ; 
in  command  of  Mediterranean 
fleet,  299;  anchors  off  St.  Chris- 
topher, 394 ;  appoints  Saumarez 
to  command  Russell,  395. 

Horn,  Cape,  260. 

HOSTE,  Paul,  historian  of  achieve- 
ments of  Tourville,  13. 

HOWE,  Lord,  his  important  mis- 
sion, 176 ;  his  return  from 


America,  182  ;  his  character  and 
temperament,  183,  184  ;  anec- 
dote of,  recorded  by  Sir  Byam 
Martin,  250  ;  254  ;  his  especial 
claim  on  esteem  of  Americans, 
254;  respect  in  American  colo- 
nies for  his  elder  brother,  254- 
256 ;  succeeds  to  the  peerage 
held  by  his  brother,  256;  char- 
acter compared  with  that  of  his 
brother,  256 ;  his  early  service, 
259;  enters  the  navy,  259;  em- 
barks for  Pacific  in  Anson's 
squadron,  259 ;  serves  in  West 
Indies,  260;  his  part  in  Seven 
Years  War,  260 ;  his  friendship 
with  Wolfe,  262  ;  characteriza- 
tion of,  by  a  French  pilot,  262 ; 
Hawke's  opinion  of,  262,  263 ;  his 
taciturnity,  263  ;  receives  the 
Duke  of  York,  263  ;  his  coolness 
and  self-possession,  263 ;  anec- 
dotes of,  264, 265 ;  his  composure 
under  suspense,  266,  267,  268  ; 
his  campaign  against  D'Estaing, 
268;  contrasted  with  Jervis,  270, 
271 ;  at  Quiberon,  273;  in  House 
of  Commons,  274 ;  becomes 
rear-admiral,  274 ;  in  confidence 
of  Hawke,  274 ;  appointed  to 
command  squadron,  274 ;  vice- 
admiral,  275 ;  commander-in- 
chief  of  North  American  station, 
275;  given  treaty  powers,  275; 
addresses  note  to  Franklin,  275; 
his  comment  on  Franklin's  re- 
ply, 275 ;  concerning  his  letter 
to  Washington,  276;  his  opera- 
tions about  New  York,  276; 
author's  characterization  of,  277, 
278  ;  learns  of  coming  of 
D'Estaing,  278 ;  concentrates 
at  New  York,  278  ;  disposition 
of  squadron  of,  against  D'Es- 
taing, 279,  280;  manoeuvres  to 
avoid  battle  with  D'Estaing, 
281  ;  fleet  of,  scattered,  282  ; 


Index 


489 


highest  title  of,  to  fame,  283  ; 
follows  French  fleet  to  New- 
port, and  Boston,  284;  resigns 
command,  284  ;  succeeded  by 
Vice-admiral  Byron,  284;  sails 
for  England,  284 ;  words  of,  in 
House  of  Commons,  284;  again 
brought  into  service,  287  ;  en- 
counters allied  fleet  off  Scilly, 
288 ;  tactical  manoeuvre  of,  off 
Land's  End,  288 ;  relief  of 
Gibraltar  by,  288,  295;  tribute 
of  Chevalier  to,  296 ;  headed  for 
Atlantic,  297  ;  is  pursued  by 
allies,  297 ;  regains  Spithead, 
297  ;  on  shore  duty,  297  ;  as 
first  Lord  of  Admiralty,  298 ; 
appoints  Nelson  to  a  ship,  298 ; 
at  head  of  navy  at  outbreak  of 
French  revolution,  298 ;  takes 
command  of  Channel  fleet,  299; 
encounters  French  fleet  and  con- 
voy, 301,  302  ;  gives  chase,  302 ; 
tactical  skill  of,  303,  304  ;  analy- 
sis of  tactics  in  fight  with  Vil- 
laret-Joyeuse,  306,  307  ;  attacks 
latter,  in  force,  310;  conduct  of, 
in  action,  311  ;  victory  of,  over 
French  fleet,  315,  316;  career 
of,  ended,  318  ;  in  nominal  com- 
mand of  Channel  fleet,  318 ; 
suppresses  mutinies,  318;  active 
service  of,  closed,  319;  retires 
formally  from  command  of 
Channel  fleet,  319 ;  estimate 
of,  of  Battle  of  the  Nile,  379; 
appearance  of,  off  Rhode  Island, 
388, 409 ;  commends  Pellew,  440; 
again  commends  Pellew,  450, 
476,  477- 

HOWE,  General,  departs  for  Eng- 
land, 284. 

Hudson,  river,  442. 

Hyeres  Islands,  21. 

Indefatigable,  ship,  455 ;  fight  of, 
wit.  Droits  de  I'Homme,  456, 


457  ;    narrow    escape    of,  from 

wreck,  458. 
India,  403. 
Inflexible,  ship,  435 ;    launch   and 

description  of,  435,  436;  in  battle 

of  Lake  Champlain,  438,  439. 
Intrepide,  ship,  57, 59,  60,  62,  63, 91. 
Ionian    Isles,   slaves,   natives    of, 

released  by  Pellew,  462. 
Ireland,  French  expedition  against, 

sails  from  Brest,  455 ;  expedition 

reaches,  456. 

Jacobin,  ship,  313. 

Jamaica,  threatened  by  Brest  fleet, 
160;  161  ;  succored  by  Rodney, 
162;  163;  station,  Rodney  ap- 
pointed to  command,  167  ; 
station,  required  high  degree 
of  executive  ability  to  com- 
mand, 168;  its  situation  in  rela- 
tion to  Spanish  colonies,  168 ; 
free  ports  instituted  in,  169 ; 
Rodney  moves  toward,  243 ; 

393- 

JAMES  II.,  Duke  of  York,  his  fight- 
ing instructions,  1665,  9. 

JERVIS,  Admiral,  contrasted  with 
Howe,  270-272,  320  ;  contrasted 
with  Nelson,  321 ;  his  opinion  of 
Nelson,  321 ;  birth  of,  321,  322  ; 
early  life  of,  322 ;  runs  away  to 
sea,  322 ;  sails  for  West  Indies, 
322 ;  early  privations,  323 ;  con- 
trasted with  Rodney,  324 ;  cruises 
in  the  Caribbean,  324;  returns 
to  England,  324 ;  is  made  lieu- 
tenant, 325;  with  Boscawen  in 
the  St.  Lawrence,  325;  goes  to 
Mediterranean  with  Hawke,  325 ; 
relieves  Byng,  325 ;  associated 
with  Sir  Charles  Saunders,  325  ; 
intimacy  with  Wolfe,  325 ;  in 
command  of  Porcupine,  326 ;  con- 
versation of,  with  Wolfe  before 
battle  of  Plains  of  Abraham,  326 ; 
leads  fleet  against  Quebec,  326; 


49° 


Index 


goes  to  England  after  fall  of 
Quebec,  327  ;  appointed  to  com- 
mand a  ship,  327  ;  ordered  to 
return  to  North  America,  327 ; 
puts  in  at  Plymouth,  leaking, 
327 ;  given  command  of  sloop 
Albany,  327  ;  conquers  mutinous 
sailors,  and  sets  sail,  328 ;  ar- 
rives at  New  York,  328;  pro- 
moted to  post-captain,  328;  an 
admiral  at  fifty-two,  328;  com- 
mands frigate  in  Mediterranean, 
328 ;  resents  insult  to  British  flag, 
by  Genoese  officers,  329 ;  forces 
an  apology,  329 ;  opposed  to 
abolition  of  slave  trade,  329 ; 
commissions  the  Foudroyant^ 
330;  attached  to  the  Channel 
fleet,  331 ;  in  Keppel's  battle  off 
Ushant,  331 ;  at  Gibraltar  with 
Howe,  331 ;  captures  French  ship 
Pegase,  33 1 ;  receives  a  baronetcy, 
332  ;  receives  Order  of  the  Bath, 
332;  takes  seat  in  Parliament, 
332 ;  supports  Fox,  332 ;  attains 
rank  of  rear-admiral  and  of  vice- 
admiral,  332 ;  is  again  afloat,  332  ; 
on  service  in  Caribbean  Sea, 
332 ;  his  brusque  treatment  of  a 
lieutenant,  332, 333  ;  his  attitude 
toward  matrimony,  333  ;  returns 
to  England,  333  ;  appointed  to 
command  Mediterranean  Sta- 
tion, 333;  joins  fleet  in  San 
Fiorenzo  Bay,  333  ;  reaches 
grade  of  admiral  of  the  Blue, 
334 ;  reaches  crowning  period  of 
his  career,  334 ;  disposition  of 
fleet  of,  336 ;  as  strict  disciplina- 
rian, 337 ;  anecdotes  concerning 
this  characteristic  of,  337-340; 
his  care  of  health  of  officers  and 
men,  343,  344 ;  embarrassment 
of,  347 ;  disappointment  of,  at 
Admiral  Mann's  failure  to  obey 
orders,  349;  cheerfulness  of,  un- 
der discouragements,  351  ;  rein- 


forcements reach,  351 ;  encoun- 
ters large  Spanish  fleet,  352 ; 
courageous  remark  of,  352 ; 
victory  of,  at  Cape  St.  Vincent, 
352-357 1  gratitude  of  England 
toward,  356;  created  Earl  of  St. 
Vincent,  356;  analysis  of  move- 
ments of,  in  battle  of  Cape  St. 
Vincent,  356,  357  ;  blockades 
Spanish  at  Cadiz,357;  suppresses 
mutinous  action  of  seamen,  358, 
359 ;  action  of,  in  case  of  sea- 
men, of  ship  St.  George,  360,  361 ; 
repels  attack  of  Spanish  gunboats 
from  Cadiz,  361,  362;  stern  re- 
pression of  mutiny  by,  on  board 
ship  Marlborough,  362-367 ;  stern 
rebuke  of,  to  Capt.  Ellison,  363, 
364 ;  brusque  reply  of,  to  Sir 
Edward  Pellew,  367;  sternness 
of,  368  ;  forbids  captains  to  dine 
each  other,  368 ;  quaint  humor 
of,  369  ;  anecdotes  of,  369,  370 ; 
reverence  of,  for  the  flag,  372  ; 
satire  upon,  by  Lieutenant  Cum- 
by,  373 ;  pretended  revenge  of, 
f°r>  373.  374 ;  decline  of  health 
of,  374;  return  of,  to  England, 
374 ;  placed  in  command  of 
Channel  fleet,  375;  establishes 
rigid  discipline  in  same,  375 ; 
closes  port  of  Brest,  375 ;  anal- 
ysis of  last  named  movement, 
376;  three  great  services  of,  to 
England,  378 ;  discipline  of,  of 
Mediterranean  fleet,  378;  win- 
ning by,  of  Battle  of  St.  Vincent, 
378  ;  suppression  of  mutinies  by, 
378;  contrasted  with  Nelson, 
378.  3795  Nelson's  esteem  for, 
379 ;  Nelson's  differences  with, 
379;  arranges  expedition  which 
led  to  Battle  of  the  Nile,  379; 
credit  due,  for  same,  379,  380 ; 
later  years  of,  380 ;  succeeds 
Pitt  as  P'irst  Lord  of  the  Ad- 
miralty, 380;  retires  from  active 


Index 


491 


service,  380;  hauls  down  his 
flag,  380;  country  seat  of,  380; 
closing  years  of,  380,  381  ;  liber- 
ality, of,  381  ;  active  habits  of 
in  old  age,  381  ;  death  of, 
381. 
Judith,  Point,  281. 

KEITH,  Lord,  367. 

KEMPENFELT,  Admiral,  288  ;  sec- 
ond to  Howe,  289;  death  of, 
290  ;  sent  in  pursuit  of  De 
Grasse,  393  ;  makes  valuable 
capture,  393. 

KEPPEL,  Admiral,  appointed  to 
Channel  fleet,  176;  resigns  com- 
mand of  Channel  fleet,  182  ;  cha- 
grin of,  286;  287  ;  Jervis  with,  at 
Ushant,  331  ;  assists  Saumarez 
in  advancement,  384,  385;  com- 
panion of  uncle  of  Saumarez, 


LAND'S     END,     Howe's    tactical 

movement  off,  288. 
LANGARA,  his  fleet  destroyed   by 

Rodney,  216. 
Leander,  ship,  472. 
L'ETENDUERE,     Commodore,    at- 

tacked  by   Hawke,  89  ;  Hawke 

commander   in   battle  with,  97  ; 

157- 

Leghorn,  in  power  of  France,  346. 
LESTOCK,  Vice-Admiral,  off  Tou- 

lon, 21,  22;  his  part  in  trial  of 

Mathews,  21-25;   his  own   trial 

and  defence,  26. 
Levant,  the,  384. 
LINOIS,  at  battle  at  Algeciras,4i6; 

his  division   in    second    attack, 

419. 

Lisbon,  350. 
Louisa,  ship,  60,  61,  64. 
Louis  XVL,  treats  Saumarez  with 

attention,  398,  399. 
LOWTHER,  Miss,  betrothed  of  Gen. 

Wolfe,  326. 


MADRAS,  French  conquest  of,  103 ; 
yielded  in  exchange  for  Louis- 
burj,  103. 

Magnanime,  ship,  262 ;  2725273. 

Malaga,  movements  of  Rooke  off, 
15;  battle,  69,  70;  156. 

Malta,  Nelson  receives  news  of 
surrender  of,  to  the  French,  403. 

Manila,  loss  of,  embitters  Spain, 
171. 

MANN,  Admiral,  discouragement 
of,  348  ;  calls  council  of  officers, 
348;  returns  to  England,  348; 
deprived  of  command,  348 ; 
Jervis's  criticism  of,  349 ;  Nel- 
son's criticism  of,  349  ;  effect  on 
fleet  of  defection  of,  350. 

Mantua,  blockaded,  346. 

Marengo,  413. 

Marlborough,  frigate,  41 ;  42 ;  57 ; 
mutinies  on,  362-367. 

Marseilles,  430. 

MARTIN,  Sir  Byam,  records  anec- 
dote of  Lord  Howe,  250. 

Martinique,  Rodney  operates 
against,  158;  captured  by  Brit- 
ish, 158;  165;  236;  245;  393. 

MARRYATT,  Capt.,  Peter  Simple 
quoted,  95,  96;  source  of  sea 
picture  in  his  The  King's  Own, 
458. 

MATHEWS,  Admiral,  off  Toulon  in 
r774>  5  !  description  of  engage- 
ment, 21,  22,  41,  42,  43;  court- 
martial  of,  27,  28  ;  author's  criti- 
cism of,  45,  56. 

Mediterranean,  fighting  begins  in, 
1759,  133  ;  Nelson  returns  from 
cruise  in,  351,  352;  400;  411; 
British  expedition  enters,  413; 
Pellew  cruises  in,  430 ;  Pellew  is 
appointed  Commander-in-chief 
in,  460;  461. 

MILLBANK,  Admiral,  297. 

Minorca,  Byng's  incompetency  at, 
5,  20;  affair  at,  reviewed,  47-63 ; 
French  send  a  fleet  against,  104; 


492 


Index 


French  fleet  lands  at,  104;  156; 

367. 

Mona  Passage,  244. 
MONCTON,  General,  his  reluctance 

to  move,  161  ;   sends  troops  to 

Jamaica,  166. 
MO.NK,  commands  in  Four   Days 

Battle,  11. 

Montague,  ship,  312;  313. 
MONTGOMERY,  fall  of,  432. 
MOREAU,  French  general,  347. 
Moultrie,  Fort,  attack  of  British 

fleet  on,  386. 
Mutiny,  in  British  navy,  1797,  358, 

359;  on  ship  Marlborough,  363- 


NAPLES,  Kingdom  of,  Napoleon 
designs  to  occupy,  413;  463. 

NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE,  contem- 
porary of  Jervis,  346;  before 
Mantua,  347;  402;  403;  411; 
practically  absolute  ruler  of 
Europe,  412;  designs  to  occupy 
Portugal  and  Kingdom  of 
Naples,  413;  threatens  Saum- 
arez's  flank,  414;  concentrates 
Spanish  and  French  navies  at 
Cadiz,  414  ;  agreement  of,  with 
Czar,  at  Tilsit,  421  ;  breach  of, 
with  Russia,  422  ;  forces  Sweden 
to  declaration  of  war,  422  ;  454  ; 
decline  of,  coincides  with  Pel- 
lew's  advance,  461. 

Narragansett  Bay,  210;  D'Es- 
taing's  fleet  at,  281  ;  387. 

Naval  Warfare,  in  i8th  century, 
3,  et  seq.;  Hawke  and  Rodney 
identified  with,  4  ;  advance  in, 
shown  by  two  great  failures,  5  ; 
waged  with  vessels  moved  by 
oars,  7  ;  such  method  more  re- 
liable than  by  sail,  7  ;  its  scene 
long  in  the  Mediterranean,  8  ; 
introduction  of  cannon  in,  8;  a 
period  of  systematization  sets 
in,  9;  period  of  transition  in, 


12  ;  Tourville's  influence  on,  14; 
peace  of  Utrecht  closed  transi- 
tional period  in,  68;  Napoleon's 
influence  on,  68,  69;  conditions 
of,  in  i8th  century,  74,  75;  ad- 
vance of,  in  1 9th  century. 

Navy,  French,  its  movements  at 
Quiberon  Bay,  125;  attempts  to 
concentrate  at  Brest,  126;  van- 
quished by  Hawke,  141 ;  con- 
centrated at  Cadiz,  414. 

Navy  of  Great  Britain,  in  1739,  69 ; 
permitted  to  decline,  100. 

Navy  of  U.  S.,  in  1812,  69. 

NELSON,  Admiral,  his  remarkable 
order  at  Trafalgar,  alluded  to,  7 ; 
on  true  way  of  fighting,  30 ;  on 
the  comparative  value  of  prize 
money,  88;  146;  appointed  to 
command  a  ship  by  Howe,  298 ; 
letter  of,  to  his  brother,  298; 
opinion  of,  of  Jervis's  Mediter- 
ranean fleet,  330;  remark  of, 
concerning  Hood,  335  ;  criticises 
movements  of  British  fleet,  1795, 
346-  his  criticism  of  Admiral 
Mann,  349  ;  return  from  mission 
up  Mediterranean,  351,  352;  at 
battle  off  Cape  St.  Vincent,  355; 
receives  Spanish  surrender,  355, 
356 ;  approves  sentence  of  sea- 
men of  ship  St.  George,  361  ;  362  ; 
contrasted  with  Jervis,  Earl  St. 
Vincent,  378,  379 :  esteem  of,  for 
Jervis,  379;  credit  due  to,  for 
victory  of  the  Nile,  379 ;  con- 
trasted with  Saumarez,  383  ;  401 ; 
402 ;  his  lack  of  personal  sym- 
pathy with  Saumarez,  407 ; 
Saumarez's  unfortunate  remark 
to,  407 ;  at  battle  of  the  Nile, 
407-409;  410;  Baltic  league 
shattered  by,  413;  eulogizes 
Saumarez  in  House  of  Lords, 
421 ;  seamanship  of,  contrasted 
with  that  of  Pellew,  446;  anec- 
dote of,  446 ;  mentions  incident 


Index 


493 


of  Algerine  policy,  462, 463 ;  de- 
nounces Algerine  piracy,  463 ; 
Israel  Pellew  with,  at  Trafalgar, 
476. 

Nevis,  island,  394. 

Newport,  D'Estaing  enters  harbor 
of,  281. 

Nile,  battle  of,  362 ;  Admiral 
Howe's  estimate  of,  379;  credit 
due  to  Admiral  Lord  St.  Vin- 
cent for,  379,  380 ;  Saumarez 
cruises  in,  384  ;  403 ;  description 
of  battle  of,  405-408 ;  Saumarez 
wounded  at,  409. 

Nore,    threatening     mutinies    of, 

454- 

NORRIS,  Captain,  absconds  to 
avoid  trial,  37. 

Nymphe,  frigate,  Pellew  in  com- 
mand of,  447  ;  448 ;  fight  of, 
with  Cleopdtre,  448,  449. 

Orient,  ship,  Nelson's  coffin  made 

from   mainmast   of,   353 ;  blows 

up,  407. 
Orion,   ship,  Saumarez   appointed 

to   command,   400 ;    401  ;    406 ; 

409;  410. 

PALLISER,  Vice-Admiral,   accused 

of  betrayal    of    his   chief,   182 ; 

twelve  admirals  memorialize  the 

king  against,  182. 
Paris,  Rodney  settles  in,  175. 
PARKER,  Admiral,  Rodney  writes 

to,  225. 
PARKER,  Commodore   Sir    Peter, 

38S- 

Passaro,  Cape,  Battle  of,  69. 

Pegase,  ship,  331. 

PELLEW,  Admiral,  asks  for  court- 
martial  upon  a  mutiny,  367  ;  368 ; 
389 ;  428 ;  of  Norman  extrac- 
tion, 428 ;  early  orthography  of 
name,  428  ;  settlement  of  family 
in  England,  429  ;  father  of,  429; 
fearlessness  of,  at  school,  429; 


goes  afloat,  430;  sides  with  a 
companion  in  a  quarrel  and 
leaves  the  ship,  430;  intimacy 
of,  with  Captain  Pownoll,  431  ; 
brought  in  contact  with  Ameri- 
can revolution,  431 ;  at  recep- 
tion of  Burgoyne  on  ship  Blonde, 
431 ;  saves  a  sailor  from  drown- 
ing, 431 ;  exuberant  vitality  of, 
431  ;  anecdote  of  recklessness 
of,  431 ;  anecdote  of  accident  to, 
435 ;  second  officer  of  Carleton, 
437 ;  in  battle  of  Lake  Cham- 
plain,  436,  437 ;  by  loss  of  su- 
periors left  in  command,  438 ; 
gallantry  of,  in  contest,  438  ;  is 
commended  by  Douglas,  Lord 
Howe  and  the  Admiralty,  440 ; 
is  promised  promotion,  440; 
gives  chase  to  Arnold,  441 ; 
lands  at  Crown  Point,  441 ;  ac- 
companies Burgoyne,  442 ;  re- 
turns to  England,  442  ;  promoted 
to  a  lieutenancy,  442 ;  serves 
under  Capt.  Pownoll,  442  ;  lieu- 
tenant of  frigate  Apollo,  442 ; 
meets  French  frigate  Stanislas, 
442  ;  action  with,  442 ;  succeeds 
to  command  at  death  of  Pownoll, 

442  ;  grief  of,  for  death  of  Pow- 
noll, 443 ;  gains  promotion,  443 ; 
destroys  French  privateers,  443; 
wins  grade  of  post-captain,  443  ; 
in   time  of  peace  tries  farming, 

443  ;  commands  frigate  on  New- 
foundland    Station,    444 ;    per- 
sonal activity  of,  444  ;  anecdotes 
of,  444,  445 !  h's  knowledge  of 
seamanship,  446 ;  447  ;  in   com- 
mand of  Nymphe,  447 ;  at  fight 
between  Nymphe  and  Cltop&tre, 
448,    449 ;    Lord     Howe     com- 
mends,   450;    opposes     French 
privateers,  451,  452  ;  directs  res- 
cue  of   troops,  passengers,  and 
crew  of  ship  Dutton,   452-454 ; 
stationed    off    Brest,    454 ;   dis- 


494 


Index 


couraged  appointment  of  Roman 
Catholic  chaplains,  455 ;  opposes 
enfranchisement  of  Roman  Cath- 
olics, 455  ;  follows  French  expe- 
dition against  Ireland,  455,  456; 
sails  for  Falmouth,  456;  fights 
Indefatigable  and  Amazon  against 
Droits  de  FHomme,  456-458 ; 
narrow  escape  of,  from  ship- 
wreck, 458 ;  great  personal 
endurance  of,  illustrated,  459 ; 
eminent  qualities  of,  459 ;  holds 
command  in  India,  459,  460 ; 
appointed  commander-in-chief  in 
Mediterranean,  460 ;  made  a 
rear-admiral,  460 ;  assigned  to 
East  India  station,  460 ;  Medi- 
terranean command  of,  coincides 
with  Bonaparte's  falling  for- 
tunes, 461 ;  created  Baron  Ex- 
mouth,  462  ;  visits  Barbary  ports, 
462 ;  compels  release  of  slaves, 
462 ;  demands  peace  for  Sar- 
dinia, 463 ;  arranges  with  Tunis 
and  Tripoli  for  treatment  of  cap- 
tives, 463 ;  Algiers  refuses  con- 
cession to,  regarding  treatment 
of  captives,  464 ;  demands  release 
of  all  Christian  slaves  in  Algiers, 
464;  despatches  cruiser  to  Al- 
giers, 466 ;  instructions  of,  to 
Capt.  Charles  Warde,  466 ;  asks 
for  small  force  against  Algiers, 
467 ;  preparations  of,  against 
Algiers,  468 ;  sails  for  Algiers, 
468  ;  joins  Dutch  fleet  at  Gibral- 
tar, 468  ;  arrives  at  Algiers  Bay, 
468  ;  serves  demands  on  Dey  of 
Algiers,  468;  receives  no  an- 
swer, 468 ;  opens  battle,  469, 
470;  is  slightly  wounded,  473; 
receives  submission  of  Dey,  473 ; 
frees  Algerian,  Tunisian,  and 
Tripolitan  slaves,  474 ;  returns 
to  England,  474  ;  close  of  career 
of,  475  ;  later  days  of,  475,  476; 
religious  nature  of,  476 ;  death 


of,  476;  rank  of,  at  death 
476. 

PELLEW,  Israel,  bravery  of,  in 
fight  between  Nymphe  and 
Cleop&tre,  448,  449 ;  promoted 
to  post-captain,  451  ;  476. 

Penmarcks,  rocks,  458. 

PENN,  Sir  William,  his  criticism 
of  Four  Days  Battle,  12. 

PERRY,  Commander,  436. 

Peuple  Souverain,  ship,  406. 

Philadelphia,  evacuation  of,  284. 

PITT,  William,  defends  Admiral 
Byng,  105  ;  his  dislike  of  Hawke, 
106;  his  military  purpose,  no; 
proposed  series  of  descents  on 
French  coast,  no;  his  impetu- 
osity a  spur  to  laggards,  113;  his 
energy  felt  in  civil  administra- 
tion, 114;  blames  military  and 
naval  leaders,  115;  his  injustice 
meets  rebuke,  116  ;  profits  by 
Hawke's  suggestions,  117  ; 
leaves  Hawke  a  commodore, 
144 ;  succeeded  by  Lord  St. 
Vincent  in  Admiralty,  380. 

Plattsburg,  436. 

Plymouth,  ship  Dutton  driven 
ashore  at,  452. 

POCOCK,  Admiral,  164  ;  165. 

Poder,  ship,  41,  42,  43,  86. 

Point  Judith,  281. 

Pompee,  ship,  dismasted  at  Al- 
geciras,  416 ;  withdraws  under 
tow,  417;  418. 

Porcupine,  sloop-of-war,  326. 

Portland,  ship,  80. 

Port    Mahon,    surrendered,     105 ; 

156;   367- 

Porto  Rico,  244. 

Portugal,  Napoleon  designs  to 
occupy,  413;  414. 

POWNOLL,   Captain,    intimacy   of,  * 
with  Pellew,  431  ;  commands  fri- 
gate Apollo,  442  ;  death  of,  442. 

Prince,  ship,  365. 

Prince  William,  ship,  188. 


Index 


495 


QUEBEC,  432. 

Queen    Charlotte,   ship,    250,   265  ; 

3°s;  3";  3*3;  31?;  469;  470; 

472;  473- 

Quiberon  Bay,  Hawke's  disregard 
of  pilotage  difficulties  at,  114; 
Hawke's  triumph  at,  122 ; 
France  determines  to  invade 
England,  124;  location  of,  125; 
Hawke  crowds  all  sail  for,  136; 
islands  of,  cultivated  as  kitchen 
gardens,  141 ;  Howe  at,  273  ;  460. 

Ramillies,  ship,  60,  6l. 

Real,  ship,  41,  44. 

Real  Carlos,  ship,  417;  420;  re- 
markable loss  of,  420. 

Red  Sea,  403. 

Reunion,  frigate,  quits  Cherbourg, 
399  ;  meets  British  frigate  Cres- 
cent, 399 ;  action  of,  with  Cres- 
cent, 399,  400. 

Revenge,  ship,  59  ;  60  ;  62. 

Rhode  Island,  Saumarez  sent  to, 
387  ;  British  retreat  to,  387. 

Richelieu,  river,  433  ;  434. 

ROBESPIERRE,  orders  of,  to  Ad- 
miral Villaret-Joyeuse,  301. 

Rochefort,  Hawke's  expedition 
against,  in  ;  Conflans's  vessels 
escape  to,  141. 

Rochetts,  country  seat  of  Lord  St. 
Vincent,  380. 

RODNEY,  Admiral,  development  of 
naval  warfare  identified  with 
name  of,  4 ;  uplifted  the  navy,  6 ; 
before  Havre,  126;  succeeds 
Hawke,  145 ;  his  descent,  148 ; 
his  father  in  command  of  the 
royal  yacht,  148;  George  I.  his 
sponsor,  148 ;  given  the  name  of 
the  king,  148;  his  advancement, 
148;  contrasted  in  temperament 
with  Hawke,  152;  presented  at 
Court,  153;  complimented  to 
the  king,  153;  appointed  Com- 
modore, and  commander  of 


Newfoundland  station,  154;  let- 
ter to,  from  Earl  of  Sandwich, 
154,  155;  the  Earl's  confidence 
in,  1 55 ;  returns  to  England,  1 56 ; 
elected  to  Parliament,  156;  no 
connection  with  Minorca  inci- 
dent, 156,  breaks  with  tradition, 
156;  accompanies  Rochefort  ex- 
pedition under  Hawke,  157; 
commands  ship-of-the-line  under 
Boscawen,  at  Louisburg,  157; 
again  returns  to  England,  1 57 ; 
promoted  to  rear-admiral,  158; 
operates  against  Havre  and 
Brest,  158;  again  elected  to  Par- 
liament, 158;  appointed  to  Lee- 
ward Islands  station,  158;  sails 
for  his  new  post,  158;  begins 
operations  against  Martinique, 
1 58 ;  begins  hostilities  against 
Spain,  159;  receives  intelligence 
of  approach  of  Brest  fleet,  160; 
gives  pursuit,  160;  hastens  to 
succor  of  Jamaica,  160;  takes 
the  responsibility,  162,  163;  his 
bitter  disappointment,  164;  or- 
dered to  join  expedition  under 
Pocock,  164;  his  letter  to  Earl 
of  Sandwich,  164;  goes  to  Mar- 
tinique, 166;  at  fall  of  Havana, 
166 ;  active  service  in  Seven 
Years  War  terminated,  166;  re- 
turns to  England,  1763,  166; 
made  a  vice-admiral  of  the  Blue, 
and  vice-admiral  of  the  Red, 
167 ;  appointed  commander-in- 
chief  at  Jamaica,  167  ;  governor 
of  Greenwich  hospital,  167  ;  his 
report  concerning  free-ports,  169, 
170;  was  a  pronounced  Tory,  170 ; 
demands  of  governor  of  Carta- 
gena delivery  of  captured  war 
schooner  Hawke,  171 ;  disturbs 
British  ministry  by  Hawke  inci- 
dent, 172 ;  Sandwich's  caution- 
ary letter  to,  172,  173 ;  his  act 
justified  by  government,  174;. 


496 


Index 


Sandwich  reassures  him,  174; 
his  hopes  for  a  colonial  appoint- 
ment, 174;  Jamaica  his  first 
choice,  174;  Sandwich's  renewed 
assurances,  175;  is  superseded, 
175;  has  permission  to  remain  at 
Jamaica,  175;  lands  in  England, 
175;  lacked  influence  to  obtain 
preferment,  175  ;  settles  in  Paris, 
175;  becomes  pecuniarily  in- 
volved, 175;  applies  to  Admir- 
alty for  employment,  176;  his 
application  disregarded,  176  ;  ad- 
miral of  white  squadron,  177; 
declaration  of  Sandwich  con- 
cerning, in  House  of  Lords,  178 ; 
Richard  Cumberland's  remark 
concerning,  178 ;  detained  in 
France  by  creditors,  179;  Lady 
Rodney's  efforts  to  release,  179; 
Marechal  Biron  makes  advance 
to,  179 ;  demands  of  creditors  of, 
satisfied,  179,  180;  repays  Biron, 
180;  returns  to  England,  180; 
appointed  to  command  Leeward 
Islands  station,  185;  analysis  of 
his  powers  in  1782,  186;  Sand- 
wich urges  him  to  sea  with  all 
despatch,  187  ;  sails  from  Plym- 
outh, 187 ;  captures  a  Spanish 
convoy,  188 ;  sights  Spanish 
fleet,  off  Cape  St.  Vincent,  188; 
is  congratulated  by  Sandwich, 
190;  letter  of  latter  to,  191  ;  let- 
ter to,  from  Lady  Rodney,  191  ; 
his  reply,  192  ;  his  report  of  bat- 
tle, 192;  Sandwich's  letter  to, 
193  ;  England's  joy  over  achieve- 
ment of,  193 ;  reaches  St.  Lucia, 
194;  place  of,  among  naval  chiefs, 
196;  follows  De  Guichen's  sail- 
ing from  Martinique,  197 ;  over- 
takes French  fleet,  197;  attacks 
the  enemy,  198 ;  criticises  mis- 
conduct of  his  officers,  204 ;  his 
stern  discipline,  206,  207  ;  makes 
suggestions  to  the  Admiralty, 


209 ;  sails  for  North  American 
coast,  21 1  ;  anchors  off  Sandy 
Hook,  211;  his  coming  a  grievous 
blow  to  Washington,  211;  dis- 
claims intention  of  offending 
Arbuthnot,  213;  lands  at  New 
York,  214;  returns  to  West  In- 
dies, 216;  destruction  of  Lan- 
gara's  fleet  by,  216;  reaches 
Barbados,  217;  vessels  lost  in 
hurricane,  217  ;  ordered  to  pro- 
ceed against  Dutch  shipping, 
217;  captures  St.  Eustatius 
island,  218;  captures  Dutch  fleet 
of  merchant  ships,  218;  author 
criticises  hampering  of  Hood, 
222;  writes  to  Admiral  Parker, 
225;  is  advised  of  approach  of 
French  fleet,  225,  226 ;  devotes 
himself  to  supervision  of  St. 
Eustatius  island,  226;  his  error, 
227 ;  sends  small  force  against 
De  Grasse,  229;  forced  to  retire, 
230;  his  return  to  England,  232; 
again  afloat,  232 ;  sails  for  his 
station,  232  ;  reaches  Barbados, 
234 ;  learns  of  capitulation  of  St. 
Kitts,  235 ;  takes  united  fleet  to 
Santa  Lucia,  235 ;  is  assailed  in 
Parliament,  235  ;  follows  French 
fleet  from  Martinique,  236; 
pushes  reinforcements  to  Hood, 
237 ;  battle  with  De  Grasse,  238- 
242 ;  his  victory,  242 ;  moves 
toward  Jamaica,  243  ;  is  criticised 
for  lethargic  action,  by  Hood, 
244;  his  defence,  244,  245;  anal- 
ysis of  character  as  shown  in 
battle  with  De  Grasse,  248,  249, 
250  ;  his  professional  career 
ends,  251  ;  is  superseded,  251  ; 
succeeded  by  Pigot,  251 ;  leaves 
Jamaica  and  lands  at  Bristol,  251; 
Hood's  comment  on,  252 ;  re- 
ceives thanks  of  Parliament,  252; 
advanced  to  the  peerage,  252 ;  is 
voted  a  pension,  252;  his  other 


Index 


497 


honors,  253 ;  made  vice-admiral 
of  Great  Britain,  253 ;  his  troub- 
lous later  years,  253 ;  death  of, 
253  ;  in  accord  with  Lord  Sand- 
wich, 287. 

RODNEY,  Lady,  goes  to  England 
to  obtain  pecuniary  relief  for 
husband,  179;  her  letter  to  hus- 
band concerning  victory  off  Cape 
St.  Vincent,  191,  192. 

ROOKE,  Admiral,  his  movements 
off  Malaga,  1 5. 

ROWLEY,  Rear-Admiral,  off  Tou- 
lon, 21,28;  compliments  Hawke, 
84. 

Royal,  Fort,  235. 

Royal  George,  ship,    140;   loss  of, 

29° ;  393- 

Royal  Savage,  schooner,  438. 
Russell,  ship,  Saumarez  appointed 

to  command,  395  ;  396. 
Russia,  Sweden  at  war  with,  421 ; 

breach  of,  with  Napoleon,  422  ; 

fleet  of,  takes  refuge  in  Gulf  of 

Finland,  425. 
Russia,  Czar  of,  421. 

St.  Antoine,  ship,  420. 

St.  Christopher,  island,  394. 

St.  Eustatius,  island,  captured  by 
Rodney,  217,  218;  recaptured  by 
French,  233;  Rodney  assailed  in 
Parliament  for  acts  at,  235. 

St.  George,  ship,  351 ;  two  seamen 
of,  condemned  for  infamous 
crime,  360 ;  outburst  of  crew  of, 
360;  execution  of  seamen  of,  361. 

St.  Johns  (Canada) ;  434,  435  ; 
437- 

St.  Kitts,  163;  165;  228;  is  be- 
sieged by  French,  234;  capitu- 
lates, 235. 

St.  Lawrence,  river,  433  ;  434. 

St.  Vincent,  Cape,  captured  by 
British,  159;  Spanish  fleet 
sighted  by  Rodney,  off,  188 ; 
battle  off,  190 ;  victory  of  Jervis 


at.  345  ;  353 ;  355  '•>  Jervis's  battle 
off,  352-357  ;  Saumarez  at  battle 
off,  400. 

ST.  VINCENT,  Earl,  declines  a  com- 
mand, 286;  denounces  ministry 
to  George  III.,  287 ;  Admiral 
Jervis  created,  356;  359;  360; 
361 ;  362 ;  364 ;  367 ;  368  ;  370 ; 
372;  373.'  374;  375J  376;  377J 
379  !  380  ;  381  ;  401 ;  assumes 
command  Channel  fleet,  411  ; 
complimentary  note  of,  to  Sau- 
marez, 411,  412;  his  praise  of 
Saumarez,  412,  413;  recognizes 
ability  of  Pellew,  460,  see  also 
Jervis. 

SAINTE-ANDRE,  Jean  Bon,  312. 

SANDWICH,  Earl  of,  letter  from,  to 
Rodney,  154, 155;  his  confidence 
in  Rodney,  155;  his  cautionary 
letter  to  Rodney,  172,  173  ;  dis- 
regards Rodney's  application  for 
employment,  176;  his  remark 
concerning  Rodney  in  House  of 
Lords,  178 ;  urges  Rodney  to 
sea  with  all  despatch,  187  ;  con- 
gratulates Rodney,  190;  private 
letter  from,  to  Rodney,  193; 
character  of,  285,  286. 

Sandy  Hook,  Rodney  anchors  off, 
211. 

San  Fiorenzo  Bay,  333 ;  348. 

San  Josef ,  ship,  355. 

San  Nicolas,  ship,  355. 

Santa  Lucia,  island,  captured  by 
British,  159;  228;  French  pro- 
ceed against,  229;  failure  of 
attack  on,  229;  Rodney  takes 
united  fleet  to,  235  ;  245  ;  248. 

Santo  Domingo,  244. 

Saratoga,  276;  441;  442. 

Sardinia,  Lord  Exmouth  demands 
peace  for,  463. 

SAUMAREZ,  Admiral,  382;  birth  of, 
383 ;  his  mastery  of  French  lan- 
guage, 383 ;  lineage  of,  383  ;  con- 
trasted with  Nelson,  383  ;  early 


498 


Index 


taste  of,  for  navy,  383 ;  begins 
career  at  early  age,  383, 384 ;  goes 
afloat  at  thirteen,  384;  cruises 
in  Mediterranean,  384 ;  follows 
Nelson  in  pursuit  of  Bonaparte's 
fleet,  384 ;  return  of,  to  England, 
384;  examined  for  promotion  to 
lieutenancy,  384 ;  appointed  Mas- 
ter's Mate,  384;  owes  advance- 
ment to  Admiral  Keppel,  384, 
385 ;  sails  in  squadron  com- 
manded by  Commodore  Sir 
Peter  Parker,  385  ;  offered  com- 
mission by  Lord  Cornwallis,  385  ; 
meeting  of,  with  Cornwallis 
subsequently,  385;  arrives  off 
Charleston,  386;  aids  in  attack 
on  Fort  Moultrie,  386 ;  courage 
of,  in  action,  387 ;  promotion  of, 
to  lieutenancy,  387  ;  in  command 
of  a  galley,  387 ;  is  sent  to  Rhode 
Island,  387 ;  stationed  at  Sea- 
komet,  388  ;  returns  to  England, 
388  ;  his  lot  thrown  with  line-of- 
battle  force,  388,  389 ;  in  action 
with  Dutch  off  Dogger  Bank, 
391,  392 ;  again  promoted,  392  ; 
made  commander  of  Tisiphone, 
392 ;  on  the  tide  which  leads  to 
fortune,  393 ;  reaches  Barbados, 
394  ;  joins  fleet,  394;  encounters 
French  fleet  under  De  Grasse, 
394 ;  effects  brilliant  manoeuvre, 
394;  ordered  to  England,  395; 
Hood  substitutes  another  officer, 
395 ;  appointed  to  command 
Russell,  495  ;  an  acting  post-cap- 
tain, 395;  bravery  of,  in  Rod- 
ney's renowned  battle,  395,  396 ; 
engages  De  Grasse's  flagship, 
396;  brilliant  manoeuvre  of, 

396  ;    promoted   and  returns  to 
England,     397 ;    in     retirement, 

397  ;   marries,  398  ;    makes   trip 
to  France,  398 ;   at  beginning  of 
work  on  Cherbourg  breakwater, 
398;    receives    attention    from 


Louis  XVI.,  398;  appointed  to 
command  Crescent,  399;  inter- 
cepts French  frigate  Reunion, 
399 ;  analysis  of  action  between 
Crescent  and  Reunion,  399;  is 
knighted  for  victory,  400 ;  ap- 
pointed to  ship-of-the-line  Orion, 
400 ;  captures  three  French 
ships,  400;  at  battle  off  Cape 
St.  Vincent,  400;  blockades 
Cadiz,  400 ;  operates  off  Toulon, 
400;  inferior  to  Trowbridge  in 
eyes  of  St.  Vincent  and  Nel- 
son, 401 ;  given  equal  command 
with  Trowbridge,  402 ;  his  at- 
tack upon  French  fleet  before 
Toulon,  402;  as  a  letter  writer, 
402 ;  his  record  of  pursuit  of 
French  fleet,  402 ;  favors  seeking 
enemy  off  coast  of  Egypt,  404 ; 
reaches  Alexandria,  404 ;  returns 
westward,  404 ;  again  sights 
Alexandria,  404 ;  despondency 
of,  405 ;  learns  of  proximity  of 
enemy  in  Aboukir  Bay,  405; 
share  of,  in  battle  of  the  Nile, 
405;  wounded,  407,  409;  unfor- 
tunate remark  of,  to  Nelson, 
407,  408 ;  losses  of,  at  battle  of 
Nile,  409 ;  convoys  prizes  to 
Gibraltar,  409;  ordered  to  home 
station,  409;  impatient  at  delays, 
410;  reaches  England,  410;  ap- 
pointed to  command  the  Casar, 
410  ;  at  blockade  of  Brest,  41 1  ; 
St.  Vincent's  flattering  note  to, 
411,412;  importance  of  situation 
of,  off  Brest,  412  ;  St.  Vincent's 
praise  of,  412,  413;  Napoleon 
threatens  flank  of,  414;  given 
command  of  a  squadron,  414; 
now  a  rear-admiral,  414;  ordered 
to  blockade  Cadiz,  414  ;  sails  on 
his  mission,  415;  arrives  off 
Cadiz,  415;  learns  of  French 
vessels  at  Algeciras,  415;  starts 
for  Algeciras,  415;  finds  French 


Index 


499 


fleet  moored  at,  415;  steers  to 
engage  French,  415;  failure  of 
wind  interferes  with  plans  of, 
415;  disaster  to  two  ships  of, 
416;  withdraws  to  Gibraltar, 
416;  failure  of,  416;  confident 
despatch  of,  to  Admiralty,  417 ; 
fresh  opportunity  of,  417  ;  learns 
of  approach  of  Spanish  fleet, 
417,  418 ;  sails  in  pursuit  of 
Spaniards,  418;  gives  battle  off 
Algeciras,  420 ;  St.  Vincent's 
praise  of,  421 ;  St.  Vincent  eulo- 
gizes, in  House  of  Lords,  421 ; 
eulogized  by  Nelson,  in  House 
of  Lords,  421  ;  never  again  en- 
gaged in  serious  encounter  with 
enemy,  421 ;  commander-in-chief 
at  Channel  Islands,  421 ;  insures 
Swedish  neutrality,  422 ;  main- 
tains importance  of  Baltic,  421 ; 
disturbs  commerce  between 
nations  on  the  Baltic,  controlled 
by  Napoleon,  422 ;  succeeds  to 
diplomatic  situation,  424 ;  suc- 
cess of,  425;  praise  of,  by  Swed- 
ish statesman,  425;  follows  Rus- 
sian fleet  in  Gulf  of  Finland, 
426;  retires  from  service,  427; 
later  life  at  Guernsey,  427 ;  re- 
ceives peerage  from  William  IV., 
427  ;  death  of,  427 ;  476;  477. 

SAUMAREZ,  Lord  de,  427. 

SAUMAREZ,  Philip,  385. 

SAUNDERS,  Captain,  his  conduct  in 
battle  off  La  Rochelle,  92. 

SAUNDERS,  Sir  Charles,  associated 
with  Jervis,  325  ;  328. 

SCHANK,  Admiral,  435. 

SCHUYLER,  General,  442. 

Scilly,  Howe  encounters  allied 
fleet  off,  288. 

Serieuse,  frigate,  406. 

Seven  Years  War,  contrasted  with 
American  revolution,  102  ;  result 
of,  in  North  America  and  India, 
102 ;  finds  Rodney  a  captain, 


156;  Rodney's  career  in,  termi- 
nated, 166;  Howe's  part  in,  260. 

Siberia  (on  French  coast),  411. 

Sicily,  403 ;  404. 

Smuggling,  in  West  Indies,  168, 
169. 

Sorel,  town  of,  433. 

South  African  war,  contrasted 
with  American  revolution,  101. 

Spain,  refuses  to  surrender  British 
supply  vessel  captured  by  the 
French,  106 ;  Great  Britain  be- 
gins hostilities  against,  159;  in- 
creases custom-house  force  in 
West  Indies,  169 ;  seeks  a 
quarrel  with  Great  Britain, 
171  ;  embittered  by  loss  of 
Havana  and  Manila,  171  ;  near 
verge  of  rupture  with  Great 
Britain,  over  Falkland  Islands 
incident,  172;  declares  war,  185; 
fleet  of,  enters  English  Channel, 
185  ;  navy  of,  concentrated  at 
Cadiz,  414. 

Spanish  colonies,  in  West  Indies, 
their  geographical  relation  to 
Jamaica,  168;  smuggling  in,  168. 

Stamp  Act,  discontent  over,  in 
American  colonies,  172. 

Stanislas,  frigate,  442  ;  goes 
aground  off  Belgian  coast,  442, 

443- 

STEWART,  Colonel,  446. 

Superb,  ship,  417  ;  419;  420. 

Sweden,  British  fleet  supports, 
421  ;  424;  forced  by  Napoleon 
to  declaration  of  war,  424. 

TAGUS,  river,  351. 

TERNAY,  Admiral,  212;  214. 

Terrible,  ship,  91. 

T/ie'se'e,  ship,  140. 

Ticonderoga,  433 ;  441  ;  442. 

Tilsit,  agreements  at,  421. 

TIPPOO  SAIB,  403. 

Tisiphone,  ship,  392  ;  393 ;  395. 

Tobago,   attack   on,   229 ;    Drake 


500 


Index 


meets  De  Grasse,  off,  230 ;  sur- 
renders to  De  Grasse,  230. 

Tormanl,  ship,  90,  91. 

Torbay,  British  fleet  leaves,  128. 

Toulon,  Admiral  Mathews  off,  5, 
20  j  engagement  off,  21,  22  ;  de- 
scription of  action  off,  30,  31 ; 
movements  of  fleet  criticised, 
33,  345  346;  348;  Saumarez 
operates  off,  400 ;  403 ;  414 ;  415. 

TOURVILLE,  characterization  of, 
13  ;  his  death,  14. 

Trafalgar,  422  ;  461  ;  476. 

Transvaal,  war  in,  some  lessons 
from,  18. 

Trident,  ship,  60,  61,  64,  91. 

Tripoli,  agrees  to  treat  captives  as 
civilized  countries,  463 ;  releases 
Christian  slaves,  474. 

TROUBRIDGE,  Captain,  353  ;  gal- 
lantry of,  at  battle  off  Cape  St. 
Vincent,  353  ;  355  ;  401  ;  402. 

Tunis,  agrees  to  treat  captives  as 
civilized  countries,  463 ;  delivers 
up  Christian  slaves,  474. 

Turkey,  troops  of,  slaughter  coral 
fishermen  on  Algerine  coast,  464. 

UNITED  STATES,  Navy  of,  see  Navy 

of  United  States. 
Ushant,  island,  Howe  encounters 

French  fleet  off,  302 ;  Jervis  in 

battle  off,  331. 

VALCOUR  Island,  436 ;  437. 

Vengeur,  ship,3i4  ;  31 5;  loss  of,  316. 

Victory,  ship,  293  ;  354. 

Vilaine,  river,  141,  143. 

ViLLARET-JoYEUSE  Admiral,  or- 
ders of  Robespierre  to,  301 ;  en- 
counters fleet  under  Howe,  302  ; 
306;  attacked  by  Howe  in  force, 
310;  record  of,  312. 
Ville  de  Paris,  flagship  of  De 
Grasse,  collides  with  Zelf,  238 ; 
strikes  her  flag,242j  363;  369;  373. 


WALPOLE,  on  the  Colonies,  101. 

WARDE,  Captain  Charles,  instruc- 
tions of  Lord  Exmouth  to,  466  ; 
examines  defences  and  sound- 
ings in  port  of  Algiers,  466. 

WASHINGTON,  George,  Rodney's 
coming  to  American  coast  a 
grievous  blow  to,  211 ;  214;  con- 
cerning letter  of  Howe  to,  276  ; 
279 ;  comment  of,  on  arrival  of 
D'Estaing,  280;  letter  of,  con- 
cerning movement  against  Rhode 
Island,  282. 

West  Indies,  smuggling  in,  168; 
Arbuthnot  ordered  to  send  ships 
to,  210  ;  conditions  in,  1780,  210 
Rodney  returns  to,  216;  392; 

393- 

WHITE,  sailing-master,  com- 
mended by  Jervis,  342,  343. 

WHITSHED,  Admiral  Sir  James, 
266 ;  his  anecdote  of  Lord  Gard- 
ner, 266. 

WILLIAM  III.,  King  of  England, 
grantor  of  peerage  to  grandfather 
of  Lord  Howe,  256. 

WILLIAM  IV.,  King  of  England, 
a  midshipman  at  taking  of  Span- 
ish convoy,  188 ;  confers  a 
peerage  on  Admiral  Saumarez, 
427. 

WOLFE,  General,  Howe's  friend- 
ship with,  262;  intimacy  of,  with 
Admiral  Jervis,  325,  326;  anec- 
dote concerning,  326;  message 
of,  by  Jervis,  to  Miss  Lowther, 
326. 

YORK,  Duke  of,  received  on  ship- 
board by  Howe,  263;  holds  re- 
ception, 263,  264. 

Yorktown,  393. 

Zealous,  ship,  350. 
Zeli,  ship,  238 ;  collides  with  flag- 
ship Ville  de  Paris,  238. 


CAPTAIN     MAHAN'S     LIFE     OF     NELSON 

NEW    POPULAR  .EDITION 
COMPLETE    IN    ONE  VOLUME 


THE   LIFE   OF    NELSON.     The   Em- 
bodiment  of  the  Sea  Power  of  Great 

Britain.  By  CAPT.  A.  T.  MAHAN.  With  12  portraits 
and  plates  in  half-tone  and  a  photogravure  frontispiece. 
Crown  8vo.  Cloth.  750  pages.  $3.00. 

It  is  not  astonishing  that  this  standard  life  is  already  passing  into 
a  new  edition.  It  has  simply  displaced  all  its  predecessors  except 
one,  that  of  Southey,  which  is  the  vade-mecum  of  British  patriotism, 
a  stimulant  of  British  loyalty,  literature  of  high  quality,  but  in  no 
sense  a  serious  historical  or  psychological  study.  .  .  .  The  reader 
will  find  in  this  book  three  things  :  an  unbroken  series  of  verified 
historical  facts  related  in  minute  detail  ;  a  complete  picture  of  the 
hero,  with  every  virtue  justly  estimated  but  with  no  palliation  of 
weakness  or  fault  ;  and  lastly  a  triumphant  vindication  of  a  thesis 
novel  and  startling  to  most,  that  the  earth's  barriers  are  continental, 
its  easy  and  defensible  highways  those  of  the  trackless  ocean.  .  .  . 
Captain  Mahan  has  revealed  the  modern  world  to  itself.  —  American 
Historical  Re-view,  July,  1899. 

Captain  Mahan' s  masterly  life  of  Nelson  has  already  taken  its  place 
as  the  final  book  on  the  subject.  — Mail  and  Express,  New  York. 

One  never  tires  of  reading  or  reflecting  upon  the  marvellous 
career  of  Horatio  Nelson,  the  greatest  sea  captain  the  world  has 
known.  Captain  Mahan  has  written  the  best  biography  of  Lord 
Nelson  that  has  yet  been  given  to  the  world.  —  Chicago  Evening 
Post. 

His  biography  is  not  merely  the  best  life  of  Nelson  that  has  ever 
been  written,  but  it  is  also  perfect,  and  a  model  among  all  the 
biographies  of  the  world.  —  Pall  Mall  Gazette. 


LITTLE,  BROWN,   &   COMPANY,  Publishers 
254  Washington  Street,  Boston 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER 
UPON   HISTORY,  1660-1783.    By  CAPT. 

A.  T.  MAHAN.      With  25  charts  illustrative  of  great  naval 
battles.      8vo.     Cloth,  gilt  top.      $4.00. 

Captain  Mahan  has  been  recognized  by  all  competent  judges,  not 
merely  as  the  most  distinguished  living  writer  on  naval  strategy,  but 
as  the  originator  and  first  exponent  of  what  may  be  called  the 
philosophy  of  naval  history.  —  London  Times. 

No  book  of  recent  publication  has  been  received  with  such  en- 
thusiasm of  grateful  admiration  as  that  written  by  an  officer  of  the 
American  Navy,  Captain  Mahan,  upon  Sea  Power  and  Naval 
Achievements.  It  simply  supplants  all  other  books  on  the  subject, 
and  takes  its  place  in  our  libraries  as  the  standard  work.  —  DEAN 
HOLE,  in  "  More  Memories.'"'' 

An  altogether  exceptional  work  ;  there  is  nothing  like  it  in  the 
whole  range  of  naval  literature.  .  .  .  The  work  is  entirely  original 
in  conception,  masterful  in  construction,  and  scholarly  in  execution. 
—  The  Critic. 

Captain  Mahan,  whose  name  is  famous  all  the  world  over  as  that 
of  the  author  of  "The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History,"  a 
work,  or  rather  a  series  of  works,  which  may  fairly  be  said  to  have 
codified  the  laws  of  naval  strategy.  —  The  Westminster  Gazette. 

An  instructive  work  of  the  highest  value  and  interest  to  students 
and  to  the  reading  public,  and  should  find  its  way  into  all  the  libra 
ries  and  homes  of  the  land.  —  Magazine  of  American  History. 

A  book  that  must  be  read.  First,  it  must  be  read  by  all  school- 
masters, from  the  head-master  of  Eton  to  the  head  of  the  humblest 
board-school  in  the  country.  No  man  is  fit  to  train  English  boys 
to  fulfil  their  duties  as  Englishmen  who  has  not  marked,  learned, 
and  inwardly  digested  it.  Secondly,  it  must  be  read  by  every 
Englishman  and  Englishwoman  who  wishes  to  be  worthy  of  that 
name.  It  is  no  hard  or  irksome  task  to  which  I  call  them.  The 
writing  is  throughout  clear,  vigorous,  and  incisive.  .  .  .  The  book 
deserves  and  must  attain  a  world-wide  reputation. — COLONEL 
MAURICE,  of  the  British  Army,  in  the  "  United  Service  Magazine." 


LITTLE,  BROWN,  &   COMPANY,  Publishers 

254  Washington  Street,  Boston 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SEA  POWER 
upon  the  French  Revolution  and  Em- 
pire. By  CAPT.  A.  T.  MAHAN.  With  13  maps  and 
battle  plans.  2  vols.  8vo.  Cloth,  gilt  top.  $6.00. 

A  highly  interesting  and  an  important  work,  having  lessons  and 
suggestions  which  are  calculated  to  be  of  high  value  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States.  His  pages  abound  with  spirited  and  careful 
accounts  of  the  great  naval  battles  and  manoeuvres  which  occurred 
during  the  period  treated.  —  New  York  Tribune. 

Captain  Mahan  has  done  more  than  to  write  a  new  book  upon 
naval  history.  He  has  even  done  more  than  to  write  the  best  book 
that  has  ever  been  written  upon  naval  history,  though  he  has  done 
this  likewise  5  for  he  has  written  a  book  which  may  be  regarded 
as  founding  a  new  school  of  naval  historical  writing.  Captain 
Mahan' s  volumes  are  already  accepted  as  the  standard  authorities  of 
their  kind,  not  only  here,  but  in  England  and  in  Europe  generally. 
It  should  be  a  matter  of  pride  to  all  Americans  that  an  officer  of 
our  own  navy  should  have  written  such  books.  — THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT,  in  "  Political  Science  Quarterly." 


THE    LIFE    OF   NELSON:   The  Em- 
bodiment of  the  Sea  Power  of   Great 

Britain.  By  CAPT.  A.  T.  MAHAN.  With  19  por- 
traits and  plates  in  photogravure  and  21  maps  and  battle 
plans.  2  vols.  8vo.  Cloth,  gilt  top.  £8.00. 

Captain  Mahan' s  work  will  become  one  of  the  greatest  naval 
classics.  —  London  Times. 

The  greatest  literary  achievement  of  the  author  of  "  The  In- 
fluence of  Sea  Power  upon  History."  Never  before  have  charm  of 
style,  perfect  professional  knowledge,  the  insight  and  balanced 
judgment  of  a  great  historian,  and  deep  admiration  for  the  hero 
been  blended  in  any  biography  of  Nelson.  —  London  Standard. 


LITTLE,  BROWN,   &   COMPANY,  Publishers 
254  Washington  Street,  Boston 


THE   PROBLEM    OF   ASIA   and   its 
Effect  upon  International  Policies. 

By  A.  T.  MAHAN,  D.C.L.,  LL.D.,  Capt.  United 
States  Navy,  author  of  "  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power 
upon  History,"  "Types  of  Naval  Officers,"  "The 
Life  of  Nelson,"  etc.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth,  gilt  top, 
$2.00. 

Contents:  I.  The  Problem  of  Alia.  II.  Effect  of  Asiatic  Con- 
ditions upon  World  Policies.  III.  Merits  of  the  Transvaal  Dispute. 

Captain  Mahan  hai  (cored  another  distinct  success.  ...     A  strong  book, 

fascinating  In  its  Interest  and  invaluable  as  a  philosophical  statement  of  the 

greatest  International  problem  the  world  has  faced  for  many  a  year. —  St. 

Paul  Pitnur  Prui. 

Capt.  Mahan  is  a  writer  of  great  influence,  and  his  influence  Is  not  likely 

to  wane  while  he  continues  to  write  such  books  as  this.  —  Mail  and  Kxfrtn, 

N.  r. 

A  volume  which  every  thoughtful  American  may  well  read  and  ponder. — 

Btiton  Journal. 

LESSONS  OF  THE  WAR   WITH 

SPAIN,  and  other  Articles. 

By  Capt.  A.  T.  MAHAN,  author  of  "The  Influence 
of  Sea  Power  upon  History,"  etc.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth, 
gilt  top,  52.00. 

Contents:  Letsons  of  the  War  with  Spain,  1898;  The  Peace 
Conference  and  the  Moral  Aspect  of  the  War;  The  Relations  of 
the  United  States  to  their  New  Dependencies;  Distinguishing 
Qualities  of  Ships  of  War;  Current  Fallacies  upon  Naval  Subjects. 

THE  INTEREST  OF  AMERICA  IN 
SEA  POWER,  Present  and  Future. 

By  Capt.  A.  T.  MAHAN.  With  two  maps  showing 
strategic  points.  Crown  8vo.  Cloth,  gilt  top,  $ 2.00. 

Contents:  I.  The  United  States  Looking  Outward.  II.  Hawaii 
and  our  Sea  Power.  III.  The  Isthmus  and  our  Sea  Power. 
IV.  Anglo-American  Alliance.  V.  The  Future  in  Relation  to 
American  Naval  Power.  VI.  Preparedness  for  Naval  War.  VII. 
A  Twentieth-Century  Outlook.  VIII.  Strategic  Features  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea. 

LITTLE,    BROWN,   AND    COMPANY, 

Publishers,  254  WASHINGTON  ST.,  BOSTON,  MASS. 


University  of  California 

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